The International Dimension of the SPD and the PCI: Europe, the Cold War and Detente by Freyberg, Stefanie
Stefanie Freyberg 
Department of History, Queen Mary, University of London 
Degree: PhD 
The International Dimension of the SPD and 
the PCI: 
Europe, the Cold War and Detente 
Abstract 
This thesis compares the foreign policy course undertaken by the German Social Democratic 
Party (SPD) and the Italian Communist Party (PC I) in the 1960s and 1970s. The thesis 
analyses where the foreign policy of the two parties converges and diverges, especially with 
regard to international detente, security policies, the Eastern bloc and European integration. 
The choice of a broad time frame is justified by the diverse timing and junctures of the SPD's 
and the PCI's revisionist course. 
Departing from the assumption that both SPD and PCI were characterised by their national 
roots and ambitions, the thesis seeks to arrive at party overlapping trends and conclusions as 
to how political parties address and overcome national and international constraints in spite of 
ideological divergences. 
One aim of the comparison is to examine policy revisionism and analyse its ongIns and 
motivations. Revisionism has its origins in a number of interrelated factors which are often 
not mutually exclusive. Policy shifts are every so often caused by ideological reconsiderations 
or a rethinking of, and adaptation to political, economic and social circumstances. The 
comparative method allows one to make general assumptions and draw parallels about the 
origins of revisionism, and relate them, where possible, to wider sections of the Western 
European Left. This process which occurred in the wider context of de-ideologisation was not 
distinctive to Italian communism or German social democracy but can be observed by 
examining Western European parties of the Left in general. 
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I ntrod uction 
This thesis compares the foreign policy course undertaken by the German Social Democratic 
Party (SPD) and the Italian Communist Party (pel) in the 1960s and 1970s. The thesis 
analyses where the foreign policy of the two parties converges and diverges, especially with 
regard to international detente, security policies, the Eastern bloc and European integration. 
The methodological approach chosen here needs some explanation and justification. 
Historical comparisons are characterised by the fact that they analyse systematically the 
similarities and differences of two or more historical phenomena. The analysis is then used as 
a basis to arrive at more general statements and assumptions about historical experiences, 
processes and structures.} 
The SPD and the PCI have been chosen, firstly, for the fact that they were the two largest 
parties of the left operating in pluralist democracies during the Cold War, in terms of 
adherence figures and votes. The comparative analysis produces considerable similarities of 
the issues which the two political forces addressed. After the Second World War, Germany's 
and Italy's foreign policy became firmly imbedded in the West as a prerequisite to regain 
some of their lost national sovereignty. As a result of the countries' most recent history, 
neither could hope to initiate a truly independent national foreign policy. Military adherence 
to the Atlantic Alliance and economic integration with the West thus became paramount in 
regaining a minimal say in international affairs. The emerging Cold War and deteriorating 
East-West relations had a profound impact on Germany geographically, and hence could only 
but affect all national political players. In Italy, the Cold War clearly exacerbated domestic 
I For the pros and cons of the comparative method in international history, see Heinz-Gerhard Haupt and liirgen 
KncLI. 'Historischer Vergieich: Methoden, Aufgaben, Probleme. Eine Einleitung', in Heinz-Gerhard Haupt and 
liirgen Kpcka (eds), Geschichte ztnd \'ergleich. Ansiit;:.e lllld Ergebnisse internationaler vergleichellder 
Gl'schicl1tsschreibzmg (Frankfurt. New York: Campus Verlag, 1996), pp. 9-39. 
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contrasts and confrontations on the already heterogeneous domestic scenery. The emerging 
Cold War drastically altered the domestic scene within which both political forces operated. 
and determined their choices considerably until the end of superpower hostilities at the 
beginning of the 1990s. 
A comparability of two or more phenomena is justified primarily by the mam research 
questions. Besides that, the objects of comparison need to share a minimum of commonality 
and comparing always also means examining the differences. 2 The comparative approach here 
is justified through the underlying relevance of the thesis' research questions and working 
hypothesis: it is precisely the differences in nature and ideology of the two political parties 
that allow me to arrive at more general assumptions about the origins of policy revisionism 
and re-thinking, in spite of ideological motivations. Hence, the comparison of the two, in 
many ways undoubtedly diverse political forces, provides fertile terrain for more general 
statements and conclusions on parties' revisionism and policy choices. 
A second reason behind the choice of the cases is their common desire to become people's 
parties. In this context, I seek to examine the similarity of problems faced, the constraints of 
political power as well as the demands of electoral politics, which the two parties had faced 
since 1945 and relate them to foreign policy choices and shifts. Both parties acquired the 
features of government-oriented, pragmatic parties of the Left, though in part at diverse stages 
and to a varied extent. This, in practice, entailed that the SPD's and the PCl's policy shifts 
were considerably motivated by greater pragmatism and consensus-seeking policies 
encouraged by a pronounced electoral orientation. Of course, it is a commonality of virtually 
all political parties that they continue to respond overwhelmingly to national electorates but 
also, in systems of proportional representation, to the requirement of forming coalitions and 
1 Ib"d '1'i 
- 1". p" ~. " 
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more often than not in response to their political opponents on the domestic political scene. In 
systems of proportional representation, political parties so often do not 'win' elections on 
their own terms. Their entry into government is often accomplished because they secure the 
support of a coalition partner. At least as far as Western democracies are concerned, one 
should bear in mind that political parties are constantly struggling to enhance their own 
distinctive 'profile' whilst seeking coalition partners and securing their own parliamentary 
survival. The patterns of the approaching and dealing with the demands of parliamentary 
competition, electoral interests, national constraints and international obligations run like a 
red thread throughout this study. Admittedly, it is impossible to deny that the overall 
historical development of the SPD and the PCI was also characterised by fundamental 
differences. For example, despite its remarkable strength and size, the PCI never managed to 
re-enter government after its expulsion in 1947. However, one cannot deny that the PCI's 
approaching and dealing with the challenges of the parliamentary system and the attempt to 
come to power bear some remarkable resemblance to the development of the SPD. 
In many ways, a companson between the PCI and its French counterpart, the French 
Communist Party (PCF), would have been the more obvious choice; or analogously, a 
comparative analysis of the SPD and the Italian Socialists' revisionism from the mid-1950s.3 
With respect to the former, a vast amount of literature exists already, generally arguing that 
the PCI was a more reform-oriented, pragmatic party of the Western European Left in direct 
3 As far as the post-war period is concerned, the SPD and the Italian Socialists (PSI) are dealt with in comparison 
only in broader studies on the Western European Left. See, for example, Stephen Padgett and William E. 
Paterson, A History of Social Democra(\' in Postwar Europe (London and New York: Longman, 1991); Herbert 
Kitschelt. The Transformation of European Social Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1994): 
William E. Paterson and Alastair H. Thomas, Social democratic parties in Western Europe (New York: St. 
Martin's Press, 1997). For the pre-war period see Katharina Keller, Modell SPD? Italienische So:jalistell WId 
delltschc So;ialdenwkratie his ;./(m ersten Weltkrieg (Bonn: Verlag 1.H.W. Dietz NachL 1994). 
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comparison with its French counterpart.4 Despite periods of rudimentary re-thinking, the PCF 
fundamentally remained a pro-Stalinist, dogmatic Western European communist party, which 
maintained throughout the Cold War a very high degree of loyalty to the world communist 
movement. The events of 1968 marked a crucial juncture in the PCI's internationalism. as 
entailed in the party's foreign policy perception. 1968 and its aftermath presented a decisive 
step for the PCI to further its previous, theoretically elaborated changes (as entailed in the 
notion of 'polycentrism') of its internationalism and give them a more concrete context.5 
It can be assumed that, during the Cold War, the ties which the PCI maintained with Moscow 
affected the party's domestic position. In the aftermath of the Second World War, the Soviet 
myth and prestige as victorious power and liberator of Nazi Germany had contributed 
enormously to the PCI's political growth, as far as adherents and voters were concerned. 
Much of the PCI's initial success was owed to its organic link with the USSR. In the early 
post-war years, reference to the Soviet Union and the international communist movement 
provided one source of legitimisation on the domestic level; the other fundamental source of 
legitimisation represented the communist share of victory over Italian fascism. The rising 
Cold War atmosphere soon led to a climate of a 'national Cold War' in Italy. Much as 
Germany became geographically and ideologically separated, Italy too became ideologically 
divided along Cold War lines. Italian political parties have always tended to search for 
external legitimisation. As far as the PCI was concerned, the focus on sources of legitimation 
shifted significantly in the course of the party's post-war history. 
While devoting loyalty to Moscow's foreign policy interests, the PCI developed national 
interests and ambitions that were increasingly incompatible with Soviet hegemony over the 
international communist movement. In the course of the PCI's foreign policy revisionism and 
~ Sec, for example, Donald L.M. Blackmer and Sidney Tarrow (eds), Communism in Italy and France 
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1975). 
5 While in the case of the peF, the devdopments of 1968 seem to have led to a far-reaching realignment of the 
party with the worId communist movement on Soviet terms. 
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implementation of its national road to socialism ('via italiana al socialismo'). greatest urgency 
was attributed to finding new international reference points which assured the PCI the much 
desired international and national legitimisation. From 1967, this was in part sought in the 
SPD. The monolithic international communist movement which responded to the primacy of 
Soviet power policies was gradually replaced as the exclusive point of reference or external 
legitimisation. New convergences on the Western European level were sought across a wide 
political spectrum, in spite of prevailing ideological divergences. In this the SPD played a role 
that should not be underestimated. Internally, the PCI's ambitious domestic proposal as 
entailed in the 'historic compromise' strategy was inspired by the first 'great coalition' In 
post-war Germany. For the PCI, the SPD not only presented a real source of inspiration, but 
increasingly also a source of legitimisation. Internationally, the SPD's Eastern course was 
observed by the PCI with greatest interest and anticipation. The PCI's polycentrism as a 
notion of relations amongst communist states could in turn improve relations between 
Germany and the East and thereby reinforce the SPD's Ostpolitik. Changes in Soviet 
dominated Eastern Europe could not leave the PCI, or the SPD, unaffected. The Cold War and 
detente therefore mark the context and framework against which the two parties' foreign 
policy course and shifts will be analysed. 
The comparative method here does not distinguish between the 'contrasting type' and the 
'universalising type' but applies both where necessary for the argument.6 The underlying 
assumption of this thesis is that it is precisely the relative diversity of the two parties that 
allows one to make useful comparisons, identifying the causes of policy shifts. 
One aim of the comparison is to examine policy revisionism and analyse its ongms and 
motivations. Revisionism has its origins in a number of interrelated factors which are often 
not mutually exclusive. Policy shifts are every so often caused by ideological reconsiderations 
6 For the various types of approaches sec Haupt and Kocka, 'Historischer Vergleich', p. II. 
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or a rethinking of, and adaptation to political, economIC and social circumstances.7 The 
comparative method allows one to make general assumptions and draw parallels about the 
origins of revisionism, and relate them, where possible, to wider sections of the Western 
European Left. This process which occurred in the wider context of de-ideologisation was not 
distinctive to Italian communism or German social democracy but can be observed by 
examining Western European parties of the Left in general. Due to the diverse timing and 
junctures of the SPD's and the PCI's revisionist course it is necessary to choose a relatively 
broad time frame. This is often required when adopting this kind of comparative method.8 
The scholarly literature on both the SPD and the PCI is vast. The wealth of material on the 
PCI is certainly exceptional. No other Western European, non-governing, communist party 
has been subject to such manifold research. From a comparative perspective, the existing 
literature generally places the PCI in the context of the international communist movement, or 
its dubious relations with Moscow. If analysed from a comparative approach, the PCI is 
usually examined in relation with its counterparts in Western Europe. As a member of the 
Socialist International (SI), the SPD is generally analysed in the context of the European 
socialist movement. 9 
In much of the literature, the Cold War is the prime and often sole explanatory prism through 
which to understand communist party behaviour. Comparing the PCI with the SPD bears the 
advantage of demonstrating that this was not a typical communist phenomenon. The SPD was 
equally affected by the Cold War and a lot of its choices certainly have to be viewed in that 
7 It should be noted that ideology will be used throughout in a more general sense and linked to belief and to 
identity. 
8 Haupt and Kocka, 'Historischer Vergleich'. p. 25. 
9 See, for example, 10han leroen De Deken, The German Social Democratic Party', in Robert Ladrech and 
Philippe Marliere (eds), Social Democratic Parties in the European Union: History, Organisation and Policies 
(Basingstoke and London: Macmillan Press, 1999); Kevin Featherstone. Socialist Parties and European 
Integration. A Comparative History (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1988): Dietrich Orlow, Common 
Destiny: A Comparatil'c HistolY of the Dutch, French, and German Social Democratic Parties, 1945-1969 (Ne\\ 
York ~nd Ox ford: Bcrghahn Books. 2(00). 
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context, nonetheless, neither party's behaviour can be exclusively accounted for by the 
bipolar world constellation. 
The enormous literature produced by British and American scholars in the 1970s and 1980s 
readdressed the issue of national and international belonging of the PCI. An important work 
on the complex understanding of the interaction between the PCI's national and international 
belonging is Donald Blackmer's Unity in DiversityIO, which thoroughly analyses the 
permanent and often conflicting interests of the PCI. Indispensable to any analysis of the PCI 
is Donald Sassoon' s The Strategy of the Italian Communist Partyll; it places the PCI both in 
the national and international context, analysing the PCI's domestic and foreign policy 
strategies also from the perspective of the logic of the blocs. A classic work on the PCI and its 
relations with the Soviet Union is also Joan Barth Urban's Moscow and the Italian 
Communist Partyl2. Many of the differences between the approaches to PCI history can be 
traced back to the question of whether this party should be studied as any other political party 
in the context of a pluralist party system, or if it was fundamentally different and hence 
required a specific approach. The two approaches are not necessarily mutually exclusive and 
any comprehensive and thorough analysis of the behaviour of the PCI will have to study the 
party from within the Italian party spectrum without undermining its international belonging 
and constraints. 
The SPD's foreign policy in the 1960s and the 1970s is also a well researched field. The 
existing literature is vast. Nonetheless a few works should be emphasised here, some of which 
will be critically addressed throughout the thesis. Arnulf Baring provides an important 
10 Donald L.M. Blackmer, Unity in Diversity. Italian Communism and the Communist World (Cambridge, Mass.: 
. . 
MIT Press, 1968). See also Donald L.M. Blackmer, 'The International Strategy of the Italian Communist Party'. 
in Donald L.M. Blackmer and Annie Kriegel (eds), The International Role of the Communist Parties of Italy and 
France (Cambridge. Mass.: Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, 1975). 
II Donald Sassoon, The Strategy (~fthe Italian Communist Party. From the Resistance to the Historic 
Compromise (London: Frances Pinter, 1981). 
12 Joan Barth Urban, Mosc(}\\' and the Italian Communist Party. From Togliatti to Berlingller (Ithaca and 
London: Cornell University Press, 1986). 
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contribution to the analysis of the social-liberal Ostpolitik, despite its lack of references. 13 
Haftedorn also gives valuable information about the genesis of Ostpolitik and places it in an 
international context. 14 A number of recently published monographs deal with Brandt's life 
and politics. 15 From a comparative perspective, the most profound analysis of Western 
European socialist, social democratic and communist parties is Donald Sassoon' s One 
Hundred Years of Socialism. 16 A thorough analysis of the PCl's policies towards European 
integration in comparison with the SPD as well as the Communists' role in the SPD's 
Ostpolitik, is Heinz Timmermann's I Comunisti italiani. 17 
Given the wealth of research on both PCl and SPD, it is worthwhile asking whether there is 
room for a new approach to the subject and where this thesis differs and contributes to the 
scholarship on the foreign policy course of the two parties. This thesis provides the first 
systematic comparative analysis on the strategies of the PCl and the SPD and thereby 
attempts to open up new perspectives, to give insightful innovation and to provoke new 
research on familiar subjects. Timmermann's work, for example, is an important and original 
contribution to the history of the SPD and the PCI. However, it is incomplete as it focuses on 
European integration and SPD-PCl encounters over Ostpolitik exclusively. Here it is used as a 
13 Arnulf Baring, Machtwechsel. Die Ara Brandt-Scheel (MUnchen: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 1984). 
14 Helga Haftedorn, Sicherheit und Entspannung. Zur Auj3enpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1955-1982 
(Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1983). A well researched work is Sarotte's Dealing with the Del'if. 
East Germany, Detente, and Ostpolitik, 1969-1973 (Chapel Hill & London: The University of Carolina Press, 
2001). Sarotte, however, examines exclusively the East German interaction with both West Germany and the 
Soviets. As she mentions herself, it does not provide the West German view of interactions with East Germany 
and the United States. Topics such as the debate over Ostpolitik within the SPD, or the tensions between the SPD 
and its coalition partners, the attacks of the conservative West German press on Ostpolitik - all of which are 
important for his thesis - have not been dealt with. 
15 See, for example, Peter Merseburger, Wi/I....,. Brandt 1913-1992 (MUnchen: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 
2004); Barbara Marshall, Willy Brandt: A Political Biography (Basingstoke, London: Macmillan Press, 1997): 
Brigitte Seebacher, Willy Brandt (MUnchen, ZUrich: Piper, 2004). Given his role in the SPD and during the great 
coalition, it is also worth mentioning and addressing some of the existing literature on Herbert Wehner. See. for 
example, Christoph Meyer, Herbert Wehner (MUnchen: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 2006): Wayne C. 
Thompson, The Political Odyssey of Herbert Wehner (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1993) and for his 
role in the German Communist Party and his life in Moscow, see Reinhard MUller. Herbert Wehner - Moskall 
1<)37 (Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, 2004). 
16 Donald Sassoon, One Hllndred Years of Socialism: The West European Left in the Twentieth Century 
(London: Fontana Press, 1997). 
17 Heinz Timmermann. I Comzwisti italiani (Bari: De Donato Editore. 1974). 
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basis and will be expanded to other aspects of the foreign policy domain, whereby I seek, 
whenever possible, to place the strategies of the SPD and the PCI in the wider European 
context. The comparative method here is particularly revealing for a number of reasons. 
Those who look at one party exclusively, tend to attribute all changes and shifts to that party, 
without analysing it in the wider context of policy revisionism. Drawing parallels between the 
SPD's and the PCI's foreign policy shifts and turns is also insightful in as much as it draws 
attention to previously neglected areas, such as the SPD's Deutschland Plan and acceptance of 
NATO. It also offers a more comprehensive understanding of the origins of revisionism and 
its motivations. 
The existing manifold literature on the PCI's history has so often focused on the complex 
relation of the Italian Communist Party with the Soviet Union and the world communist 
movement. The present study does not ignore this undeniably central element of the PCI's 
identity. By virtue of its membership of a Soviet-dominated international Communist 
movement, the PCI was also a Stalinist party. But by virtue of its involvement in a democratic 
capitalist West European country, the PCI was also a reformist social-democratic party. And 
by virtue of its position as a minority opposition party operating in a hostile environment, the 
PCI was also a constitutional-liberal party upholding civil liberties. I8 Any comprehensive 
history of the PCI must sufficiently account for and deal with these differing aspects of PCI 
identity. A comparison with the SPD highlights striking similarities with the Western 
European, non communist, Left. 
This thesis attempts to place the PCI's foreign policy strategies in the national and Western 
European context, without in any way intending to downplay the undeniably important 
internationalism and loyalty to the Soviet Union on the PCI's identity. It therefore seeks to 
avoid denouncing the importance of relations with Moscow or dependency on and belonging 
18 D. Sassoon, 'The PCI between 1948 and 1956: four perspectives on \'01. VII of Storia del per, in Journal (~f 
Modern Italian Sflldies, Vol. 4, No.3 (1999), p. 392. 
1.+ 
to the international communist movement, whilst attempting not to exaggerate the national 
context in complete disregard of ideological positions. Instead, one needs to contemplate both 
of these 'links' to fully conceptualise some of the party's most profound choices. Departing 
from the assumption that both SPD and PCI were characterised by their national roots and 
ambitions, the thesis seeks to arrive at party overlapping trends and conclusions as to how 
political parties address and overcome national and international constraints in spite of 
ideological divergences. It analyses the SPD's and the PCI's foreign policy revisionism and 
foreign policy course, by examining the domestic interplay, the national constraints and 
international obligations the two parties were confronted with. 
Though the focus of this work is primarily on foreign policies, it is impossible to separate 
those from domestic issues. It is in fact one of the underlying hypothesis of this study that 
national policy ambitions and reflections were often, sometimes exclusively, responsible for 
the SPD's and the PCI's foreign policy reappraisals. Every so often, the two were inseparably 
intertwined and to understand the complexity of the issues of analysis, one needs to examine 
how far domestic considerations and ambitions were responsible in shaping the parties' 
foreign policy outlook. By building my analysis on two political forces deriving from 
different ideological camps, it is possible to illustrate that foreign policies are often a product 
of domestic power constellations and that ideology played an ever decreasing relevance in 
determining the international position of political forces. 
Some problems of the comparative method should be mentioned here. Comparing always 
implies accounting for both, similarities and differences. Acknowledging convergences in 
some areas, does not deny the existence of fundamental divergences in others. A comparison 
does not attempt to seek convergences at all costs. In cases of clear contrast, the two parties 
will be dealt with separately and I will seek, if possible, to highlight the reasons for the lack of 
15 
analogies. I have tried to deal with the two parties simultaneously whenever possible. When at 
times the two parties are dealt with separately this is owed to the fact that the timing of the 
changes in party policies and strategies had frequently been diverse. This is a typical 
phenomenon of the comparative method. It should also not go unmentioned that every so 
often diametrically diverse strategies lay behind overtly similar positions. This thesis does not 
suggest that the two parties' foreign policy concepts (or the strategies behind them) were 
essentially the same, in complete disregard of prevailing dissimilarities between the two. 
Keeping in mind these difficulties, the aim is to demonstrate that on the basis of key foreign 
policy aspects which the two parties were confronted with, such as the understanding and 
concepts of international detente, security policies, relations with the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation (NATO) and the United States, the Warsaw Pact and the international 
communist movement, European integration and unity, notable similarities can be produced. 
This is more so the case in terms of the SPD's and the PCI's reciprocal understanding of 
certain issues and consequently involved a similar handling of specific foreign policy aspects. 
Despite undeniable problems of comparative analyses, the choice of two parties from diverse 
political camps bears the advantage to illustrate party overlapping movements and trends. 
The first and second chapter provide a general background of the SPD's and the PCI's 
strategy until the end of the 1950s. This entails a brief excursion to the period from the 
resistance to post-war reconstruction, giving a picture of the political systems and actors 
involved in both countries and of the foreign and domestic policy issues to be addressed at the 
time. 
Chapter three examines the context against which the policy reappraisal vis-a-vis NATO took 
place. A common departing point of the two parties was the search for bipartisanship in 
foreign policy and accommodation of political power at home. The chapter deals with the 
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ongIns of the SPD's move from intransigence to bipartisanship in foreign policy and 
subsequent relations towards NATO and the United States. The PCI's endorsement of the 
military pact took place more than a decade later but was strikingly similar. The PCI's policy 
shift also occurred in the context of an overture to the Italian Christian Democratic Party (DC) 
in the midst of the 1970s. Both SPD and PCI had come to conclude that their march to 
governmental power would have to involve an acceptance of their countries key military 
obligations. 
Chapter four will analyse the motivations for previous hostilities and subsequent support of 
economic integration with Western Europe. Europe and the integration process were viewed 
and approached in the context of Realpolitik; in ideological terms we witnessed a greater 
extent of consensus politics and the termination of divergences over principles. Both Italy and 
Germany were economically affected by Western Europe's significant post-war economic 
boom - which had owed its success not least to the impact of economic integration with the 
West. Both SPD and PCI came to acknowledge and positively embrace this process; even the 
timing marked a remarkable concurrence between the two parties. 
Chapter five deals with the parallels and the complexities of the PCI's and SPD's foreign and 
domestic policy strategies, investigating the SPD's and the PCI's foreign policy choices and 
changes towards the East and the international communist movement as well as the two 
parties' 'originality' on the domestic level. Both parties shared a similar perception of 
international detente and peaceful coexistence that went well beyond the mere acceptance of 
the status quo. It also provides a systematic analysis of SPD-PCI encounters over Ostpolitik. 
The PCI presented itself as a credible 'mediator' in opening doors for talks with the German 
Democratic Republic (GDR) and Moscow. The PCI played something of an intermediary role 
between the SPD, East Berlin and ultimately Moscow. SPD and PCI were unique in their 
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respective political 'camps'. The SPD, at the forefront of conducting its own independent and 
well respected foreign policy as entailed in Ostpolitik, the PCI as a distinctive 
'Eurocommunist' party that held decreasingly little in common with the Soviet-dominated and 
monolithic international communist movement. On a national level, the chapter will analyse 
the domestic choices as entailed in the SPD's 'great coalition' and the PCl's 'historic 
compromise' . 
For the purpose of clarity, chapter six will be divided into two parts. The first part will make 
sense of the paradox that whilst the period between 1968 and 1976 saw a remarkable 
convergence between the PCI and SPD as far as their concepts of detente, security policies 
and positions towards the Atlantic Alliance were concerned, in short a period in which the gap 
in terms of foreign policy differences shrank enormously, the distance the SPD officially 
sought from the PCI grew enormously in 1975/76. This study will place the PCI in the wider 
framework of Western fears of communist advances in Western Europe. Subject of analysis 
will be the economic summit meeting of the four powers held in Puerto Rico in June 1976, on 
which I intend to shed some new light on the basis of archival research, challenging the 
existing literature on the incident. The second part will investigate the positions of the two 
political forces towards the deteriorating East-West relations and the newly emerging 
armament race between the superpowers. The NATO dual-track provides a case study of the 
correlation of domestic constraints and international choices. 
In terms of methodology, the sources used for the study of the two parties are of similar 
nature. These included party or sympathetic press, party congresses, protocols and resolutions, 
yearbooks and speeches, memoirs, and oral interviews, etc. With regard to archival sources, 
the study uses for the main part of the thesis material from both party achives, the SPD's 
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Archiv der Sozialen Demokratie (AdSD) in Bonn and the PCI party archive at the Fonda;:,ione 
Istituto Gramsci (APC) in Rome. 
A few words should be said about the usefulness of archival sources. Parties like the SPD and 
PCI have attracted the attention of a vast amount of historians and political scientists and are 
well researched political forces. The likelihood that the party archives reveal anything 
sensational is rather minimal. In fact, political parties such as the SPD and the PCI have every 
interest in conveying their ideas to the widest public possible. Hence, party archives are 
unlikely to reveal new empirical material or particular party secrets. In short, party archives 
on their own, are not likely to produce any major revelations. They are useful when 
reconstructing a particular decision-making process and the role of all key players involved. 
Nonetheless it is the task of the historian to thoroughly study archival material and analyse the 
primary sources against the already existing research in the field. 19 As far as this thesis is 
concerned, the various archives were particular useful in the context of SPD-PCI encounters 
and the Puerto Rico incident. Here they disclosed a number of insights that have not been 
previously dealt with in the literature so that the thesis makes a particularly valuable 
contribution to the existing literature. 
There exists a discrepancy between the sources used from both archives. This is due to the 
organisational structure of the two party archives and internal party structures. The top to 
bottom decision-making process characteristic of communist parties implies that policy 
choices were made in a closed leading circle. As far as the SPD is concerned, the decision-
making process is more heterogeneous and not confined to a few individuals. Exempt from 
this was the period under Kurt Schumacher, first party leader, who had been widely 
characterised by an authoritarian-style leadership. With this exception, the reader should bear 
in mind that use will be made here of official party positions and policies which, however. 
19 Sec Haupt and Kocka, who problematise the usage of and reliance on secondary sources in historical 
comparisons, in 'Historischer Vergleich', p. :n. 
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does not imply that these were automatically and always unequivocally shared by the entire 
party. Inner party tensions are secondary for this work and beyond the scope of the thesis. 
They will only be dealt with where considered absolutely crucial. The thesis makes use of 
information from the deposits of Willy Brandt and Helmut Schmidt. Particularly noteworthy 
is also the printed edition Willy Brandt: Berliner Ausgabe, which is one of the first works to 
make ample use of Brandt's personal files preserved at the Willy Brandt archive at the Archil' 
der Sozialen Demokratie. These sources are accompanied by protocols and meetings from the 
SPD parliamentary faction. For the PCI, the thesis analyses sources of the party's leading 
circles such as central committee meetings, party publications and the deposit of Enrico 
Berlinguer for the 1970s. The SPD's weekly Vorwarts and the communist daily L'Unita were 
used for the main period of analysis, so were the theoretical organs Die Neue Gesellschaft and 
Rinascita. The findings on 'Puerto Rico' are supported by material from both the political 
archive of the Federal Foreign Office in Berlin and the National Archives in London. 
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Chapter 1 
The strategy of the SPO and the PCI during the resistance and post-war 
reconstruction of Germany and Italy, 1944-1949 
1.) The SPO, PCI and the resistance 
In spite of key differences, the SPD and PCI converged on a variety of aspects, not least 
because the two countries and the political landscapes within which both parties operated 
were not that dissimilar. To start with one should analyse the strategies of the PCI and the 
SPD in the immediate post-war period. These can only be fully understood by considering 
where the two parties came from and some of the constraints they faced in the post -1945 
period. 
Both parties re-emerged after the Second Word War from years of clandestinity. Their 
experiences during those years had an enduring impact on the political identity of the two. 
The PCI and the SPD had similar experiences in the 1930s and 1940s. The Communists had 
been banned under Mussolini in 1926; the SPD was banned in 1933. During the Second 
World War, many SPD members spent years in concentration camps in Nazi Germany or in 
exile. Kurt Schumacher, who later became the party's uncontested post-war leader until his 
death in 1952, had spent ten years in concentration camps. 
The experiences of many Italian Communists were similar. During most of the Fascist period, 
the PCI was outlawed and its leaders in prison or abroad. Many Communists had spent years 
in exile or were imprisoned under Mussolini and only re-emerged with the Allied occupation 
of Southern Italy. Palmiro Togliatti, the PCI's first post-war leader, had spent several years in 
exile in France and in Moscow (where he used radio broadcasts to guide the policy of the 
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PCI). In Italy, there was no armed resistance to speak of until 1943.20 With the fall of 
Mussolini in 1943, the Italian resistance grew rapidly in speed and size. Although one cannot 
speak of a united resistance movement in Italy as such, the PCI was the key force behind the 
resistance effort. More importantly, the PCI gained enormous prestige from its role in the 
resistance and much of its character and post-war strategy derived from the experience in 
these years. 
2.) Germany and Italy after the Second World War: the re-emergence of political 
parties 
In May 1945 Germany had faced complete defeat and the country was divided by the Allies 
into an American, Soviet, British and French zone of occupation. In September 1944 it had 
already been agreed that Berlin should be placed under four-power control, and at the 
conferences of Teheran (28 November-l December 1943) and Yalta ( 4-11 February 1945) 
there was a general agreement on the principle need and mutual task to demilitarise and 
democratise the country. Despite these vague statements, soon after the surrender of 
Germany, the clashes between the four occupying powers (over issues such as the redrawing 
of the German-Polish border, reparations and Germany's future political system) became 
prevalent. 
The decision to allow the re-foundation of political parties. in the West was also taken in 
response to Soviet initiatives and activities of the Communists in the Eastern sector. Prior to 
Allied approval, Schumacher, who immediately became the unchallenged post-war leader of 
the SPD, at once began the reorganisation of party work from Hanover. The SPD's founding 
meeting took place as early as May 1945, a few days before the unconditional surrender of 
Germany. Other political parties soon began to rise in West Germany. A new conservati\'e 
20 Sassoon, One Hundred rears (~lSocialism, p. 88. 
group of both Catholics and Protestants formed the Christian Democratic Union (CDU): in 
Bavaria a separate identity as the Christian Social Union (CSU) was founded. The CDU/CSU 
joint in common lists during German national elections and merged into a parliamentary 
faction. Several liberal parties emerged in the Western zones of Germany which eventually 
merged to become the Free Democratic Party (FDP). In the East, immense pressure had been 
put on a reluctant SPD to merge with the Communist Party (KPD) in the winter of 1945-46. 
Despite resistance, a forced merger between the KPD and the SPD into the Socialist Unity 
Party (SED) was finally ratified during a meeting in April 1946. 
Although some other minor parties existed in West Germany, this study will focus on the 
three main parties, the CDU/CSU, SPD and FDP. This is because the governmental coalition-
building processes were decided amongst those three. West Germany was essentially a 
'tripartite' parliamentary democracy, based on the system of proportional representation. 
In Italy, the political landscape was somewhat more complex and heterogeneous. The 
'Democrazia Cristiana' (DC) was the newest party, but distinguished itself from the outset as 
the strongest in post-war Italy. Enjoying the advantage of being heir to the tradition of Don 
Sturzo's Popular Party, the large peasant based Catholic party founded in 1919, it could use 
the already established and vast machine of Catholic societies and organisation that were 
allowed to exist and operate under Fascism.21 Moreover, it enjoyed massive support of the 
Church as well as the benevolence of the United States in order to contain Italian 
communIsm. 
In July 1937, the PCI and the Italian Socialists had signed a pact of cooperation, which was to 
last until 1956. In the 1946 election of the Constituent Assembly, the Socialists for the first 
and only time in the post-war Italian political system outnumbered the PCI, reaching 20.7 
21 Sassoon. Contemporary Italy, Second Edition (London and New York: Longman, 1997), p. 6. 
percent of the votes (PCI: 19 percent). The Socialists were divided in a small faction that 
favoured the party's independence from the PCI and a larger group that wished to keep the 
close alliance with the PCI. At the 1946 Congress of the PSIUP, only 10 percent voted for 
Giuseppe Saragat's 'social democratic' faction, while the majority stressed a commitment to 
unity of action with the PCI. In 1947, the group around Saragat decided to form what 
eventually came to be known as the 'Partito Social Democratico Italiano' (PSDI), while the 
remaining majority changed its name from PSIUP to 'Partito Socialista Italiano' (PSI).22 
In the 1948 national elections, Communists and Socialists (PSI) cooperated on a joint list and 
reached 31 percent of the votes.23 In his speech to the Naples communist organisation in April 
1944, PCI post-war leader Togliatti had already advocated a party policy that allowed for an 
ever greater cooperation with the PSI, conceivably even a fusion. 24 The closest possible 
alliance with the Socialist Party was crucial, in as much as the PCI feared that it would 
otherwise run the risk of losing contact with certain important strata of the working people. 25 
The PSI was vital in the PCl's entire post-war strategy of alliance seeking. 
One of the key questions to address is how the SPD and the PCI dealt with the strong 
presence of Christian democratic and Catholic parties in Germany and Italy as well as the 
importance of the Church, albeit considerably more so in Italy, in securing their support. This 
implied that both parties were forced to operate within the context of strong Christian 
democratic hegemony and needed to deal with Christian democratic supremacy if they wished 
to come to governmental power. 
~2 Sassoon, One Hundred Years of Socialism. p. 135. 
23 Sassoon, Contemporary Italy. p. 177. 
24 Sassoon. The Strategy qfthe Italian Communist Party. p. 20. 
2:\ 'V Congresso Nazionale, Sotto la bandiera della democrazia', Resolution to the 5th Congress of the pel. 29 
December 1945-6 January 1946. in PCI (ed.). Da Gramsci a Berlinguer. La via italiana al socialismo attral'erso 
i congressi del partito cOI1l11nista italiano, II 1944-1955 (Venezia: Marsilio Editore. 1985) p. 22-+. 
From the end of 1945 to 1950, there were five coalition governments in Italy, allIed by De 
Gasperi, leader of the DC. The first three included all parties of the Left as well as the minor 
parties of the centre. De Gasperi' s fourth government from May 1947 signalled a turning 
point in Italian post-war politics. As the Cold War broke out, the Left (PSI and PCI) was 
expelled from the coalition and Italy was henceforth governed by the DC together with the 
centrist parties until the beginning of the 1960s. 
In West Germany, the coalition building processes were determined by the CDU/CSU, mainly 
in cooperation with the smaller FDP between 1949 and 1966. Until then, the parliamentary 
opposition was essentially represented by the SPD. Interestingly, and particularly in 
comparison with the PCI, the SPD's post-war strategy until the beginning of the 1960s was 
not determined by the search for coalition partners. The post -war SPD was above all an 
intransigent, dogmatic opposition party which believed to 'win' or emerge strongest from the 
national elections. Consequently, its election programmes were not centred on bipartisanship 
or finding common terrain with the other parties. 
The PCI, despite facing a number of challenges from the Left and strong Catholic hegemony, 
the PCI became and remained the strongest party of the Italian Left (both in terms of 
adherents and voters) until the party's dissolution at the beginning of the 1990s. 
Nonetheless, the PCI faced a dual challenge which developed into an ever increasing conflict 
of interest: as a communist party with a strong organic link with the Soviet Union, the PCI 
already distinguished itself from the other parties, more so after 1956, when the PSI officially 
distanced itself from the PCI after the party's failure to condemn the Soviet invasion of 
Hungary. Simultaneously, the PCl's post-war strategy evolved around the attempt of 
becoming eligible for government and seeking possible alliances and coalition partners. Being 
confronted with a variety of other left-wing parties, the PCI (as well as the other parties of the 
Left) always faced the task of distinguishing itself from the other parties of the Italian Left 
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and keeping a distinct profile, whilst at the same time seeking cooperation in local, regional 
and (so it was hoped) national governments. 
2.1) pel relations with other political forces in Italy 
During the resistance and first post-war government, the Italian Communists attributed 
particular importance and paid great attention to relations with other political forces, most 
importantly of all, the Christian Democratic Party. This policy was never entirely abandoned. 
even though with the onset of the Cold War it could no longer be pursued so rigorously. In 
coming to terms with this strong Catholic presence, which also naturally involved a 
considerable religious cohesion in Italy, the PCl's entire post-war strategy was developed 
around finding answers in order to come to terms with Christian democratic dominance. As 
early as 1944, Togliatti had assured that the PCI 'must not and does not intend to collide with 
the Catholic masses, which have equally suffered from fascism, and with whom the PCI 
should rather find a common terrain for creating a democratic Italy' .26 As we will see later, 
the Cold War rendered this long-term strategy somewhat difficult, yet, it was never entirely 
abandoned. This consensus-seeking strategy should not be mistaken as a mere short-term 
tactic (even if perhaps it was justified as such to the militants amongst the party's rank and 
file), but proved to be one of the key underlying and distinctive features of the PCl's entire 
post-war strategy. Unity of action with the PSI as well as a political understanding with the 
DC were the two twin pillars of Togliatti' s perception of relations with other parties as part of 
the construction of the partito nuovo (new party) and inherent in the idea of establishing a 
'progressive democracy'. 27 
2b Palmira Togliatti, 'La politica di unita nazionale dei comunisti', Speech to the communist organisation of 
Naples, I I April I l)-l-l, in Togliatti, Opere Scelte (Roma: Editori Riuniti, 1974), p. 306. . 
27 Paolo Spriano, Stor;a del Part;to C011l11n;sta Italiano (\'). La Res;sten:a, Togliatt; e ;1 part;to nllo\'O (Tormo: 
Giulio Einaudi Editorc, 1975), p. 391. 
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Upon return to Italy, Togliatti announced the PCI's willingness to participate In the 
government headed by Marshal Pietro Badoglio in joint cooperation with the other anti-
Fascist forces in Italy (King Victor Emmanuel III had called on Marshal Badoglio to form a 
government after Mussolini had been overthrown on 25 July 1943). This line, by which the 
PCI had agreed to enter a coalition government of 'national unity' under the King, and 
Marshal Badoglio became to be known as 'la svolta di Salerno' (the turning-point of Salerno). 
The underlying strategy was apparent: the PCI aimed to enter and remain in government as 
well as urge close cooperation with the other national democratic players. All other questions 
were subordinate to this aim in these specific national circumstances. With the 'turning-point 
of Salerno', the PCI attempted to access, and ideally remain in the area of governmental 
legality and political power. 28 
The only essential precondition that Togliatti had laid down (in order for the PCI to 
cooperate) was that a Constituent Assembly based on universal suffrage be elected once the 
war was over to decide the future institutional structure of the country. This marked an 
undisputed compromise all parties could agree upon. 29 This was, by the PCI's rationale 
behind it, a minimum condition which everyone could accept, and it would further secure the 
cooperation of all anti-Fascist and democratic forces in the country. More importantly, it 
would guarantee the possibility of future influence of the party and the working class. 
The PCI's post -war strategy was to all intents and purposes unIque amongst Western 
European communist parties, let alone those parties emerging in Eastern Europe. Togliatti had 
always firmly rejected the 'Russian October 1917 model' as a universal path for revolution. In 
a famous speech to the cadres of the communist organisation of Naples, Togliatti had already 
affirmed on 11 April 1944 that 'today the problem facing the Italian workers is not that of 
28 See also Giorgio Bocca. Palmira Togliatt; (Roma-Bari: Editori Laterza. 1973). p. 365. 
29 'I ConsilTlio Nazionale. La politica di unita nazionale dei comunisti·. held 30 March - 1 April 1944 in Naples. 
in PCI (edJ, Da Gramsc; a Berhngller. La v;a ;tahana al sociahsmo attrarerso ; c01lgress; del part;to COmll1l;sta 
italiano, II 1944-1955. p. 42. 
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doing what was done in Russia. The Italian working class has today to solve the terrible and 
grave problems of the present moment through its own action and struggle' .30 
Independent from the Soviet model and experience, in every country the roads to socialism 
were to assume particular forms in accordance with the diversity of the development of 
capitalism, with its national characteristics and traditions as well as the particular position the 
country has taken during the Second Word War. The PCI's aim after the war was not the 
destruction of the capitalist system as such, but to create the economic and social structures 
that would permanently prevent Fascism from rising and newly planting its roots. The lessons 
from the past were learned, and the most immediate and urgent objective was to create the 
economic and political conditions to permanently prevent its re-emergence.3l 
Since an objectively revolutionary situation did not exist (not least due to Allied presence in 
the country), the party's immediate objective was not socialism but a 'progressive 
democracy,32, a notion itself vague and open to various interpretations. What the PCI intended 
was to build a democratic and economic state, which, as a result of various structural reforms, 
would permanently eradicate all roots of Fascism and prevent the possibility of its rebirth. In 
precise terms, this involved an extensive agrarian reform and the destruction of 'monopoly' 
capitalism. 
The PCI's concept of a 'progressive democracy' as an innovative and enlightened programme 
for a post-war political order should, however, not be overestimated. Its actual content was so 
vague as to barely consider it a coherent political programme at all. It was a terminology used 
in almost all of the PCI's declarations between 1944 and 1947. With the party's expUlsion 
from government, it quickly disappeared from the political agenda. 
30 Togliatti, 'The Communist Policy of National Unity', in Togliatti, On Gramsci and Other Writings (London: 
Lawrence and Wishart, 1979), p. 40. 
31 Rinascita, 'L'Unita nazionak', August / September 1944. 
32 Napolitano, Giorgio, The Italian Road to Socialism, an interview with Eric Hobsbawm (Westport. Conn.: 
Lawrence Hill; London: Journeyman Press, 1977), p. 7. 
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In the immediate post-war period until the beginning of the Cold War, the PCI's strategy was 
shaped by the dictate of Realpolitik. Rigid party dogmatism was not only considered to be 
misplaced, but would have failed to secure the PCI the widest possible support in permanently 
implanting itself throughout Italian society. This proved to be the right strategy at the time, 
when the Italian popUlation was most concerned with the reconstruction of the country and to 
grasp and deal with the lessons from the past. 
2.2) The creation of mass parties 
Part and parcel of the PCl's post-war strategy was the attempt to create a mass political party. 
Togliatti had opened the door to as many activists as possible and aimed at the establishment 
of a true mass party. In July 1943 the PCI had only incorporated around 5,000 to 6,000 
activists. By January 1946, the party's membership had risen to approximately 1,800,000 
members33 , a number the SPD had never reached in its entire post-war history. Religious faith 
was not seen as an obstacle to PCI membership, which in turn not only secured greater party 
membership in a Catholic country, but in itself may be interpreted as an invitation to 
cooperation with the DC.34 The broadest possible admission criterion to the party was seen 
crucial to destroy Fascism, annihilate the reactionary bourgeois forces but also to implant 
itself permanently in society and attract members and voters well beyond the traditional 
working class spectrum, and link the latter with wide sections of society, peasants, 
professionals, intellectuals etc.35 The PCI thus practised an exceptionally broad admissions 
.l3 Sassoon, The Strategy a/the Italian Commllnist Party, p. 4. 
3-1 'V Congresso Nazionale, Sotto la bandiera della democrazia', Resolution to the 5th Congress of the PCI. in 
PCI (ed.), Da Gramsci a Berlingller. La via ita/iana ( ... ) II 1944-1955, p. 225. 
35 Togliatti. 'I compiti del partito nella situazione attuale'. in Togliatti. Opere See/teo p. 3'+9. 
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policy, whereby ideological credentials and religious faith were secondary and not an 
impediment for member recruitment. 36 
Particular attention was attributed to the peasant masses, which would not yet tum to 
proletarian parties but the DC instead. Togliatti at various occasions reiterated that one of the 
reasons why fascism came to power was that 'we [the Italian Communists] did not arrive at an 
agreement between the proletarian organisations led by the Communist and Socialist Parties, 
and the peasant associations which had the then Popular Party as their reference point'. 37 As 
early as April 1944, Togliatti outlined the immediate tasks of the PCI in the present situation, 
according to which the PCI was no longer to be merely a small cadre section or propagandist 
organisation that advocated the ideals of communism and a socialist society.38 Rather, in the 
course of 1944, the PCI consolidated its image and character of a true mass-( class based) 
party that derived much of its national character from its role in the Italian resistance, 
combating the German invader and liberating Italy from all Fascist roots. 39 
In the immediate post-1945 period the PCI's evolution was characterised by an unparalleled 
growth in size and prestige. As mentioned before, this in part may be attributed to the fact that 
the PCI's moral and political prestige had grown enormously by the party's resistance effort 
and that it fought at the forefront against Fascism. In addition, the PCI, at least initially, 
benefited enormously from its link with the Soviet Union. Between 1944 and 1946, the image 
of the USSR was substantially positive, which then reversed considerably in the forthcoming 
years. 40 
Reaffirming the party's respect for religious convictions of the people and presenting the 
PCI's new image as a defender of religious liberty and respect. Togliatti fully endorsed the 
36 'V (~ nO,"") Nazionale Sotto la bandiera della democrazia·. Resolution to the )th Congress of the PCI. in o _ C SSl . 
PCI (ed. ).~Da Gramsci a Berlingller. La via iraliana (. .. ) II 1 ().J.J-1955. p. ~~). 
37 Togliatti. 'I compiti del partito nella situazil)ne attuale·. p. 360. 
38 Ibid .. p. 3'+5. 
39 Ibid .. p. 340. . ' . __ . 
40 SaSSlHln. 'Italian Imagt:s of Russia. 19'+)-56'. in Chflstophcr Duggan. Chnsto~her \\ agstalf (cds l. Italy 111 the 
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Constitutional guarantees of freedom of conSCIence and of religious propaganda and 
contributed the decisive votes of the party in favour of the inclusion of Article 7 in the Italian 
Constitution (the 1929 Lateran Pacts maintained the Church's special status in the state).-ll 
This was a unique strategy in as much as it manifested a reversal of the conventional 
relationship towards the State and Church that was common to communist parties. 
In terms of SPD membership, the figures achieved by the party were impressive considering 
Germany's most recent history. The majority of the population was demoralised and more 
immediately involved with the concerns of imminent survival than engagement in politics and 
party activism. Nonetheless, in December 1946 the SPD incorporated around 720,000 
members, by March 1947 they had increased to 782,000 members.42 Although these figures 
were remarkable, they were not comparable with the development of the PCI since its 
rebirth.43 
Ever since the SPD's re-emergence after 1945, Schumacher addressed the issue of winning 
over the middle strata in most of his speeches, reiterating that the SPD should be 'open' to all 
people who were willing to cooperate and work actively in reconstructing the party. These 
included the expansion of the class sector, the winning over of intellectuals, the middle 
classes, peasants, as well as former NSDAP members who did not compromise themselves 
during the Third Reich.44 For electoral reasons, the SPD acknowledged that it necessarily had 
to appeal to other and wider sections of society, particularly because it had lost some of the 
41 Blackmer, 'Continuity and Change in Postwar Italian Communism', in D. Blackmer, S. Tarrow (eds), 
COlJllllllnism in Italy and France (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1975), p . .30. 
42 See Appendix 1. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Peter Losche, 'Abschied von der Klassenpartei - das Ringen der SPD urn die Mittelschichten', in Dieter Dowc 
(ed.), Kurt Schumacher und der "Nellball" der deutschen So~Jaldemokratie nach 1945, Gesprachskreise 
Geschichtc, Heft 1.3 (Bonn: FES, 1996), p. 100. See also Kurt Klotzbach, Der Weg ;'llr Staatspartei, 
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strongest areas of social democratic support that after the war lay in Poland or in the Soviet 
zone of occupation. 
Moreover, the SPD realised that it would only become a people's party, both in membership 
and electoral terms, if it refrained from the usage of dogmatism and rigid Marxism. Despite 
this acknowledgment, the SPD pursued an isolationist policy in many respects and the party 
was, besides its intentions and rhetoric, a far cry from becoming a people's party. 
2.3) The economic strategy of the pel and the SPO 
From an orthodox Marxist perspective, the PCl's post-war economic programme had been 
remarkably revisionist in character. For a communist party, the PCl's quest for the 
nationalisation of the means of production was comparatively moderate in tone. Contrary to 
the SPD, Togliatti was rather reluctant to tie his hands with detailed programmatic statements 
that might alienate future tactical allies. As demonstrated before, the PCI was above all 
determined to become a national party and did not perceive itself as being representative of 
solely the narrow corporate interests of the working class.45 
Hence, the PCI refrained from using its prestige amongst the working class to trigger a 
militant mass movement to fight for political and economic reform.46 Nonetheless, the PCl's 
and the SPD's economic programmes converged on the aspect of the nationalisation of certain 
economic sectors. In the PCl's resolution as approved of at the 5th National Congress in 1946. 
the demand for the 'nationalisation of all large monopolistic firms, of the big banks and of the 
insurance companies' was expressed.47 In the agrarian sector, the PCI proposed the 
45 Sassoon, Olle Hundred Years of Socialism, p. 103. 
4(' Ihid., p. 146. 
-17 'V Congresso Nazionale, Sotto la bandiera della democrazia', Resolution to the 5th Congress of the PCL 29 
Decemher 1945-6 January 1946, in PCI (ed.). Da Gramsci a Berlingller. La via italiana al socialismo atfrarerso 
i congrcssi del partito comlillista italiano. II 194-1--1955. p. 22'+. 
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'elimination of the large estates of absentee landlords and the limitation of capitalist farms' .48 
The PCI's early statements on economic policy are best interpreted in the more general 
context of 'structural reforms'. These were to be implemented in the agrarian sector to 
diminish the monopoly of powerful landlords and in the industrial sector, through the 
nationalisation of certain industries and a limited degree of economic planning and the 
protection of small and medium sized property. 49 
In Germany, left-wing initiatives to reform the economy met considerable opposition of the 
American occupying forces. In October 1945, Kurt Schumacher, a dedicated Marxist in 
principle, demanded the nationalisation of the mines, the heavy goods industry, power, 
transport, the insurance and banking sector. 50 At the 1947 Party Congress, Schumacher 
somewhat qualified these demands, arguing that the SPD favoured 'a central planning in the 
economy', distinguishing itself from orthodox communist demands for 'a centralised planned 
economy' in the Eastern sector. 51 This distinction was necessary given the proximity with the 
emerging planned economy in the East. The SPD also stressed its desire for competition 
amongst socialised companies, preferably within the framework of a market economy.52 By 
1949, the SPD had confined itself to demanding the disempowerment of large ownership and 
managers through the socialisation of the basic and key industries. 53 This concept was, 
however, somewhat vague and misleading as it was not always clear which industries the SPD 
identified as 'key' and 'basic' so as to qualify for socialisation. Included in the SPD's 
48 Ibid. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Kurt Schumacher, 'Was wollen die Sozialdemokraten? Neubau nicht Wiederaufbau!', Speech held on 27 
October 1945, in Susanne Miller (ed.), Die SPD vor und nach Godesberg (Bonn-Bad Godesberg: Verlag Neue 
Gcsellschaft, 1974), p. 76. 
51 Kurt Schumacher, 'Deutschland und Europa', in SPD (ed.), Protokoll des SPD-Parteitages, held from 29 June 
to 2 July 19..+7 in Nuremberg, (Hamburg: Verlag Auerdruck, 1947), p. 49. 
)2 Ibid. 
53 'Entschlid3ungcn \'on Bad Di.irkheim', Sozialdemokratischer Pressedienst, 30.8.1949, in Willy Albrecht (ed.), 
Die SPD wlter Kurt Schumacher lind Erich Ollenhauer 1946 bis 1963, Sitz.lingsprotokolle der Spir:.engremiell. 
Band 2,1948-1950 (Bonn: 1.H.W. Dietz. 2003), p. 268. 
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socialisation programme (or those industries which qualified for a 'profound reconstruction ') 
were large monopolies, big banks and insurance companies. 54 
The conviction that capitalism had failed was not only expressed in left-wing party 
programmes but was more widely shared in West Germany. Public ownership (of the coal and 
steel industries) was in fact advocated by the CDU in its 1947 Ahlen Programme.55 Jakob 
Kaiser56, for example, had even demanded a complete reconstruction of society on the basis 
of a 'Christian-shaped socialism' , which found great support by the Catholic left.57 
2.4) The SPO, PCI and the middle classes 
Both PCI and SPD shared a reciprocal understanding of the importance of the middle classes. 
As noted before, the PCI was no longer a small propagandist sect with only a few thousand 
members. 58 It now required a thorough analysis of the party's relation with the middle classes, 
as it was this section which was seen to have secured the support of Fascism in Italy. The 
PCI's definition of 'allies' in the immediate post-war period was extremely broad and 
inclusive: it integrated everyone except 'monopolists', i.e. large capitalists, who qualified as 
the most direct adversaries of the working class. 59 The winning over of the middle classes was 
part and parcel of the PCI's post-war strategy. In his famous speech in 1946, Togliatti had 
reaffirmed that there was 'no conflict between the interests of the PCI and those of the middle 
classes' .60 
54 See SPD (ed.), lahrbuch der SPD 195011951 (Dortmund: Westfalendruck, 1951). p. 26. 
55 Sassoon, One Hundred Years of Socialism, p. 159. See also Peter Merseburger, Der sch~\'ierige Delltsche: Kurt 
Schumacher (Stuttgart: Dt. Verlagsanstalt, 1995), p. 200. 
'ill Jakob Kaiser was one of the leading figures of the CDU in the Eastern sector. In December 1947 he migrated 
to West Berlin. 
57 Merseburger, Der sclnrierige Deutsche, p. 200 ff. 
58 Togliatti, 'Le caratteristiche del nostro Partito', Speech to the 6th Congress of the PCL .+ January I Y'+8, re-
printed in Archivio Partito Comunista (subsequently APC), Microfilm (subsequently MF) 0515 066~. 
~l) See also Stephen Hel1man, 'The PCl's al1iance strategy and the case of the middle classes', in D. Blackmer. S. 
Tarrow (cds), Communism in Italy and France, pp. ~7'+-375. 
60 Togliatti, -eeto medio e Emilia rossa', Speech held on 2.+ September 19'+6, in Togliatti, Opere Seelte, p. '+60. 
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Much as the PCl's, the SPD's rhetoric under Kurt Schumacher was also directed towards the 
creation of a democratic mass party. In spite of this declared aim, there existed a vast 
discrepancy between party rhetoric and de facto policies. The SPD's policies fell short of this 
aim. At the SPD's Party Congress in Hanover in May 1946, Schumacher had advocated an 
open admissions policy, declaring that the party welcomed everyone who joined the SPD 
from a different class or section of society (and not to draw too close a line along class 
divisions), and all those who stood in contradiction to the ownership of large means of 
production.61 Despite this vocal commitment to win over large sections of the middle classes, 
the SPD, contrary to the PCI, failed to formulate a programme that appealed to and managed 
to incorporate precisely these sections of the population. 
Somewhat deliberately overstating, one could argue that the post-1945 SPD, at least until the 
death of its first leader in 1952, was more 'left-wing' and pursued policies that were more 
rigorously dogmatic and less compromising that those of the PCI. In spite of its intentions, the 
SPD's intransigent national as well as European policies alienated those sections it wished to 
attract. In pure electoral terms, this led to, for the SPD, an unexpected defeat in West 
Germany's first national election in 1949. This election marked the most profound defeat in 
the SPD's post-war history, precisely because the SPD had been convinced they were to 
become the major and electorally strongest party by appealing to the widest possible sections 
of the population. Although the SPD had only been narrowly defeated - the margin between 
the SPD and the leading Conservative Party (as well as its Bavarian sister party) was 
relatively small (SPD: 29.2 percent; CDU/CSU: 31 percent) compared to the next elections in 
1953, it marked an important defeat for the SPD. The SPD failed - as it had hoped - to become 
the governing party of the new West German Federal Republic. The loss of the party's strong 
areas of support, which by then lay in Poland or in the Soviet zone (Sachsen, Thliringen and 
East Berlin) also contributed to the electoral defeat. But more importantly and with hindsight 
61 Speech held at the Party Congress in Hanover. May 1946, in K. Schumacher, Au!gaben lllld Ziele de,. 
deufschen So::Jaldemokrafie (Karlsruhe: Schriftenreihe Volk und Zeit. Verlag Volk und Zeit. 1946), p. S. 
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(as the subsequent elections of 1953 and 1957 demonstrated) was that the SPD had not only 
failed to mobilise large sections of the population away from the traditional working class 
sector, but also alienated many potential voters with its unyielding economic and foreign 
policy positions.62 
2.5) The Foreign and European policies of the pel and the SPO 
In Western Europe, the main foreign and European policies to be addressed in the post-war 
period until the mid-1950s were membership in the Western military alliance, NATO, 
adherence to the United States and endorsement of closer European economic cooperation 
and integration. These foreign policy choices were determined by the parties of government 
and had been endorsed by all German and Italian political parties, except the SPD and PCI (as 
well as until the mid-1950s, the PSI). The SPD and the PCI, albeit for very different reasons, 
objected both NATO as well as proposals for European economic integration; the reasons for 
which will be subject of thorough analysis in subsequent chapters. 
Before gOIng any further, some attention should be paid to the Berlin question, as the 
uncertain status of this city largely influenced the SPD's foreign policy considerations over 
the next two post-war decades. Later, in the 1960s, the Berlin question was a key determining 
factor in the formulation and concretisation of the SPD's Ostpolitik. The particular 
vulnerability of the city was forcefully demonstrated when the Soviet Union blocked all 
transport to and from West Berlin as a response to the currency reform introduced in the 
Western zones in 1948.63 For almost a year, the Soviet Union had cut West Berlin off from 
communication and transport with the Western zones. From 24 June 1948 to 12 May 1949, 
62 .Tohan.T. De Deken, 'The German Social Democratic Party', in Robert Ladrech, Philippe Marliere (eds), Social 
Democratic Parties in the European Union (Basingstoke and London: Macmillan Press, 1999), p. 81. 
63 See also Mary Fulbrook, The Dh'ided Nation (London: Fontana Press, Harper Collins Publishers. 1991), pp. 
157-158. 
36 
the road, rail and water routes to West Berlin were blockaded, and the Western powers had to 
secure the supply to the population by air routes. The crisis over Berlin only hardened the 
determination of those in the SPD (as much as it confirmed the correctness of Adenauer's and 
the CDU/CSU policy choices), who wished to link the Western part of Germany closer to 
Western Europe.64 But in spite of the existence of diverging voices, the chosen course was 
predetermined by Schumacher's authoritarian leadership. 
Even with the increasing international polarisation between the East and West, Italy played, in 
comparison to Germany, an entirely peripheral role.65 Until the outbreak of Cold War 
hostilities, Italy had been of no strategic importance to either the United States or the Soviet 
Union.66 As demonstrated before, the post-war PCI can above all be characterised by its 
moderate, consensus-seeking policies. For example, with respect to economic policies, the 
PCI did not prove to be terribly communist after all, or in fact not more so than the SPD, a 
distinctive feature that was to remain prevalent even after the onset of the Cold War. 
Nonetheless, one should not overstate the autonomy and independence of the PCI's strategy 
since 1944. The PCI's 'svolta di Salerno' and subsequent collaboration with the other political 
forces in government had been endorsed and was entirely in line with Soviet foreign policy 
interests.67 Though Togliatti's national policy proved to be the right strategy at the time. it is 
difficult to imagine that it could have been elaborated and implemented if it collided with 
Soviet foreign policy interests and directives. After all, one needs to bear in mind that the 
Badoglio government had been accepted by the Soviet Union (as well as the Allies) prior to 
the PCI's recognition of the monarchist government. 'La svolta di Salerno' was in complete 
64 See Jussi Hanhimaki and Odd Arne Westad (eds), The Cold War. A History in Documents and Eyewitness 
Accoullts (Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2003). p. 71. 
65 See also Sassoon. 'Italian Images of Russia'. p. 189. 
66 This changed with the outbreak of the Cold War and the Tito-Stalin split. 
67 Silvio Pons. L'impossibile egemonia. L'URSS. il PCI e Ie origini della Guerrafredda (1943-1948) (Roma: 
Carocci Editore. 1999). pp. 11-1.2. 
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concordance with the Soviet Union.68 The PCI's cooperative attitude and role in the 
Constituent Assembly involved no conflict between the party's domestic ambitions and its 
loyalty to the Soviet Union.69 
With the increasing Cold War hostilities, Italy's temporary post-war harmony came to an end. 
This implied that the PCl's post-war strategy also came to an abrupt end and was forced to be 
radically reversed. With the beginning of the Cold War, the PCI was attacked from both sides. 
Supported by the United States as well as the Church, the DC split the tripartite coalition 
government in 1947 and adopted an intransigent anti-communist policy. This had been one of 
the conditions imposed to receive Marshall Aid; consequently, the PCI was, together with its 
socialist ally, expelled from government. Moreover, the PCI (together with the PC F) suffered 
severe criticism from the newly established Cominform (a Soviet-installed information 
bureau) for not being in government and for its soft and moderate policies. 
The Italian Communists, together with their French counterparts, were called upon to 
mobilise mass demonstrations against the Marshall Plan and NATO and the PCl's national 
interests became increasingly subordinated to the strategic needs of Soviet foreign and power 
policy interests.7o For ideological reasons and due to the organic link with Moscow inherent in 
communist identity, the creation of NATO naturally raised particularly strong objections from 
all West European communist parties. The PCI could not but align with these communist 
polemics and Soviet directives. In a speech on 12 March 1949, Togliatti dismissed NATO as a 
mere 'pact of aggression', directed towards the division of the European continent. As such 
the PCI 'said "no" to the Atlantic Pact, "no" to a policy of hostility and aggression against the 
Soviet Union' .71 
68 Michael StrUbeL Nelle Wege der italienischen Kommunisten. Zur AuJ3en- lind Sicherheitspolitik der KPI 
(1973-1981) (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1982), p. 80. 
69 Donald L.M. Blackmer. 'The International Strategy of the Italian Communist Party'. in Donald L.M. 
Blackmer and Annie Kriegel (eds). The International Role of the Communist Parties of Italy and France. No .. "12 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Center for International Affairs, Harvard University. 1975), p. 5. 
70 Sl'l' also Blackmer, 'The International Strategy'. p. 8. 
71 Togliatti's spl'l'ch against NATO. 12 March 1949. re-printed in Hanhimaki. Westad (eds). The Cold War. pp. 
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At this stage, an inherent contradiction in the PCI's foreign policy concept became noticeable: 
on the one hand the PCI demanded Italy's national sovereignty in all foreign policy choices 
and against outside interference, opposed the emerging power blocs and dismissed all 
attempts to limit Italy's autonomy and independence; on the other hand, the PCI firmly 
aligned with the Soviet Union on all foreign policy questions. 72 As a communist party. the 
PCI could of course not remain neutral in the emerging East -West conflict. The Truman 
Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, the establishment of Cominform and their expulsion from 
government, were all events that the Italian Communists were forced to accept and could not 
influence. The PCI's fate was decided upon by outside players and the party had to adapt to 
the new political realities accordingly. 
2.6) pel, SPO and the European Recovery Programme (ERP) 
The SPD generally welcomed US financial aid as part of the ERP, much as it was 
enthusiastically supported by all German parties in the Western sector (with exception of the 
small Communist Party) as a means to revive the devastated European economies and 
enhance and also reinforce cooperation amongst Western European countries.73 
According to Schumacher, Marshall Aid was intended to and would accelerate the economic 
reconstruction of a democratic society on socialist terms.74 The SPD's endorsement of the 
72 'VI Congresso Nazionale, Per una nuova democrazia per la liberta. l'indipend~nza. la.pace', 6th ~at~on~l 
Congress of the PCI, held 5-10 January 1948 in Milan, in PCI (ed.), Da GramsC/ a Berll1lg11er, La V/Q ltahalla 
( ... ) II 1944-1955. p. 406. . .. 
73 Kurt Schumacher. 'Deutschland und Europa', in SPD-Bundestagsfraktion (ed.), Parlamentansche PosrrWllell 
ZlI Europa. Von den So:ialdemokratell im Reichstag 1866 his ::'lir SPD-Blilldestagsfraktion ,hellte (Bo~n: Courir-
Druck. 2007), p. 24. See also Rudolf Hrbek, Die SPD - Deutschland lilld Europa (Bonn: Europa Umon Verlag. 
1972), p. 60. . . . . 
74 Solveig Ehrler, 'Zur Deutschlandpolitik der SPD', in Solveig Ehrler (ed.), So:wldemokratle 111l~ So::,whsmus 
heute. B;itragc :ur Analyse ulld Verallderzmg so::.ialdemokratischer Politik (Koln: Pahl-Rugenstem Verlag. 
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programme remained contingent on the expectation that it would not obstruct Western 
Europe's road to socialism and planned economy, and even make it easier.75 
Apart from general endorsement, the SPD did not devote much attention to it. More important 
in the eyes of many German Social Democrats under Schumacher, were the issue of European 
economic integration and the question of national reunification. Matters were different for the 
PCI. Opposition to Marshall Aid, as instructed by Moscow, was not confined solely to the 
PCI. It was also opposed by the PSI. For political and ideological reasons, both Italian 
Communists and Socialists heavily objected US financial aid and Italy being a recipient of 
it.76 In conformity with the Soviet Union, Togliatti dismissed Marshall Aid on the grounds 
that the recovery programme intended to create a bloc of countries hostile to the Soviet 
Union. The Marshall Plan would only further the division of Europe into two permanently 
opposing blocs - a division which the Americans called the Iron Curtain.77 PCI criticism 
against Marshall Aid was strong in rhetoric but limited towards these more general political 
and ideological statements. Opposition to it must be understood in the context of the emerging 
Cold War. Hostility was not ideologically motivated, at least not in the sense that the PCI 
opposed American economic aid per se, but - concordant with Soviet interests - the PCI 
despised the political connotation to it. 
2.7) SPO, pel, Europe and the emerging Cold War 
The SPD was not hostile towards the idea of European economic integration as such. The 
objections raised were not ideologically motivated, but partially dominated by domestic 
policy considerations. The SPD's 'Heidelberger Programme' of 1925 (the party's last official 
75 For an analysis of the SPD's position towards the Marshall Plan, see Klaus Schwabe, 'German Policy . 
Responses to the Marshall Plan', in Charles S. Maier, The Marshall Plan and Germany (New York, Oxford. 
Berg, 1991), p. 225-281. . .. . .' . . 
76 Mauro Maggiorani. L'Europa degli altri. Comumstl ttaham e rntegraZlOne europea (/957-/969) (Roma. 
Carocci Editore, 1998), p. 16. 
77 Rinascita, 'II Piano Marshall', No.6, June 1947. 
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programme) had, for the first time, envisaged a 'creation of a United States of Europe' .78 As 
we will notice, this was in particular contrast to the SPD's statements on Europe after 1945. 
The SPD's early European conception and position on economic integration with the West 
was ambivalent and controversial. On the one hand, Kurt Schumacher still officially voiced 
the very idea of a Germany fully imbedded in a socialist Europe; on the other, this was subject 
to severe reservations. The question of Europe naturally involved the issue of ceding national 
sovereignty in favour of supranational organisational structures. This idea was positively 
endorsed by the SPD, yet, it was inextricably linked to the idea of reciprocity and equality.79 
A further precondition concerned the structures of Europe: these were to be based on the 
principles of socialism and democracy.8o The aim of national reunification (at the earliest 
possible point) was (officially) of paramount concern, and all other questions were to be 
subordinated. The SPD insisted that cementing West Germany too firmly into Western 
Europe (and later in the Atlantic Alliance) would institutionalise the division. Reunification 
with East Germany was therefore officially given priority over integrating West Germany 
with the rest of Europe. 81 The 'official' character of these statements is deliberately 
emphasised as they were only secondarily responsible for the SPD's hostility. As will be 
argued later, the persistence on equality even qualified the insistence on reunification to the 
extent that the issue of equality, or the insufficiency of it (within this newly created Europe), 
was, at times, more important than the goal of reintegrating and merging all occupied zones 
together into a unified Germany. In almost all foreign policy declarations between 1945 and 
78 'Programrn der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands, beschlossen auf dem Parteitag in Heidelberg 
1925', re-printed in Dieter Dowe, Kurt Klotzbach .<eds), Programmatisch~ Dokwnente der delltschen , 
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zwischen Utopie und Politik', in Gahriele Clemens (ed.), Nation lIlId Europa, Stlldien Zlim ;memationalen 
Staatensrstem im /9. und 20. lahrhllndert (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag. 2001), p. 203. 
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1949, Schumacher reaffirmed that the SPD aimed at a 'United States of Europe' 82 and that the 
era of unlimited national sovereignty had ceased. Nonetheless, he would only accept \\'est 
Germany's integration on the basis of full parity with the other European countries.83 
Schumacher had been and could afford to be more 'nationalist' in tone due to his resistance to 
the Nazi dictatorship. In pure electoral terms, the feasibility of this strategy was questionable 
as his demands largely failed to appeal to and attract larger sections in society.84 
During many occasions, the SPD stressed an analogy between the Oder-Neisse line in the East 
and the separation of the Saar from the rest of Germany in the West, arguing that if the 
Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) gave up its position over the Saar, which a separate 
entry into the Council of Europe would have practically implied, the FRG would relinquish its 
bargaining powers over the disputed territories in the East. 85 Schumacher's maximalist 
demands were, however, not accepted without opposition in the SPD. The SPD in West Berlin 
never entirely shared Schumacher's rigid requirements and had, as early as 1947, advocated 
stronger economic integration of the Western zones with Europe. 86 
In Cold War terms, one could argue that the PCI had little choice other than to oppose all 
steps towards European economic integration. As stressed above, the PCI's evolution as the 
main party of the Italian Left and party of government was strongly hindered and decelerated 
by international circumstances. The PCI's foreign policy was determined by its link to the 
82 SPD Party Congress Hanover, 1946, in SPD-Bundestagsfraktion (ed.), Parlamentarische Positiollen :;:11 
Europa, p. 24. 
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Soviet Union and a demand for the primacy of neutrality in Italian foreign affairs. European 
integration in its early stages was dismissed in the more general context of the Cold War and 
American capitalist dominance in Western Europe. As such, the proposals to merge some 
sectors of the Western European economies, American financial aid, the Atlantic Pact - all of 
these were dismissed as alliances against the Soviet Union and attempts to permanently divide 
the European continent into two. Besides these more generally disapproving statements on 
Europe, not much attention was paid by the PCI to Europe in the late 1940s. Europe did not 
rank high in the PCI's strategic priorities. This of course is of little surprise as foreign policy 
choices were made 'abroad' and accepted by the governing parties of Italy (the same applied 
to Germany, where national sovereignty had been even more severely constrained). As such, 
the PCI could do little but remain aloof. The PCI's reaction to and position on European 
integration, and later the EEC, was hostile throughout the 1950s. As we will investigate later, 
this did not substantially alter in the 1950s and a gradual revision occurred at the beginning of 
the 1960s.87 
2.8) Prospects for the 19505 
In the immediate post-war period, ideology was already seen to be somewhat of an obstacle to 
the PCI's and SPD's advance in both electoral terms as well as in accumulating the widest 
possible membership. Adherence to ideology was regarded to alienate possible future social 
and political alliance as well as coalition partners. This was, at least in theory, understood by 
both SPD and PCI alike. In practice, both parties' policy choices were influenced and shaped 
by external constraints. The PCI, heavily constrained by international circumstances, 
nonetheless continued its chosen path of domestic moderation. With the beginning of the 
1950s, the SPD increasingly succumbed to rigid dogmatism. Driven by the belief to 'win' 
S7 Sassoon. 'The Italian Communist Party's European Strateg.y'. The Political Quarterly, Vol. ~7 (1976). p. 25~ . 
.+3 
national elections, little attention was paid to generate foreign and economic policy ground 
with the other parties. Much may be attributed to the monolithic style of Schumacher's 
leadership, who, as widely argued, influenced and made every major decision affecting the 
national and international policy of his party between 1946 and 1952.88 
As far as the PCI was concerned, the Italian constitution was, for example, not only a 
manifestation of the unity of the anti-fascist forces but also one of the most apparent 
demonstrations of the party's moderation and cooperativeness at the time. Its drafting was not 
influenced by outside constraints, and even the onset of the Cold War did not interrupt the 
cooperation between the Left and the DC, which led to a unanimous vote in favour of the final 
draft. 89 The German 'Grundgesetz' (Basic Law), on the other hand, was an expression of the 
Cold War and the division of Germany. The SPD, most importantly represented by Carlo 
Schmid, worked actively in drafting a German constitution, even though with important 
reservations.9o By referring to the provisional nature of the West German Republic, the SPD 
insisted on the creation of a 'Basic Law' (as opposed to a constitution). By asserting the 
temporary character of the Basic Law and by refraining from giving it the formal status of a 
constitution (which in fact it was), the SPD hoped it would not contradict the aim of national 
reunification. 91 An official constitution, so leading SPD officials held, could only be written 
once Germany was reunified. 
In many ways, the PCI had followed the appropriate national strategy between 1944 and 1947 
and managed to grasp the most urgent, prevailing needs of the Italian population. With the 
88 Kevin Featherstone, Socialist Parties and European Integration. A comparative history (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 1988), p. 144. 
89 Sassoon, One Hundred Years of Socialism, p. 130. 
90 Carlo Schmid was the SPD's leading representative in the drafting committee. See also Robert Hoffmann. 
GescMchte der delltschen Parteien (MUnchen. ZUrich: Piper, 1993), p. 249. 
91 Article 146 of the Basic Law (old version) declared that, 'the Basic Law with its provisional statute should be 
replaced by a permanent constitution after the restoration of German unity'. 
beginning of the Cold War, its fate was left to outside factors to decide upon. Ironically 
though, while its strategies drew the logical conclusions from the past, they did not stand a 
chance in practice. The PCI was forced to change its strategy and to adapt to a new set of 
international circumstances. As a result of the emerging Cold war hostilities, international and 
domestic conditions became least favourable for an 'Italian road to socialism'. The PCI, 
forced to align with the foreign policy interests of the Soviet Union, however, never entirely 
abandoned its policy of moderation and consensus-seeking with the other political forces in 
Italy. But subordination to Soviet directives was incompatible with the party's national 
ambitions. Nevertheless, with respect to domestic policies, the PCI remained a moderate force 
and perceived itself as foremost a national party seeking a course that was different from the 
Soviet model of society. 
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Chapter Two 
The SPO and the PCI in the 1950s: the road towards revisionism 
1.) 1950s: Parties and Elections in Italy and Germany 
The Cold War affected the SPD more than any other Western European social democratic 
party. Whereas for most parties the enemy was sitting far away in Moscow, the SPD's foreign 
policy was inextricably linked with Germany's provisional status, her geographical situation 
and the communist regime in the East. The uncertain status of Berlin presented a special 
problem for it was a dangerous buffer zone between East and West. In the 1950s, the SPD's 
German policy (as in fact inherent in the name) was essentially a national policy. This also 
implied that the party's foreign and national policies of those years cannot be clearly 
separated. This only reversed in the 1960s with the acknowledgement of the interrelatedness 
of the German question with European detente. 
The Cold War could not leave the PCI unaffected either. The party's advancement to an 
Italian way of socialism, to be achieved via structural reforms in a coalition government, was 
hindered by East-West hostilities and the party's firm allegiance to the Soviet Union. The 
theory of 'national roads to socialism' implied the acceptance of different strategies for, and 
paths towards, socialist revolution for communist parties in different national contexts. In 
Europe the national roads strategy became the official policy for Western European 
communist parties during the Popular Front era (1934-1939), and later in the phase of 
'national unity' at the end of World War II. It was discarded with the founding of Cominform 
in 1947. 
PCI participation In a governmental alliance during the Cold War, in a country firmly 
imbedded in the Atlantic Alliance, seemed unlikely at the time. The PCI's national room to 
manoeuvre was influenced and largely determined by its allegiance to the Soviet Union in the 
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Cold War and Italy's belonging to the Atlantic Alliance. Any concretisation of the PCI's 
national path was fundamentally dependent on a stabilisation of the volatile Cold War 
atmosphere. The PCI hoped that this would decrease anti-communist feelings at home and 
render a revisionism of its foreign policy fundamentals and a search for bipartisanship more 
likely. A green light by the Soviet Union (like the Twentieth Congress of the Communist 
Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in 1956) was desirable, and most certainly contributed 
decisively to a policy re-thinking in the middle of the 1950s, but changed little about the 
PCI's national stalemate. The fundamental impetus would have to come from the PCI itself. 
In spite of an international climate of hostility, the PC I, unlike the SPD, continued its 
moderate and largely constructive course in domestic politics. For example, between 1948 
and 1953, PCI deputies voted in favour of two-thirds of all legislation in parliament.92 With 
respect to economic policies, the PCI had already distinguished itself from the Soviet model. 
Soviet-style planned economy was neither regarded as vital and indispensable, nor in fact 
desirable for an Italian road to socialism. The PCI refrained from demanding further 
nationalisation in the economy, in part, certainly because of the already existing relatively 
large public sector in the country. In short, while the PCI acknowledged and praised the 
achievements of the 1917 October Revolution, the Soviet model would not be applied to Italy. 
This assertion can of course be subject to various interpretations. Most likely, however, the 
PCI acknowledged and praised the Soviet achievements in establishing a socialist society but 
refrained from the revolutionary path towards that end in Italy. How exactly the PCI wished 
to arrive at a socialist system - in a capitalist, parliamentary democracy like Italy - other than 
by introducing structural reforms, remained unanswered. 
')2 Blackmer, 'Continuity and Change', p . ..J-8. 
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In the early post-1945 period and well into the 1950s, the PCI seemed to make profit from a 
certain programmatic vagueness. After all, electoral survival depends also on the capacity to 
win over larger sections of society. A sound electoral appeal had to be given priority over 
ideological purity. Nevertheless, the PCl's political situation was at an impasse. The Italian 
Socialists managed to increase their share of votes between 1953 and 1958, whereas the PCI 
failed to do so, yet remained relatively stable. The Italian national election in 1953 marked an 
important date for Italian politics. While the left-wing vote emerged considerably increased, 
the majority gained by the centrist coalition (DC, Liberals, Republicans and Social 
Democrats) was extremely narrow. The DC, although still enjoying a comfortable 40 percent, 
had lost considerably compared to the first post-war elections in 1948. As a result of the 
election outcome, the centre-left formula was first discussed and had, as we will see towards 
the mid-1950s, far- reaching effects on the PSI, and consequently, although unwillingly, also 
on the PCI.93 In the mid-1950s, the Italian Socialists had abandoned its original post-war 
strategy of a united front with the PC I. The pact of unity with the Italian Communists had, in 
practice, meant subordination for the Italian Socialists.94 At the beginning of the 1960s, the 
PSI began to opt for an understanding with the centre parties, thereby preferring a minority 
role in the governing coalition over a minority position in a PCI-Ied opposition.95 The SPD's 
electoral results in the 1950s were equally little promising, partly, if not primarily, due to the 
party's own choice to adopt the role of an intransigent opposition party. In electoral terms, the 
CDU/CSU consolidated its advantage towards the SPD in the 1950s, while the Social 
Democrats' share of votes remained relatively stagnant. Whereas the SPD in fact suffered a 
small loss between 1949 and 1953, the CDU/CSU, by comparison, impressively increased its 
share of votes throughout the 1950s. In the 1957 national election, the CDU/CSU had even 
93 See also I1aria Favretto, The Long Search for a Third Way. The British Laboltr Party and the Italian Left since 
j<).j5 (Oxford, Basingstoke: Pal grave Macmillan, 2003), p. 26. 
94 Paul Ginsborg, A History of Contemporary Italy. Society and Politics 1943-1988 (New York and Basingstoke: 
Palgravl' Macmillan, 2003), p. 193. 
95 Sassoon, 'La sinistra in Italia l' in Europa. Elezioni e governi 1945-1988', Italia COlltemporanea, 175 (June 
1989), p. 19. 
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gained an absolute majority for the first and only time in Germany's electoral history. The 
SPD, by contrast, had managed to increase its vote between the 1953 and 1957 elections only 
disappointingl y. 96 
2.) The SPD, PCI and the proposal for a European Coal and Steel Community 
(ECSC) 
The SPD's initial attitude towards Schuman's proposal to merge Europe's coal and steel 
industries was reserved and cautious, but not as yet entirely negative.97 A first major 
declaration on the Schuman Plan was made by Schumacher at the SPD Party Congress in 
Hamburg (21-25 May 1950). Its contents did not alter much from previous statements on 
Europe and contained much of the party's position on the Council of Europe. Schumacher's 
statements were characterised by a disapproving attitude and revolved around the necessity of 
British participation (to act as a counterweight against conservative forces)98, the importance 
of preserving the nationalisation option as well as the abolition of the Ruhr Authority as a 
precondition for the establishment of a coal and steel poo1.99 Similarly to the debate over 
Germany's entry into the Council of Europe, the SPD laid great emphasis on German equality 
as a prerequisite for participation. 
In general, the question of the Schuman Plan triggered little substantial debate and 
controversy amongst SPD delegates. A party resolution was thus passed on the Schuman Plan 
stating that, 
96 See Appendix 4. 
97 William E. Paterson, The SPD and European Integration (England and USA: Saxon House. Lexington Books. 
1974), p. 51. JUrgen Bellers characterised the SPD's initial position towards the ECSC as one of 'carefuL 
hesitant and partial sympathy', see JUrgen Bellers. Reformpolitik llnd EWG-Strategie der SPD. Die innen- lind 
Ql~f3enpolitischen Faktoren der europapolitischen IntegrationslVilligkeit einer Oppositionspartei 1957-63 
(MUnchen: tuduv-Verlagsgesellschaft. 1979), p. 73. 
98 Willy Eichler, 'Das Wahlprogramrn der SPD', Speech on 10.5.1953, re-printed in Ossip K. Fkchtheim (ed.). 
Doklll1ll'1lte ;'lIr parteipolitischen EntH'icklzl1lg in Deutschland seit 1945 (Berlin: Dokumenten-Verlag Dr. Herhcrt 
Wendler & Co .. 11.)62), p. 125. 
99 Paterson, The SPD and European Integratio1l. p. 52. 
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The SPD is convinced that an organisation of Western Europe on the basis of the interests of 
heavy industry would be a fatal blow to democracy and the prospects of international co-
operation between peoples on the basis of equality. The SPD reserves the final blow until it 
knows the content of a series of discussions (my emphasis). Especially important will be the 
equality of all partners, the position of the Ruhr Authority and the right of the German people 
to decide about questions of ownership in their economy. 100 
The SPD remained hesitant until the finalised version of the plan. German reunification had 
. d . d 101 A " hId remalne unmentIone . s negOtIatIOns over t e p an rew to a close and the exact contents 
of the plan became known, positions became more dogmatic and uncompromising in tone.102 
In April 1951, Schumacher repeated the party's motives for rejection: these were the 
insufficiency of German equality in the institutions and the inclusion of the whole of Europe 
(i.e. Scandinavia and Great Britain). As far as equality was concerned, this could only be 
achieved by relating each member's position to the country's share in production. As 
envisaged in the plan, Germany alone, so Schumacher criticised, would contribute 38.6 
percent of the steel and 51 percent of the coal capacity.lo3 Moreover, suspicions about French 
motives were included. lo4 Hostility was outspokenly directed against France. Schumacher 
regarded the Schuman Plan as an obstacle towards European integration, and in practice it 
would only amount to Germany's self defeat vis-a-vis a clearly strengthened France. 105 It was 
also felt that the antitrust provisions of the treaty would destroy German industry and that the 
ECSC as a whole would institutionalise French hegemony. 106 
100 Ibid., p. 53. 
101 See also SPD press release 'Seven preconditions in order to support the ECSC', 20 April 1951, re-printed in 
Schumacher, Reden, SchriJten, Korresponden-;,en 1945-1952, p. 805. 
102 See also W. E. Paterson, The SPD and European Integration, p. 56. 
103 Neuer Vonl'iirts, No. 15, 13. April 1951, p. 2. 
10-1 Schumacher, 'Unser Nein zum Schumanplan', in Hamburger Echo, No. 93, 21. April 1951, re-printed in K. 
Schumacher. Reden-SchriJten-Korrespondenzen 1945-1952. p. 806. 
105 Neller VOl"lviirts, 'Alliierte oder europaische Politik', SPD Pamphlet on the Schuman Plan. No. 17, 27. April 
1951. p. 6. . 
106 See also Werner 1. Fdd. West Germany and the European Community. Changing Interests and CompeTIng 
Policy Objectires (New York: Praeger Special Studies. 1981). p. 31. 
50 
Although the official party line remained largely uncontested and critical voices were rare. 
some important reservations were made. Reformers, such as Max Brauerl07 and Wilhelm 
Kaisen 108, for example, had already welcomed the Council of Europe as a forum in which the 
party could join forces with other social democratic groups to advance the cause of European 
political unification. lo9 Paul LobellO and Willy Brandt equally stressed that the Saar question 
should not be an obstacle to the participation to the Council and needed to be dealt with 
separately. I I I Brandt, Brauer and Lobe considered the 'road via Strasbourg' as the one that 
would ultimately pave the way for German reunification. 112 Carlo Schmid was probably the 
most outspoken supporter of the Schuman Plan and endorsed it with equal enthusiasm as 
Adenauer had done. 113 
Particularly strong objections to the Schumacher-led course were voiced by German trade 
union leaders. From the beginning, the German Trade Union Federation (DGB) adopted a 
positive line in principle. On 7 May 1951, the DGB expressed its official approval of the Coal 
and Steel Community, though not uncritically and with certain provisions. 114 Schumacher 
managed to re-enforce his line, in spite of the fact that this caused considerable difficulty for 
many trade union members, who were also members of the SPD. 115 With the rejection of the 
107 Brauer was mayor of Hamburg, with some interception from 1953-1960. 
108 Mayor of Bremen from 1945-65. He had advocated closer association of West Germany with her Western 
European neighbours and the US and was thereby in disagreement with Schumacher over the SPD's foreign 
policy course. 
109 Dietrich Orlow, Common Destiny. A Comparative History o/the Dutch. French. and German Social 
Democratic Parties. 1945-1969 (New York and Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2000), p. 165. 
110 In the 1920s, Paul Lobe had strongly advocated the idea of a Pan-European Union: in the 1930s, he led the 
SPD-exile group in Prague. Since 1945, he was a leading foreign policy spokesman of the SPD. 
III Dietmar Ramuschkat, Die SPD und der europiiische Einigungsprozess. Kontinuitiit und Wandel in der 
sozialdemokratischen Europapolitik 1949-1955 (Niebtill: Videel OHG, 2003). p. 93. Official party policy was 
that the Saar should not be sacrificed on the altar of European integration. In SPD (ed.). lahrbuch der SPD 
195011951 (Dortmund: Westfalendruck, 1951), p. 81. 
112 Hrbek, Die SPD - Deutschland 1l11d Europa. p. 98. 
I U Ramuschkat. Die SPD lmd der europiiische Einigungsprozess. p. 100. 
11-1 Sec alsu Heinrich Potthofr, Susanne Miller, Kleine Geschichte der SPD 1848-2002 (Bonn: 1.H.W. Dietz. 
2002), p. 199. 
115 Ramuschkat, Die SPD IIl1d de,. europaische Einigzlllgsprozess, p. Ill. 
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Schuman Plan, Schumacher distanced himself from the trade unions and isolated the SPD 
from other social democratic parties in Europe. I 16 
Contrary to the SPD, 'Europe' and all projects linked to it in the period after 1945 assumed a 
substantially minor role in the PCl's foreign policy thinking, until the beginning of the 1960s. 
The PCl's position was one of hostility towards all Western projects, whether 'European' or 
'Atlantic', in fact most European projects did, according to PCI leaders, have an Atlantic. 
anti-Communist origin. A process of re-thinking within the PCI occurred at the beginning of 
the 1960s. The European outlook of the party intensified in the 1960s and 1970s. 
In the early stages, the PCI perceived the European integration proposals as tools of American 
imperialism, which, in alliance with European monopolies, only intended to strengthen and 
consolidate their hegemony over the Western European continent. Accordingly, they were 
dismissed as a capitalist conspiracy that would, and in this the PCl's and SPD's rationale 
converged, only permanently divide the European continent in two. The PCI's unconditional 
alignment with the Soviet Union did not, at that stage, allow for any critical or original 
analysis of the Council of Europe, the ECSC, and the project to integrate Western Europe's 
military divisions. 
Contrary to the DGB, the Italian communist and socialist trade umon federation, the 
'Confederazione Generale Italiana del Lavoro' (CGIL), had distanced itself from the 
Schuman Plan. In the parliamentary debate over the ratification, Giuseppe Di Vittorio, the 
leader of the CGIL, declared that the politics behind the treaty were one of dividing Europe 
and its people. I 17 Interestingly, however, the idea of economic integration inherent in the plan 
was not dismissed per se. It was something the CGIL would be principally willing to discuss. 
had it not been for the negative political connotation behind the treaty. The present forn1 of 
116 KleBmann, 'Wiedervcreinigung und deutsche Nation', p. 124. 
117 Giuseppe Oi Vittorio, 'Sui trattato istituti\'o della CECA', in Mauro Maggiorani and Paolo Ferrari (cds), 
L'Europa da Togliatti a Berlingller. Testimonian:£' e Doclt1llenti 1945-1984 (Bologna: II Mulino, 200)), p. 227. 
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the Schuman Plan was not intended to unite but divide Europe and to institutionalise 
American hegemony in Europe. 118 According to Di Vittorio, the current plan would lead to 
Italy's subordination to foreign political and economic interests and render the national iron 
and steel industry available to foreign capitalism. 119 Hence, it would have disastrous 
consequences for the Italian working class. 120 Moreover, Di Vittorio attacked the lack of 
Italian 'equality' within the newly established institutions. The fact that the voting system 
within the High Authority was based on the principle of qualified majority would, so Di 
Vittorio, automatically imply that Italy was deprived of any 'political weight' in the decision-
making process. I21 The most salient point, however, was that the CGIL leader seemed to 
agree to the principle of economic integration, if it involved more 'equality' for Italy and if 
the Italian coal and steel industry obtained more guarantees (within the institutions), as, for 
example, had been the case for the Belgium coal industry.122 What Di Vittorio was really 
criticising was not the alleged 'inequality' but the fact that other countries may have 
negotiated a better or more profitable deal. It was the terms of the Treaty that were at stake as 
well as the fact that according to the trade union leader, Italy would render its national 
industry accessible to foreign capitalists. 123 
In contrast to the PCI, the CGIL was not altogether opposed to economic integration on a 
European level, if it was beneficial to the workers and the key industries in ltaly.124 Di 
Vittorio argued from the perspective of the Italian working class, whereas the PCI was still 
caught in Soviet polemics and Cold War thinking. The CGIL's analysis on the ECSC had 
been less rigid from the onset, while the PCI remained openly hostile until the beginning of 
the 1960s. It should also not go unmentioned that the Socialists constituted one-third of CGIL 
118 Ibid. 
119 Ibid., p. 228. 
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members. Di Vittorio therefore had strong interests to avoid antagonising the PSI and the 
more pro-European elements within the CGIL. This had an undeniable impact on the pcr s 
policy reversal towards European integration. 
Whether the PCI's posture on Europe was intransigent or considerably reasonable and 
moderate depends, of course, on the perspective from which it is viewed. In comparison with 
other West European communist parties, most notably its French counterpart, the PCI had 
from the start adopted a less dogmatic and ideologically motivated attitude towards European 
integration. A comparison with the SPD demonstrated that the PCI's position was not 
distinctively 'communist', but that hostility - even though for different, mostly national 
reasons - towards European integration was widespread and shared across the spectrum of 
Western European socialist, social democratic and communist parties. In Britain, for example, 
opposition to European economic integration was expressed by both main parties, 
Conservatives and Labour alike. 
3) The SPD, the pel and the project for a European Defence Community (EDC) 
In October 1950, the then French Prime Minister, Rene Pleven, proposed the creation of a 
European Defence Community with the inclusion of West German troops. PI even ' s proposal 
was the military equivalent to economic integration as envisaged in the Schuman Plan, which 
had involved the same six countries. Both the Italian Communists as well as the German 
Social Democrats heavily opposed the creation of a European Defence Community for 
reasons that were not entirely different. 
Until his death in March 1953, Stalin continued to maintain the official Soviet position, such 
as that Moscow sought a united, albeit neutral and unarmed Germany.125 In a series of notes 
in spring of 1952, Stalin had proposed that the four occupying powers draw up a Peace Treaty 
125 In fact some of the literature argues that the USSR was until 19)-+ ready.t? trade the ~astern sector for a 
militarily neutral Germany. Sec. for example. Ehrler. 'I,ur Deutschlandpohllk der SPD . p. 85. 
aimed at establishing such a united Germany, neutral and demilitarised, with all occupying 
forces removed and a government chosen by free, all-German elections. 126 SPD officials 
heavily criticised Washington and Bonn for their failure to enter negotiations with Stalin and 
to take the proposals seriously. 
According to the SPD, there was plenty of time between Stalin's note of March 1952 and the 
Geneva summit conference in 1955 to test the sincerity of the Soviet Union. Consequently. 
the SPD attacked the West for these missed chances. ln Herbert Wehner, a former Communist 
and one of the leading figures in the post-war SPD, sought to use the Stalin note to induce the 
West to enter negotiations with the Soviet Union. 128 Whether Stalin's proposals had been 
genuine is difficult to ascertain. In any case this was of secondary nature, the importance in 
the eyes of the SPD was to espouse and exploit every opportunity to negotiate to the fullest. 
In the discussion over the Stalin note, the CDU did not act as cohesively as one would have 
imagined. Jakob Kaiser, minister for 'all-German questions', cooperated closely with Wehner 
on the issue, and argued for a closer examination of the note, whereby he heavily collided 
with the CDU mainstream around Konrad Adenauer. 129 
The EDC (as well as the ECSC) was rejected by Schumacher as a means to further 
institutionalise the country's division, provoking counteraction by the East and as being 
discriminatory towards Germany. This last aspect readdressed the issue of German equality. 
As far as the reunification aspect was concerned, this immediate goal had been faithfully 
reiterated at any party congress and in every major foreign policy declaration throughout the 
12h Tony Jude Postwar. A Hist0l}' of Europe since 1945 (New York: The Penguin Press. 2005), p. 243. 
127 SPD (ed.), lahrbuch der SPD 1954155 (Hannover-Bonn: Neuer Vorwarts Verlag Nau & Co .. 1955), pp. 13-
14. See also Gordon D. Drummond, The German Social Democrats in Opposition, 1949-1960 (Norman: 
University of Oklahoma Press, 1982). p. 287. . ' . 
12X Meyer, Herbert Wehner, p. 164. A member of the German Co~munist.Par~y untIl 19~2. Wehner ]o,lOed the 
SPD in 1946. There is a substantial bibliography on Wehner and his functIOn 10 the Conuntern. The \\ ehner 
historiography is divided between those who highlight Wehner's active and sub\"ersi\"e r?le in the So\"iet sec.fL't 
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1950s. It was to the primacy of reunification that all other interests were to be subordinated to. 
Accordingly, West Germany must only ratify international treaties if they did not contradict 
or further hinder this aim. The EDC was regarded as an obstacle to the process of 
reunification. Its rejection could only but follow logically. The SPD stressed the provisional 
nature of the present status quo and dismissed all attempts that would institutionalise it as 
permanent. 130 
The essence of Schumacher's condemnation of the ECSC, Adenauer's European policy, the 
PI even Plan etc. was nationalist in character. He despised all of these integration bodies and 
methods as means to permanently deprive Germany of equal rights and secure 'the old French 
hegemony [over Germany] on a European level' .131 Prevention of German reunification, an 
inescapable military escalation between the two opposing blocs and the failure to secure 
Germany's equality in the European army, were the chief motives for rejecting the EDC.132 
Schumacher's 'nationalism' was justified by his experiences as a former Nazi-victim, who 
had spent many years in concentration camps and did not share any moral guilt in Germany's 
past. 133 While Schumacher could afford to be more nationalist than Adenauer and many in the 
CDU, this insistence on German equality did not payoff at elections times. West Germans 
preferred military security over neutrality and were little concerned about Germany's status in 
these institutions. This strong desire for security was further increased by the Soviet 
intervention in the workers' uprising in East Germany in June 1953. 
130 'Aktionsprogramm der SPD', agreed upon at the SPD Party Congress in Dortmund, 1952. and. renewed and 
cIaborated at the Berlin Congress of 1954, re-printed in Dowe and Klotzbach (eds), Programmaflsche 
Dokumente del' deutschen Sozialdemokratie, pp. 317-321. 
131 Wolfgang Benz. 'Kurt Schumachers Europakonzeption·. in Ludolf Herbst (ed.), VOI1l Marshallplan :.ur E~~D 
Die Eingliederung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland in die westliche Welt (Mtinchen: Oldenbourg. 1990). p. )8. 
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The Italian Communists, on the other side, did not pay an enormous amount of attention to the 
subject. The general line was one of hostility and rejection of the defence project. The PCI did 
not clearly distinguish between 'European' and 'Atlantic' initiatives, as all were Western 
manoeuvres directed against the Soviet Union and the establishment of socialism in Eastern 
Europe. The PCl's conception of Western Europe was shaped by a strong 'anti-Atlantic' 
sentiment and European integration initiatives were seen as US attempts to secure economic 
domination over the Western half of the European continent. Economic integration was 
merely complementary to military steps - all directed against the Soviet Union, with the sole 
purpose of dividing the European continent into two counterposing economic and military 
blocs. The PCl's loyalty to Moscow was unconditional and the party made a clear choice of 
sides. Against this background the PCI aligned with the Soviet Union in the debate over the 
EDC, declared its strong objection to the creation of a European army, affirming that it would 
only further contribute to the division of Europe. 
The comparison with the SPD demonstrated that positions cannot be attributed to a certain 
ideological camp. The PCl's opposition was not a uniquely 'communist' position (nor was the 
SPD's a particular social democratic stance) but a reasonably plausible rationale shared across 
a wide spectrum of parties from the centre-left or centre-right in Western Europe. The Italian 
Socialists, for example, had also continued their neutralism in foreign policy - which in 
practise meant adopting a pro-Soviet line, thereby aligning with the PCl. There was also a 
strong rejection and hostility against the EDC from the Italian public. Together with the PCI, 
the Italian Socialists under Nenni portrayed the opposition against a European army as a 
'choice for peace' and promoted a policy of neutrality, which fiercely opposed the idea of the 
emergence of two counterposing military blocs. Opposition was, however, not solely confined 
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to the parties of the Italian Left; the Italian nationalist right also showed strong reservations 
against an EDC. 134 
The choices about the two fundamental themes in Italian foreign policy (as well as German 
and Western European in general) in the immediate post-war period - European integration 
and the Atlantic Alliance - were to be taken by the governing parties of the respective 
countries and therefore by the strong pro-US Christian democratic parties. Even they had been 
partly legitimised by outside factors, i.e. adherence to the US, so that it would be misleading 
to speak of their foreign policies as determined by 'true options'. This also implied that little 
room for manoeuvre was left for the opposition parties other than voicing their protest. 
In an article published in Rinascita, Sergio Segre, a leading foreign policy spokesman of the 
PCI, emphasised that the defence treaty would have disastrous consequences for European 
peace. The treaty would profoundly divide Europe by creating a military bloc that was 
directed against other countries of the European continent. Furthermore, so Segre, it would 
deter and threaten German reunification and stressed that the latter was only possible if East 
Germany also entered the treaty.135 Luigi Longo, a key figure in the PCI and Togliaui's 
successor after 1964, declared that the EDC would diminish Italian sovereignty, deprive the 
country of its control over the army and pave the way for German rearmament. 136 
Ij.~ Antonio Varsori, L'Italia nelle rela-;.ioni intema-;.ionali dal 1943 al 1992 (Roma, Bari: Editori Laterza, 1999), 
pp.98-99. 
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4.) The SPO's policy towards the formation of NATO 
Many German Social Democrats, most notably Herbert Wehner, had considered the demise of 
the EDC as a new opportunity to enter negotiations with the Soviet Union and only if these 
remained inconclusive and fruitless could West Germany uninhibitedly enter a Western 
d t t 137 Th' ff' . I . 138 e ence sys em. IS was 0 ICla party polIcy. Apart from the parliamentary opposition 
against the ratification of the Paris treaties, the SPD engaged in the extra-parliamentary 
movement at the beginning of 1955. 
DGB and the SPD jointly cooperated In the 'Paulskirche Movement' directed against 
Germany's inclusion in NATO. Together with the DGB, the SPD organised demonstrations 
against the Paris accords; on 29 January 1955, an assembly in the 'Paulskirche' in Frankfurt 
voted in favour of the so-called 'German Manifesto', according to which negotiations about a 
four-power agreement were to be given priority over military bloc building. 139 In a meeting 
held in the Paulskirche, Erich Ollenhauer, Georg Reuter (DGB) and Gustav Heinemann 
launched the Manifesto calling for an end to military integration with the West because of the 
damage it would do to German unity. 140 On 27 February 1955, German Parliament ratified the 
Treaties of Paris against the votes of the SPD and on 5 May 1955 the Treaties came into 
force. 141 
In essence, the SPD proposed that Germany (if reunification was to be achieved) must not 
enter any military obligations, which the other side would regard as a military threat. Rather, a 
German foreign policy must make the utmost effort to create a collective security system, to 
137 Meyer, Herbert Wehner, p. 187. 
138 SPD (ed.), lahrbuch der SPD 1954155, pp. 13-14. 
139 Drummond, The German Social Democrats in Opposition, p. 290. See also Meyer, Herbert Wehner. p. 187. 
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Bundeszentrale fUr politische Bildung, 2000), pp. 302-303; see also Stephen Joseph Artner, The SPD a~ld NATO: 
The Transformation of Social Democratic Alliance Policy 1957-1961, PhD (Bologna: The Johns Hopkms 
University, 1984), p. 53. . . , 
1-11 In the final debate prior to voting in German parliament, Ollenhauer reiterated the SPD's positIOn: '\\ ~oe\'er. 
at this stage and in this situation, places the ratification of the treaties before new negotiation.s" or even before the 
mere attempt to arrive at such negotiations, thereby documents his preference under all con~ltIO~s f(~r the 
definitive integration of the Federal Republic in the North Atlantic Pact rather than for reUnIficatIOn, as quoted 
by Artner. The SPD and NATO, p. 5.t. 
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suspend both parts of Germany from its respective military commitments and integrate a 
reunified Germany into a European security pact. 142 Although German rearmament was, like 
in Italy, a highly controversial public issue in the 1950s, opposition to it did not prove to be 
vote-winning. 143 
The SPD's official position was never shared unanimously. Erich Ollenhauer, Schumacher's 
successor after 1954, had been to many German Social Democrats only somewhat of an 
interim leader. He nevertheless attempted to follow Schumacher's foreign policy course. Ernst 
Reuter144 and Willy Brandt had from the onset of the Cold War been wholehearted supporters 
of Germany's integration with the West. 145 According to Brandt, Schumacher's 
uncompromising insistence on equality was totally unrealistic, as only Germany's disposition 
to integration would in turn lead to greater national sovereignty and equality.146 At the 
beginning of the 1950s, Brandt had already advocated some of the principles and ideas that 
were to become official party policy in the 1960s and marked the basis of the SPD's 
Ostpolitik. 
The SPD had opted for neutrality on 'national' grounds, because it believed that this was the 
best strategy to achieve German reunification. 147 German rearmament, whether achieved 
within an EDC or the Atlantic Alliance, would only provoke counter military action by the 
East, as it had been the case shortly after Germany's inclusion in NATO, with the creation of 
the Warsaw Pact. 148 SPD opposition to German rearmament continued in one form or another 
142 'Forderungen zur deutschen Wiedervereinigungspolitik', Resolution of the ~art~ ~ongress he,ld in M~nich. 
10-14 July 1956, re-printed in Ossip K. Flechtheim (ed.), Dokumente ::'1Ir partelpo!mschen Entwlcklung 11l 
Deutschland seit 1945. pp. 134-135. 
I,B Stefan Berger, Social Democracy and the Working Class in Ninetee~lth.and TII'e~lt~eth Century Germany 
(London: Pearson Education, 2000), pp. 187-188. See also KleBmann, Wlederverelmgung und deutsche 
Nation', p. 129. 
l.j.j Reuter had been the first mayor of West Berlin from 1948 to 1953. 
l.j.~ See Winkler, Der lange Weg nach Westen II. p, 198. 
146 See also Wolfgano Schmidt, Kalter Krieg. Koexistenz lind kleine Schritte .' Willy Brandt lilld die 
Deutschlandpolitik /948-1963 (Wiesbaden: Westdeutscher Verlag, 2001). p. 537. 
147 Sassoon, One Hundred Years of Socialism. p. 323. 
148 SPD (ed,). lahrbuch der SPD 1954/55. p. 13, 
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up until 1960, but after the signing of the Western European Union (WEU) treaty, defence 
and European policy were no longer bound together. Though not exclusively, this prompted 
the SPD's change of course on European integration. 
As we will examine later, nuances and subtle changes in the PCI's policy towards NATO 
became noticeable in 1969. A full and thorough policy reversal in favour of Italy's inclusion 
in the Alliance occurred in 1975. The PSI moved from a neutralist stand (which in 1949 took 
the form of total rejection against NATO) to a limited acceptance of the Alliance in the 1950s 
and eventually to complete acquiescence by 1962, in conjunction with and as a prerequisite 
for entering a governing coalition with the centrist parties. 149 
5.} A tentative revisionism: The impact of de-Stalinisation and the Twentieth 
Congress of the Soviet Union on the pel and the SPO's path to Bad Godesberg 
The death of Stalin in 1953 and Khrushchev's revelations at the Twentieth Congress of the 
CPSU held in February 1956 undoubtedly had an enormous impact on the PCI. It allowed for 
the re-emergence of the 'via italiana al socialismo', which, temporarily abandoned with the 
onset of the Cold War, returned to the PCI's political agenda. Stalin's death in 1953 had given 
way to an internal power struggle within the Kremlin between Beria, Molotov, Malenkov and 
Khrushchev. By 1955, Khrushchev had emerged as the overall leader. At the Twentieth 
Congress of the CPSU in 1956, he initiated a series of strategic and doctrinal changes which 
would not leave the PCI unaffected in the long term. 
149 Vannicclli, Italy, NATO and the European Community, p. 25. 
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The crucial point of the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU was the acceptance of the principle 
of peaceful co-existence in international relations, the consequent abandonment of the 
doctrine of the inevitability of war with capitalist nations, as well as the possibility of national 
roads to socialism that differed from the Soviet model. 150 The possibility of national roads to 
socialism was, of course, not a novelty in Soviet foreign policy thinking. It had already been 
developed by Stalin and subsequently been abandoned in the immediate post-war era with the 
beginning of the Cold WaL l51 The novelty was marked by Khrushchev's rejection of the 
rigidity of the two bloc theory and the inherent (limited) flexibility in international relations 
allowing for the possibility of 'peaceful coexistence'. The changes of 1956, in the short term, 
led the PCI to undertake a number of changes in its internationalism, which were clustered 
around the concept of polycentrism and the claim for limited forms of communist party 
autonomy. While de-Stalinisation was foremost a matter of identity, the national roads 
strategy had the potential of affecting the concept of socialism, and peaceful coexistence 
dramatically changed strategy vis-a-vis the West. 152 
As a profound shock to many communist parties, which had built their organisation and 
prestige around the myth of Stalin and the Soviet Union, came the non-official part of 
Khrushchev's speech and his revelations of Stalin's crimes. 153 
The most salient point in Togliatti's argument in response to these (and here the PCI again 
distinguished itself from other communist parties), was that it was not sufficient to simply 
denounce what Stalin had done and attribute all crimes to the negative consequences of the 
'personality cult' centred around Stalin. It was also necessary to explain why it had been 
150 Sassoon, One Hundred Years of Socialism, p. 261. . . 
1:>1 In Europe the national roads strategy became the official policy for the Western European communist partIes 
during the P~pular Front era (1934-39), and later on in .the phase o.f 'natio~al ~nity' at the end of the Se~ond 
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possible for Stalin to make certain 'errors'. Togliatti dismissed the idea of the \"iability of the 
concept of 'personality cult', which could not be used as the universal key for the explanation 
of all problems within the Soviet system and in the international communist movement. 154 
Stalin's errors, so Togliatti concluded, and its deeper roots may be found in the evolution of 
the Soviet political and social structures. Togliatti therefore dared to touch the delicate issue 
of the co-responsibility of the entire Soviet leadership group, which, according to him, 
required equally serious investigation. I55 Togliatti was the only communist leader to speak of 
a 'degeneration' of the Soviet system. 156 
Some historians stressed that Togliatti, however, refrained from systematic criticism of the 
Soviet regime for fear of bringing upon himself further Soviet criticism and hence the demise 
of his own party.I57 After all, so Togliatti calculated, by the mid-1950s, workers, cottage 
labourers etc. constituted for about two-thirds of the PCI's membership; intellectuals, students 
and white-collar employees (those who would adopt a more critical position on the Soviet 
Union) only a mere 3 percent. I58 
The criticism of the Soviet system also served to strengthen the concept of an 'Italian road to 
socialism', which had, in principle, characterised the PCI's post-war strategy. The re-
emergence of a national road and a tentative revisionism, which was elaborated upon in 
subsequent years, were the most important outcome and consequences of the Twentieth 
Congress and Khrushchev's revelations. Togliatti declared at the PCI's Congress in December 
1956 that the struggle for an Italian way to socialism was at the core of the party's operational 
policies, dismissing the concept of monolithism within the international communist 
movement, and attacked the rigid dogmatism that had been the guiding principle for the 
154 Togliatti. 'Intervista a ""Nuovi argomenti .. ·. re-printed in Togliatti. Opere See/rc. p. 721. 
155 Blackmer. 'The International Strategy'. p. 10. .. ., .. 
156 S I S'I' P "The Itall'an Communist Party between East and \\"LSl. 1960-64 . In \\ 11fned Loth (ed.l. et: a so 1 V10 ons. -
Europe Cold War and Coexistence. J953-J4()5 (London: Frank Casso 200.+). p. 98. 
157 Barth Urhan. Moscow and the Italian Communist Party. pp. 238-2~9. 
158 Ihid. 
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movement thus far.
159 
Once monolithism was ruled out, full autonomy for each communi~t 
party was to become, according to the PCI leader, the guiding principle of the international 
communist movement, while the unity and co-ordination of the movement was to be secured 
. b f . I . 160 VIa anum er 0 reglOna centres or polycentnsm. The actual ideological battle of the PCI 
between 1956 and 1961 was centred on demolishing once and for all any attempt to return to a 
single organisational centre, which would grant the PCI with the much desired flexibility in 
national affairs. 161 
Togliatti's famous interview with Nuovi Argomenti in 1956 signalled an important step 
towards a process of revision which culminated in the late 1970s. Whereas the pcrs 
revisionism was triggered by external events, this process had also been paralleled by 
important domestic circumstances. By the mid-1950s, Italian capitalism was leading to an 
enormous economic expansion at the end of that decade. The trade union movement was 
deeply divided along party lines and the PCI had lost its majority among the workers in the 
F· k . T . 16' Iat wor s In unn. -
In the middle of the 1950s, the PCI had faced a variety of challenges and was increasingly 
caught between numerous conflicting pressures: the party's solidarity with the Soviet Union, 
its domestic strategy, the Soviet position regarding European integration and the economic 
reality in Italy, the deviating position of the communist and socialist dominated trade union 
federation, and finally, the detachment of the Italian Socialists from the PCI and their 
subsequent flirtation with the parties of the centre. 
159 In APe. MF OS I 5 0666-0668. 
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5.1) The PCI and the Soviet invasion of Hungary in 1956 
The Soviet invasion of Hungary in October and November 1956 brought an abrupt halt to the 
newly found freedom within the international communist movement by forcefully 
demonstrating the limits the CPSU was willing to cede and to grant the countries \vithin its 
sphere of influence. It was also representative of the limits of PCI criticism vis-a.-vis the 
Soviet Union and that despite all attempts to implement a national road to socialism, largely 
uncritical solidarity with Moscow still marked the guiding principle of the PCI's foreign 
policy. It revealed the severe limitations of the 'national roads' strategy. Though the Soviet 
reaction to the Hungarian events did not 'officially' break with this strategy, it marked the 
limits of it in a sense that was highly disadvantageous for the autonomy of communist parties 
and states worldwide vis-a.-vis Soviet dominance. 163 
The PCI's reaction to the Soviet invasion of Hungary demonstrated that the obligation of 
international solidarity with the Soviet Union was still given priority over domestic political 
considerations. Although the PCI continuously sought to increase its own room for 
manoeuvre in national and foreign affairs in the following years, the PCI's subordination and 
failure to substantially criticise and condemn Soviet foreign policy would not change until 
1968. The Soviet invasion of Hungary was justified by the PCI leadership as a 'severe 
necessity' in order to prevent the imperialist reactionary forces from coming to power in 
Hungary.l64 PCI reaction to Soviet repression of the Hungarian events showed above all the 
limits of PCI independence in foreign policy beyond which the party was unwilling to move 
at that stage. 
163 On this question see Bracke, Which Socialism, p. S~'. . . .' . " 
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5.2) pel-psI relations after 1956 
After the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU in 1956, the Italian Socialists engaged in a process 
of reassessing the relationship between socialism and democracy, culminating in the full 
acceptance of the democratic parliamentary road at the Party Congress in Februarv 1957. 165 
The Twentieth Congress of the CPSU and the condemnation of the Soviet invasion later that 
year marked a watershed for the PSI more than the PCl. The Italian Socialists distanced 
themselves from the Communists in the aftermath of the invasion and reversed their 'neutral' 
foreign policy posture, gradually revising its anti-Atlantic attitudes and came to fully endorse 
the government's' Atlanticism' by the beginning of the 1960s.166 
This, in turn, opened the way for subsequent centre-left governments at the beginning of the 
1960s. Compared to the PSI, whose electoral score increased in the 1950s, the PCI's electoral 
achievements remained fairly stable in the 1950s, in spite of the de-Stalinisation process and 
the Soviet invasion of Hungary in October 1956. 167 Conversely it can be argued that they did 
not increase significantly because of the party's approval of the Soviet invasion. Thus, 
although the Soviet invasion of Hungary had some repercussions on the intellectuals in the 
PCI and considerably weakened the party's political influence due to a resultant break with 
the PSI, it did not compromise the party's mass electoral strength. 168 
165 Favretto The Long Starch. p. 35. 
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5.3) The Bad Godesberg Programme: policy revisionism and the formation of a 
people's party 
Revisionism was not confined to communist or socialist parties but transformations took place 
within the European Left in general. Not just socialist parties but political parties in general 
are, and have always been confronted with the need to change their policies and programmes, 
whether in adaptation to electoral demands, altered socio-economic circumstances or to 
distinguish themselves from the other opponents on the political market. This process is 
triggered by diverse reasons. The PCI, keen to re-launch and elaborate upon its via italiana al 
socialismo, implemented through structural reforms and via parliamentary means, needed 
some form of official sanctioning from Moscow. Nonetheless, as we have established before, 
there existed severe limitations to the 'green light from Moscow' and to the implementation 
of a truly 'national road of socialism'. 
Contrary to the PCI's hesitant revisionism, which was more dependent on external 
legitimisation than on an outside impetus, the SPD's policy transformation was essentially 
triggered by domestic policy and electoral considerations. While continuing its 
uncompromising foreign policy course until 1960, the SPD's Bad Godesberg Programme 
marked the culmination of the party's economic policy revisionism. 
At first glance, the most notable difference between the Bad Godesberg Programme and its 
. . d . d 169 predecessor of 1925, the Heidelberg Programme, was that MarxIsm remame unmentlOne . 
The SPD accepted the principles of the market economy, no longer demanded the 
nationalisation of the key and basic industries, and accepted the principles of the economic 
policy of the CDU/CSU. In doing so, the SPD hoped to widen its appeal, thereby to increase 
the party's share of votes and become an attractive and legitimate coalition partner. 
169 S h' , h' hI' ht the f'ac't that Marxism remained unmentioned as one the most outstanding features orne Istonans 19 g' , ,..., ., 
f h h P See t'or "x'lmple Hoffmann. Geschichte der delltschen ParTelen. pp, _61- ... 6_. o t e Godes crg rogramme, . ,,", .. . 
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A closer analysis of the programme - and the context within which it was elaborated _ 
somewhat qualify its originality. The Bad Godesberg Programme is less spectacular and 
contained remarkably little renovation, especially when analysed in comparison with the 
party's previous manifestations and declarations. Although the Aktionsprogramm of 1952 
(and the renewed and elaborated version of 1954) still demanded the transference of basic 
industries into public ownership17o (a demand the Bad Godesberg Programme refrained from 
voicing), the Action Programme of 1954 had already included the much quoted demand of 
'competition as much as possible, planning as much as necessary' .171 In 1958, the SPD's 
economic expert, Heinrich Deist, had also declared that the abolition of private ownership was 
no longer a goal to be aspired. Rather, the more state control and influence were allowed to be 
exercised in the economy, the lower the possibilities for free development. 172 
This demand was reiterated in the Bad Godesberg Programme but was not a specificity of it 
and thus did not mark a novelty as such. The Bad Godesberg Programme was the official 
expression of a process of revisionism that occurred in the SPD between 1953 and 1959, 
triggered by a series of electoral defeats and the economic miracle - publicly endorsed and 
seen in conjunction with the government's economic policies and the impact of European 
integration. An interesting feature of the Bad Godesberg Programme is the fact that it sought 
common ground with the CDU/CSU, while it simultaneously avoided alienating its own 
supporters and the left-wing faction within the party. It was a compromise (as party 
programmes so often are) between modernisers and traditionalists, sharing the common 
ambition of assuming governmental power. 
Its greatest success may in fact have been its vagueness and inherent ambiguities (also not an 
unusual feature of party programmes). The programme stressed general demands such as the 
170 'Aktionsprogramm der SPD', agreed upon at the Party Congress in Dortmund in I ~52, elaborated at the 
Berlin Party Congress in 1954, re-printed in Dowe and Klotzbach (eds), Programmatlsche Dokllmente der 
deutschen So::.ialdemokratie, p. 328. 
171 Ibid., p. 329. 'Id k " P , D hi d' 10 
172 SPD (cd.), Protokoll der Verhandlungen des Parteitages der So::.ra emo 'ratlsc len artn eutsc all 5, o-
n May 1958 in Stuttgart, p. 185, 
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necessity for 'increasing prosperity' and 'a just share and distribution of the national product', 
'full employment' and 'general economic prosperity' - largely undisputed calls which all 
German Social Democrats could wholeheartedly and uninhibitedly vote upon.173 The 
revisionist programme, first discussed at the 1958 Party Congress in Stuttgart, was eventually 
put to vote the following year. The SPD leadership was confronted with no serious resistance 
for reasons discussed above. As such, its final approval was never seriously questioned. 17.+ 
The new programme was accepted by the party delegates by 324 votes to 16.175 These were 
the new goals and marked the basis for both the immediate and long-term party strategy. 
It is often held that the Bad Godesberg Programme, in contrast to the Action Programmes of 
1952 and 1954, no longer overtly advocated the nationalisation (a term preferred over 
socialisation) of the key and basic industries. 176 However, just because the term was not used, 
one should not conclude that the nationalisation was renounced completely. In fact, public 
ownership was seen 'as a legitimate form of public control' in order to enshrine the freedom 
(of the individual) from the superiority of large monopolies. In As such, the programme was 
vague enough to account for the supporters of nationalisation, by allowing some sort of 
planning as a counterweight to the development of capitalism, or as a regulation of it. 178 This 
was justified by stressing that the central problem (of the capitalist system) was the economic 
power of large scale monopolies and in order to control the influence of the latter in the name 
of individual freedom and free competition, public ownership is appropriate and necessary. 179 
The precise form and degree of this 'public ownership' remained open and was subject to 
speculation and individual interpretation. The supporters of nationalisation within the SPD 
173 'Grundsatzprogramm der SPD', Extraordinary Party Congress, held in Bad Godesberg. 13-15 November 
1959, re-printed in Potthoff, Miller Kleine Geschichte der SPD. pp. 496-497. 
174 Meyer, Herbert Wehner, p. 223. . . . 
175 Sassoon. One Hundred Years of Socialism, p. 249. See also Potthoff. Miller, Kle/1le Geschlchte der SPD. p. 
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could therefore read into this the demand for some degree of public ownership, without the 
issue being specifically addressed. Reformers within the party and parts of popUlation, which 
were previously deterred by the SPD's demands for nationalisation, could be reassured by the 
party's new course of economic moderation. 
One of the underlying goals was to attempt an overture towards the CDU/CSU. As such it was 
important that the manifesto's basic statements did not contradict with those of the Christian 
Democrats. The governing CDU had, however, been equally vague in its Hamburg 
Programme of 1953, advocating some tactical influencing of the economy through market-
driven means and to establish the legal foundation for economic competition. 180 
As argued before, in order to fully comprehend the Bad Godesberg Programme, one needs to 
analyse its context. The process of rethinking had been triggered after Schumacher's death 
and the electoral defeat of 1953, when a working group under Willy Eichler was first 
established, and was further accelerated by the elections results of 1957.181 External reform 
pressures were needed to establish a drafting group and to convince those within the party 
opposed to modernisation. 182 The SPD was continuously defeated at the polls - facing an ever 
stronger CDU - and came to realise, that if it wished to assume governmental responsibility, it 
not only needed to become a possible coalition partner and widen its appeal in West German 
society, but that it also needed to present itself as something completely new on the political 
market and widen its appeal beyond the traditional working class strata by dropping official 
party slogans and banners. As such, a party congress, called upon extraordinarily, generally 
provides the ideal platform for renovation. The desire to become an acceptable partner in 
government was an implicit expression of the Bad Godesberg Programme. 
180 'Hamburger Programm der CDU', 1953. .. . .. 
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The Bad Godesberg Programme was the official watershed of a process to become a people's 
party that had been long under way. This process was paralleled by a simultaneous re-thinking 
of the SPD's intransigent policies towards European integration (but not a reconsideration of 
the official line towards NATO as yet). As the national elections of 1953 and 1957 forcefully 
demonstrated, the SPD failed to accumulate votes beyond the traditional social democratic 
strata, the possibility to govern by itself was a more than unrealistic prospect, and the party's 
intransigent policies were unacceptable for any coalition partner. The SPD sought appeal 
beyond the working class and become a party which no longer hampers any class or group in 
the population. 183 
Domestic pressures and public opinion therefore accumulated in policy revisionism. A re-
thinking towards European integration and the Bad Godesberg Programme of 1959 were the 
first manifestations of this. 
The Bad Godesberg Programme was not about foreign policy. The foreign policy section only 
reiterated the more general and ongoing SPD demand which still identified national 
reunification as the party's most important goal. As a means towards achieving disarmament 
and detente in international relations, the SPD highlighted the need for regional security 
systems in the framework of the Unites Nations. A reunified (and fully sovereign) Germany 
should then be incorporated in such a European security system. 184 The SPD's campaign 
slogans for a reunification at the earliest possible stage, although undoubtedly desired by the 
majority of West Germans, did not prove to increase the party's electoral achievements. West 
Germans did not wish to 'trade' security within the Atlantic Alliance for a reunified Germany, 
as a buffer state in the East-West confrontation. After all, the Cold War tensions were still 
high, and detente only emerged in the 1960s. The underlying principle of the SPO's analysis 
therefore still was, as will be demonstrated below, that a solution of the German question was 
183 Thompson, The Political Odyssey of Herbert lrehner, p. 179. .' ... . 
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a prerequisite for peace and security in Europe. This excluded participation in the Atlantic 
Alliance, which remained official party policy until June 1960. 
72 
Chapter 3 
SPD and PCI policies towards NATO and the United States, 1960-1976 
1.) PCI, SPD and the onset of the Cold War 
In Italy, the period between 1946 and 1948 marked the transition from fragile wartime 
collaboration in the National Liberation Committee (CLN) to an uncertain post-war period 
dominated by the emerging bipolar East-West confrontation. Once the Italian Communists 
had been expelled from government in 1947 together with their socialist ally, and Italy's 
foreign policy became firmly imbedded in the West and in the newly established military 
alliance, little remained for the PCI to do but protest. After the exclusion from government 
and the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty, the foreign strategy of West European 
communist parties was based on the fundamental rejection of the international alignment of 
their countries in conjunction with deteriorating East-West relations. The Cold War clearly 
exacerbated domestic contrasts and confrontations on the heterogeneous Italian domestic 
scenery. The decisive elections of 1948 ideologically divided the country in a Leftist bloc of 
PCI and PSI - henceforth forced into opposition - against a DC-led bloc together with some of 
the minor centrist parties. The Christian Democrats had been able to establish a power system 
which was largely unprecedented in Western democracies, while the largest force of the Left 
and strongest opposition party in general, remained stigmatised. 185 
In terms of foreign policy, the PCI's post-war moderation and constructiveness became 
influenced by deteriorating East-West relations and Soviet attacks on the PCI (i.e. with the 
adoption of the emerging vision of a bipolar world at the founding meeting of the Cominform 
in 1947). The PCI adopted an anti-Imperialist, pro-Soviet national foreign policy to o\'ercome 
IS) Bruno Schoch, 'Eurocommunism and Defence: Do \\'eslLTn European Communists feci Threatened hy the 
Soviet Union'? The Case of Italy', Bul/etin qIP('(/['( Proposals. Vol. 15. No.1 (J9X .. n. p. 28. 
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the Cold War bipolarisation, demanding an end to the East-West division and the withdrawal 
of all military troops from Italy. 
Parallel to NATO's birth and Italy's inclusion as a founding member, West Germany became 
'formally' independent on 8 April 1949, albeit still divided, demilitarised and under Allied 
occupation until 1955. Both Italy's and Germany's reconstruction in the widest sense was 
strongly dependent in economic, political and military terms on the United States and the 
Atlantic Alliance. Neutrality had not been an option. Due to Germany's specific geopolitical 
situation as a front line country in the volatile East-West relations, re-militarisation was a 
national security question of paramount importance. Changes in the international climate 
possibly put at stake national security. The Federal Republic had been more directly 
confronted with the pressures of the Cold War than any other European nation. 
Remilitarisation was a national issue all Western German political parties were confronted 
with. Rearmament and entry into the Western Alliance were also the essential preconditions 
for the restoration of German national sovereignty. 
However, contrary to the PCI, the SPD had not been ideologically constrained. Hence, it did 
not oppose West German remilitarisation within the EDC or NATO in principle, or on pacifist 
grounds, but because it ran counter to the SPD's national reunification concept by presenting 
an obstacle to it and provoking counteraction in the East. 186 As such, German rearmament, in 
whatever form, was seen as a further impediment to national reunification. Apart from 
domestic political considerations, Italy's attitude towards NATO has been from the beginning. 
contrary to Germany's, determined not so much by a concern for security as by its search for 
a role in world politics. Italy's interest in questions of military strategy had been rather 
minimal: its major effort had been to gain recognition as an important member of the 
186 Karsten Voigt. Wege :'lIr Abriis!lIllg (Frankfurt am Main: Eichhorn Verlag. 1981). p. 127. 
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Alliance. A similar rationale stood behind the SPD's strategic reassessment vis-a-vis the 
Atlantic Alliance: SPD leaders attempted to increase the party's status within Germany as a 
result of an unequivocal acceptance of the military alliance. Later, support of the Atlantic 
Alliance (and NATO as an integral part) was paramount to the SPD's Ostpolitik. The SPD 
could not have conducted its Ostpolitik successfully if it had not been supported by the United 
States or Germany's Western neighbours. Later, Ostpolitik became a field where the FRG 
could demonstrate that it could look after its interests with self-confidence, always in 
accordance with the general Western course of detente but not merely echoing French and 
American interests. I87 Acceptance of the Alliance was thus also a first step towards gaining 
greater recognition and a say in international affairs to ultimately develop an independent 
foreign policy that could rely on the support of the Western Alliance. 188 
Here it will be argued that adherence to NATO was seen by both SPD and PCI, at least 
initially, as a necessary means to an end. Although due to a lack of ideological constraints 
more 'Atlanticist' in principle, the SPD, if analysed from a party and rank-and-file 
perspective, was less US enthusiastic and more critical than what was conveyed by an often 
somewhat distorted official party picture. This discrepancy of perspective between different 
party wings, and the governmental and non-governmental levels of the SPD, was forcefully 
expressed over the debate of the stationing of new missiles in Western Europe at the 
beginning of the 1980s. Central to this were the in general, more widely diverging views over 
military deterrence as an appropriate means of securing detente in East-West relations. 
187 Gottfried Niedhart, 'Ostpolitik and its impact on the Federal Republic's relationship with the West', in 
Wilfried Loth (ed.), The making of detente: Eastern and Western Europe in the Cold War. 1965-75 (Oxon: 
Routledge, 2008), p. 124. ') . , , . 
188 L"t E I . SPD ( , J ) Protokoll des Parteitaoes der SPD, 26 - 30 May 196_ In Cologne (Hanmn cr. Bonn. rfl Z ~r er In l: l, , '" 
Neuer Vorwarts-VerIag Nau & Co., 1962). p. 199. 
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In comparison with the SPD, the PCI's policy reversal towards NATO departed from a similar 
(realistic) calculation, it was a strategic means to a certain end. The party's acceptance of 
NATO did not result from a sudden enthusiasm for the Atlantic Alliance (or from a changing 
nature of the Alliance itself) but from the realisation that Italy belonged to a certain political-
military bloc. If the PCI wanted to become a partito di governo (party of government) it had 
to acknowledge this external element and adapt to it. The crux to the PCI's concept of the 
'logic of the blocs' was the realisation that two military camps existed (and would do so for 
an uncertain period of time) and that the party would have to 'move within the existing 
realities', i.e. obey to the foreign policy rules as imposed from the outside. Both SPD and PCI 
had come to realise that long-term domestic opposition to international realities had little 
chance of success. 
As a result of Italy's and Germany's most recent history, neither country could hope to 
originate a truly independent national foreign policy. Acceptance of both NATO and 
European integration became paramount in regaining national sovereignty and a minimal say 
in international affairs. They were the necessary means to end foreign occupation and gain a 
higher degree of international equality. This practice was left unchallenged to a somewhat 
greater extent in Italy, than in Germany. As one will notice in the context of the missile debate 
at the end of the 1970s, Italian leaders expected to increase the country's status within the 
Atlantic Alliance as a result of missile installations. Even purely strategic decisions were 
approached in terms of prestige rather than security considerations. 189 Again, national security 
considerations had a much greater impact on strategic policy decisions in Germany than in 
Italy. 
l~l) Vannicelli, Italy. NATO. and the European Community. p. 23. 
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For the German Social Democrats and the Italian Communists, as for most other national 
parties in Western Europe, full endorsement of their country's key foreign policy principles _ 
European integration and loyalty to the United States and NATO - were thus the mandatory 
path to governmental co-operation. Western European integration and NATO marked the twin 
pillars of Italy's and Germany's foreign policy. An analysis of the SPD's and PCI's policy 
reversal on NATO (as well as their security policies and stand in the East-West confrontation 
in general) is illustrative and provides an interesting case study of how the positions of 
political parties are often symbolic of the use made of international questions for domestic 
purposes. Acceptance of adherence to NATO did not depend so much on a 'free choice' of the 
parties, but as we shall see, it was often an almost obligatory path deriving from the nature of 
the bipolar system in search for national foreign policy consensus. In this the SPD and the PCI 
largely converged and this recognition formed an essential part of the ambitions of the two 
parties to integrate themselves into their domestic political system and society. 
Once a policy reversal was accomplished, neither party was a wholehearted or enthusiastic 
supporter of the military alliance in principle. Largely unequivocal endorsement of NATO 
became an integral part of an (often) critical 'Atlanticism' practised by both parties alike. For 
ideological reasons, the Italian Communists were of course much more US-sceptic, yet, pro-
Americanism was somewhat less widespread in the SPD than one would have imagined. 
As we will examine later with regard to the euromissile debate in the late 1970s, there existed 
a high correlation between domestic policies and strategies and certain positions regarding the 
Atlantic Alliance. Foreign policy decisions and strategies can often only be fully 
comprehended when viewed from a domestic policy context. One would assume that political 
parties, when in power, often feel bound by external constraints (i.e. decisions taken within 
the Alliance and vis-a-vis the US ally) or internally, by inner-coalition agreements and are 
more liberal to object when in parliamentary opposition. With regard to the pcrs security 
77 
policies in the prevailing superpower confrontation, as the NATO dual-track decision will 
further demonstrate, the Communists' choices, when in opposition, were as profoundly 
shaped by external and internal constraints in the late 1970s as those of the governing SPD 
during the same period of time. The debate of new missiles on European territory provides a 
highly interesting case study for the correlation and strong interdependence between domestic 
strategies and foreign policy choices. 
2.) The SPD's foreign policy reassessment: in search of a foreign policy 
consensus 
Some historians pay greater attribute to international reasons (or a change of the gIven 
political realities)190, some to inner-party power constellations191 , or electoral motivations l92 
when accounting for the sudden policy shift in the SPD's security policy thinking and the 
fundamental policy reversal regarding West Germany's adherence to NATO. The prevailing 
geopolitical realities and Moscow's reluctance to German reunification most certainly 
accelerated the SPD's call for a more realistic foreign policy approach. However, the move 
toward a foreign policy consensus with the CDU/CSU on the basis of West Germany's 
unquestioned adherence to the Atlantic Alliance was certainly also directly, if not primarily, 
motivated by domestic political ambitions. The SPD's previous 'policy of polarisation' and 
isolationist course, confronting West Germans with an 'either or choice', had been almost 
exclusively beneficial for the CDU/CSU. Although pacifism and opposition to German 
rearmament were undoubtedly widespread amongst West Germans in the mid-1950s (as 
190 Reinhard Mutz, 'Atlantische Abschreckung und europaische Entspannung: Kritische Analyse des 
Sichcrheitskonzeptes der SPD', in Gerhard Kiersch and Reimund Seidel mann (eds), Sicherheit.lllld 
Entspannllng. Die AntH'ort des demokratischen Sozialisl1lllS (Frankfurt am Main, Kol~: Europalsche . 
VerIagsanstalt, 1977), p. 24. See also Andrea H. Schneider, Die Kunst des Kompromlsses: Helmllt Schnlldt lllld 
die Groj3e Koalition 1966-1969 (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schoningh Verlag, 1999). p. 25. 
191 Sec Abraham Ashkenasi. who argued that the sudden rise of power of the group around Brandt wa~ 
responsible that the foreign policy concept of the Berlin SPD was adopted by the federal SPD. in Reformparrei 
lind Al~f3el1politik (Koln. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1968), p. 186. . .. 
I')~ Reiner Marcowitz, Optioll.!i"ir Paris? [inionsparteiel1, SPD lind Charles de Gaulle 1958 blS /969 (f'-Iunchcn: 
R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1996), p. 89. 
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manifested in the 'Paulskirche' movement), the SPD's concept of national reunification did 
not amount, as the 1953 and 1957 national elections expressed, to sufficient parliamentary 
193 
success. 
2.1) The failure of the 'Deutschland Plan' 
The most manifest expression of the SPD's failure to grasp the prevailing international 
circumstances was the party's Deutschland Plan (published on 19 March 1959). The SPD's 
'Deutschland Plan', or German Plan, was a political construction that remained largely 
ignored at the time of its launch, but became highly controversially debated amongst 
historians, decades after its rapid demise. The most interesting question to address here is not 
what the plan precisely consisted of or an analysis of its inherent flaws or why it failed, but 
why the plan was introduced at all and supported by its initiators (at least officially) well into 
spring of 1960. 
The SPD's reunification initiative as envisaged in the party's Deutschland Plan was largely 
ignored by the West German public and the Western Allies (during the Geneva conference of 
1959) alike, and was controversially debated within the SPD itself. 194 If examined exclusively 
from an inner-party perspective, it was certainly one of the most contentious political 
constructions at the time. In most of the literature, it is correctly analysed as the SPD's final 
effort to come to early reunification on neutral, demilitarised grounds (and thereby present an 
alternative to the government's policies), before the party's foreign policy U-turn in June 
19l V . i b .. I '17 
- DIg!. Wcge ::'11" ,,-\ rustling. p. ~ . 
1<).1 Artncr. The SPD and NATO. pp. 218-219. 
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1960.
195 
It was the last 'social-democratic' contribution to solving the German question based 
on a neutral foreign policy before the SPD fully embraced bipartisanship in foreign policy. In 
essence, the Deutschland Plan of the SPD envisaged a number of individual steps towards a 
military relaxation of tension leading ultimately towards national reunification, via a 
withdrawal of all foreign troops and free national elections in a reunited (neutral) Germany 
imbedded in a European security system. 196 The feasibility of this reunification initiative was 
more than minimal, given the fact that Moscow was barely interested in achieving 
reunification of a neutralised Germany (one of the few points of convergence between the two 
superpowers).197 By 1955 the FRG had become a NATO member, the Eastern side followed 
suit by turning the GDR into a Warsaw Pact member, and the 'German question' had become 
'solved' by firmly anchoring the two parts into their respective alliances. Many SPD leaders 
were, in private, not at all optimistic given the fact that after the FRG's inclusion in NATO 
(and the GDR in the Warsaw Pact), the goal to achieve reunification became more improbable 
than ever. 198 For instance, in March 1959, Fritz Erler and Carlo Schmid, two leading foreign 
policy spokesmen, held talks with Soviet leaders - the outcome of which had led both Social 
Democrats to conclude that the Soviet Union had no intention in achieving German 
reunification but to maintain a separate East German state as her close ally.199 Although 
195 See, for example, Helga Haftedorn, Sicherheit und Entspannung, p. 96. See also Drummond, The German 
Social Democrats in Opposition, 1949-1960, p. 252; Susanne Miller. 'Die SPD vor und nach Godesberg'. in 
Richard Lowenthal and Hans-Peter Schwarz (eds), Die ;.weite Republik (Stuttgart: Seewald Verlag, 1974). p. 
388. 
196 The SPD's German Plan envisaged reunification in four stages, at the end of which free elections would be 
held ror an all-German parliament and government. See Drummond, The German Social Democrats in 
Opposition. p. 250. 
197 JUrgen Bellers, EWG lind die "Godesberger" SPD, Schriften des Faches Poli.tikwissenschafte? No.9. 
(Siegen: Universitat Siegen, 2003). p. 314. Udo F. Lowke, for example, e~phaslse~ that the SPD s concept 01 
reunification without adhering to a military bloc but imbedded in a collectIve secunty system should not he 
dismissed as unrealistic from the start. It was the power political circumstances which caused its failure. Udo F. 
U)wke, Fiir den Fall. dass ... SPD ltnd Well1frage 1949-1955 (Hannover: Verlag fUr Literatur und Zeitgeschehen. 
1969). pp. 225-226. . . _ 
198 W. Schmidt held that Brandt, after the failure of the Four-Power conference on BerlIn In January 19)4. had 
already favoured West German integration in NATO si~ce the S()\'iet ,Union \\'as not interested in German 
reunification - even if on neutral grounds. see W. SchmIdt. Kalter Kneg. p. 538. . ' ' ., ., 
I'll) Meyer. Herbert H'e/11ler. p. 228. See also Drummond. The German Social Democrats In 0PPOSlflOll. p. _5 .... : 
Hartm~t SociI. He/milt Schmidt 1918-1969 (MUnchen: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt. 2(03). p. 32.+. 
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Soviet plans on the GDR had always been difficult to determine, it became clear after 1955 
that the Soviet Union was aiming towards a two-state solution. 
Despite these discouraging and gloomy reports, the SPD still published its plan - in complete 
disregard of geopolitical realities.2oo Hence it is astonishing that the plan was elaborated and 
ever made public at all. This leaves us largely puzzled about why it was published (and not 
abandoned earlier), if its authors had recognised that it barely stood any chance of realisation. 
Here it will be argued that it was intended as a final concession towards the 'left-wing' of the 
SPD, those Social Democrats around the former Schumacher / Ollenhauer group and Herbert 
Wehner, who wished to achieve reunification on neutral grounds at the earliest possible stage, 
before bipartisanship in foreign policy could be embraced. Those around Brandt and the 
West-Berlin SPD on the other hand, had dismissed the plan as neither desirable nor realistic, 
but as a political compromise or necessary concession towards the Wehner group in order to 
then (after the plan's failure) move towards a bi-partisan foreign policy together with the 
leading CDU/CSU. The publication of the Deutschland Plan was agreed upon by its inner-
party opponents precisely on the calculation that it would encounter Soviet resistance (or be 
ignored by the Western Allies) and consequently be doomed to failure. It was the political 
price to pay for a subsequent move to the Right. This is not to suggest that the Bonn and 
Berlin wings of the SPD diverged over the idea to achieve reunification in principle, but their 
means to accomplish this were almost diametrically diverse. To the Bonn SPD it had been the 
most important short-term goal, whereas in Berlin a tendency had developed towards thinking 
in a much longer time scale, bearing in mind that the German problem was firmly imbedded 
in and inseparably linked with the wider East-West conflict. As such, the Deutschland Plan 
could have been taken as a calculated move to the Left. which turned out to be one of the 
essential preconditions for a subsequent move to the Right (a foreign policy convergence \\'ith 
200 S f' I W S hml·dt who correctly argued that the plan was doomed to fail as it completely i~nored 
, ce, lor examp e, . c , 
the political realities. in Kalter Krieg, p. 539. 
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the CDU/CSU in the framework of West Germany's firm and undisputed adherence to the 
West). 
Serious differences about how to proceed in the German question had always existed between 
the Berlin and Bonn SPD.201 In November 1958, a Soviet note caused a second major crisis 
over Berlin (after the Berlin blockade of 1948/49 when Stalin had already shut off the 
overland access to Berlin). The Soviets' note to the Western Allies and West Germany 
demanded an end to the occupation of Berlin and the conversion of West Berlin into a 
demilitarised free city. When Khrushchev set off the second Berlin crisis in late 1958 by 
threatening to conclude a separate peace treaty with the GDR that would nullify Allied 
agreements and transfer control of the transit routes to the non-recognised East Germans, both 
the Western access to Berlin and its policy on Germany were once more in danger. The Bonn 
SPD generally agreed on the need for negotiations, pressing ahead with talks at all costs (even 
if rejecting the precise contents of the Soviet note) and accusing the Adenauer government for 
failing to do so. After the Stalin note of 1952, the SPD had already preferred to put Stalin's 
sincerity to the test. After the failure of the EDC in the French national assembly, the SPD 
renewed its demands for negotiations with the Soviets. Only if those remained fruitless, would 
it be 'justifiable' for the FRG to enter the Atlantic Pact. 202 Belief in the primacy of 
reunification and the necessity of exploring every possibility (towards that end) were the basis 
of the SPD's foreign policy concept thus far. 
The group around Brandt, on the other hand, disagreed with the social democratic leadership 
that the 1958 Berlin crisis offered a chance to negotiate. In this. the Berlin SPD had already 
embarked on a foreign policy course that had more in common with that of Adenauer than the 
SPD leadership in Bonn. Willy Brandt had urged unity with the West in trying to eventually 
201 Bellers. EWG lind d;e "Godesberger" SPD, pp. 318-319. See also Drum~lOnd. Th~ German Social 
D . 0 .. III 19 1960 pp 2'+'5-'1.+7 See also AshkenasI. Rejormpartel lind AIIj3el/polttlk. p. 11. emocrats III PPOSltlOll. 'f-t - ,. - - . 
202 Meyer. Herbert ~rcll1le,., p. 187. 
1..)1 
0-
promote reunification. Brandt's thinking had been strongly determined by the liying 
conditions of West Berlin's popUlation (in his experiences as mayor of Berlin), the city's 
frontline role in the Cold War, and how its security and survival would have to be artificially 
maintained in the event of a political and military escalation (i.e. Berlin crisis of 1948/49).203 
Fritz Erler, for example, by the late 1950s one of NATO's most enthusiastic supporters. had 
during the EDC debate already contested the view that West Germans should refrain from 
addressing the question of remilitarisation and defence until reunification had been achieved. 
The authors of the Deutschland Plan failed to take into consideration that the German 
question had long ceased to be solely a 'national' issue, that a neutral, reunified Germany was 
unfavourable to US or Soviet interests, let alone ignoring sentiments of many Western 
Germans, who felt safer under NATO's protection. Desire for military protection and material 
improvement of the living conditions had become increasingly interwoven and associated 
with economic and military integration in the West. West Germans were not willing to 'trade' 
security for reunification, let alone for the SPD's adventurous plans for a demilitarised zone 
or neutral Germany.204 It was widely assumed that the majority of West Germans undoubtedly 
desired national unity. Of even greater concern, so it was assumed by decision-makers, was 
national security from the Soviet Union and that most Germans were unprepared to make 
economic sacrifices for national reunification. 205 
During a meeting of the SPD's Executive in March 1960, Carlo Schmid had already declared 
that Moscow was reluctant to negotiate, and that a demilitarised zone was of little interest to 
the Soviets. He thus concluded that the geopolitical situation had altered to the extent that a 
203 W. Schmidt, for instance. assessed that Willy Brandt had already been an enthusias~ic supporter of N.\ TO in 
th . d fG 'arly post war reconstruction Brandt endorsed NATO essentIally tur twu n:asons: as a e peno 0 ermany s e - . '. . . . 
military deterrent vis-a-vis the Soviet Union and secondly as a means to achlew close polItIcal and economIC 
cooperation with the West. See W. Schmidt. Kalter Krieg. p. 537. 
2U.J Meyer. Herbert Wehner. p. 181. 
~():\ Ibid. 
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two-state theory was the only chance to secure the survival of West Berlin. 206 His views had, 
however, still remained mainly isolated at the time. With the Deutschland Plan the SPD also 
. , 
attempted to provide a social-democratic contribution to the four power discussions after the 
1958 Berlin crisis and to the foreign minister conference held in Geneva in 1959. It marked a 
SPD-initiative which was in line with the party's primacy of reunification. 207 The Geneva 
conference not only completely disregarded any of the SPD's proposals, but proved itself to 
be a dismal failure as regards to any prospect of reunification. 208 
2.2) Acceptance of NATO and the move towards a bi-partisan foreign policy 
Changes in the international setting therefore partially contributed to the acceptance of the 
existing post-war realities by strengthening those positions in the SPD, which had opted to 
generate the foreign policy ground for a subsequent cooperation with the CDU/CSU. The 
move towards a bi-partisan foreign policy was in part also a resignation of the given 
geopolitical circumstances disfavouring reunification. Many of the SPD's positions adopted 
from June 1960 onwards were thus no novelty and not a complete U-turn in policy thinking, 
but were existent, although in minority, since the 1950s and had been hitherto dismissed. 
Domestic electoral support (or lack of it) forcefully accelerated the SPD's change of course. 
The 1953 and 1957 election results demonstrated that the SPD's 'policy of polarisation' had 
proved counterproductive by demonstrating the electorate's support for Konrad Adenauer's 
economic and military alignment with the West. Economic boom and military security had 
outweighed previous opposition to rearmament in the eyes of many West Germans. Thus. 
while international factors justified a shift in SPD foreign policy Uustification mainly vis-a-
206 Protocol of the SPD's Executive meeting, 12 March 1960, re-printed in Willy Brandt, Berliner Alisgabe. 
Berlin bleibtfrei: Politik inllndftir Berlin 1947-1966 (Bonn: 1.H.W. Dietz, 2004), pp. 288-21.)2. 
207 'AuBenpolitik und gcsamtdeutsche Fragen', in SPD (ed.), lahrbllch der.SPD 1958/_:9 (Hannover. Bonn: .. 
N V .. t V I Nau & Co 19')9) p '4 See also KkBmann, 'SoZlaldemokratle und deutschc ha~c , In euer orwar s er ag, .. - . ~ . _ ~ 
Dowe (cu.). So:.ialdemokratie und Nation in Geschichte lind GegemI'Qrt. pp. 4)-46. 
208 Artner. The SPD and NATO, pp. 21 ~-219. 
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VIS inner party opponents), electoral considerations prompted the policy reassessment. To 
suggest a direct interrelation with the SPD's Bad Godesberg Programme of 1959 is only 
revealing in as much as it is illustrative of the SPD's general trend to become a people' s 
party.209 Establishing domestic and foreign policy consensus (with the leading CDU/CSU) 
were unquestionably the two twin components of the SPD's strategy to achieve governmental 
respectability and responsibility. The path to Bad Godesberg was prepared for carefully and 
thoroughly since the electoral defeat of 1953, and put to a vote at an extraordinary party 
congress. The change to the SPD's operational strategy (i.e. acceptance of NATO) could only 
occur suddenly in order to prevent a fierce internal debate. 21 0 
The final abandonment of the Deutschland Plan was thus solely an expression of the SPD's 
dismissal of its previous reunification concept that had categorically excluded West German 
adherence to the Atlantic Pact, as well as firm integration in the West in general. It paved the 
way for the SPD's almost sudden policy reversal in June 1960. In a much quoted and famous 
speech in German parliament on 30 June 1960, Herbert Wehner declared that 'the Federal 
Republic's Western ties must form the basis for all West German efforts toward security, 
reunification and detente' .211 Interestingly though, Wehner, one of the firmest supporters of 
the SPD's 'old' foreign policy line was, from June 1960, one of the key constructors behind a 
coalition with the CDU/CSU. 
Defence (within NATO) and detente (on the basis of active peaceful coexistence with the 
East) marked henceforth the twin components of the SPD's security policy concept and were 
loyally reassured in the party' s government programme prior to the 1961 national elections. at 
~()!) Sec. for example, Paterson who argued that Wehner's speech in June 1960 can. be seen as the foreign policy 
el!uivalent to the Bad Godesberg programme, in The SPD and European IntegratIOn, p. 141. 
21 Egon Bahr. Zu meiner Zeit (MOnchen: Karl Blessing Verlag. 199.?). pp. 278-279. . 
~11 Re-printed in Herbert Wehner, Wandelund Bell·dhnmg. A./(sgewa~lte Reden und SchriJten 1930-19~O, 5th . 
d·· (F kf B I· . Ullstel·n 1981) P '40 See also Herbert \\ ehncr. Bundestae,.\reden (Bonn: \ erla~ :\Z e ItIOn ran urt, er In. , ....... '- ~
Studio. 1970), pp. 197-215. 
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every party congress, in almost every foreign policy statement and party programme 
throughout the 1960s and 1970s.212 Most importantly, they were compatible with Western 
interests and unequivocally endorsed Adenauer's Western policy course (Westpolitik) 
embarked upon thus far. 
3.) Italian political parties and NATO 
Domestically, opposition to NATO was not exclusive to the Italian Communists and their 
junior partner, the PSI. During the 1949 debates on the Atlantic Treaty, a significant portion 
of the Italian political elite - a wide group cutting across many parties - had strong objections 
to any military alliance. With exception of the Italian Social Democrats (PSDI), both the 
Italian Left and influential Catholic circles inside the DC and the Vatican rallied to oppose 
any national alignment with NATO. The Catholic front was sharply divided between the 
official pro-Western DC and governmental line on one side, and the neutralist-nationalistic, 
partly anti-American left wing opposition within the party.213 The PSI had traditionally 
remained committed to neutralism and an (in principle) equidistance between East and West, 
and objected to Italy becoming the battleground between pro-Soviet Left and pro-Western 
conservative forces. Its alignment and subordination to PCI interests, of course, somewhat 
qualified and weakened the party's credibility in demanding Italy's neutrality. Though the 
PSI's stress on neutralism in foreign policy derived from socialist ideology and tradition, its 
212 See Willy Brandt's speech at the Party Congress, in SPD (ed.), Das Regierungsprogramm der SPD 
(AuBerordentlicher Kongress der SPD), 28 April 1961, Bonn, 1961, pp. 3-22. See also SPD (ed.), SPD lahrbllch 
1960161 (Hannover. Bonn: Neuer Vorwarts Verlag Nau & Co., 1961), p. 19; SPD (ed.), SPD lahrbuch 
196411965 (Bad Godesberg: Neuer Vorwarts Verlag Nau & Co., 1965), p. 57; SPD (ed.), SPD lahrbllch 
196611967 (Bad Godesberg: Neuer Vorwarts Verlag Nau & Co., 1967), p. 62; 'Kundgebungen und 
EntschlieBungen des NUrnberger Parteitages 1968'. in SPD (ed.), lahrbuch der SPD 196811969 (Bonn-Bad 
Godesberg: Neuer Vorwarts Verlag Nau & Co .. 1969), p. 339; 'Kundgebungen und BeschlUsse des 
AuBerordentlichen Parteitages in Dortmund', 12-13 October 1972. in SPD (ed.), lahrbllch der SPD 197011972 
(Bad Godesberg: Neuer Vorwarts-Verlag Nau & Co .. 1972), p. 553. 
213 Marco Rimanelli. Italy between Europe and the Mediterranean. Diplomacy and Naml Strategy from 
Unification to NATO. 1800s-2000 (New York: Peter Lang, 1997). p. 719. See also Rainer ~. Kla~s.', .. 
'Uherwindung der BlOcke: Konzeptionen der italienischen Linken zur Entspan~ung und Slc~erheJt In Europa. In 
Gerhard Kiersch and Reimund Seidel mann (eds). Sicherheit und Entspall111l11g 111 Europa. DIe Anlwort des 
d k t · I S 'ail's1111IS p 8 I Natalino Ronzitti 'Italian Political Parties and European Integration'. Lo emo 'ra lSC len Oll ... . 
Spettatore InfCl"lla::ionaie, Vol. 10. No. I (January-March 1975). p. II. 
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opposition to NATO was (correctly) seen as evidence of the Socialists' subjection to the PCI 
d · th f' d d ') 14 unng e lrst post-war eca e.- The Socialists later moved from a neutralist stand (and 
total rejection of NATO) in 1949 to a limited acceptance of the Alliance in the 1950s and 
eventually to complete acquiescence by 1962 in conjunction with the party's entry into the 
government coalition. Of course, the development of the SPD and PSI implied that for any 
Western European party to be considered a party of government, it would necessarily have to 
accept its country's fundamental foreign and defence policy choices. Or conversely. national 
political ambitions rendered a thorough policy re-thinking fundamental. 
The PCI has fought Italy's incorporation in NATO from the very beginning. In this, it gave 
way to neutralist leanings shared by much wider parts of the Italian political spectrum, 
including (like in Germany) Catholic, socialist and trade union circles, and was thus not 
exclusive to communist parties. 215 A significant section of the public assigned little 
importance to NATO as a military alliance. An opinion poll conducted in 1958, when the 
Cold War had not abated but gained new proportions, showed that only 50 percent of the 
respondents favoured Italy's continued membership in the Alliance. 216 Although opinion polls 
are by no means solely representative, they do reveal some interesting insight in general 
political trends. This also suggests that opposition to rearmament or NATO was not 
representative of 'communist' policy thinking but rather, as the euromissile debate of the late 
1970s will further demonstrate, that it was not possible to determine an exclusively 'social-
democratic' or solely 'communist' policy line. Rather, domestic considerations interplayed 
with foreign policy positions to the extent that it is impossible to identify specific or exclusive 
positions and attribute them to a certain political camp. 
214 Vannicelli. Ita lv, NATO, and the European Community. p. 8. . . . . 
215 Sec also Mich;el Strubel. Nelle Wege der italienischen Kommullistell. 2ur AIIJ3en- lind Sicherheaspolwk der 
KPI (1973-1981) (Baden-Baden: Nomos VerIagsgesells~haft. ~ 982), p. 196. 
216 Vannicelli. Italy. NATO, and the European Coml1lullIty, p. _4. 
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Since the foundation of NATO, the PCI had perceived the North Atlantic Pact as the military 
instrument of American imperialism established solely to secure capitalism in Europe. This 
was part of a hostile and aggressive foreign policy against the Soviet Union and hence 
b· d d' 1 217 h' o ~ecte accor Ing y. T IS was not to alter fundamentally until the mid-1970s. In 1971. 
Alessandro N atta, a PCI foreign policy spokesman, had still declared that 'Atlanticism. US 
economic and military presence in Italy served as a guarantor of the conservative bloc, of a 
system that above all revolves around strengthening the power and privileges of bourgeois 
capitalism and its political representative' .218 Nuances in party speeches and articles in the 
communist weekly Rinascita were, however, noticeable since the end of the 1960s, but a 
fundamental policy reversal only occurred in 1974. 
PCI Party Congress resolutions and policy statements in the 1960s generally revolved around 
and repeated the demand for Italy's neutrality, a discard of any foreign intervention in internal 
affairs, an end to all military bases in the country and the overcoming of the two blocs in 
favour of a new peace settlement.219 The PCI continuously stressed that it favoured an Italian 
foreign policy based on 'active neutrality', as only this neutrality, so the PCI believed, would 
provide the government with the possibility to launch new initiatives for coordinated and 
mutual disarmament, a simultaneous dissolution of both military blocs and the creation of a 
11 ' . . E 220 co ectIve securIty system In urope. 
Comparable with the SPD's foreign policy advances in the 1950s, PCI demands failed to take 
into account the existing post-war realities. Italy, firmly imbedded in the West. of course 
~17 See Togliatti's speech against NATO, 12 March 1949, re-printed in Hanhim~iki, Westad (eds). The Cold War, 
~p. 133-134. 
_IR Rinascita, Alessandro Natta, 'II legame che soffoca', 26 February 1971. p. 2. 
219 Togliatti, 'Per I'unita del movimento comunista internazionale'. 10th Congress?f the p.e!. 1962, p~. 2.4-2.5 
and 'Tesi del XI Congresso nazionak 1966'. p. 108, both in PCI (ed.), Da GramsCl a Ber.ll1lguer .. ~ \'~a.1fal/Gf/a 
al socialis11lo attral'erso i congressi del partito comllnista italiano. 1\' 1964-1975 (VenezIa: Marslho EdIton. 
1985). 
~20 Rinascita, Longo. 'La catti"a cosciL'nza degli oltranzisti', 22 September 1967, p. 2. 
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could not have remained neutral in a bipolar world characterised by East-West hostilities: 
rather conversely, only adherence to the Western Alliance would increase a say in 
international affairs. From an international perspective, Germany's and Italy's . inferior' 
position after the war only improved as a result of membership in NATO. Consequently. PCI 
demands for a neutral foreign policy could only but remain unrealistic. Similar to those of the 
SPD prior to June 1960, the PCl's proposals did not acknowledge the fact that Italy's 
government (and as such the other political forces in the country) had little to gain from and 
thus no interest in promoting a neutral foreign policy. Adherence to the West and its military 
alliance were beneficial above all to the DC, which had since 1947/48 enjoyed US 
benevolence. It was crucial in maintaining DC hegemony in a bipolar national system divided 
along Cold War lines. Both main political actors, the PCI and DC, had developed with the 
emergence of the Cold War international (and ideological) bonds of loyalty. These 
international loyalties left both PCI and DC in a position of dependence and limited Italy's 
. 221 
sovereIgnty as a state. 
The Italian political system, until 1963 ideologically divided into two camps, nurtured the 
fighting of a 'national Cold War' .222 Similar was the rationale of some of the smaller left-
wing or centrist parties in Italy, whose parliamentary survival was centred around and secured 
via a participation in the many DC-led coalitions. Foreign policy ambivalence and 
controversial positions towards NATO were simply not' affordable'. Even if, as it is assumed, 
rearmament or military deterrence was difficult to accept for many of them, equidistance in 
the Cold War was simply not an option. Parliamentary survival had its price to pay. 
221 Bracke, Which Socialism, p. 24. . . .. . 
222 Particular reference is made to 1963, when the PSI was included in the gO\'l~rmng coahtlo.n \\Ith the DC. ThiS 
. I· It' the balance of' 'orces as the PSI's inclusion in the DC-led bloc theoretically put an end. to was crucla In a enng I . 
the bipolarity or the Italian domestic system. In pr~ct.ice, ~~e PCI was hencl:forth, ~\er O1ore firm.ly Isol.atcd 1,rom 
the governmental area by referring to its democratic Illegitimacy. The DC. abo\ I.: all. 'W<lIlted to all) \\ Ilh thl.: 
Socialists in order to divide the Left. 
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At the same time, the PCl's potential for causing significant, wider changes in the world 
communist movement and in European detente were rather minimal. This was forcefully 
realised after the events of 1968. Though not marking a crisis of detente in terms of a 
deterioration of East-West relations, the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 had a 
drastic impact on the PCl's concept of internationalism. It was a crisis of the global 
communist movement and had crushed all hopes of former concepts of polycentrism within 
the system, or the realisation of diverse strands of socialism. For the first time, the severe 
restrictions and limitations within the 'other' camp were realised. The influence this 
ultimately had on the PCl's own vision of detente and the bloc confrontation should not be 
underestimated. The Soviet invasion of CSSR provoked the question of whether detente, in 
the Soviet conception of it, was beneficial to socialist transformation in the West. In the long-
term, it challenged and subsequently altered the PCI's previously held position that US 
imperialism was solely held responsible for a deterioration of East-West relations. 
It is difficult to imagine how a neutral (Italian or German) national foreign policy could have 
dynamically contributed to detente, let alone have a say in world affairs. Italy and Germany 
had no choice but to align with the West. This was acknowledged by the SPD in 1960, and by 
the PCI more than a decade later. Given the nature of the bipolar system, we can also 
understand how some operational initiatives that would aim toward an autonomous foreign 
policy for Europe from that of the USA, would be looked upon with suspicion. Additionally, 
the PCI, whilst advocating an Italian foreign policy based on active neutrality, was itself not 
and could not have been neutral in the Cold War. Though reiterating the need to dissolve both 
blocs, the PCl's foreign policy was closely linked with Soviet positions until the 1970s. 
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4.) SPO and pel perspectives on East-West detente in the 1960s 
The Federal Republic, with its close ties with the US and NATO, its geographic vulnerability, 
its concern for the division of Germany and its Ost- and Deutschlandpolitik, had been tom 
between dependency on both East and West. Dependence on the West entailed the need for 
military protection and European integration; and on the East for improved relations with the 
GDR, Soviet constructiveness on the German question and increasing German trade with the 
Eastern bloc. Relations with the East had been largely consolidated by the beginning of the 
1970s as a result of the treaties envisaged in Ostpolitik. In the mid to late 1970s, Chancellor 
Schmidt continuously argued that support for Ostpolitik could not entail a lessened 
commitment to an adequate defence capability via NATO, the US nuclear shield and an East-
West military balance. The passing over of office from Brandt to Schmidt in 1974 went hand 
in hand with changes in style and emphasis towards securing European detente. 
In the 1960s, the PCI had envisaged a zone of disengagement from Cold War politics in 
Europe, which involved the gradual 'phasing out of the two power blocs' - a proposal which 
could be implemented through controlled disarmament, agreements of nuclear control, 
recognition of the two Germanies and a withdrawal of all foreign bases in Italy and Western 
Europe. 223 This process of detente would facilitate the reacquisition of Italian autonomy and 
subsequently no longer render a PCI entry in government impossible. Most profoundly, the 
PCI's dynamic conception of detente had been almost diametrically reverse to the Soviet 
concept of peaceful coexistence. Contend with securing the present status quo, the Soviet 
Union - more so since the experiment of Czech reformism - had been concerned with 
crushing discontent within and consolidating its own bloc. The PCI wished to overcome the 
blocs and hence promoted, since 1968, a different internationalism which became increasingl y 
22.1 Sec. for instance. PCI (ed.), 'Tesi del XII Congrcsso Nazionale 1969', in Da Gramsc; a Berlingller. La \'ia 
ifaliana al socialismo attral'crso i congress; del partito comllnista ;taliallo [\' 1964-1975. p. 263. 
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incompatible with Moscow's foreign policies, or reversely, Soviet internationalism proyided 
insurmountable obstacles to the PCI's via italiana al socialismo. 
5.) SPO, PCI and the idea of a collective European security system 
'Detente' often exclusively refers to a relaxation of (military) tensions towards a relation of 
peaceful coexistence of the Cold War adversaries. It is often understood as mere continuation 
of the Cold War by different means rather than as a break with it. 224 It was thus characterised 
by a declared willingness on behalf of the superpowers to avoid global nuclear conflict and a 
deterioration of military escalation and only secondarily, by an increase of commercial, 
economic and cultural ties across the Iron Curtain. The kind of detente favoured by Soviet 
leaders was based on the consolidation of the political and military blocs and hegemony from 
above, a so-called 'static detente' in the PCI's definition.225 Analysed from this perspective, 
both SPD and PCI, though wholeheartedly embracing the very idea of East-West detente, had 
little in common with the superpower conception of the term. Their concept of detente went 
well beyond a mere, albeit peaceful, coexistence of the two military camps. In many ways, 
their conceptions of detente and ideas were ahead of their time. Both parties did not simply 
contend with the existence of the two blocs but aimed at a dynamic process of detente leading 
ultimately towards the dissolution of the blocs. Somewhat oversimplifying the PCI thus 
defied the Soviet concept of peaceful coexistence based on the consolidation of the status quo 
by referring to the idea of peaceful coexistence as ultimately as means to eliminate the blocs 
which were dividing Europe. Both SPD and PCI converged towards that end. It is worth 
noting that the SPD's rhetoric on the subject were a little misleading. The SPD accepted the 
status quo, but not the Soviet vision of detente from above, and only to the extent that the 
peaceful coexistence of the blocs was necessary as a sort of interim stage leading to the 
eventual disintegration of both. The SPD's conception was premised on continuation of the 
224 Brackc. Which Socialism. p. 37. 
~2:i Ihid., p. 365. 
rival blocs with detente occurnng between them, but its end logic was nevertheless the 
transformation if not the disintegration of Soviet-style communism, even if nobody could 
conceive this happening in the short-term, most certainly it was not believed by the SPD to 
occur in the immediate future. 226 
SPD and PCI held convergent conceptions of detente. It was precisely the rigidity of the bloc 
system which both SPD and PCI so arduously wished to overcome. This end goal was shared 
by both. The operational strategy towards that end diverged until 1974. 
A mutual interest in overcoming the Cold War divisions in Europe led both SPD and PCI to 
raise the idea of a collective European security system. The fundamental difference was that 
the PCI intended a phasing out of both blocs in favour of such a system which had 
categorically excluded the possibility of Italy's adherence to a certain military bloc until 1974. 
This is remarkably similar to the SPD's concept as envisaged until the end of the 1950s.227 
From 1960 onwards, the SPD, however, saw the military Alliance as a guarantor for Western 
Europe's (and West Germany's safety) until it was dissolved in favour of a more 
h · E . ""8 compre enSlVe pan- uropean secunty system.--
~2h Irwin M. Wall, 'The United States and two Ostpolitiks. De Gaulle and Brandt', in Wilfried Loth (ed.). The 
making of detente: Eastern and Western Europe in the Cold War, J965-75, p. 134. 
227 The SPD' s concept of a collective European security system was developed around 1952 in light over the 
EDC debate. This system would incorporate a reunited Germany on the basis of equal rights. The inclusion of 
the separate German states in two opposing military blocs would render the Cold War inevitable. SeL' 
'Aktionsprogramm der SPD'. decided upon at the 1952 Party Congress in Dortmund and extended at the 1954-
Berlin Congress, re-printed in Udo F. L6wke. Fur den Fall, dass ... SPD lind Wehifrage J<)..I.I.)-1955. pp. ~5~-~5.~. 
This idea was elaborated upon in 1953. In a parliamentary debate over the EDC treaty. Erich Ollenhauer 
declared that this security system would have to be implemented on the widest possible basis. including Britain. 
Denmark and Norway. Its relation with the Atlantic system would still have to be defined. Speech hich 
Olknhauer. 19 March 1953, re-printed in ibid .. pp. ~51-~52. See also the resolutions of the 1956 Party Congrc'>'> 
and the 1957 elections campaign programme of the SPD re-printed in Flcchtheim (ed.). Dokllmellte z,ur 
parteipolitischell Entll'ickhmg ill Deutsch/alld seit 1945. pp. 13.f-l.f~. . 
22X SPD (ed.). SPD lahrbuch J966/67. p. 6~: SPD's resolutions at the 1968 Party Congress held In Nuremhurg. 
in SPD (cd.), lahrbuch der SPD J968/1969, p. 339. See also AdSD, \\'BA. AuBenminister 1966-1969. 
AllgL'llleine Korrespondel1l. MapPL' .f. 
The demand for Germany's inclusion in NATO did not exclude the call for a collective 
European security system, or inversely, adherence to the Western Alliance was, according to 
the SPD, compatible with the end goal of a European peace order, whose central component 
was a collective system of European security.229 This idea had been promoted by the SPD in 
the 1950s and 1960s and less overtly and ardently raised in the 1970s. In almost all foreign 
policy statements, the PCI stressed the need for the dissolution of both political military blocs, 
proposing a policy of 'active neutrality' for Italy involving a withdrawal from NATO and the 
establishment of a collective all-European security system,230 which would render both 
military pacts obsolete. 231 This demand went had in hand with that for a European security 
conference. Such a conference would play an enormous role in overcoming the existing 
military blocs, and would establish the framework for a peaceful, democratic and independent 
Europe - a Europe which was not subject to external interference in national affairs (referring 
to Soviet and US interference alike).232 
One has to distinguish between those in the SPD who saw the FRG's safety permanently 
secured only by the American military shield (Helmut Schmidt) and those who were more 
critical about the dual foreign policy concept of NATO-membership as a precondition for 
reunification (Egon Bahr).233 Brandt and his foreign policy advisor, Egon Babr, never 
questioned Germany's membership to NATO, however, only until a 'better mechanism was 
~29 Interview with Brandt, Der Spiegel, 9 September 1968, re-printed in W. Brandt, Berliner Aus~abe. Ein ~olk 
der gllten Nachbarn. AujJen- lind Deutschlandpolitik 1966-1974 (Bonn, Berlin: Verlag 1.H.W. DIetz NachL, 
2(0)), pp. 184. . . . 
230 For example, Luigi Longo, 'Report to the Central Committee', 20 October 1965, In F~relgn ~1I11etlll of the 
PC1 (suhseljuently Foreign Bulletin) (October-December 1965?, p. 1 S. S~e also G. NapolItano, Report to the 
Central Committee and Central Commission of Contro\'. Foreign Blilletlll ( July-August 1967), p. 10. 
2.'1 Rinascita, Alessandro Natta, 'Oltre i1 Patto atlantico', I September 1967, p. 2. . ,. . . 
2.'2 A . N II 'R t to the Foreign Polic\' Commission of the Central CommIttee, In Foreign Blil/etlll gostInO ove a, epor . 
(March-June 1973), p. 6-l. . . _ , -
211 Andreas Vogtmeier. Egon Bahr lind die dellt.lche Frage (Bonn: J.H.\\. DIetz, 1(96), pp .. 1)3-.~)-l. 
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found to replace NATO in the process of German reunification' .2:i4 The end goal was to 
overcome the division of Europe and the dissolution of both military blocs.2:i) Until then, the 
Atlantic Alliance was the sine qua non for Germany's security.236 Schmidt's thinking. on the 
other hand, was shaped by the belief in a necessary military balance between the Western 
military Alliance and the Warsaw Pact.237 Schmidt argued that detente (and negotiations with 
the East) were only possible from the basis of military parity in order not to render either 
power vulnerable to political blackmail. In the late 1970s Schmidt increasingly pursued his 
own, distinctive security policy firmly based on nuclear deterrence through the NATO 
alliance and the classical perception of the balance of power. These differences of perception 
in security and military thinking, as for example with regard to the missile debate in Europe, 
were more than minimal and led to fierce internal debates. As we will examine SUbsequently, 
once the PCI had accepted NATO as the international framework within which the Italian 
road to socialism could be accomplished, this did not dismiss the long-term aim of 
overcoming the blocs in general and their replacement by a more suitable system through 
which European detente could be maintained.238 Many within the SPD also considered NATO 
as an interim international framework, which would eventually be replaced by a more 
'suitable mechanism'. 239 
23.1 'Kundgebungen und EntschlieBungen des NUrnberger Parteitages 1968', in SPD (ed.), Jahrbuch der SPD 
1968/69, p. 339. See also Brandt's article in AujJenpolitik, August 1967, re-printed in W. Brandt, Berliner 
Ausgabe. Ein Volk der guten Nachbarn. AujJen- und Deutschlandpolitik 1966-1974, pp. 130-137. 
235 It has often been stressed that the Atlantic Alliance was necessary until a functioning system of European 
security was established, in AdSD, WBA, AuBenminister 1966-1969, Allgemeine ~orrespondenz, ~ap~e 9. 
This was reiterated by Brandt in the aftermath of the Czech events of August 1968. m 'SPD PressemltteJlungen 
und Informationen', No. 388, 22 August 1968. in AdSD. WBA, Publikationen 1968. Mappe 283. 
216 Willy Brandt, 'Die Entscheidung des lahres'. in Die neue Gesellschaft: No. ~ (Ma~ch/A~ril 1965), p. 6.05. 
2.17 Schmidt's speech to the 1966 Party Congress of the SPD, extract r~-pnnt~d m Bons M,clssner (cd.). Die 
delltsche Ostpolitik 1961-1970. Kontinllitdt llnd Wandel. Dokll11lentatIOIl (Koln: Verlag \\ Issenschaft und 
Politik, 1970). p. 132. . ". . 
2.1X Sec, for example. Bracke who argued that once NATO \>as ac~epted ~Y .the PCI the aIm of 0\ crcommg the 
hlocs' throuoh European dynamic detente was abandoned, m Which S~:c/Qlrsm. p. 331.. . 
239 Horst Eh~ke (cu.). Perspektil'ell So;.ialdelllokratischer Politik im Ubergang :'11 dell sleb;'lgcr Jahre" (Bonn: 
RowohIt. 19(9). p. 19. 
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6.} The pel and NATO: Towards foreign policy revisionism, 1969.1974 
For the PCI, foreign policy has always played a detennining role, not least because of the 
necessity of presenting itself as a party with an independent, autonomous and Western 
identity. Due to Italy's heterogeneous political scenery (divided along Cold War lines), the 
PCI had faced the dual challenge of presenting itself as a credible national force and reliable 
political player, genuinely independent from Moscow's directives, whilst maintaining a 
distinguished, authentic image in comparison with the other parties of the Italian Left. The 
PCI, as a communist party, thus found itself constrained by two loyalties which compelled the 
party to probe the themes of foreign policy and to make the interests of its activists cluster 
around them. In light of the Cold War, the PCI was - by its internal and international 
opponents alike - seen as functioning solely as a pawn in the chess game of another player in 
international politics. It was consequently doomed to parliamentary opposition in a bipolar 
system in spite of its enormous and unprecedented political weight (relative to other Western 
European communist parties) on a national level. 
The party's domestic strategy of the historic compromise - a governmental alliance with the 
other leading forces of the country as launched in October 1973 - drastically affected and 
altered the party's military and security policies. As discussed above, transfonnations in the 
party's relations with the Soviet Union and the global communist movement preceded these 
changes and were directly linked to the invasion of 1968. Even earlier (in 1962), the PCI had 
undertaken a major shift in tenns of its European strategy and position on Western European 
economic integration. The potential for a nonnalisation of East-West relations stimulated and 
made possible any change of PCI policies towards the Atlantic Alliance and conceptions of 
European detente. 
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6.1) The renewal of the Atlantic Pact 
While the 1960s were generally considered as the beginning of detente, the more visible 
effects of it in terms of superpower agreements of disarmament and the SPD's Ostpolitik as 
an integral part of detente in Europe occurred only after 1968. The PCI not only euphorically 
endorsed and welcomed detente, but was proud to have had an active share in at least its 
services of 'mediator' for Brandt's Ostpolitik in 1967/68. In its wake, the PCI began in the 
early 1970s to slowly rethink and revise some of its earlier dogmatic positions on the Atlantic 
Alliance. Changes in tone (less outspoken intransigent opposition) led some observers to the 
somewhat premature conclusion that first signs of a revision regarding the Atlantic Pact were 
noticeable already before the 20-year term of the North Atlantic Treaty.24o However, official 
communist policy remained 'NATO out of Italy, Italy out of NATO'. Within the party, 
matters were different. Any security and military policy U-turn could only occur gradually. 
The position on NATO was rather widely discussed within the leading circles of the party and 
hence more carefully prepared for (compared with the SPD's abrupt shift in June 1960). The 
PCI's policy shift and changed perception on NATO had to take place progressively. Internal 
resistance to years of opposition to the Alliance had to be overcome. For more than twenty 
years, the PCI had opposed NATO and Italy's membership in the Alliance. The Vietnam War, 
in the eyes of not only the PCI's militants but other leading circles as well, had been the most 
forceful manifestation of aggressive American imperialism241 - and was still being fought and 
had produced strong anti-US sentiments not exclusive to communist parties (these feelings 
were also widespread amongst the SPD and its young socialist group). The internal 
organisational structure of a communist party (a top to bottom decision-making process) of 
course generates more scope for the decision making circles to carry out certain policies or 
240 Ronzitti, 'Italian Political Parties'. p. 15. . 
241 Antonio Rubbi, II Mondo di Berlingller (Roma: Napoleone, 199'+). p. 23; Rinascita. Romano Ledda .. ~1 • 
confini della Cina' (editorial). 19 February 1971. pp. 1-2: Rinascita, Alessandro Natta. 'I1legame che sotfoca 
(editoria\). 26 February 1971, p. 2. 
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impose specific operational measures. Nonetheless, years of internal opposition had to be 
overcome. In the midst of the Vietnam War this process was slowly initiated. 
Thus, prior to 1969 (renewal of the NATO treaty), the issue was discussed in closed leading 
circles. Officially though, the treaty's renewal was opposed.242 Public campaigns against 
NATO (demonstrations in Rome etc) were supported by the PC I, but the lack of initiative to 
launch massive propaganda campaigns was illustrative of the changes taken place inside the 
party.243 Most probably intended as conciliation towards the party's activists, Sergio Segre 
had in 1967 attempted to pave the way for a gradual reversal by suggesting that NATO's 
character itself had changed. Whereas it had been the principal instrument of American 
imperialist policies after the Second World War, it (by 1967) no longer corresponded fully to 
American interests.244 Slowly, formerly unperceived virtues were attributed to the Atlantic 
Pact. 
6.2) From active neutrality to NATO 
At the XII Party Congress, PCI secretary-general Luigi Longo still called on the validity of 
the old slogan 'NATO out of Italy, Italy out of NATO', whilst he simultaneously emphasised 
that the PCI's goal was 'not the dissolution of the Western bloc in favour of the consolidation 
of the Eastern bloc, but the dissolution of both, in favour of a new European settlement'. 245 
Yet, in spite of all terminological nuances which come to bear in the distinction of 'bloc 
withdrawal' but not in 'favour of one or the other bloc', the PCI, at that stage, had not freed 
its internationalism from all relicts of the obligatory 'choice of sides'. As far as the pcrs 
2.12 Napolitano's Report at the Central Committee and the Central Commission of Control, Foreign Bulletin 
(July-August 1967), p. 10. . ., II . . NT' 
~13 I . I . R' 't Renato Sandrl' stressed that the PCI had promoted demonstratIOns acaInst A 0 In n an artIe e In 11laSCl a, . _. , •. . 
R h . I as entl'tled 'Basi NATO' gli aggressori sono tra nOl - Fuon la NA 10 dall Italta . ome; t e campaIgn s ogan W . . • 
see Rinascita. Renato Sandri, 'Lotta anti NATO e sleurczza europea , .5 June 1970. p. 4. 
2.J.J R' 't S '0 S '{'f' 'Guerre loeali c strategia della coesistenza'. 7 July 1967, p. 4. lIIaSCl a, ergl LC L. . . La" I' 1 2.J~ Longo. XII National Congress of the pel. 1969 in PCI (ed.), Da GramsC1~~ Berllllguer. nQ lta IOlla a 
.wciali,;mo atfral'crso i congressi del partito conlllnis{a italiano. 1\' 196'/'-19! .'1. p. 169. 
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international adversaries were concerned, this rather limited development with regards to the 
Atlantic Pact implied that in the prevailing consciousness of the West. communist parties. and 
as such the PCI, were still perceived as ill-defined monoliths. This, at least. remained the 
picture for the outside observer. 
In 1972 Berlinguer declared that the problem may no longer be reduced to a simplistic call in 
favour or against the Western military pact. At the beginning of 1973, whilst the official 
position was still valid, it became more thoroughly and critically debated in closed circles of 
the party. Though still rather isolated, Longo had stressed during a reunion of the party's 
executive committee that 'Today, remaining inside the Atlantic Pact or not is no longer the 
problem of debate. We should underline staying in the Alliance ( ... ) as this is necessary if we 
wish to improve our relations with other (political) forces' .246 Hence, if the PCI hoped to enter 
government, acceptance of Italy's military and security obligations was the price to pay. This 
was realised and previous demands seemed more outdated and unrealistic than ever. Similar 
to the debates within the SPD's parliamentary faction and executive in the spring of 1960, 
Longo's position was not as yet representative of official party thinking. During the same 
meeting, Bufalini stressed that 'it would not be realistic and rather unattainable to maintain 
"Italy out of NATO, Soviet Union out of Prague", because ultimately espoused by us, this 
Id I d . S . , 247 wou ea to antI- OVlet postures . 
For political parties, foreign policy is frequently a tool of domestic politics. Policy changes 
are often not motivated by ideological re-evaluations but inspired by pure pragmatism. As the 
January / February 1973 meeting of the PCI's Direzione showed, this was undoubtedly valid 
for the Italian Communists' move to accepting Italy's military obligations. For the PCL the 
2.)() See, for example. Luigi Longo's intervention at the meeting of the PCI's Direzione. 31 January/l Fehruary 
1973. in APe Direzione 041. 
2,)7 Bufalini 's intern:ntion at the meeting of the PCI's Direzionc in ihid. 
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debate was above all a means to ascertain its many opponents that it was acting primarily as a 
national party and only secondarily as an integrated component of the international 
communist movement. As the strategy of approaching the governmental area was adjudged 
determinant, it was obligatory to first 'soften' the party's anti-Atlanticism and ideologically 
motivated rejection of NATO - given that Atlantic loyalty was being considered one of the 
requisite hinges of Italian foreign policy (again bearing in mind that the PSI had already had 
'to pay the price' in order to enter government in 1963). 
Avoiding to position itself unequivocally, the PCI, between 1969 and 1974, did so by parting 
with the self-imposed dictate to make a choice in the Cold War confrontation, by dismissing 
the hitherto valid notion of 'choice of side' in international politics. This involved the 
elaboration of a detente conception exclusive to the PCI and unique amongst Western 
European communist parties. This took the form of slogans such a 'promoting a foreign 
policy that was neither anti-Soviet nor anti-American' .248 By subjecting its international 
policies and activities almost exclusively to the priority of detente, the party, at that stage, also 
avoided making an unambiguous 'choice of side' . 
7.) The pel and the 'umbrella NATO' 
At the December 1974 meeting of the Central Committee, Berlinguer eventually paved the 
way for the policy U-turn by declaring that the PCI should abandon the slogan 'Italy out of 
NATO, NATO out of ltaly,.249 By 1975, the PCl's position vis-a-vis the Atlantic Pact was 
fully and unambiguously reversed. The Italian Communists no longer questioned Italy" s 
~..j8 Novella, 'Report to the Foreign Policy Commission of the Central Committee'. p. 68. 
~..j9 Central committee meeting of the PCI. 10-12 December 1974, as referred to by Rubbi. II Mondo, p. ~5. 
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obligations in the Alliance.25o The PCI had come to realise that if Italy withdrew from NATO 
unilaterally, this would in fact jeopardize European detente, which the party had so 
euphorically endorsed. In 1976 Sergio Segre declared that 'one of the things that has made 
detente possible was the attainment of a military strategic equilibrium and that further 
progress can be made in detente only to the extent it did not produce unilateral disadvantages 
for one or the other side ( ... ),.251 In essence, the PCI argued the following: If Italy unilaterally 
withdrew from NATO, this would change the international balance of power between the two 
blocs and jeopardise detente and cooperation since the two are founded on that very balance. 
This would run counter PCI interests. Whereas in 1970 Berlinguer had argued that, 'belonging 
to the Atlantic Pact not only did not guarantee Italy's security, it also severely limited the 
country's independence in search for an autonomous international initiative' 252, the reverse 
was argued in 1976. The PCl's operational concept of detente had drastically altered and been 
attuned to the national and international geopolitical realities. By 1976 detente was perceived 
as a process which could only be maintained without changing the strategic equilibrium 
(albeit at the lowest possible military level) between Washington and MoSCOW.253 This did not 
imply that the strategic goal of bloc dissolution was renounced or permanently abandoned in 
favour of NATO as the new international framework. Both SPD and PCI had come to realise 
that the Western military alliance was a given fact, would in any case exist for an indefinite 
period of time (much as the Cold War in general) and that, if it could not be withdrawn from, 
it could at least be used so as to function advantageously to the national interests and 
250 Enrico Berlinguer, 'Intesa e lotta di tutte Ie forze democratiche e popolari per la salvezza e la rinascita 
dell'Italia', in XIV Congresso, 18-23 Marzo 1975, in PCI (ed.), Da Gramsci a Berlinguer. La via italiana af 
socialismo attraverso i congressi del partito comunista italiano, N 1964-1975, p. 382. See also Enrico 
Berlinguer 'Le peculiarita e l'autonomia del PCI', originally from an interview with Time magazine. 2.+ June 
1975, re-printed in Enrico Berlinguer, La politica intemazionale dei comunisti itaUani 1975-1976. Antonio Tata 
(ed.) (Roma: Editori Riuniti, 1976), p. 70. 
251 Sergio Segre, 'The "Communist Question" in Italy', Foreign Affairs, No.4 (1976), p. 699. 
~52 Enrico Berlinguer, Speech in Parliament. 11 August 1970, in E. Berlinguer, Discorsi parlamentari (1968-
1984), Maria Luisa Righi (ed.) (Roma: Camera dei Deputati, 2001), p. 42. 
253 Enrico Berlinguer. 'La diversita sostanziale della via al socialismo dell' occidente europeo' , originally in 
'Dall'intervento al CC, 29 October 1975, re-printed in Enrico Berlinguer. La politica intemazionale dei 
c0111unisti italiani 1975-1976, pp. 92-93. 
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ambitions of the two parties. Neither party considered NATO as the most suitable 
international framework but as the most realistic and accepted it as an 'interim solution' to a 
more comprehensive all-European peace and security order. 
Previously it was held that only by overcoming the 'logic of the blocs' - so the PCI's 
calculation - stood the party, if at all, with a feasible chance in realising its 'via italiana al 
socialismo'. Subsequently it was argued by the PCI that in fact only by accepting and not 
altering the logic of the blocs could it become a legitimate partner in a coalition government. 
The international geopolitical realities had disfavoured previous outdated demands. The new 
concept discarded the rejection of NATO and explained this move with the old and lasting 
interest in the process of detente which, to the PCI, was the precondition for social and 
political change in Italy in as much as the national projection of international bipolarism 
prevented the proper functioning of the rules of representative democracy and parliamentary 
change of government. 
The PCI's support for Italy's security and military obligations in the form of NATO was thus 
exclusively directed at domestic purposes. The policy reversal cannot be understood without 
the domestic strategy as envisaged in the historic compromise. Yet, it also stemmed from the 
realisation that the party's previous demand of unilateral dissolution of both blocs had become 
entirely unrealistic. This had been declared occasionally by the leadership but was most 
plausibly directed at the PCI's militants and to reconcile inner-party opponents. 
The question of government participation forced the PCI into making clear that the future 
Italy would not be aligned with the communist bloc, that Italy's adherence to the West (and 
NATO) would not be put into question and that a PCI participation in government would not 
alter the military status quo in the Mediterranean. As a result, PCI leader Berlinguer went a 
step further in declaring. on the eve of Italy's national elections in June 1976 in a much 
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quoted interview with Giampaolo Pansa from the Italian daily Carriere della Sera, that 'he in 
fact felt safer on this side and under NATO's protection' .254 The timing of Berlinguer's public 
reassurance of the party's acceptance of NATO (in conjunction with Italy's national elections) 
was well chosen: it had the function of demonstrating and reassuring the West that the PCI 
was a national, democratic force that actively sought to contribute to the process of East-West 
detente and hence could be fully trusted as a partner in government. The novelty in 
Berlinguer's declaration was not so much that he no longer questioned Italy's membership in 
NATO, but that he felt 'safer on this side' .255 By reassuring that the party too felt safer in the 
West and under the 'umbrella NATO', the PCI wished to reassure the US and its international 
opponents in the West of its democratic credentials, and that it had entered a new phase of 
independency and autonomy from the Soviet Union. This would, so it was hoped, render the 
historic compromise at home more viable. If the PCI did not wish to await the end of East-
West hostilities (and as such the end of the Cold War itself), it needed to find a domestic and 
international strategy that would allow the party to move more freely (towards a participation 
in government) within the confines of the existing power bloc confrontation. Thus, the most 
fundamental side to Berlinguer's statement was that the PCI aimed to reassure Italy's Western 
European neighbours and the United States of its democratic reliability and that - in the event 
of Communist participation in government - this would not in the slightest alter Italy's 
military and security commitments. 
This re-orientation marked the closest concurrence between the domestic policy of the PCI on 
the one hand and its international orientation thus far. It was intended to reconcile the 'Italian 
way to socialism' with the international course, which in the correspondence with the 'choice 
of sides' had prevailed since the onset of the Cold War. European detente of the 1970s 
~:i.j Corriere della Sera, Enrico Berlinguer, 'II PCI e la NATO'. Interview with Giampaolo Pansa. 15 June 1976. 
re-printed in E. Bcrlinguer. La politica intemazionale dei comunisti italiani 1975-1976. p. 7. 
~:i:i Ibid. 
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provided the necessary international setting for the PCI to reverse its previous lines as a 
relaxation of tension did not force the PCI to align with either side. This of course also 
implied that the PCl's strategy was strongly dependent on the process of European detente. 
On the other hand, it allowed the party to launch a new image and to be at the forefront of 
contributing to an enduring detente between the East and West. Although the 
Czechoslovakian events of 1968 well preceded the PCl's policy reappraisal, the military 
suppression of the Czechoslovak reform course - an expression of staunchest Soviet bloc 
policy - had shown the PCI that Soviet foreign policy and intervention had also been obstacles 
for an Italian path to socialism. Thus, within the hitherto chosen side, there had been severe 
impediments to communist advances in Italy. 
8.) Reactions in the West 
The precise and well-calculated timing of Berlinguer's remarks unsurprisingly and 
unavoidably rendered them subject to attacks and accusations of insincerity and as being 
merely tactically motivated moves. Contrary to Berlinguer's intentions, his reassurances were 
not only half-believed (after all, the PCI was still a communist party) but the West felt even 
more threatened by the PCl's policy reversal on NATO in June 1976. 
To what extent Berlinguer had the party's militants behind him is difficult to ascertain. 
Barbagallo, for instance, stressed that Berlinguer's move had not been welcomed by many in 
the PCI, precisely because of the increasing distance from Moscow which would emerge from 
it. 256 The fact that large parts of the party's activists or its electorate allegedly did not agree 
with the directorate's policy changes contributed to Western fears and suspicions about the 
PCI. To many Western observers, one of the key questions to address was how a party with 
such a distinctly radical background could manage to become acceptable for those within 
2Sh Francesco Barbagallo, Enrico Berlingller (Roma: Carocci Editore. 2006), p. 266. 
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Italian society who did not aim at radical changes, without losing at the same time large parts 
of its rank and file? Since according to Western observers, significant parts of the PCI's 
support derived from pro-Soviet militants, the PCI's moderation and reassurances amounted 
to mere rhetorical statements and tactic manoeuvres. Viewed from this perspective, it is not 
entirely surprising that the PCI's foreign policy statements generated serious concern amongst 
Western European and American leaders. From an American and Soviet perspective, it is 
comprehensible why a strong and independent Western European communist party presented 
a threat. At the end of 1975, Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Kissinger's right-hand man, declared at a 
meeting of American ambassadors in Europe that 'a communism together with liberty is a 
hypothesis that frightens both Washington and Moscow alike' .257 Moscow feared the spill-
over effect on the communist regimes in the East and the challenges a Western unorthodox 
type of communism would involve. 
Western fears must of course be seen in light of the developing Eurocommunist phenomena -
which, by the mid-1970s had gained momentum - and the alleged dangers which the 
remarkable national mass consensus and electoral success of the largest Western European 
communist party provided for the West. Europe was haunted by it again - the ghost of 
communism. As we will analyse later, media and press coverage nurtured the developing 
'hysteria'. Western Europe certainly would have preferred smaller, less successful (in 
electoral terms), more intransigent, Soviet-loyal communist parties which were not more than 
shapeless monoliths. Electorally strong communist parties which, above alL even declared 
their acceptance of the values of parliamentary democracy, pluralism and the Atlantic 
Alliance, could not but raise great suspicion in the West. The Italian case is illustrative of the 
fears and dangers that were conjured up in the West. 
2<,7 Francesco Barbagallo, 'Enrico Berlinguer, il Compromesso Storieo e I'Alternative Democratica', 5wdi 
Storiei, October-December 2004 (Roma: Carocci Editore, 2005), p. 942. 
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The Italian election campaign of 1976, the rising success of the PCI (since the 1975 regional 
elections of definite Western concern) and the eventuality of a PCI entry in government as a 
result of the realisation of the historic compromise, were widely discussed and thoroughly 
covered by the German press since March 1976.258 Diametrically reverse to the SPD's (as 
well as the PS I' s) move to Atlanticism, the PCI's acceptance of NATO was considered to be a 
tactic measure and little credibility was given to it, at least from the perspective of the party's 
international adversaries.259 The 'precipitated' decision on the eve of the Italian national 
elections in June 1976 only further proved in the eyes of many Western observers that 
Berlinguer's reassurance was half-hearted. West German press - conservative and left-wing 
alike - paid an enormous amount of attention to Italian domestic politics between March and 
July 1976, with particular consideration to the development of the PCI. 
Much as the PCI hoped to make a participation in government acceptable to the US VIa 
NATO, the latter strongly opposed a PCI government entry in the 1970s. Fine distinctions in 
tone were, however, noticeable between the Ford and the Carter administrations. While the 
Carter administration did not seem to have been willing to intervene militarily, it did maintain 
a strategy of keeping the PCI out of government through far-reaching political and economic 
support of the DC.26o The Puerto Rico economic summit of June 1976 was seen as the most 
salient expression of Western interventionism thus far. 
258 The Italian political situation and the development of the PCI were subject to wide press coverage in 
Germany. See, for example, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ), Suddelltsche Zeitung (SZ), Die Welt. 
Miincheller Merkllr, Stuttgarter Zeitllllg. Vonl'iirts between March and July 1976. 
~59 Henry Kissinger argued that 'support of NATO (by the PCI) as expressed is explicitly tactical. and rests upon 
a distortion of detente' and he came to the somewhat simplistic conclusion asking 'how could Leninist parties 
dedicate themselves with any conviction to a military alliance whose primary purpose was and remains to 
counter Soviet power?', in H. Kissinger, 'Communist Parties in Western Europe: Challenge to the West'. in 
Austin Ranney and Giovanni Sartori (eds), Eurocol1lmllnism: The Italian Case (Washington. D.C.: American 
Enterprise Institute for Puhlic Policy Research, 1978). p. 191. 
260 Brackc. Which Socialisl11, p. 332. See also Andreas Pott and Michael StrUbel who argued that though the 
Carter administration opposed PCI governmental participation in principle, it emphasised a policy ()f non-
interference in internal affairs of other states, in 'Eurokommunismus aus der Sicht der NATO', in Dieter S. Lutz 
(cd.). Eurokol11l11lillisl11liS lilld NATO (Bonn: Osang. 1979), p. 132. 
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9.} pel and SPD relations with the United States and the war in Vietnam 
The PCI's policy reassessment towards NATO was somewhat necessarily intertwined with a 
general interest in improved relations with the United States. In the immediate post-war 
period until the beginning of the 1970s, insofar as it referred to the Cold War situation, anti-
imperialism was linked to anti-Americanism. It was also linked to the struggles for liberation 
in the Third World and to American interventionism. In the 1960s and 1970s. the Soviet-
aligned communist world had also identified with the decolonisation and the national 
liberation movements. Anti-Americanism was an integral part of communist ideology; since 
the 1960s it was strongly linked to US global policy and the escalation of the Vietnam War, 
and as far as the PCI was concerned, only secondarily with the cultural and socio-economic 
model it represented. With the beginning of the 1970s, anti-Americanism as a symbol and 
expression of communist internationalism decreased sharply in PCI thinking. In many ways 
imperialism, when referring to the Third World, became a considerably stronger and an 
increasingly important element of the party's internationalism.261 
In 1973 the PCI leadership initiated contacts with the United States. 262 In light of these 
relations with the United States, the PCI began to stress that these were not motivated by anti-
Americanism and that the party was pursuing a policy for Italy and Europe that was 'neither 
anti-American, nor anti-Soviet', but instead held friendly relations with both.263 Throughout 
197511976 the formula of a foreign policy that was 'neither anti-US nor anti-Soviet' was 
reiterated whenever possible. 264 This formerly anti-Imperialist, pro-Soviet foreign policy of 
the PCI developed into an in principle equidistant, but in practice critical yet benevolent pro-
American foreign policy. Equidistance could of course only be maintained in periods of East-
261 Bracke, Which Socialism. p. 25. 
'6' . 
- - Ihld .. p. 331. 
263 Berlinguer, 'L'ltalia, il PCI e gli Stati llniti', re-printed in Berlinguer. La politica illtema~iollale dei 
C011111llisti italiani 1975-1976, p. 63. 
264 Ihid. 
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West detente. Whenever Cold War hostilities came to the fore again, this position could not 
be upheld and the party ran the risk of losing credibility. 
The SPD had generally been more 'liberal' to attack American (foreign) policies from within 
the parliamentary opposition. Ever since the end of the 1950s, though still in opposition. the 
SPD was interested in closer relations with the United States, primarily because compatibility 
with US foreign policy was a prerequisite to gain trust amongst the West German 
population.265 The particularly good relation between Brandt and Kennedy was only an 
expression of this. Though inner-personal relations are by no means exclusively responsible 
for party or state relations, they often automatically influence those. This had been most 
noticeably the case between Schmidt and Ford and later Carter. 
The Vietnam War and the accompanying shift in the relationship between Western Europe 
and the United States unleashed the most significant anti-US movement - against the 
Vietnamese War - seen in Europe thus far. Opposition to US 'imperialism' was not exclusive 
to left-wing groups but common to large sections of the West German public. The SPD's 
Ostpolitik had coincided with US involvement in the Vietnam War. This severely restricted 
the Social Democrats' willingness to attack American foreign policies. The involvement in 
the Vietnam War had detached the Americans from previous engagements in Western Europe 
and provided the SPD with more leverage to pursue an independent Eastern policy and to 
open dialogue with Eastern nations. Hence, even if the conflict in Vietnam affected US-
German diplomacy, open criticism of the US engagement in the war was detained. 
Nonetheless, this had failed to silence critical voices within the SPD. On the contrary. it had 
265 See also Edwin C/crwick, Oppositionstheorien lind AlIJ3enpolitik. Eine Analyse so;ialdemokratisclzer 
Deutschlandpolitik 1955-1966 (Konigstcinffs.: Anton Hain, 1981). p. 98. 
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become an explosive issue amongst inner-party circles. 266 The party leadership and Brandt 
were frequently attacked for being too conciliatory towards US foreign policy, avoiding any 
clear cut criticism about American involvement in Vietnam.267 Prominent SPD members such 
as Karsten Voigt criticised the SPD's weak and hesitant disapproval of the American 
imperialist war in Vietnam.268 A number of SPD regional and sub-regional committees 
condemned US bombing of North Vietnam. These committees pressed the federal 
government in Bonn to demand an unconditional and immediate end of all American 
bombardments.269 
The party leadership was itself torn in the attempt to channel the widespread anti-
Americanism amongst the SPD's base (as well as amongst West Germans) in order not to 
jeopardise US-German relations. Due to the party's Ostpolitik, this was of primary concern. 
Willy Brandt became increasingly trapped in his dual function as foreign minister (and in this 
role promoting close ties with the US and the Alliance) as well as in his role as SPD leader 
(reconciling diplomacy with demands from the SPD's rank and file). The diverse perception 
of the Vietnam War within the SPD had crystallised in the course of 1967, when the 
American military action against North Vietnam escalated into a war bombardment which had 
d I . hI' 270 cause severe casua tIes amongst t e popu atIon. 
266 See also Klaus Schonhoven, Wendejahre. Die Sozialdemokratie in der Zeit der GrojJen Koalition 1966-1969 
(Bonn: J.H.W. Dietz, 2004), p. 421. 
267 Frankfurter Rlll1dschall. 'SPD-Parteitag kritisierte Bundeskanzler Willy Brandt'. 20 Fehruary 1973, re-printed 
in AdSD, 2IBTFGOO 1977; see also Von-rarts, 'Endlich Schluss in Vietnam', 18 January 1973, p. l. 
268 Sec speech by K. Voigt. in SPD (ed.), AlljJerordentlicher Parteitag der SPD. Protokoll der \'erhandlzmgen, 
12/13 October 1972. Dortmund, Bonn, p. 147. 
269 'SPD-Gliederungen verurteilen US-Bombenterror', AdSD, 2IBTFGOOI977. 
~70 Schlinhoven. Wendejahre, p. -+21. 
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Chapter 4 
SPO and PCI policies towards European integration 
1. Italy, Germany and the context of European economic integration 
In the 1960s, Western Europe's remarkable post-war economic expansion continued to rise. It 
marked a period of high growth rates, booming exports, minimal unemployment and 
controllable inflation - in sum, an economic performance that did much to cement in the 
minds of Western European policy makers and citizens an equation between integration and 
economic success.271 Economic stability and growth was in large part attributed to Western 
European economic integration (from ECSC to EEC).272 In Italy, the so-called 'economic 
miracle' dates back to the years from 1958 to 1963 which, without doubt, represented a 
unique and exceptional phase of Italian economic history. In those years, Italy transformed its 
economy from a rural to an industrialised one, and closed the gap which had existed with 
other European countries like France, Germany or Great Britain since its birth as a nation.273 
The 'golden age' of unparalleled economic prosperity in fact lasted in most of the OECD 
countries until the oil shock of 1973.274 This period saw a growth of GDP and GDP per capita 
on an unprecedented scale in all parts of the world economy, a rapid growth of world trade, a 
reopening of world capital markets and possibilities of international migration. The average 
per capita growth in Italy was 4.8 and in Germany it was 4.9. 275 
271 Introduction by N. Piers Ludlow, in N. Piers Ludlow (ed.), European Integration and the Cold War. Ost-
Westpolitik, 1965-1973 (London and New York: Routledge, 2007), p. 4. 
m In Italy the effect of the Common Market was clear for all to see: the percentage of Italian goods destined for 
the EEC countries rose from 23 percent in 1955 to 29.8 percent in 1960 and 40.2 percent in 1965. see Paul 
Ginsborg, A History a/Contemporary Italy. Society and Politics 1943-1988 (New York, Basingstoke: Pal grave 
Macmillan, 2003), p. 214. For figures on Germany's economic performance during those years. unemployment 
rates, public expenditure, and GOP see Werner Abelshauser, Deutsche Wirtschaftsgeschichte seit 1945 
(Mtinchen: Verlag C.H.Beck, 2004), p. 289 and p. 293. 
213 Favretto. The Long Search, p. 24. 
274 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (DECO) 
275 Angus Maddison, The World Economy ill the 20th Century (Paris: Development Centre of the DECO. 1989). 
pp. 34-35. 
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In the 1950s, policy revisionism was elaborated within a context of conservative hegemony, 
(CDU/CSU in Germany) and long periods of left-wing opposition plus a wake of successive 
electoral setbacks (national elections in 1953 and 1957) that induced parts of the SPD to 
thoroughly rethink some of its previous positions.276 This development was not exclusive to 
the SPD but can be observed by examining the Western European Left in general. In Italy, the 
PCI's gradual process of revisionism coincided with the opening to the Left (i.e. the PSI's 
gradual distancing from the PCI and subsequent inclusion in the governmental alliance in 
December 1963). This had further contributed to the isolation of the Communists on a 
national level. In ideological terms, this created a greater extent of consensus politics and the 
termination of divergence over principles. Europe and the economic integration process were 
viewed and approached in the context of Realpolitik and former, partially ideological, 
positions (PCI) were slowly revised. Within political systems of proportional representation 
such as in Italy and Germany, 'the making of politics' always consists of the mobilisation of 
support in terms of voters and political allies: this requires the construction of policy 
consensus, an overlapping of positions and the optimisation of support for a certain political 
stance. Hence, the conversion from hostility to support of the European integration process 
must also be viewed in this context. It demonstrated the fact that the SPD's and PCI's policies 
were increasingly shaped by the acknowledged necessity for greater pragmatism and by an 
ever more pronounced electoral orientation. 
No mono-causal explanation is sufficient to account for the SPD's and the PCI's policy shift 
towards favouring economic integration with the West. The general hypothesis, however. is 
that domestic considerations were almost exclusively responsible for the parties' policy 
reappraisal towards European integration. These were the adaptation to the economic 
principles of the capitalist system, the recognition of the economic boom as a direct 
276 Favretto, The Long Search, p .. 1 
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consequence of integration, trade union influence, electoral considerations and the search for 
bi-partisanship in foreign policy as a means to achieve governmental consensus. Of course, 
the extent of these aspects on influencing policy shifts varied somewhat. Even so, 
considerable similarities between SPD and PCI can be produced. 
The diversity of the two parties allows one to make some useful and interesting comparisons. 
identifying whether policy shifts are caused by ideological reconsiderations or an adaptation 
to the political, economic and social circumstances. By examining the positions of two diverse 
parties (i.e. from different political and ideological camps) one can make general assumptions 
and conclusions about the origins of revisionism that affected wider sections of the West 
European Left. In this particular context, special emphasis will be made on the PCI's national 
character (which shaped and determined party policy) and only secondarily as an integral part 
of the international communist movement. The latter was important in as much as it shows 
that the global communist movement was gradually replaced as the PCI's sole and exclusive 
point of reference and external element of legitimisation. Though the PCI's internationalism 
continued to be a matter of deepest, inescapable but also ambivalent identity, Europe assumed 
an ever greater importance for the PCI.277 In many ways, the PCI's post-war history can be 
characterised as a constant struggle to define and redefine the nature of its deep but 
ambiguous relations with the Soviet Union and the world communist movement. With regard 
to European integration, the PCI identified its own national interests in the struggle for 
socialism at an early stage. In part, this was possible because it did not raise the question of 
loyalty to Moscow, the belonging to the international communist movement or the general 
bloc orientation of the PCI, and did not involve the so often painful 'choice of sides'. 278 
277 See. for instance, Maggiorani who argued that by the mid-1970s, due to the progressive economic successes 
resulting from economic integration with the West. the pel's Europeanism became an undisputed choice. in 
Maggiorani. L 'Europa degli altri. C011l1111isti italialli e illtegra~iolle ellropea. p. 305. 
~7S It should also be noted that the Soyict Union itself some\vhat qualified its hostility towards the Comnwn 
Market in the I 960s and acknowledged its acceptance. 
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The Cold War element and the 'logic of the blocs' was inherent in the PCI's idea of an 
autonomous Europe. The PCl's vague concept of an autonomous and independently acting 
Italian foreign policy was transmitted on to the European platform. Initially (in the 1960s) this 
Europe was pictured as a globally acting and politically as well as economically independent 
(from the US) force in the East-West conflict, which in turn would guarantee a greater amount 
of autonomy for Italy's national affairs. Towards the 1970s, Europe played an ever greater 
importance in the East-West conflict and assumed an equidistant role in the PCI's concept of 
detente. In the 1970s, independence and autonomy were increasingly sought from the Soviet 
Union as well, whose system was in contradiction with, and marked an impediment to the 
very idea of socialism as envisaged by the PCI. 
In the immediate post-war period until 1960, it had been difficult to clearly separate the 
SPD's domestic policies from foreign policies on certain aspects. The most obvious example 
of this interrelatedness was the SPD's Deutschlandpolitik (German policy). As implied in the 
name, this policy would normally fall in the realm of domestic policies. Nonetheless, the 
SPD's German policy and changes in intra-German relations affected and determined all other 
foreign policy aspects of the SPD. Foreign policy considerations were almost totally 
subordinated to the primacy of national policies and ambitions. Foreign policy aspects were 
subservient to the SPD's German (and reunification) policy - which, in the 1950s, was 
undeniably assigned to the realm of domestic policy but shaped the SPD's foreign policy 
significantly, if not exclusively. It was only in 1960 that the SPD acknowledged the 
interrelatedness of the German problem with the Cold War and that solutions to it must be 
sought in the context of the East-West relations. In the early 1950s therefore, the SPD's 
equivocal choice for Europe was (officially) to an overriding extent hindered by the desire for 
reunification. 
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The SPD's policy reversal vis-a.-vis European economic integration, however, preceded the 
party's strategic reassessment of NATO and the domestic consensus-seeking course, as 
envisaged in the Bad Godesberg Programme. At first sight, the former may seem III 
contradiction with the SPD's very concept of national reunification. A closer analysis. 
however, demonstrates that the SPD's objection to European economic integration was only 
secondarily influenced by the reunification line. The PCl's gradual endorsement of 
Europeanism also preceded the conversion to Atlanticism. The PCl's initial reluctance and 
hostility towards Western European integration was thoroughly rethought at the beginning of 
the 1960s. The almost parallel juncture of the two parties' policy reversal in support of the 
EEC was striking. 
An analysis of the two parties' policy towards Europe - especially when given consideration 
to European socialist, social democratic and labour parties in general - shows that one can not 
speak of particular 'socialist', 'social democratic' or 'communist' positions. Opposition to 
European integration was widely diffused in Western Europe (i.e. in Britain and Scandinavia) 
and not a distinctive feature of communist parties exclusively. National reasons were often 
responsible for that. It should also be noted that the PCI's revisionism towards Europe 
occurred well before that of some of the political parties of Britain and Scandinavia. With 
regard to the PCl's European counterparts, for example the PCF, the Italian Communists' 
'European outlook' was unique to all intents and purposes. It will also be demonstrated here 
that the positions of the SPD and PCI on European integration had never significantly 
differed. In more general terms, following Sassoon, the position of the PCI had not been 
fundamentally diverse from those of Western European social democratic parties.279 This 
suggests that the 'pros' and 'cons' about European integration were perceived from a national 
279 In contrast for instance to the peF, whose Europeanism had never assumed the flexibility or dimension 
comparable to the PCI's. see D. Sassoon, 'La sinistra, I'Europa, il PCr. in Roberto Gualtieri (ed.). II PCI 
llell'ltalia repllbblicalla 1943-1991 (Roma: Caracci Editore. 2001). p. 223 and p. 237. 
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perspective, i.e. supported or opposed to in consideration with national economic or political 
interests. Ideology and former dogmatic positions were gradually replaced by Realpolitik. The 
choice of the PCI and SPD provides an interesting case study in support of this hypothesis. 
Both parties had opposed the initial stages of the integration process and came to 
acknowledge the 'fruits' of it in the coming years. Even the juncture of their revisionism 
manifests a remarkable convergence between the two political parties. In both cases, their 
declining opposition to European integration was part of a general process of de-
ideologisation of the two parties. Policy revisionism towards European economic integration 
went hand in hand with the decline of ideology in party programmes and policies in becoming 
acceptable to wider sections of society. It was part of the process of becoming a 'people's 
party'. Implanting themselves in society in terms of adherents and voters, as well as seeking 
relations with other political forces, rendered this process obligatory. 
Even if the PCI still remained a communist party after all- and in the 1960s the Soviet Union, 
without doubt, marked its most important point of reference, the PCI softened ideologically 
and a significant convergence of positions and motivations for policy shifts can be found 
between the SPD and the PCI. Hence, European policy revisionism and the origins of the 
transformation process produced considerable similarities in the two political forces. 
It will also be suggested here that one cannot as rigorously separate or deny any correlation 
between the SPD's Ostpolitik and European integration as has previously been done in some 
of the literature.28o European integration must also be analysed in the Cold War context and 
280 Sec Andreas Wilkens who argued that there was no relationship between Ostpolitik and European integration, 
only on a general level that Brandt took every opportunity to insist that the solid anchorage of W. Germany 
within the ~European and Atlantic structures was a precondition for an Eastern policy, in A. Wilkens, 'Ne\\~ . 
Ostpolitik and European integration', in P. Ludlow (ed.), European Integration and the Cold War. Ostpollflk-
Westpo/itik. 1965-1973. p. 69. 
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cannot be as clearly separated from the SPD's policies towards the East. For the PCI, Europe 
assumed an ever greater importance in the late 1960s and 1970s. It marked part of the wider. 
fundamental party strategy to become a legitimate national force. By the mid-1970s the PCI 
can be perceived as an integral part of the Western European Left (which the party officially 
did a decade later). The PCI sought convergences of interest and strategic alliances with other 
parties on the European platform, well beyond fraternal links with some of the other West 
European communist parties. The Cold War framework was of great importance to the 
development of the PCI's national identity and by the late 1970s Western Europe had 
significantly altered the PCl's previous Soviet-aligned internationalism. It no longer marked 
the party's external point of legitimisation or most significant point of identification. 
2.) SPD policies towards Europe: from intransigence to endorsement 
Though rhetorically pro-European, the SPD had opposed all concrete steps towards European 
integration in the early 1950s. A number of factors explain the SPD's policy shift from 
opposition to support of economic integration with the West. The SPD never opposed 
economic integration per se, thus not for ideological reasons. Rather, in the early stages, 
Schumacher put the Western European integration process under 'qualified acceptance'. As 
long as it did not hinder the reunification process, integration with the West would be 
supported unreservedly, so said the official party policy. Schumacher's vision entailed the 
integration of a 'free and democratic Germany into a community of free people on the basis of 
equality of all members'. This Europe would naturally be socialist, as this was the necessary 
precondition for democracy and equality.281 Integration was in fact endorsed as Western 
281 Hrhek, Die SPD-Delitschland lind Europa, p. 3'+. 
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prosperity was seen to have a possible domino impact on the building of communist regimes 
in the East. 
Schumacher's European policies were complex and ambivalent, and a simple link with the 
reunification argument does not sufficiently account for the party's growing hostility.282 The 
question of Germany's equality in the newly established institutions (Ruhr statute, Council of 
Europe, ECSC, EDC) and the capitalist nature of those were constantly interwoven with the 
unification aspect. 283 It has been almost unequivocally held in most of the literature that the 
desire for national reunification predominantly shaped and determined the SPD's European 
policies in the early stages.284 While this aspect was used as an explanatory factor for the 
party's intransigence, it did not determine the party's course exclusively. Rather, it will be 
suggested here that during the Schumacher period, the reunification argument often seemed as 
a mere pretext. Schumacher had greatly emphasised Germany's willingness to cooperate but 
only on the basis of full equality.285 As argued before, Schumacher's reservations were rather 
nationalist in tone. 286 The demand for Germany's equality in all European projects was 
emphasised to the extent that one may even argue that Germany's division as a hindrance to 
integration was simply exploited as a pretext to the more crucial impediment of Germany's 
deficient equality in the institutions.287 
282 Ramuschkat, Die SPD und der europiiische Einigungsprozess, p. 191. 
283 Equality largely referred to voting rights in the various newly established European bodies. Schumacher 
propagated the principle of non-discrimination. 
~S..j See, for instance, Bellers, EWG und die "Godesberger" SPD, p. 292. 
285 See, for example, Wolfgang Benz who argued that Schumacher's priorities were German reunification and 
the equality of Germany in this European association, in 'Kurt Schumachers Europakonzeption·. in Ludolf 
Herbst, Werner BUhrer, Hanno Sowade (eds), Yom Marshallplan ::ur EWG (MUnchen: R. Oldenbourg. 1990). p. 
47. See also Ossip. K. Flechtheim, who stressed that until Schumacher's death, the SPD not only supported 
reunification in favour of integration in the Europe of the six, but as a 'national party' also heavily attacked 
Adenauer for failing to integrate Germany on the basis of full equality, in Ossip K. flcchtheim (ed.). Die 
Parteien der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Hamburg: Hoffman und Campe, 1973), p. 20. 
286 According to Schumacher. the ECSC would institutionalise French control over German industry. See. for 
example. Schumacher, 'Unser Nein zum Schumanplan·. Hamburger Echo, No. 93. 21. April 1951. p. 2. re-
erinted in Schumacher, Reden. Schriften. Korrespondenzen 194~-1952. pp. 806-~07. .' '. 
_87 A contradiction in the SPD's reunification and European polIcy may be seen In the fact that Marshall AId \\ .\'> 
unequivocally endorsed by the SPD - although it clearly had a Cold War connotation to it and accelerated the 
merger of the three zones in West Germany and de-coupled those from the East. 
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The SPD demanded above all full parity, the inclusion of Britain and Scandinayia, the 
rejection of the capitalist, conservative and cartelistic structure of the 'Europe of the Six'. 
dismissing the fragmentation of Germany's basic industry in favour of capitalist groups and 
interests, and unconditional equality and membership in all institutions without 
discrimination.288 Schumacher despised the capitalist nature of the 'Europe of the Six'. British 
and Scandinavian membership was therefore enthusiastically endorsed so as to change the 
character of Europe and render it more socialist. Consequently, the implication of this line of 
argument is that the reunification issue would not have prevented the SPD's approval of the 
Schuman Plan had it included Britain, and if Germany's economic interests had been more 
rigorously defended and incorporated. After his death in 1952, Schumacher's intransigent line 
was continued by Erich Ollenhauer, who acted, however, more as an interim leader of the 
SPD?89 After the 1957 electoral defeat, the previous monolithic style of party guidance was 
brought to a close and changes in European policy gradually came to the fore. 
2.1) The German trade unions and European economic integration 
The ECSC had in large parts become associated with the renewal and preservation of 
economic prosperity in the public mind. The DGB had already favoured West Germany's 
integration in the ECSC.29o Trade union leaders had become more enthusiastic about 
European integration mainly because it coincided with the period of economic prosperity in 
Western Europe. With the de-coupling of German rearmament (which the DGB had fiercely 
opposed together with the SPD) from economic integration in 1955 (Germany's inclusion in 
NATO), the integration process was ever more enthusiastically endorsed by the trade unions. 
288 SPD press release 'Seven preconditions in order to support the ECSC'. 20 April 1951, re-printed in 
Schumacher, Reden, Schriften, Korresponden-;.en 1945-1952. p. 805. . 
~Xlj Ollenhauer's leadership was accompanied by a personnel restructuring of the parliamentary factIOn after the 
1957 electoral defeat. Against Ollenhauer's will, the leadership of the SPD in parliament was subs~quently led 
hy a group of reformers like Carlo Schmid, Fritz Erler and Herbert Wehner. See Meyer. HerberT n ehller. pp. 
208-209 
290 On 7 May 1951 the DGB had published a communique expressing its approval of the Coal and StL'cl 
Community with certain provisions - which were mainly that the trade unions' interests he satcguarded at all 
levels and that full employment and high standards of living be protected. 
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The DGB, already supportive of both ECSC and the EEC, pressed the SPD to renounce its 
economic programme of nationalisation and subsidised investment toward market oriented 
policies, as well as towards including European integration.291 Both SPD and PCI were under 
pressure from their respective trade unions to re-examine their policies towards Europe. In 
both cases, trade unions had very early on adopted diverging positions from the parties the\' 
were affiliated with. Similarities between trade union pressures in Italy and Germany were 
striking. 
The SPD had never been united over its European course. For much of the 1950s, Willy 
Brandt's commitment to West Germany's integration with the West, NATO and the evolving 
European Communities set him apart from the mainstream of his party. 292 Other leading 
figures like Ernst Reuter and Carlo Schmid favoured the integration process from the outset 
and some considered integration with the West as important as unification with the East, or at 
least did not necessarily see an incompatibility between the two. Nonetheless, Schumacher's 
line had remained predominant. After 1952, internal party pressures for a re-examination, in 
combination with external pressures from trade union elements partially led the SPD to speak 
in favour of the EEC and the atomic energy community EURATOM. 293 Changes over the 
Saar problem also contributed, though marginally, toward a positive evaluation of the Rome 
Treaties. The attainment of a satisfactory solution to the Saar problem had been an SPD 
precondition for a general acceptance of economic integration with the West. 29-l The 
conclusion of the Saar plebiscite on 23 October 1955 removed another possible source of 
291 Andrew Moravcsik, The Choice Jor Europe (Ithaca, New York: Cornell U~ive~sity Pres~,. 1998), p. 98. SeL 
also Featherstone, who highlights that the 'implausibility of the SPD maintaimng Its OPPll~ltIO~ t.t1\\'ard~ . 
European integration in the 1950s, is partly to be explained by the attitudes of the trade umons , In Socialist 
Parties and European Integration, p. 164. . .. 
292 Arne Hofmann, The Emergence oj Detente in Europe. Brandt, Kennedy and the formatlOlI of OstpolITIk 
(hon, New York: Routledge, 2007), p. 3. 
293 Belkrs, ReJormpartei lind EWG-Strategie der SPD, p. 80. . . 
2lJ.j The SPD had argued that an annexation of the Saar by France would automattcally pul Germany In a legall~ 
and morally inferior position over demands of the national borders in the East. 
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disagreement. On 1 January 1957 the Saar was reunited with Germany. This rendered 
Germany's inclusion viable as a separate Saar identity was no longer an issue of dissent. 29:'i 
2.2) The road to Europe: SPO approval of the Treaties of Rome 
On 24 June 1957 the SPD parliamentary faction decided to support the ratification of the 
Rome treaties. 296 In part, the vote in favour of the EEC was justified by the SPD in parliament 
by noting that in contrast to the ECSC and EDC, the EEC did not raise fundamental 
geopolitical issues, and its social and economic credentials were desirable, albeit with certain 
reservations.297 These entailed demands for full employment and improved living 
standards.298 
From 1955 onwards, Herbert Wehner and party leader Erich Ollenhauer had joined Jean 
Monnet's newly established 'Action-Committee for the United States of Europe'. This 
confirmed the SPD's principle willingness to constructively accompany the succeeding 
integration steps. The contribution towards the workings of this action committee diminished 
the party's previous hostility and liberated the SPD from its negative, anti-European image 
considerably.299 It helped the SPD to design and co-formulate new integration concepts and in 
part managed to secure the majority of the SPD vote in parliament in favour of the Rome 
Treaties. The few remaining concerns about a consolidation of Germany's division were 
displaced by arguing that the Common Market would in any case be solely (and fully) 
295 On the subject see also Bellers, ReJormpartei und EWG-Strategie der SPD, pp. 70-73.. .. 
296 The Rome Treaties were not approved of by the SPD unanimously. In a parliamentary factIOn meeting. SIX 
members, most importantly Herbert Wehner. spoke in favour of abstention in the ~arliament~y V()t~. Others .. 
such as Ollenhauer, advocated support of the treaties to prevent further obstacles for the c~mlng natIOnal. ek~tlOn 
campaign. Helmut Schmidt voted against the treaties on the grounds of British and ~c~ndIn.a\,lan abstentIOn irom 
it. The SPD parliamentary faction meeting ultimately approved the treaties by a ma.~onty ui ten votes. See 
Meyer, Herbert WehnCT. p. 172. See also Loth, 'Von Heidelberg nach Godesberg: Europa-Konzepte der 
deutschen Sozialdemokratie zwischen Utopie und Politik', p. 218. 
297 Wilhelm Mellics. 'Erklarung der SPD-Bundestagsfraktion zur Begrtindung ihrer Zustimmung IU den 
Romischen Vertragen', re-prin;ed in SPD (ed.), Parlamentarische Positiollell;'u Europa, pp. 27-2S. 
298 Ib'd ')7 1 ., p. _ . 
299 Loth, 'Von Heidelberg nach Godesberg'. p. 217. 
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consolidated in fifteen years. 300 This further underlines the argument that the reunification line 
had lost its significance and was no longer seen, if ever, as a hindrance to economic 
. . . h h W 301 F d I . mtegratIOn WIt t e est. un amenta to changes In the SPD's European policies was also 
the de-coupling of economic integration from military integration with the FRG's inclusion in 
NATO in 1955. Quite plausibly Germany's adherence to NATO made SPD acceptance of the 
Rome Treaties possible. The military division of Germany had become a given and 
unchangeable fact for an uncertain period of time. This paved the way for acceptance of 
economic integration with the West. It may somewhat be overstating it but it may even be 
maintained that contrary to the debate in the context of NATO, the SPD's early anti-
Europeanism had never been determined by the reunification aspect. 
Paradoxically though, the SPD's acceptance of the Rome Treaties was simplified and enabled 
through continued party opposition to NATO until June 1960 (in which the reunification idea 
was still inherent). 302 Analogies to the PCI's differentiated balancing between pro-
Europeanism and anti-Atlanticism in the 1960s were certainly noticeable. The pcrs fierce, 
partially ideological, polemics and opposition to Atlanticism and the military alliance allowed 
for a greater leeway towards Europe. 
3.) Italian Parties and European economic integration 
Opposition to the Common Market was not exclusive to communist parties. In Italy, the 
Italian Socialists under Nenni had warned of the dangers of the EEC 'leading to sharp 
impoverishment' of the poorer regions, whilst the richer areas benefited even more. The 
300 Ihid. . 19 __ 
301 Moravcsik allocated the point of the SPO's policy reversal to 1955: after the failure of Adena~er" .)) 
Moscow trip and the failure of the Geneva conference, reunification had heen downgraded as an Immediate goal: 
see The Choice for Europe, p. 95. . ' . . .' ' .. 
. 1()2 H' . h 0 . ,t )1' the SPO's leading economists, stressed that the secunng oj the SPI) O1aJont~ In la\ our 
etnnc els , one (~ f '1' hi 
was rendered possihle hecause the treaties had clearly detached economic integration rom 011 Itary OC 
huilding, as quoted by Susanne Miller. Die SPD ror und nach Godesberg, p. 119. 
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Italian Left, not just communist, spoke of the EEC as strengthening the industrial monopolies 
d d . I l' . 1 303 Th an as amaglng to ta Ian agncu ture. e forces of the Italian left (with exception of the 
Social Democrats) for their part during the early integration years, were opposed to or 
diffident towards European integration in perception of it only as a fact of pro-US foreign 
policy and primarily as a by-product of Atlanticism.304 
When the Treaties of Rome were put to a vote in Italian parliament in July 1957, the PSI took 
a position of benevolent abstention on the EEC, but supported EURATOM.305 The PSI's anti-
Atlanticism was slowly dropped and the idea of Europe endorsed. After 1956, the autonomist 
faction in the PSI had paved the way for a distancing from the Communists. This was an 
essential step towards the party's incorporation in the first centre-left government in 
December 1963. With the increasing ambition to seek an alliance with the DC, the Socialists 
saw the EEC as an opportunity to gain support for their domestic policies.306 
With exception of the PCI and Nenni's Socialist party, the other Italian political forces had 
endorsed all European integration projects from the outset. The DC, the Social Democrats, the 
Liberals (PLI), and Republicans (PRI) all supported political and economic integration as part 
of the Atlantic system. The DC, in particular, approached European integration as an aspect of 
the Atlantic link and objected to any scheme for further integration that might lead to greater 
autonomy for Europe. Constants of the DC's European policy have been the total adherence 
to the idea of the political union of Europe, the rejection of the Gaullist conception of a 
centre-right Europe, and endorsement of the democratisation of Community institutions via 
307 dB' . h . h the election of the EP through universal suffrage. The DC favoure ntIS entry 10 t e 
303 Featherstone, Socialist Parties and European Integration, p. 224. 
304 Ronzitti, 'Italian Political Parties', p. 20. . 
1()."i Featherstone argued that the PSI was more comfortable with EURATOM: it was seen as. the ~)~I y. '~ractJcal 
possihility' for Italy to participate in new scientific development. a field in which the capacity 01 md\\"ldual 
. . d . 'b'd '")'")1 '")'")<:: natIOns was shown to be ma equate, m I I . pp. ~_'-t-~ __ J. 
306 Vannicclli. Itah'. NATO. and the European Community, pp. 11-12. 
307 Ronzitti, 'hali;n Political Parties'. p. 11. 
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Common Market accordingly.308 It was a commonality of virtually all Italian political forces 
to perceive of the EEC (as well as the Atlantic Alliance) as an external factor which had to be 
supported unequivocally but could also be utilised to promote certain domestic political 
ambitions. The pre-eminence of the Atlantic relationship in Italian eyes has been a major 
cause of the country's equivocal behaviour towards the European Community. By perceiving 
NATO and the EEC as two interrelated processes, Italian leaders tended to approach them in a 
similar manner, mostly by reasserting their loyalty to both. At the Community level this led to 
Italy's strong support of contradictory developments such as supra-nationality and Britain's 
admission to the EEC. Ultimately, in giving priority to the Atlantic relationship, Italy's 
behaviour within the European Community sought to undermine De Gaulle's 'French-
dominated European Europe' .309 
3.1) The pel and European economic integration 
In the 1950s, Europe did not rank high in the PCI's strategic priorities. Statements were rare 
and generally limited to a propagandistic nature. 310 These were aligned with Moscow's 
judgment about Western integration. In light of the debates over the Rome Treaties, the PCI 
opposed the very idea of regional integration limited to Western Europe and oriented to the 
Atlantic Alliance. In accord with the Soviet response to the Treaty of Rome, the PCI regarded 
the EEC like another manifestation of American imperialism and a 'conspiracy of 
monopolies' against the working class. 311 Moreover, the treaties were directly linked to the 
308 Vannicelli, Italy. NATO, and the European Community, pp. 34. 
309 Ihid., pp. 48-49. . . . d d' "d I. , 
3)0 This led Maggiorani to highlight that at the PCI's Eighth Congress 10 19~6 ToglIattl .e I~ate . on ) o~e .' 
minute of his report to the 'European question'. This was intended to underlIne the marg1Oaht) 01 PCI thInk10g 
on that matter. See Maggiorani. L'E/lropa degli altri, p. 47.. .,. " 
J)) 'SuI Mercato comune europl'o·. Comuniqu0 hy the PCI's DirezlOne. 24 March 1957, In PCI (lJ.). DO(/(f1IlIltr 
politici e dircttirc del Partito C011l11flista italiaflo dallTlIl al IX Congresso. (Roma: 1960). p. 47. 
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North Atlantic Pact.312 PCI statements were restricted to the somewhat simplistic demand for 
the suspension of the Treaties of Rome whenever possible until an alternative proposal had 
been established.313 This alternative proposal- without being specified - would entail Eastern 
Europe and not be limited to integration with the West. The idea of the Common Market as an 
autarchic and closed economic entity was dismissed altogether and the PCI advocated its 
extension to the socialist countries in Eastern Europe instead. 314 This would terminate the 
political connotation to the EEC as an American imperialist tool. This, however, also implies 
that the PCI's objections were not ideologically motivated, as the party was not opposed to 
economic integration per se but to this particular form of regional integration as a by-product 
of the Cold War. In a speech to the European Parliament in March 1969 Giorgio Amendola, 
one of the PCI's most outspoken pro-Europeans, retained that the PCI's initial opposition did 
not derive from denying the necessity of economic collaboration as such, but because it was 
born as a political mechanism which would further the division of Europe.:ns Hence, PCI 
propaganda was ideological in tone - to say that Soviet positions on Western European 
integration were largely adopted uncritically - but not ideologically motivated in principle. 
This was also the main line as advocated by Western European communist parties. In a joint 
declaration, the communist parties of the Europe of the Six underlined that 'the ECSC and the 
312 'SuI Mercato comune europeo', in ibid., pp. 45-47. It is worth noting that in 1978 the PCI though having 
become a pro-European party still maintained the validity of this initial judgement of the European Community. 
see PCI (ed.), Progetto di tesi per il XV Congresso nazionale del PCI (Roma: Editori Riuniti, 1978), p. 40. See 
also Giorgio Amendola who later recalled that the PCI's hostility was appropriate in the specific circumstances 
or the 1950s. The original and undisclosed purpose of the EEC, its shortcomings and inherent errors had been the 
undeniable 'umbilical cord' with the Atlantic Alliance; in G. Amendola, Il rinnovamento del PCI. Inten'ista di 
Renato Nicolai (Roma: Editori Riuniti, 1978), pp. 195-197. 
313 'Bandire dall'Italia Ie armi atomiche e sospendere il MEC', Comunique of the pcrs Direzione, 25 Apri I 
1958, in PCI (ed.), Document; politic; e direttil'e del Partito comllnista italiano dal/TIlI al IX Congresso, ~. 
288. 'Risoluzione della Direzione del PCI', 8 January 1959. in ibid., p. '+16; 'Per il rinno\'amento democratlco 
della societa italiana. Per avanzare verso il socialismo', 9th National Congress in 1960, in PCI (ed.). Da Gramsci 
a Berlingller. La via italiana al socialismo attraverso i congressi del partito comll11ista italiano IIlI956-1l)()-f 
(VellL'lia: Edizioni del Calendario, 1985). p. 290. . 
314 Other PCI statements in fact spoke about the extension of commercial relation to socialist and ll~utral st~te.., \0 
order to create a united world market. See 'Tesi del X Congresso Nazionale 1962'. in Da GramsCl a Berlmgll('f 
... IJI1956-1964, p. 403. .' .. 
315 GAd 1· 'Dl'scorso al Parlamento europeo'. 12 March 1969 in Mauro MagglOram. Paolo l-erran (cd..,). 
. men 0.1. C • .., 1 
L'Europa da Togliatti a Be rlinglIer. Testimonian:e l' Doclimentl 1945-/984 (Bologna: II Multno. _0(5). p. _X .. l. 
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Common Market represented the economic and political by-products of American policy in 
Europe' .316 
PCI critical judgments were in general limited to the negative and devastating impact of the 
EEC on Italy's agriculture as well as the previously highlighted political connotation to it as 
an American imperialist tool. Arturo Colombi, member of the PCI's Direzione, voiced that 
the 'economic miracle' in reality contributed to a relative regression of Italy's agriculture, 
deteriorating the living conditions of farmers and of agriculturallabour.317 
Even though this remained official party policy until a gradual reversal was offset in 1962, 
differentiating voices had existed, above all in CGIL circles. This ultimately had an influence 
on the PCI's revisionism that should not be underestimated. 
3.2) The PCI, the CGIL and European Integration 
The PCI's analysis of the negative effects of European economic integration (or the party's 
lack of substantial examination) was not paralleled by the communist-socialist trade union 
movement, CGIL. Though contrary to the DGB, the treaties were, from an overall 
perspective, rejected. Trade union circles adopted a differentiated position vis-a-vis the 
Treaties of Rome, arguing that the solution can not consist of a simplistic call for the 
suspension of the Common Market. 318 In December 1959 Eugenio Peggio, an economic 
expert of the PCI, underlined that the initial character of the EEC had changed. 'Contrary to 
its expectations, the economic integration process of the small Europe of the Six has assumed 
a different significance and characterisation. It in fact had an impact on international detente 
316 'Contro la CECA c il MEC. una politica nuova in Europa', declaration of the communist partics of the six 
countries of the 'small Europe', in PCI (ed.), DoclIInenti politici e direttire del Partito cOl11l1llista Italiano 
dall'\'11I al IX Congresso, p. 437. . . . 
317 Arturo Colomhi in VI Consiglio Nazionale, 1960, in PCI (ed.), Da Gramsci a Berlillgller. La rIG lfaitalla at 
socialisl1lo attral'('I"SO i cOflf(ressi del partito cOl1ll1nista italiano III 1956-1964. p. 311. 
318 Antonio Pesenti. 'Sospe~sionc + Riforme', originally from Vie NllOl'e. 17 May 1958. re-printed in 
Maggiorani. Ferrari (cds), L 'Europa da Togliatti a Berlinguer, p. 251. 
and contributed to the decline of American hegemony of Western European economIes. 
Moreover, so Peggio concluded, the EEC has lost its character as an instrument of coercion 
and of NATO, and in fact had destabilising effects on the Atlantic Alliance on the European 
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contment. 
The CGIL's acknowledgment and in principle acceptance of the EEC became somewhat of a 
fundamental choice, motivated by the conviction that workers' actions can no longer be 
coordinated in isolation on a national scale, but would in fact have to assume levels of 
international coordination, especially in the Common Market area. 320 A fundamental impetus 
for the PCI to rethink its positions thus came without doubt from the CGIL. Due to the strong 
presence of the Socialists in the CGIL (one-third) and the PCl's strong determination not to 
break with the union, the Communists tried to minimise the differences between their views 
and those of the CGIL on the EEC.321 
3.3) The pel's policy shift towards Europe 
Domestically, West European communist parties in the 1960s were faced with the visible 
success of capitalist modernisation. In Italy, the 'economic miracle' of the late 1950s to the 
1960s rapidly modernised the economy and transformed it from a predominantly agrarian 
country into an industrial-agrarian economy. Economic success had its negative impacts as 
well. Though overall national wealth increased rapidly and unprecedently in this period, it 
developed along uneven patterns, in geographical and sociological terms. Massi\'l~ 
immigration from the poverty-stricken south to the industrialised north of the country 
occurred which in turn was one of the causes behind the political radicalisation of the , 
319 Eugenio Peggio, 'Riesaminare il MEC?·. originally from Politica ed Ecollomia, ~o. 12. Decemher 1l)5l), re-
r,~inteJ i~ Ma~gil~rani, FelTari ~eds~: L 'Europa da Togliatti a Berlingller, pp. 252-2)3. 
- MagglOranI, L Europa deglr a/tn, pp. 1 U-ll·+. 
1 ) ~ ~ . Ie' .. /.. 11 () 1 Y) 
. -IOn the subject Sec also TIInmermann. 011lU1llst11fa talll, pp. - - _ ..... 
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workers in the 1960s.322 Despite these accompanying negative developments. the long waves 
of capitalist expansion called for some reconsideration of the idea of the inevitable collapse of 
the system.323 The fact that capitalism, the very system communist parties were born to 
oppose, has been constantly evolving and has gone through fundamental transformations 
throughout the century could not leave socialists and communists unaffected. 324 The capitalist 
system not only proved resistant and able to transform itself successfully, but it also proved 
beneficial to the working class in a way that had previously been unexpected. As Favretto put 
it, it was only with the golden age of economic wealth and prosperity across Western Europe 
as experienced in the 1950s and 1960s, that the right conditions existed for revisionism to 
make a real breakthrough in socialist thinking. 325 This development was not distinctively 
'socialist' but had occurred in 'communist' thinking too. 
The PCI's modified position and judgement on European integration also have to be viewed 
in the framework of changes on the domestic political scene. The beginning of the 1960s saw 
the gradual emergence of the first centre-left governments which led to further isolation of the 
PCI. 326 Moreover, the PCI, if it hoped to implement its governmental ambitions, had to adapt 
to new economic circumstances such as the (largely unexpected) post-war boom of the Italian 
economy. The realisation of economic progress, in conjunction with trade union pressures and 
changes in the domestic political setting, contributed to a profound rethinking of the PCI's 
European policy. 
The most overt change of the PCI's position thus far occurred in the context of the 
'Convention on Italian Capitalism' in 1962, when Giorgio Amendola admitted the 
possibilities conceded by the EEC for Italy's modernisation. 
122 Bracke, Which Socialism. Whose detente? p. 33 . 
. 123 Favretto. The Long Search. p. 2 . 
. 12-1 Ibid .. p. 172. 
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Our position, a politically responsible one, in criticising the EEC, was accompanied, howeyer, 
by an erroneous overestimation of the economic difficulties which would ha\'e followed the 
application of the Community regulations and by an underestimation of the new possibilities 
for the expansion of the Italian economy which arose out of the initial formation of a European 
market. In fact it is in the interest of the working class to favour an economic development 
which would allow the Italian economy to acquire competitive capabilities in the international 
market. Technical progress and the modernization of the Italian economy are exigencies which 
must be supported in a context of a policy of democratic development and not of conservation 
of the backward positions of minor groups of the Italian bourgeoisie. Inevitably the EEC 
contributes to the process of capitalist centralisation and concentration, causes the crisis of re-
adjustment, sweeps away positions which are working on excessively high unit costs. But all 
this necessitates the development, on the part of the working class, of a 'European' struggle. in 
full agreement with the working forces of the other EEC countries against the monopolistic 
forces which control the executive organs of the EEC.327 
The Italian Communists came to admit the potentialities and prospects of the EEC for the 
Italian economy. The EEC was no longer exclusively seen as a capitalist enemy but as a 
capitalist construction which, if shaped and altered from within, could prove profitable to the 
. I d ... . I I 328 socIa pro uchve lorces In ta y. 
The PCI's policy shift towards the Common Market and Western European integration thus 
gradually occurred around 1962 and was a first step towards greater autonomy from Moscow. 
Though later perceived as a given reality, Soviet leaders had of course despised the creation 
of a Common Market (and all other European projects) as a political construction which they 
dismissed as merely a tool of American Cold War strategy in Western Europe. Moscow 
.127 Giorgio Amendola, Lotta di classe e sviluppo ecollomico dopa la libera:ione (Roma: Editori Riuniti. 19(2). 
r2'S ~his has been amply discussed and affirmed during a meeting of.the pel's central.c?mmittee on 26-28 April 
1962 in APe, MF 026. Sec also L' Unita. 27 April 1962. On the subject sec also Vassills Fouskas. Italy. Europe. 
the Left. The transformation of Italian Communism and the European imperatil'e (Aldershot: Ashgate. 11.)1.)8). p. 
32. 
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consequently compelled European communist parties to launch domestic resistance directed 
at its destruction. In comparison with its European counterparts, the PCI had developed a very 
distinct position on the Common Market very early on. 329 This only reflected upon the fact 
that the PCI began to identify national interests of its own, which were not necessarily 
compatible with Soviet foreign policy interests. The Italian domestic scene could only but 
coax the PCI to somewhat qualify and re-think former attitudes towards Europe. 
The development of an Italian road to socialism could not, as Sassoon put it, proceed in a 
unilinear fashion. It was constrained not only by the realities of the social struggle in Italy, but 
also heavily conditioned by international considerations, mainly, the location of Italy in the 
American sphere of influence in Europe and the relations of the PCI in the world communist 
movement. 330 Though economic integration with the West fell into the realm of what the PCI 
termed the 'logic of the blocs' and thus heavily despised, the PCI came to acknowledge the 
existence of this economic bloc (and Italy's belonging to it) and that it would prove more 
favourable to work from within this reality. It was an acceptance on qualified terms. By 
accepting its reality and working from within, the PCI hoped to stem the process in more 
favourable conditions, which could be accepted without reservation. In the 1970s Giorgio 
Napolitano recalled that the 'Community could serve as a spokesman for Western Europe's 
vital need for economic independence; it could favour an autonomous and coordinated 
development and support a common resistance to the threat that the present phase of the world 
crisis (1970s) will lead the US to reaffirm and strengthen its supremacy against the countries 
of capitalist Europe. This is the line for which we fight within the EEC. ,331 
329 This led Timmermann to the assumption that the PCI was motivated abOH~ all hy national policy objectin:" 
which in this context meant active participation from within to direct the proce"s in more favourahle directions. 
With regard to the European integration context, Timmermann's analysis is most certainly accurate. See 
Timmermann. I Camllnisti itahani. p. 102. . . 
330 Sassoon. 'The European Strategy of the Italian Communist Party'. in Sassuon (cd.). The Italrall Cammllflllts 
s~eakfar themselves (Nottingham: Spokesman. 1978). p. 10. 
3 I G. Napolitano, The Italian Road, p. 57. 
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Interestingly both PCI and SPD came to acknowledge the existence of and adherence to the 
economic aspects of the bloc confrontation, while continuing to proclaim opposition to the 
belonging to a military bloc for some time. 
The PCI began to VIew economIc integration as an irreversible process which had to be 
viewed, if not positively, at least constructively. This was because the very idea of national 
sovereignty had, due to the increase and challenge of globally functioning forces (such as 
multinational organised capital) lost its driving force. The newly developing global challenges 
could no longer be responded to from a purely national perspective but had to assume a 
multinational dimension as well. Antonio Rubbi later retained that the PCI's positive attitude 
towards integration derived from the awareness that certain issues such as health, 
environment, industrial and agrarian development and the control of multinational enterprises 
could no longer be addressed within closed national borders due to the increased 
interdependence of cross border problems.332 The protection of national interests is also 
inherent in the PCI's thinking and change of course. The return to national protectionism was 
not only impossible but indeed contrary to the interests of the working class, which in 
principle found itself advantaged by the installation of markets without barriers. However, the 
logic of integration did not, for the PCI, lead to full and unequivocal adherence to the present 
community structures and policies. Again, the Common Market represented an instrument not 
to be destroyed but to be modified from within. Timmermann has correctly maintained that 
the PCI's support of the economic Community was guided by a 'yes' in principle. This 
approval referred to the existence of the Community and communist participation from 
within. This 'yes' in principle was accompanied by a certain hesitant 'but' which applied to 
the contents and precise Community structures.333 
n~ Ruhhi was a prominent foreign policy spokesman in the PCI. See Ruhhi. II M01ldo. pp. 29-30. 
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The struggle against monopolistic capital and tendencies would have to be coordinated on a 
European level. 334 In his 'Yalta memorandum' To gliatti had come to the reco gni tion that. · In 
today's conditions in the West, the struggle of the unions can no longer be conducted in 
isolation, country by country. It will have to be developed on the international scale too. with 
common demands and actions.,335 Although the PCl's opposition to European integration, 
much as it was a product of alignment with the Soviet Union in the Cold War. it was also a 
manifestation of the belief in national solutions. The PCI increasingly detached itself from 
this perception in as much as it no longer believed in a purely Italian road to socialism. 
The PCl's Europeistic option became ever more accentuated. By the beginning of the 1970s, 
the Europeanism of the PCI had become an undisputed choice.336 The PCl's Europeanism did 
not confine to an indifferent observing status, but to active cooperation from within the 
Community institutions. By 1970, every major PCI foreign policy declaration addressed the 
question of European unification (and security) as well as the integration process. These 
issues were inseparable for the PC I, and marked two sides of the same coin. Hence, the one 
side of the PCl's Europeanism retained the necessity for a revision of the Rome Treaties. In 
practice, this entailed the democratic transformation of the Community via direct elections to 
the European Parliament.337 The other side envisaged a united Europe achieved via a system 
of collective security and on the economic side, by incorporating neutral countries (Austria, 
Switzerland, Sweden) and socialist countries associated in the CMEA, non-aligned Socialist 
countries (Yugoslavia) and former dictatorships (Spain, Portugal, Greece) into the EEC.338 
~q Tesi del XI Congresso Nazionale', 1966. in PCI (ed.), Da Gramsci a Berlingller. La via italiana al 
socialismo attraverso i congressi del partito comunista italiano IV 1964-1975. p. 107. 
335 P. Togliatti, 'Yalta Memorandum'. in Togliatti, Opere Sce/te, p. 292. 
336 At the Thirtecnth Congress of the PCI in 1972, Berlinguer declared that the problem of Europe and its. 
sccurity. the democratic transformation of the economic community has become of decisi\c importance, In 
'Programma dci comunisti per un governo di svolta democratica', in Da Gramsci a Berlingller ... IV /964-1975. 
r. J52 . 
. 37 'The Italian Communists and Europe', in Foreign Blllletin, January-February 1972. p. 91 and p. 105. 
11~ Ibid., p. 95 and p. 102. 
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4.) SPD, PCI and the 'democratisation' of Community institutions 
The 1957 Treaties of Rome, which set up the EEC and EURATOM, followed in the ECSC's 
footsteps. The High Authority was renamed 'Commission' and the Common Assembly 
became the 'Parliamentary Assembly'. Both Court and Assembly were common to all three 
bodies of the ECSC, EEC and EURATOM. The treaties had thus referred to the European 
Parliament (EP) as the 'Assembly'. From March 1962, the Assembly referred to itself as the 
EP, even though its old name was officially kept until the Single European Act of 1986. 
Previous proposals for direct elections to the EP had been rejected by President De Gaulle, 
who had been adamant towards supranationalism. 
The present stage of relations between Community institutions were totally unbalanced 
because whereas the Commission is supposed to draft the Community programme and the 
Council of Ministers is the leading executive body, it is not clear what the Parliament was 
supposed to do. 339 Though the undemocratic nature of the EEC was not solely due to the fact 
that the Parliament was not elected directly, but that as a consequence of this there had been a 
tendency towards a too thorough concentration of powers in the hands of the Council of 
Ministers. 34o There was little parliamentary control to the powers of the EEC's executive 
organs. 341 As the largest net contributor to the EEC, Germany had a particular interest in 
securing a greater say in the European decision-making process. This explains demands for 
greater transparency with regard to decisions over the EU budget. 
In the 1960s, demands for an election of the EP by universal suffrage became a widely 
popular demand across the political spectrum and hence. was not a particular element of the 
339 Sassoon, 'The Italian Communist Party's European Strategy', p. 272. 
140 Ih'd '17'1 . 1. p. __ . , 
.141 SPD (ed.), Protokoll des SPD-Parteitages, held in Cologne, 26 -30 May 1962 (Hannovl!r/Bonn: ;\l'Ul'! 
Vorwlirts-Verlag Nau & Co., 19(2). p. 593. See also lahrbuch der SPD /9621/963, p. 24. 
European policy of a certain political camp. A directly elected parliament was an explicit 
demand in the struggle for the democratisation process of the EEC institutions. Altering the 
relationship between the EP and the Community's executive organs was another essential part 
of this struggle. In line with their national rivals, both SPD and PCI explicitly stood for direct 
elections to the EP and no European policy statement failed to underline this demand. ),,(2 
The Europeanism of the PCI involved a certain national interest: besides coming to realise the 
limitations of the social struggle in Italy, the choice for Europe also served to sanction the 
PCI's democratic legitimacy. In the PCI's enthusiasm for the EP and for the idea of direct 
elections, one can also see a domestic design, i.e. to gain legitimisation at the European level 
in order to improve the chances of the historical compromise at home. In trying to define a 
Western image, the PCI was compelled to partly neglect the other Western communist parties 
and seek contacts and convergences with European socialist parties. In this the EP provided 
an important platform. It would be a mistake though, to assume that this opening to European 
socialist parties and the quest for a European platform was purely instrumental or tactically 
motivated due to domestic calculations.343 This choice for Europe developed into a profound 
and inherent feature of PCI identity and party programme. 
5.) SPD, PCI and the enlargement of the Community of the 'Six' 
The 1956 SPD party conference in Munich had already adopted a resolution calling for the 
extension of the Community, though it was difficult to exert much pressure on the federal 
government, not least in face of a generaL resolute British and Scandinavian disinterest in 
Community participation. Even earlier, under Schumacher, SPD support of the integration 
_~.j2 For the PCI see, for instance, Nilde lotti, 'Elezione del Parlamento europeo a sun-raggio uni\l_'rsal~ dirctto·. in 
Maggiorani. Ferrari (eds). L'Europa da Togliatti a Berlingller, p. 313. . 
~~\ On this argumcnt scc also Pierre Hassner, Ellrocommllnism and 111li\'ersal reconciliaTio1l: The i1lTef1lat~o1lal 
dime1lsion {~f the golden dream of The PCl ( J 975- J 979). No. 28, Occasional Papcrs. (Rescarch Institute: 1 he 
Johns Hopkins Uni\'crsity. Bologna Center, April 1980). p. 2'+. 
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proposals were to some extent made dependent on British and Scandinavian membership. 
Until Britain's and Denmark's inclusion to the EEC in 1973, no SPD statement on Europe 
failed to reiterate this demand.344 The SPD highly endorsed British membership (and that of 
other European Free Trade Association (EFTA) states who wished to join) not least for strong 
economic and commercial considerations.345 This was reinforced by Schmidt from 1967 
onwards and supported by German business circles.346 There was undeniably a powerful 
economic component to the desire for British and Scandinavian participation. The proposed 
expansion of the EEC including the EFTA states with Switzerland, Sweden, Norway and 
Austria as members as well as Finland and Yugoslavia as associates, would strengthen the 
majority of the leftist-labour based parties within a unified Europe, given the strength of these 
parties in most EFTA countries. If the SPD viewed the Common Market as a potential 
movement towards European unity, British and Scandinavian membership would indeed be 
important towards that end. This was crucial to the SPD's overall perception of European 
reunification. 
Despite generally favouring the enlargement of the EEC by Britain and the EFT A states, the 
PCI's position on British membership to the EEC was subject to controversy.347 This is 
because the PCl's vision of an autonomous (from the US) Europe was in fact in direct 
contradiction with the support of British membership. Given British special ties with 
America, a Europe including Britain would automatically be more US-oriented. 
In some of the literature this paradox is explained by fact that British participation would 
signify - in the eyes of the PCI - a positive contribution to working class participation in the 
l.l~ lahrbuch der SPD 1962/1963. pp. 21-22 and p. 28: Willy Brandt, Begegnungen mit Kennedy (MUnchen: 
Kindler. 1964). p. 239: Brandt's government statement. 6 December 1966 in AdSD. WBA. A7. 17; Helmut . 
Schmidt Archiv in AdSD, 1 / HS AA007555: Resolution of the SPD Party Congress held In Nuremhurg. 196~L In 
Jahrbuch de,. SPD 1968/1969, p. :139. 
345 AdSD, lIHS AA007555 . 
. 1~h Schneider. Die Kunst des Kompromisses, p. 196 . 
. l.l7 For the PCI's statements on British membership to the EEC see for instance 'Tesi del XI CongreS\l) 
Nalionale·. 1966, in PCI (cd.), Da Gramsci a Berlinguer: La l'ia italiana af socialismo attraverso i congress; del 
pm'tito C0111lillista italiano, IV 1964-1975. p. 109. 
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integration process.348 Then agam, due to Anglo-American special ties, British inclusion 
would move the EEC automatically closer to the United States. This would diminish the very 
idea of an independent Europe as a third force or global actor. Viewed from this perspective. 
the PCI could have had little interest in British membership. Timmermann suggests that it was 
precisely because of Britain's special relations with the United States - and in order to loosen 
those, i.e. to tie Britain closer to Europe - that the PCI welcomed Britain in the Common 
Market. 349 This is plausible. The outcome of a meeting of the PCI's leading circle suggested 
that British membership was also endorsed to counterbalance Franco-German influence in the 
EEC.350 
With 'Atlanticism' firmly imbedded in the Italian political establishment, Italian parties 
perceived Britain's membership in the EEC as essential to the preservation of close ties 
between Europe and the USA. 351 As far as European economic integration was concerned, the 
PCI's attitude had become marked by an ever more pronounced pragmatism in disregard of 
ideology. To that end, the PCI could not have done other than welcoming British application 
to the EEC in line with the other Italian parties.352 Besides generally endorsing the expansion 
of the Community by Britain and Scandinavia, the PCI did not pay an enormous amount of 
interest and attention to the matter. 
The PCI's initial European and detente concept (until the beginning of the 1970s) was rather 
Gaullist in tone and tendency. De Gaulle's detente sought the disintegration of rival blocs, 
348 Blackmer. 'The International Strategy', p. 20. 
349 Timmermann, I C0111unisti italiani, pp. 86-89. 
1.'\0 'Direzione del PCI', 20 September 1962, in APC, MF 026. 
1.'\1 Both PSI and DC favoured British membership to the Common Market. See Antonio Varsori, L'ltalia nelle 
rela:.iolli intema:.ionali dal 1943 al 1992 (Roma-Bari: Editori Laterza, 1998), p. 1.+9: Featherstone, Socialist 
Parties and European Integration, p. 228. . 
352 Napolitano later recalled that the 'Italian left was optimistic about England's enu:y l~to the Common Mark.ct 
hecause of the influence which the labour movement has (in England) and the contnbutlon toward stn:ngthentng 
the more progressive positions within the Common Market which should result from it', in G. Napolitano. The 
Italian road, p. 59. 
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implying ultimately the end of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, and the construction of a Europe 
'from the Atlantic to the Urals', a European Europe excluding America but including the 
USSR.353 
The PCI's conception envisaged an independent and autonomous Europe that acted as a 
counterweight to, and decreased US economic influence and military presence in Western 
Europe. The PCI did not support European integration as a component of the Atlantic link but 
quite reversely, as a means to guarantee maximum autonomy and independence from 
American pressures on Europe and on Italy in consequence. 
By the mid-1970s, the PCI envisioned a Western Europe as 'neither anti-Soviet nor anti-
American'; a Europe that was no longer economically and politically dependent on the United 
States, but which nonetheless did not raise the issue of a political rupture or conflict with the 
US or the elimination of US' economic presence in Western Europe. 354 
6.) The SPD, French-German relations and the question of British membership 
to the EEC 
As far as relations with France were concerned it has been examined that at the beginning of 
the 1960s, the German political class and leading CDU/CSU circles were deeply divided 
between 'Gaullists' and 'Atlanticists' .355 The former supported French demands for an ever 
increasing European autonomy from the US, not least in the area of defence policies. This 
implied a rejection of Britain's application to the EEC as a result of its 'special relationship' 
.1'\.1 Irwin M. Wall. 'The United States and two Ostpolitiks. De Gaulle and Brandt', in Wilfried Loth (~d.), The 
making of detente: Eastern and Western Europe in the Cold War. 1965-75 (Oxon: Routledge: 2008). p. U-I.. 
Ruhhi held that a very similar European conception was proclaimed by Amendola. See Rubbl. II Mondo, p. 31. 
1.'14 Napolitano, The italian road, p. 6'+. .., 
155 Willy Brandt. Erinnenl1lgcn (Hamburg: Spiegel-Verlag, 2006/2007), pp. 2.+6-2.+7: \\ mkler. Der lange \\ cg 
nach Westen 11, p. 21-1.. 
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with Washington. In the CDU this group was associated with Chancellor Adenauer. Those 
'Atlanticists' around Ludwig Erhard and Gerhard Schroder thought of the USA as the most 
important ally and consequently supported Britain's membership at the earliest possible stage. 
Erhard certainly had strong economic interests on the national agenda. 356 
Somewhat ironically, the images of the CDU and the SPD with regard to Europe and the 
integration aspect had significantly reversed from 1960 onwards. The SPD fostered its image 
as a pro-European party, carefully balancing relations with the US and French power-policy 
interests. The desire for close relations with France on the one hand and dependency on the 
United States (especially on the security/military shield) on the other caused an increasingly 
pronounced foreign policy dilemma for the SPD at the beginning of the 1960s. This is 
certainly a little ironic considering the fact that the SPD had only just committed to the 
Atlantic Alliance as a main pillar of Germany's foreign policy. 
The SPD was increasingly suspicious of Adenauer's close euro-political cooperation with de 
Gaulle and French ideas for Europe. In essence, the SPD rejected the French leader's concept 
as detrimental to the European cause. A party statement issued in September 1960 objected de 
Gaulle's European construction with its puppet parliament and exclusion of Great Britain.357 
Instead, the SPD strongly advocated British membership to the EEC which was incompatible 
with de Gaulle's vision of a French-dominated Europe detached from the United States. De 
Gaulle's attempt to steer a course more independent of the US ran counter to the SPD' s vision 
for a united Europe and its very idea of transatlantic partnership. Against this background the 
SPD critically observed the beginning of French-German negotiations over the Fouchet-Plan, 
as the building of a political union would further the already existing rift with the EFT A 
states. This would imply an additional impediment to true European unity, which was 
3561~rhard had always endorsed the idea of promoting European integration in form of a free trade area. Thi" 
made him a naturally ally of British economic interests. 
1<,7 Marcowitz, Option liir Paris .?, p. 91. 
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unthinkable without Britain and the Scandinavian countries. This illustrated to what extent the 
SPD had by now come to endorse the European project and sought to promote its image and 
responsible nature as a party of true European unity. Key to this was the close and 
unequivocal relation with the American ally. Though friendly relations with Germany" s 
Western neighbours and France in particular were important, this could not be achieved at the 
expense of relations with the transatlantic partner, as de Gaulle's plans would, without doubt, 
have implied.358 After all, one has to bear in mind that the SPD's relations with the United 
States were particularly strong at the time of the special Brandt-Kennedy bond. 
In choosing between an 'Atlantic' or 'Gaullist' orientation for Europe, the SPD supported 
Kennedy's idea of a European-Atlantic partnership.359 This, in practice, entailed close 
relations with the US. Many Social Democrats were impressed by the new style leadership of 
Kennedy and deeply sceptic about the practical implications of de Gaulle's European vision. 
In November 1962, Erich Ollenhauer and Herbert Wehner strongly advocated a joint action 
programme with other European Socialists, which envisaged a 'European political and 
supranational system', open to new members and in close alliance with the US.360 
The SPD believed that proper European unity depended on participation of both Britain and 
France. As much as the party believed in Franco-German reconciliation after the war, and 
France's belonging to the community institutions, the SPD was not willing to pay the price of 
friendship with France at the expense of British membership. The same applied to SPD-
French divergences over the future organisational structure of the Atlantic Alliance. The 
underlying assumption was that no German government could entirely sacrifice relations with 
m Marcowitz even argued that the SPD geared primarily towards the US since its foreig~ policy U-.tur~ i~ .1960. 
This implied that its European policy and relations with the European allies were suhordmated to thl'>: m Ihld .. p. 
97. 
359 SPI) (ed.). lahrhuch der SPD 196211963, p. 22; SPD (cd.), lahrbuch der SPD 196411965. p. 5~: SPD (cd.). 
lahrbllch der SPD 196611967, p. 275. 
360 Marcowill. Option Iii,. Paris:'. p. 95. 
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the US and NATO to favour relations with France.361 The SPD was also rather sceptic of de 
Gaulle's motivations and of the geopolitical benefits of Franco-German relations. De Gaulle's 
rejection of Britain's membership to the EEC was therefore seen by the SPD as the most 
salient setback on the integration process thus far. 362 This severely complicated French-
German reconciliation in the eyes of many Social Democrats.363 
As far as the Elysee-treaty was concerned, the SPD insisted on a specific preamble to the 
Franco-German treaty of 1963 reaffirming support for both the EEC and NATO. 36-+ The 
SPD's position on the Elysee-treaty illustrated the party's rejection of French-German special 
ties, particularly if these would sacrifice relations with the US or British membership. The 
underlying idea was a united Europe - including Britain, Scandinavia and all EFT A states 
interested to participate - which would engage in a special transatlantic partnership. At the 
time, this was of course not feasible and would meet French resistance. 
Differences of opinion and policy divergences existed between the SPD and France above all, 
over the debate on European integration (enlargement, supra-nationalism) and the 
organisational structure of NATO.365 In 1966, de Gaulle took French forces out of NATO's 
integrated command. His ambitions, however, went further; he hoped to set an example that 
would induce other members of the Atlantic Alliance to abolish military integration in 1969, 
that is, by the time of the renewal of the military treaty.366 
Divergences were confined to the period of de Gaulle's leadership. After de Gaulle's defeat in 
April 1969 and the taking over of presidency by Georges Pompidou, relations improved 
rapidly and significantly. 
361 Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe, p. 198. 
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363 Schonhoven, Wendejahre. p. 32. In his analysis Schonhoven highlighted the mediating role the SPD had 
taken on in overcoming French-British differences; see also pp. '+13-419. . 
364 The Elysce-treaty, treaty of friendship. was concluded between Charles de GauIle and Konrad Adenauer In 
1963. For the SPD's position on the treaty see SPD (ed.), lahrbllch der SPD 19621/963. p. 17. 
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Chapter 5 
PCI and SPD relations with the Communist bloc, 1960-1979 
1.) The reappraisal of the SPD's policy towards the East and the development 
of a 'new' Ostpolitik 
The building of the Berlin Wall in August 1961 did not mark the starting point for a strategic 
reappraisal, but accelerated the formulation of a new and reversed policy towards the East. 
Conversely, the actual roots of the SPD's Ostpolitik may not, as some have asserted367 , be 
found in the construction of the WalL Many of the ideas that later characterised the SPD's 
Ostpolitik had already been existent in the 1950s. Some of its early features and theoretical 
foundations were then elaborated upon in the 1960s and developed into a new Ostpolitik. The 
erection of the Wall only further strengthened some of the positions that had been hitherto 
dismissed and rendered a policy reappraisal indispensable. It demonstrated that it was 
necessary to think in terms of a much longer time scale, realising that there could not be a 
solution to Germany's division unconnected with the wider evolution of East-West relations. 
The German problem had ceased to be solely a national problem. Certainly, one needs to be 
careful as to distinguish between a fully thought out new policy and its practical steps, and 
one that had already been partly existent and had subsequently laid the theoretical background 
for the development of Ostpolitik in the 1960s. The existing literature is divided between 
those who wish to prove that Brandt had already developed the conceptual basis of Ostpolitik 
prior to 1961 (Wolfgang Schmidt's Kalter Krieg, Koexisten-;. und kleine Schritte /68 and those 
who put more emphasis on the impact of the Berlin Wall and Kennedy's German policy on 
Brandt. Hence they trace the concept of Ostpolitik more to the post-1961 era by arguing that 
367 For example. Frank Fischer. 1m delltschen Interesse. Die Ostpolitik der SPD \'011 1969 bis 1989 (Husum: 
Matthiesen Verlag. 200 I), p. '+2. . . .,. . 
IllS See also Niedhart who argued that the original concept of OstpolItik. as dlslmct Ir~)m practl~al -.t~r-' and . 
operational policy, dates from the 1950s. Niedhart. 'The East-West Pr~)hlem as s~en tro~1 BerlIn: W!"y Brandl s 
Early Ostpolitik', in Wilfried Loth (ed.). Europe, Cold War alld Coe.rtstellce, 19:13-196_'1 (London: hank Ca-.-.. 
200'+1. p. 286. 
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the Kennedy years were pivotal for the emergence of detente and SPD thinking (Arne 
Hofmann's The Emergence of Detente in Europe. Brandt, Kennedy, and the fonnation of 
Ostpolitik). 
The two notions are not necessarily exclusive or incompatible and both provide an 
understanding of the evolution of the SPD's Ostpolitik. Viewed exclusively, the former tends 
to deny any substantial development during the early to mid-1960s by relating the roots of 
Brandt's thinking almost entirely to the 1950s. The opposing notion ignores the experience of 
Brandt and Reuter and the Berlin crises on the formation and specification of Brandt's 
Ostpolitik by overemphasising the impact of the Berlin Wall and the special Kennedy-Brandt 
relation on the formation of Ostpolitik. To fully comprehend the evolution of Ostpolitik, one 
needs to understand the pre- and post-1961 period, thus the early conceptual ideas and 
Kennedy's designs without denying or failing to acknowledge the mutual influence and 
impact of one or the other. Hofmann, quite correctly, pointed out that Brandt's thinking was 
by no means completed or predetermined by 1963. The end of the 'pass agreements' , Brandt's 
experience as Foreign Minister, the Ulbricht doctrine and the Cambodian crisis, Bahr's work 
in the Foreign Office planning staff, the notion of a 'European peace order', the blueprint for 
the treaty system and the security dimension of Ostpolitik were all yet to come, as were the 
declared readiness to enter into full diplomatic relations with Eastern Europe, to recognise the 
Oder-Neisse border and drop the Hallstein doctrine.369 
Willy Brandt's reactions to the construction of the Berlin Wall and his subsequent policy of 
small steps, which henceforth characterised inner-German relations,370 were thus in part also 
based on his earlier ideas and perceptions. Forced by the harsh reality of events during the 
Berlin crisis (or in fact the many Berlin crises) leading up to the erection of the Wall (as well 
369 Hofmann, The Emergence. p. 176. . . 
no ·Aus/.ug aus dcr ErkHirung der SPD-Regierungsmannschaft·. 8 January 196). in AdSD. WBA. Puhltkattoncn. 
l\1appc I 99. 
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as the memory of the Berlin blockade of 1948), Brandt continuously insisted to take into 
account the particular situation of Berlin and that the German problem was strongly 
intertwined with international affairs, European security, disarmament and East-West 
relations in general. 371 
Before becoming governing mayor of Berlin (1957-1966), Brandt had been more favourable 
towards integration with the West and did not see it hindering reunification, as many of the 
SPD officials in Bonn in fact had done. Due to his experiences in Berlin, Brandt had given 
much concern to the living conditions of the people in the Western sector of Berlin and those 
in the GDR.372 Under the influence of West Berlin's first governing Mayor, Ernst Reuter 
(from 1948-1953), Brandt focused on the political defence of West Berlin in the Cold War 
and uncharacteristically for a social democrat, became decidedly pro-American in the process. 
Thus, according to him, like his predecessor Reuter, integration with the West would not 
necessarily contradict the reunification line. Brandt believed that only European and 
international detente, without the inclusion of the German question, would ultimately pave the 
way for improvements in inner-German relations. At the 1956 Party Congress of the SPD, 
motions were forwarded that favoured direct negotiations between Bonn and East Berlin.373 
These, however, remained minority positions in the 1950s. In 1959/60 the federal SPD had 
still assumed that only by resolving the German issue first could an enduring international 
relaxation of tension be reached. 374 
A policy change at the national level occurred only in 1960, when international circumstances 
had substantially changed, disfavouring German reunification at the current stage. After the 
failure of a number of successive conferences and meetings between the former Allies, it had 
371 'Vcrmerk fur Berlinfrage', 27 June 1960, in Willy Brandt. Berliner Ausgabe. Berlin bleiht frei. Politik ill lind 
fiir Berlin 1947-1966, Vol. 3 (Bonn: J.H.W. Dietz, 2004), p. 302. 
m Willy Brandt. The East-West Problem as seen from Berlin'. International Affairs. Vol. 3.+ (195X). pp .. ,01-
302. 
m Klel.)mann, . Sozialdemokratie und deutsche Frage'. p. -+7. 
m W. Schmidt. Kalter Krieg, p. 541. 
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become increasingly apparent that the Soviet Union did not desire the much hoped for 
reunification, and was reluctant (as much as the United States) to alter the present status 
quO. 375 The SPD's Deutschland Plan, as discussed in chapter three, intended to offer a final 
solution to the German question on neutral grounds. In March 1960, Wehner declared that a 
direct path to German reunification had become ever more unlikely.376 It has been argued that 
the Deutschland Plan was arduously justified throughout 1959, even if Wehner and many in 
the SPD had realised by October 1959 that it would in fact prove to be entirely fruitless. 377 
The SPD had repudiated its former policy of neutralism as the chosen road to reunification in 
June 1960, opting for a bi-partisan foreign policy course together with the leading CDU/CSU. 
The SPD's policy reappraisal had been proclaimed by Herbert Wehner almost single-
handedl y, without much prior consultation in parliament on 30 June 1960.378 It was intended 
to minimise the foreign policy differences between the two main parties and pave the way for 
future governmental cooperation. 
As argued before, it would be oversimplified to assert that the SPD's acceptance of NATO 
and the Federal Republic's membership in the Atlantic Alliance simply marked the foreign 
policy equivalent of Bad Godesberg, and hence presented its logical conclusion in the foreign 
policy field. Whereas the timing may speak in favour of a connection with Bad Godesberg, it 
was nonetheless also a product of altered international circumstances. The process to Bad 
Godesberg had been discussed at lengths within the party and put to a vote at an extraordinary 
party congress. The occurrence of the foreign policy shift - and a change of the SPD's 
375 For example, the foreign minister conferences of the four powers in May and December 1959. 
376 Meyer. Herbert Wehner, p. 230. 
377 Ib'd "''"H) I ., p. __ . . ' . 
378 Wehner. 'Pliidoycr fUr cine gemeinsame Politik', speech in German parltament on 30 June 1960, In \\ chncr. 
Wandel lind Bewiihrung, p. 240. 
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operational strategy was much more sudden. Had it been discussed in the party or at an 
executive level before, it would have caused a lasting debate, as Bahr later recalled. 379 
The Cold War attitude of the 1950s had been replaced by a more realistic assessment of the 
international constellation and a more flexible response to the post-war realities. Germany's 
peculiarity was of course that the country's outstanding unresolved domestic problem was 
also a major international issue. It is also crucial to bear in mind that due to Germany's 
geostrategic position, the FRG was, more than any other Western European country. absorbed 
in the difficult process of finding the right balance between detente and military defence. 
Since German reunification on neutral grounds was neither desirable by the superpowers nor a 
feasible option given the proximity of the Soviet military presence, 'all' Western Germany 
could do was to engage in open communication with the East. 380 The guiding principles of the 
newly developing approach towards the East were peaceful coexistence (as established by the 
Twentieth Congress of the CPSU in 1956) combined by political, economic and cultural 
exchange. Especially after the building of the Wall, the priorities of the SPD's political 
agenda were the easing of tensions in order to find practical solutions to some of the most 
pressing humanitarian and economic problems (access to the West, traffic, postal issues etc.) 
caused by the country's division.381 None of this could of course have been realised from 
within the parliamentary opposition. The SPD needed to abandon its constant policy of 
intransigent opposition and embark on a course of foreign policy convergences with the 
leading CDU/CSU. The acceptance of Germany's international and military obligations was 
thus a prerequisite for any advancement towards potential coalition partners in order to 
ultimately achieve governmental responsibility. 
,79 . . Z' 278 '179 
. See. tor example. Bahr. Zu mel1lcr elf. pp. -_. 
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381 'Kundgebungen und Beschltisse des Parteitages ,"on K<.)ln', 1962. in SPD (ed.), SPD lahrbuch J96~/J <)63. p. 
456. See also Interview with W. Brandt. Der Spiegel. No. 1-2 (10 January 19(2). pp. 30-3-1.. 
To start with, it is important to stress that one must not speak of one coherent German 
Ostpolitik. The existing manifold literature on the SPD's Ostpolitik or the FRG's Ostpolitik 
often distinguishes between 'Ostpolitik' (1950s) and 'new Ostpolitik' (1960s).~82 This 
presupposes that there existed a party specific Ostpolitik in the 1950s. Here I will suggest that 
no such Eastern policy was developed in the 1950s. On the contrary, policies towards the East 
were volatile and more often than not a reaction to events in the East. It is therefore more 
appropriate to speak of Ostpolitik in the 1960s, and a 'second' or 'new' Ostpolitik in the 
1980s. 
The policies towards the East were the central element of West German foreign policy in 
general, yet perceptions of strategies towards the East largely diverged between the 
CDU/CSU and SPD. Until the late 1960s, West German policy towards Eastern Europe had 
been dominated by the Hallstein Doctrine, which pointed to the lack of democratic legitimacy 
and the overbearing role of the Soviet occupation power. The Federal Republic (followed in 
this by her allies) refused to recognise the GDR, denied its statehood and claimed to be the 
sole legitimate representative of all Germans.383 It also refused to recognise East Germany's 
Oder-Neisse border with Poland, and with it the loss of Germany's Eastern territories after the 
war. This position precluded diplomatic relations with all of Eastern Europe and left minimal 
scope for any West German policy towards the East. 
In the course of the 1960s, when the monolithism of the Warsaw Pact (and the Soviet leading 
role in it) had been more openly questioned, the Hallstein Doctrine became increasingly 
obsolete . 
.182 Niedhart, 'Ostpolitik and its impact'. p. 119. . _ _ 
m Named after Walter Hallslein. State Secretary of the West German Federal Foreign OffIce ( 1951-ll»)g). 
The SPD's Ostpolitik (as distinct from that of the CDU/CSU) was originally conceiyed as a 
German contribution to detente that was compatible with and fully accounted for Germany" s 
specific national interests, a policy which was made possible as a result of the international 
realities in the 1960s. The United States saw in it a possibility (perhaps the only) to diminish 
the newly established nuclear potential of the Soviet Union, which would give Washington 
enough leverage to overcome the disaster in Vietnam. The USSR, under Brezhnev. was so 
concerned with the severe ideological tensions in its own sphere of influence (dispute with 
China, the Prague Spring) that a combination of military parity, closer economic cooperation 
with the West as a result of a more active (peaceful) coexistence, would provide the Soviet 
Union with additional legitimisation vis-a.-vis the Warsaw Pact states, and promised to 
consolidate the status quo of the territorial disputes resulting from the Second World War.384 
After 1961 the SPD's central aim was to develop and implement a realistic policy towards the 
East, based on the given post -war realities. One reality after the building of the Berlin Wall 
was that the division might exist for an unforeseeable period of time. If it was impossible to 
remove the Wall, the aim was to make it more penetrable and to improve the living conditions 
of the people in Berlin and East Germany.385 This was the starting point in the SPD's 
calculation. In 1964 Willy Brandt declared that reunification could only be achieved in the 
context of far-reaching changes in East-West relations in general, which, in tum, could only 
be attained through improved and normalised relations with the Soviet Union.386 It was 
realised that the German problem was no longer a 'national issue', but had a European and 
international dimension and could only be at the end of a process of small steps.387 
lS~ Sec also fischer. 1m deutschen Interesse, p. 30. 
385 Bahr, Zu meiner Zeit, p. 161. 
386 Willy Brandt. 'Grundgedanken deutscher AuBenpolitik', speech on 11 June 1964. in AdSD, \\'BA. 
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The features of a more flexible approach towards the East were advocated since the earl \' 
1960s, and were formalised at the 1968 Party Congress of the SPD.388 In his speech, Brandt 
declared that Germany's reunification was not on the SPD's (immediate) international 
political agenda (although this by no means signified that it no longer represented the party' s 
long-term goal), but it was replaced by a more realistic approach based on the assumption that 
the GDR may in fact exist for an indefinite period of time.389 Since the German problem was 
strongly interrelated with the European development in general, the SPD henceforth 
concentrated on the 'improvement of the present climate of distrust, tension and conflict'. 390 
The SPD had realised that a general rapprochement with the East required Bonn's formal 
acceptance of the status quo. By recognising the territorial and political realities stemming 
from the Second World War, the SPD developed a more realistic and constructive approach to 
the East, and attuned West German foreign policy to the dynamics of East-West detente (as 
we will examine later, a more realistic foreign policy approach was developed by the PCI in 
the late 1960s). Bonn hoped to increasingly widen its margin of manoeuvre at an international 
level by contributing to improve relations with the East and thereby towards a general 
relaxation of tensions. The recognition of the post-war borders, in particular the Oder-Neisse 
line, the recognition of the existence of two German states as well as the signing of the 
nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, had also been identified as prerequisites for talks by the 
388 There exists a discrepancy amongst historians about who was the main strategic thinker of the SPD' s new 
foreign policy orientation and Eastern concept. Some attribute this role to Egon Bahr, Brandt's close advisor, 
who undoubtedly had an essential impact on the SPD's new foreign policy course. See also Karsten Schroder, 
Egan Bahr (Rastatt: Verlag Arthur Moewig, 1988). p. 133. Others argue that Herbert Wehner was the essential 
strategic mind behind the SPD's foreign policy. See, for example, Meyer, Herbert Wehner, p. 230. It needs to be 
stressed, however. that Wehner was often identified more with the SPD's German policy of the 1950s. See 
Meyer, Herbert Wehner, p. 230. Bahr was certainly one of the most influential practitioners, strategists and 
ideologists of Ostpolitik from the early 1960s. In the literature his role in Ostpolitik is mainly attributed to the 
theoretical foundations of Ostpolitik and the first phase of 1969-1972. It should be noted that his influence went 
well beyond that and was not limited to the SPD's first phase in Ostpolitik: see also Timothy Garton Ash. In 
Europe's Name. Germany and the divided Continent (London: Jonathan Cape, 1993), p. 18. . 
389 Willy Brandt, speech at the SPD Party Congress, 17-21 March 1968 in Nuremburg. in SPD (cd.), Partertag 
der SPD 1968 (Hannover / Bonn: Neuer-Vorwarts Verlag Nau & Co., 1968), p. 92. 
390 Brandt. 'German Policy toward the East', Foreign Affairs, April 1968. re-printed in AdSD, WBA MappL' 
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conference of Communist parties held at Karlovy Vary in 1967391 , and all of which had been 
subject of talks between the SPD and the Italian Communists in 1967/68. 
It is a commonality of political parties In general that they continue to respond 
overwhelmingly to national electorates. One therefore needs to also bear in mind that the 
abandonment of German reunification as a possibility in the short term was, as Sassoon put it, 
made possible by changes in public opinion. In 1964, reunification was the most salient 
'foreign' affairs issue, with 41 percent of respondents regarding it as 'the most important 
question facing Germany today' .392 In January 1965, this percentage had risen to 47 percent. 
By January 1967, respondents considered economic problems, salaries, prices and the 
currency as considerably more important (62 percent) and reunification, at 18 percent, was 
regarded as the most outstanding question facing West Germany (it is also very interesting to 
note that the importance of the Berlin problem dropped from 11 percent (1963) to 1 percent 
(1967).393 By the late 1960s, the economy was perceived as more important, and a general 
anxiety concerning Germany's probable obliteration in case of a world conflict was of central 
relevance to the electorate.394 
The SPD attempted to construct a new and innovative social-democratic foreign policy which 
in itself presented a particular and active contribution to detente in Europe. The rationale 
behind this would give West Germany a greater say in international affairs and contribute to 
the external emancipation of the Federal Republic (much as the treaties with the West had 
39( L'Unita, 'La dichiarazione di Karlovy Vary per la pace e la sicurezza europea', 28 April 1967. See also ') 
compiti attuali della lotta antimperialista e I'Unita d'azione dei partiti comunisti e operai. di tutte Ie forze 
antimpcrialiste' (Preparatory Document of the International Conference of Communist Parties. held in Moscow, 
19-22 March 1969), in Central Committee 1969, in APC, MF 006. 
3lJ2 lahrbuch der offentlichen Meinllng 1965-1967, Institut fUr Demoskopie Allensbach (ed.) (Allenshach. Bonn: 
Verlag fUr Demoskopie, 1967), p. 387. . 
193 It is worth noting that these figures were not least an expression of the economic downturn In 1966/67. 
Further to this was the concern of an increasing unemployment rate: the figure increased from 0.7 percent to 2.1 
percent. which was the highest amount since 1959. See Winkler, Der lange \reg nach H'csten 11. p. 2)4. See 
also lahrbuch der offentlichell Meillung 1965-1967, p. 387. 
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done in the 1950s). The establishment of a distinctive (and widely accepted) social democratic 
foreign policy was also a novelty in much of Western Europe, as post-war foreign policies 
were often formulated and exclusive to conservative or centre-right parties (for instance, 
France and Italy). As we will establish later, the Italian Communists were also engaged in a 
process of developing a distinctive foreign policy as a national communist party. 
In Germany, the SPD was not the only party to be confronted with and adapt to a new set of 
international circumstances as well as alterations in public opinion. The FDP, when forced in 
opposition during the period of CDU/CSU-SPD governmental cooperation (1966-1969), had 
also distanced itself completely from the FRG's claim that it alone represented all 
Germans.395 Legally, the SPD was unwilling to accept and recognise the GDR as a fully 
sovereign state396 ('even if two states exist in Germany, they are not foreigners to one another; 
their relations to one another can only be of a special status,397), but Brandt and the majority 
of the SPD agreed to the de facto (and not de jure!) acceptance of an East German state. It 
was an indefinite arrangement or compromise open to diverse understanding (depending on 
the interpretation of whichever side) between the former claim of West Germany's status of 
sole representation and the East German demand for a two-state solution.398 Its sole purpose 
was to clear the way towards negotiations and coming to inner-German agreements. 
Again, if opinion polls were to be believed, the percentage of West Germans who favoured 
the recognition of the Oder-Neisse line as Germany's border with the East rose remarkably 
during this period: in February 1966 it amounted to 27 percent (compare with 5.+ percent 
395 Wilfried Loth, Overcoming the Cold War. A History of Detente, 1950-1991 (Basingstoke. New York: 
Palgrave, 2(02), p. 104. 
396 Willy Brandt, 'RegierungserkUirung vor dem Deutschen Bundestag', 28 October 1969. in Verhandlll1~gell ~es 
Deutschen Bllndestages. Stenographische Berichte, 6. Wahlperiode. 5. Sitzung. Bd .. 71. pp. 20-34. fe-pnnted In 
Hrandt, Berliner Allsgabe. Ein Volk der gllten Nachbam. AllfJen- 111ld Delltschlandpolitik 1966-1974. \"01. 6 
(Bonn: Verlag J .H. W. Dietz Nachf.. 2005), p. 237; see also SPD (ed.), lahrbuch der SPD 1968/1969. p. _~40. 
397 Ibid. 
398 Sec also Schonhovcn. Wendejahre, p. 393. 
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against)399, whereas by November 1967 it had risen to 47 percent.400 The debate about the 
recognition of the Oder-Neisse line as Germany's border to the East was, however, not 
accepted by the SPD parliamentary faction unanimously, especially not by SPD delegates that 
had their roots in those areas.401 Most probably it was ultimately agreed upon in order to open 
negotiations with the East.402 
2.) The pel and the international communist movement in the 1960s 
The Twentieth Congress of the CPSU in 1956, the process of de-Stalinisation and the Soviet 
green light for national roads to socialism (which in practise implicitly undermined the role of 
the Soviet Union as the sole legitimate guiding-state within the international communist 
movement, or so it was understood) had given new impetus to serious elaboration and 
implementation of an Italian national road to socialism. Soon after, the limits of this newly 
granted autonomy were forcefully demonstrated by the Soviet invasion in Hungary in October 
that year. At that point, PCI loyalty vis-a.-vis the Soviet Union was given priority over 
national interests and the invasion was justified uncritically as a 'painful necessity' .403 
Nonetheless, the PCI embarked on a process of emancipation within the international 
communist movement, increasing its independence and autonomy vis-a.-vis Moscow. At the 
same time, the Italian Communists avoided rupture, open criticism of the Soviet Union, and 
thereby any critical assessment of the Soviet system itself. The relations with the Soviet 
Union and within the international communist movement could only be, so said PCI officials. 
of a certain nature: they were characterised by 'unity in diversity'. To that end, the PCI 
asserted the principles of autonomy and independence of each communist party in pursuing 
3
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their national roads to socialism, recognising the different national circumstances, and refused 
a return to centralised forms of direction or a necessity to formulate mutual ideas and 
standards as had been characteristic of the movement in the past..to.t During Togliatti's 
leadership and in the aftermath of his death in 1964, solidarity and adherence to the 
international communist movement were still something that the Italian Communists 
considered important. 405 Between 1956 and 1968, the PCI's loyalty to the CPSU had been 
genuine, but limited. 'Unity' was demonstrated whenever necessary (i.e. Hungary. in the 
Sino-Soviet split), but it was henceforth ever more evident that allegiance to Soviet foreign 
policy interests and identification with the Soviet system ran counter PCI domestic policy 
ambitions. 
The function of a party's international positions is often also a direct reflection of its domestic 
policy objectives. This has been even more so the case with the PCI. With the beginning of 
the 1960s, the PCI found itself gradually more isolated in the national political arena. The 
beginning of the 1960s saw the birth of the first centre-left experiment (by incorporating the 
PSI in the area of government), which marked a devastating blow to the PCI as it permanently 
lost the PSI as an ally. Toward the mid-1960s the PSI also began to make overtures to the 
Social Democrats with whom they eventually - albeit shortly - reunited until 1969. All this 
contributed to a profound revision of some of the PCI's former positions. Nonetheless, the 
PCI's concept of 'unity in diversity' was, in the 1960s, still loose and was only given new 
context after the Czech crisis of 1968, when the PCI adopted a more critical presence within 
the international communist movement, fully embracing its notion of total autonomy of all 
parties, and dismissed any right to intervene in the affairs of another party or state. 
-I()..1 Togliatti. Central Committee, 2.+ October 1963. in APe. Fondo Berlinguer. Movimento Operaio 
Internazionale (subsequently MOl), Fascicolo 5. 
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A considerable moment of tension in the international communist movement arose between 
the Soviets and the Chinese at the conference of 81 communist parties held in Moscow in 
November 1960. On this occasion, the Chinese communist leadership presented itself as the 
main defender of an intransigent tendency which opted for a re-Iaunching of a form of 
ideological orthodoxy, an open anti-imperialistic challenge and aspired leadership of the 
international communist movement. 406 
The PCI's posture in the Sino-Soviet dispute was marked by contradictions: on the one hand. 
it was opposed to the substance of the Chinese line - that the war was inevitable and against 
the strategy of peaceful coexistence407 - and considered the Chinese positions essentially as 
wrong.408 However, on the other hand the PCI vigorously objected the 'excommunication' of 
the Chinese from the international communist movement, thereby intending to preserve the 
(somewhat artificial) unity of the movement. In light of this, Longo declared that 'one must 
discard, as "bad and dangerous", every procedure that may lead to a deepening of the present 
divisions and ruptures, such as might be, the convocation in the moment and conditions of a 
new international conference of the working class and communist parties' .409 The PCI 
objected a new conference as intended to excommunicate the Chinese and restore past norms 
of the movement. The PCI leadership of course realised that the Sino-Soviet dispute was itself 
a reflection and inescapable consequence of the by then polycentric system. To this end, the 
PCI came to the somewhat paradoxical conclusion that unity (of the movement) must be 
preserved, but could not be enforced from above (Soviet Union) and that only by allowing for 
its diversity could the international communist system be maintained in the long-term. The 
underlying idea was: unity was necessary (i.e. for a united struggle against the imperialist 
.t06 Silvio Pons, The Italian Communist Party between East and West, 1960-64', in Loth (ed.), Europe. Cold 
War and Coexistence. p. 99 . 
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408 Togliatti, Central Committee. 2.t October 1963, in APC, Fonda Berlinguer, MOL }-<a~clcol() 5 .. 
409 Longo's report on domestic policy to the Central Committee. 20 October 1965, ForeIgn Bulletln, No . .t 
(October-December 1965). p. 16. 
enemy) and needed to be preserved, but unity could only be possible and genUIne if 
accompanied by autonomy of all parties with respect to national decisions. 
The PCI's position on Moscow's rift with the Chinese was of course a mere reflection of the 
PCI's own struggle and ambiguous relations with the international communist system. The 
PCI's resistance was motivated not only by an unwillingness to see the Chinese expelled from 
the movement, but mainly by the concern that the Soviets used the occasion to restore the 
norms of the past with regard to inter-party relations within the movement and a return to 
obedience to a single-party guide.4JO 
3.) SPO-PCI relations and OstpOlitik: the PCI in search for an international 
reference pOint 
Both SPD and PCI were fundamentally interested in the development of detente. It is 
therefore particularly interesting that a historical comparison addresses the question of 
relations between the two. This is revealing for three reasons. First of all, it is a previously 
under-researched area. Secondly, the encounters between the two disclose remarkable insights 
in the parties' motivations and thirdly, my research findings challenge previously done 
research in this field. 
For national reasons the PCI had a great interest in reducing the existing bloc confrontation 
and constructively contributing to Ostpolitik. This engagement was unique amongst Western 
European communist parties. Italian political parties have always tended to search for external 
legitimisation to consolidate national positions (the DC, for instance. held close ties v,'ith the 
US). In the course of the PCl's foreign policy revisionism (and development of its national 
road policy) it henceforth wished to engage in. it was of particular importance to somewhat 
~)() . IS' I 1 Blackmer. The InternatlOna trategy. p. "t. 
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qualify the organic links with the Soviet Union and find new international reference points 
that solidified its national standing and assured the PCI national and international 
legitimisation. The PCI's domestic strategy and its foreign policy concept went hand in hand. 
Much like the SPD, the PCI had a specific national interest in detente. and a relaxation of 
tension between the two German states was seen as an important contribution towards that 
end. 
If, following the PCI rationale, the bloc confrontation was a severe and perhaps the strongest 
impediment for an Italian road to socialism, this rigidity of superpower tension had to be 
minimised and overcome. This, in turn, was hoped to reduce international and internal 
hostilities against domestic alliances with the PCI. The 'German problem' was both the 
outcome and expression of Cold War hostilities at the heart of Europe. The SPD's Ostpolitik 
seemed promising to contribute to East-West detente. At the same time, so the PCI's logic, 
this would pave the way for multilateral tasks and the much desired convocation of a 
Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). This could play an important 
role in overcoming the military blocS.411 The SPD, in contrast, had stressed that though it was 
desirable, it could not be held without a prior improvement of inner-German relations. 
Otherwise the conference would be dominated by the German conflict.412 Hence, the PCI also 
had a strong interest in a resolution of the German dispute. Interestingly, both SPD and PCI. 
in developing their 'own national roads' in foreign policy terms, held common comparable 
perceptions of the East -West problem and sought solutions to untangle the rigidity of the 
military blocs and Cold War tensions that were remarkably similar. 
-Ill NO\'l~lIa. 'Report to the Foreign Policy Commission of the Central Committee', Foreign BulleTin, No. 2-~ 
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Dialogue between the SPD and the PCI had commenced in the autumn of 1967. This was 
something quite sensational at the time, since the SPD only held official contacts with the 
Communist Party of Yugoslavia and in Germany, the Communist Party was still banned.-+ 13 
Here I intend to challenge Timmermann, who argues that the initiative came from the PCI.41 -+ 
Research findings from PCI archives suggest the opposite: the initial request for a private 
meeting came from the SPD.415 This is more likely given the SPD's underlying interest 
behind these talks: to pave the way for talks with the SED and ultimately Moscow. 
The PCI served as a 'mediator', communicating the SPD's positions with the Soviet 
leadership and the East German regime. Bahr recalled that the SPD was interested in 
transmitting an authentic picture of its policies to Moscow, so that the Soviets not only relied 
on hostile reports from East Berlin on what the SPD's intentions were.416 The SED had been 
equally hostile towards the great coalition than towards the previous coalitions and dismissed 
the SPD's new Ostpolitik as a mere continuation of Adenauer's foreign policy.417 By 
choosing the PCI as a mediator, the SPD hoped to challenge, so Leo Bauer, Brandt's close 
advisor, affirmed, the 'exclusivity of the SED's version and interpretation of the great 
1·· '0 l' 'k' 418 coa IlIon s stpo Itl . 
An initial informal meeting was held in Bonn on 20 September 1967 between Alberto 
lacoviello and some German journalists, one of which was GUnter Markscheffel.-+19 Later 
m Sec Ehmke, Mittendrin. Von de,. GrojJen Koalition :ur Deutschell Einheit (Berlin: RowohlL 1994), p. 255. 
414S Ie ... I' . 2t: ee, 011111lllstllta Will, p. _J. . 
415 Sec letter from Alberto Iacoviello (foreign policy editor of L' Un ita ) to Luigi Longo, 17 October 1967, In 
APc, MF 0545. 
416 Bahr, Z1I meiner Zeit, p. 251. Sec also Leo Bauer, in APc' MF 0552. 
417 Carlo Galluzzi, Togliatti, Longo. Berlinguer (Milano: Sperling & Kupfer Editori. 19~9), p. 93. 
m As quoted by Merseburger. Willy Brandt, pp. 540-541: S~c also Schonhoven. WendeJahre, p. 398: '. . 
419 GUnter Markscheffel was editor in chief of the SPD offiCIal press lrom 1957 to 1970; Carlo GalluzlI. Nota 
per I'ullicit) politico', in APc, l\1F 0545. 
Brandt sent Bauer to Rome to continue talks with PCI officials.42o The choice of Jacoviello 
and Bauer to initiate talks was both interesting and illustrative. Brandt decided to trust his 
friend Bauer, a former communist, with the task and the PCI had sent Jacoviello a more 
reform-minded Italian Communist, to establish the basis for further meetings. Later. the two 
parties' delegations were composed of Berlinguer, Galluzzi and Segre on the Italian side and 
Egon Franke, Leo Bauer and Fried Wesemann on behalf of the SPD.421 After initial talks, 
Egon Bahr also attended meetings.422 The precise amount of SPD-PCI meetings in this initial 
phase of Ostpolitik is difficult to establish. Allegedly, at least 15 meetings were held in 
1967/68.423 Issues discussed during those meetings were European detente and security, the 
overcoming of the military blocs and a European security system, the German problem 
(acceptance of pre-war borders etc.) and a renewed legality of the German Communist Party 
(KPD), which had been unconstitutional since 1956.424 Neither SPD nor PCI were particularly 
interested in the KPD. Nonetheless, the foundation of a new party was an important 'by-
product' of these meetings in as far as it was a concession vis-a-vis the SED on a long-
standing demand. Both SPD and PCI negotiated means to enable the renewed foundation of 
the KPD under a different name.425 The SED dropped its former demand of are-establishment 
of the old KPD and eventually agreed to a newly founded communist party.426 This process 
was not only actively supported but made partly possible by Gustav Heinemann, the SPD's 
minister of justice. 427 
420 Bauer had only come to West Germany in 1955. In the 1960s, he was editor for the German weekly Stern. 
Later he became one of Brandt's closest advisors. Brandt, Erinnerungen, p. 182. See also APe MF 0545. 
-1~1 Sergio Segre had previously been correspondent of L'Unita in East-Berlin. was married to a German and 
spoke the language fluently. In 1970, Segre became head of the Interna~ional Department of ~he P~I. . 
Fried Wesemann was the information director of the SPD Party ExecutIve and one of Brandt s polIcy adVISors at 
the time. See APC, MF 0545. 
-122 Interview with Egan Bahr. 1 June 2007. See also Egan Bahr, Zu meiner Zeit. p. 251. . 
-123 P. Brandt, J. Schumacher, G. Schwarzrock, K. SUhl, Karrieren eines AllJ3enseiters. Leo Baller :'H"lschen 
KOllllllzmismlls lind So;:;atdemokratie 1912 his 1972 (Bonn: Dietz, 1983), pp. 287-288. 
-12-1 Notes on PCI-SPD meetings see APe MF 0545. 
-1~:i See lettL'r from Carlo Galluzzi to Luigi Longo, APe MF 0545. 
-126 Merseburucr, Witlv Brandt, p. 54.~. . 
-127 Mersebur~er attributed particular importance to the foundation of a new communist party as an outcome 01 
SPD-PCI talks. ibid., pp. S .. U-54-L 
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Following initial meetings between the SPD and PCI, the Italian Communists commenced 
talks with SED officials. In December 1967, Galluzzi and Segre travelled to East Berlin. and 
in February 1968 a delegation of the SED's Central Committee continued talks in Rome:L28 
The composition of the PCI's delegation expressed the importance the PCI attributed to these 
meetings. The delegation consisted of Galluzzi and Segre (both attended meetings with the 
SPD), Colombi and Cossutta (members of the PCI's Direzione), as well as party leader Luigi 
Longo and Pietro Ingrao.429 
The SPD gave more weight to the reform course of the PCI, than for example statements 
made by the PCF. Moreover, the PCI's mere size and role in post-war Italy ascribed it a 
particular importance. The party observed the opening to the East with the greatest curiosity 
and apprehension and hoped to assume an active role in the detente process. The meetings 
with the SPD served this purpose.430 PCI archival sources manifest that the maximum 
objective was to overcome the military blocs and the establishment of a collective security 
system.431 The PCI also distanced itself from Moscow and reinforced its role as an 
independent, national communist party.432 This would increase credibility at home and pave 
the way for governmental participation. The SPD was interested in the impact of the PCI's 
'1 ., h E E . 433 po ycentnsm on t eastern uropean regImes. 
4~H In 'Italienische Kommunisten bei der SPD', Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (subsequently FAZ), 2 April 
1968, in Press documentation of German parliament, 1-060-5. See also Brandt. Schumacher. Schwarzrock, SUhL 
Karrieren eines AujJenseiters, p. 281. 
4~9 Timmermann, I COlllmunisti italiani, p. 38. 
430 Notes on meetings, 30 November 1967, APC, MF 0545. 
411 Ibid. 
432 In an articlc in January 1968, Segre declared that despite profound ideological and political diffen;~ces 
between communist and social democratic parties, there existed a common interest for a European polley to 
overcome the divisions. The PCI firmly believed in the usefulness of such contacts and exchange (11 opinil)ns. 
See Rinascita, Segre, 'Aprire la porta al dialogo. I rapporti tra i partiti comunisti e socialdemocratici', 12 Januar) 
1968, pp. 8-9. . . . . 
411 In a speech held in December 1967, Brandt argued that a tentatIve polemIC from parts of the PCI agall1st "ast 
Berlin and Moscow had hecome noticeable: in WBA Mappe 267. 
For questions of national and international prestige, the PCI could only profit from an 
exaggeration of its role in the SPD's Ostpolitik. At the beginning of the 1970s. when the 
FRG's treaties with the East were being implemented, the Italian Paese Sera wrote that 'la 
Ostpolitik e cominciata aRoma' .434 This claim was supported by the German historian 
Timmermann in a number of articles published in the Italian press.435 
The PCI was, without a doubt, the most promising ally to achieve the much desired 'change 
through rapprochement'. Togliatti' s concept of polycentrism had challenged the monolithic 
tendencies of the international communist movement, which had an impact on Eastern 
European communist parties. The PCI was a 'trustworthy partner' precisely because it had a 
great interest of its own in Ostpolitik and encouraged the de-centralisation of the communist 
movement. 
Giorgio Napolitano recalled later that the encounters with the SPD had been of utmost 
importance and confirmed the weight and autonomy of the PCI's international action.436 The 
amount of material and coverage of PCI-SPD relations on Ostpolitik available in the PCI 
archives is also expressive of the weight the party had attributed to the matter. More 
importantly, the PCI had observed the SPD's Ostpolitik very closely.437 Finally, the 
underlying motivation was to actively contribute to a foreign policy that was not only 
compatible but almost identical with the PCI's own policy objectives. 
Whilst both SPD and PCI had a lot to gain from these encounters, they also proved rather 
more risky for the Social Democrats than for the Italian Communists. Initially. the meetings 
Hl Ostpolitik began in Rome. Paese Sera, II May 1971, APc, MF 0162. 
·n) An article by Timmermann in L' Unita, for example, was entitled 'Gli incontri PCI-SPD aiutarano 
I'Ostpolitik'; II May 197I.APC,MFOI62. 
·B6 R;nasc;ta, Napolitano, 'L'Unita della sinistra avanza in Europa', 3 M.ay 1968, p. 5. . . 
m Ostpolitik and the SPD's foreign policy course were widely cO\'l.'red In PCI press. Sec Rl1lQs~·lta at the 
heginning of the 1970s. For example, "Lo spazio degJi europei', I I December I 970: '~~ na~'e dl, B~andt e la 
na\'icL'lla dei trattati', 17 March 1972; 'Brandt in campo', 29 September 1972: 'QuantI Iruttl dara I alhero della 
"Ostpolitik''', 3 November 1972: 'L' altoparlante della .. stabilita' .. , 10 November 1972: 'La \iltoria di Hrandl.al 
di la delle cifre', 2-+ Novcmher I 972;'Risultato pieno tra Brezne\' c Brandt', 25 March 1973, to name only a tew. 
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were secret. This is to say that the SPD did not discuss this venture with its coalition 
~8H . k partner. owever, meetIngs were not ept secret and became disclosed shortly after the first 
encounters took place. They had been closely monitored by the German Secret Service 
(BND)439; once they had been revealed, they became subject of widespread public debate and 
were partly attacked by German conservatives as well as conservative press. Conservative 
press coverage about SPD-PCI encounters was mostly negative. The Stuttgarter Zeitung 
stressed that reports about meetings between PCI and SPD were rather alienating and that 
they revealed more about the foreign policy concept of the Social Democrats than most of 
their party congress speeches.44o The term 'mediator' was preferably used by the Italians, as it 
attributed greater importance to the role of the PCI. The SPD tried to avoid this terminology. 
The SPD, to avoid further attacks or misinterpretation, went to great lengths to reaffirm the 
still insurmountable and irreconcilable ideological differences between the two parties. It also 
maintained that meetings neither had the purpose of fratemisation nor were 'popular front' 
attempts (a widely popular accusation by the conservative press) and that the Italian 
Communists were not 'mediating' between the SPD and the Ulbricht regime, but that the 
nature of talks was merely that of 'information contacts' .441 Leo Bauer declared that the sole 
purpose of encounters was to provide exact information and clear interpretation of the SPD's 
Ostpolitik.442 
It is also worth asking whether these meetings provoked reaction from the Italian Left, most 
notably the PSI. As Favretto put it, the British Labour Party, for example. worked closely 
together with the British embassy and the SI to make both socialist unification and the 
·13S Interview with Bahr, 1 June 2007. 
-119 . . Z' ') 'i I 
- Brandt. Erinnerungen. p. 189. See also Bahr, Zu melne! elf, p. -- . 
,),)0 Stllftgarter Zeitlmg. 'SPD und KPI'. 2 April 1968. . . 
·w Interview with Bahr, 1 June 2007. See also FAZ, 'Ein romisches Gesprach'. :2 Apnl 1968, In Press 
documentation of the German parliament, I -060-5. See also Leo Bauer, interview with 'Westdeutscher 
Rundfunk', 6 April 1968, as quoted in Timmermann, I Comllllisti .irati.alli. p. 32. . .. .. , ") 
44~ LL'll Bauer in Frall~fllrter RUlldschali. 5 April 1968. as quoted In Tlmmnmann. I COI1l11lllstl lTalzalll. pp.'--
.~l 
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opening to the left in Italy happen. This would be the best strategy for dealing \vith the 
'communist threat' .443 As far as SPD archives are concerned, there is no evidence that SPD-
PCI meetings caused tensions between the SPD and the Italian Socialists or the SI. It is also 
unlikely that contacts with the PCI were criticised since they were intended to serve the cause 
of detente. In 1967/68, the SPD was primarily interested in the PCI in relation to Ostpolitik 
and not the PCI's national situation. At the same time, the SPD highlighted ideological 
differences with the PCI. In doing so, the SPD hoped to protect itself from conservative 
criticism. In a letter Herbert Wehner reassured the Socialist leader Nenni that the SPD 
believed that a communist participation in government was avoidable.444 This was after the 
publication of misleading press articles in Germany which stated that the SPD allegedly 
believed that the PCI was an important political force which could no longer be ignored. 
The precise role the PCI had played in the SPD's Ostpolitik is difficult to determine. What 
can be established is that these information contacts were characterised by a common desire 
in the same cause: to overcome the gap between the two German states in order to improve 
the possibilities for enduring detente in Europe. Even if the objective of constructing an inner-
German bridge (with the help of the PCI) had not been accomplished at that stage, the 
meetings were not left inconclusive. They actively accompanied the SPD's first initiatives 
towards the East. SPD-PCI encounters were not lastingly affected by the Soviet invasion in 
Czechoslovakia in August 1968. In March 1969, Leo Bauer wrote a letter to Brandt. 
informing him about a revealing telephone conversation he had with Segre and who informed 
him that Berlinguer and Galluzzi had held talks with Moscow about the 'German question'. 
~·n Fa\'rctto, 'The Wilson Gn\'l~rnments and the Italian Centre-Left Coalitions: Betwcen "socialist" Diplomacy 
and Realpolitik. 196-1--70', in European History Quarterly. Vol. 36. No.3 (2(X)6). pp. -1-21-422. 
W Lctter from Wehner to Nenni. 3 April 1968. WBA. Mappe 30. 
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Segre informed Bauer that a fundamental change of course vis-a-vis the FRG was about to 
occur in the Soviet leadership.445 
The mere speed with which the SPD picked up Ostpolitik with the beginning of the social-
liberal coalition in 1969 supports the argument that the ground for negotiations was 
established well before. In this, the PCI's task to provide a more authentic picture of the 
SPD's interests in the East should not be undermined.446 In 1967/68, the SPD's foreign policy 
leverage was still constrained by the coalition with the CDU/CSU. When the social-liberal 
coalition commenced its work, some of the former boundaries seemed more permeable. 
1967/68 only marked the onset of direct PCI-SPD relations. Meetings and exchanges between 
the PCI and the SPD continued on a party level and in various forms throughout the 1970s.447 
After the formalisation of Ostpolitik and after Brandt's resignation from office in 1974, they 
assumed a different dimension. At the end of the 1960s, the SPD's interest in the PCI was 
centred around Ostpolitik. Towards the mid-1970s, the SPD increasingly observed the PCI's 
revisionism, Eurocommunist course and development in the Italian political scene. The SPD's 
party executive established a working group led by Horst Ehmke, which dealt with the 
developments of Western European communist parties, Eurocommunisn and the declared 
dedication to the principles of pluralism and democracy. To avoid Conservative attacks and 
denunciations, the group was named 'study group South-West Europe'. 448 Moreover. apart 
.j.j:i Sec letter from Bauer to Brandt. 25 March 1969. in WBA. Allgemeine Korrespondenz 1966-69. Mappe ~. 
446 Sec Timmermann who also argues that the meetings were not left without results. The PCI provided a more 
realistic picture of Germany's interests and once the social-liberal coalition was formed. it did not have to start 
from lew. in I COllll1l1isti italiani. pp. 51-5~. . . . .. . 
W Ehmke, Mittendrin, p. 25..J.-255. Voigt, 'Dialog zwischen SPD und kommumsttschen Partelen , m Karlhemz 
Bentelc Renate Faerber-Husemann, Frill W. Scharpf and Peer Steinbrtick (eds). ,\!etal1lorpho,\lJlI. 
:\lllliihe~'lillgell an einell l'ielseitigen Freulld. Fiir Horst Ehmke :Ulll Acht:igsten (Bonn: Dietz. 20(7), p. 279. 
448 Ehmke, Mittendrill. pp. 25..J.-255. 
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from the newly established German Communist Party, the PCI was also the only communist 
party to regularly attend congresses of the German Young Socialists.449 
4.) The 'Great Coalition' in Germany, 1966-1969 
The CDU/CSU coalition with the Free Democrats had collapsed as a result of an economic 
recession and budgetary debate that turned into a crisis involving Chancellor Ludwig Erhard 
who had lost the trust of his own party (i.e. over the handling of the economic recession, the 
CDU's loss in the regional elections in Hesse and not least due to a lack of trust in his 
leadership).450 This subsequently had evolved in a much wider crisis between the coalition 
partners. On 27 October 1966 the PDP withdrew four of its ministers, practically forcing the 
Conservatives to open up towards the SPD. The idea of entering a coalition with the 
CDU/CSU had been controversially debated in the SPD and despised by many leading 
figures. Brandt, for instance, had been very hesitant about the project from the start.451 
Herbert Wehner, in agreement with Helmut Schmidt on the matter, was the most decisive 
supporter of such a constellation and had been working towards a coalition with the 
Conservatives from June 1960 onwards in order to demonstrate the SPD's governmental 
responsibility.452 Wayne C. Thompson convincingly laid out that since the beginning of the 
1960s, Wehner had steered his party into power and became the indispensable figure in the 
././9 APe MF 074 . 
./50 See Winkler, Der lange Weg nach Westen II, p. 232 and p. 236 ff. . . 
451 See Barbara Marshall who argued that Brandt preferred a coalition with the FDP. not least because Klcsmger 
had been a member of the NSDAP. See Marshall. Willy Brandt, p. '+9. 
452 Helmut Schmidt, unpublished speech in the SPD parliamentary faction, 3 April 2006. p. 3. Helmut Schmidt. 
'Yom Klassenkampfer zum Staatsmann', in Herbert-Wehner-Bildungswerk (ed.). Herbert H'ehller~ J906-~?9() 
Deutscher Jahrhlllldertpolitiker (Herbert-Wehner-Bildungs\\'erk: Dresden. 2006). p, 75. Sec alsn Ehrler. Zur 
Deutschlandpolitik der SPD'. p. 85 ff. Schneider. Die Kunst des Kom~romiss~s. pp. 28-29 and p., ~.R. Kar~ J. . 
Brandstetter. 'Willy Brandts "Ostpolitik" und die Detente: zur Histone cmer tnrtdauernden BegnllsvcrwlITung . 
Bliitterfiir delltsche lind intemationale Politik. No.3 (1994). p. 299. 
162 
coalition. According to him, the great coalition was simply a political necessity to prove that 
the SPD was a responsible and acceptable coalition partner.453 
Informal talks between CDU/CSU and SPD were first held in 1962 but did not go beyond this 
mere exploratory status. On 27 November 1966, the SPD parliamentary faction voted with a 
narrow two-third majority in favour of forming a coalition with the CDU/CSU.454 Wehner 
was the key strategist behind the coalition. 
The 'great coalition' of CDU/CSU and SPD was regarded as a necessary evil and grudgingly 
'swallowed' by most Social Democrats and Conservatives. Wehner had become decisive not 
least because of the mutual distrust and antipathy that characterised the Brandt -Kiesinger 
relationship. Kiesinger avoided Brandt whenever possible and dealt with Wehner instead.455 
It was a parliamentary compromise from which the SPD had more to gain than to lose. Not 
only was it a passport to government, but it also demonstrated to the CDU/CSU that they were 
not indispensable as a political force in West Germany and that space was opening for 
different political constellations and parliamentary majorities. 
After the collapse of the CDU/CSU coalition with the FDP, the SPD had also entered talks 
with the Liberals, although the SPD had already moved more evidently in the direction of 
reaching agreement with the Conservatives. The great coalition had the function of making 
the SPD 'ripe for government', by proving its democratic legitimacy, and providing it with 
the necessary governmental expertise. Egon Bahr later recalled that prior to 1966, the SPD 
was not eligible for government; the coalition was thus indispensable in gaining the necessary 
experiences to prove responsibility on a national level - without which the electoral success 
hl Thompson, The Political Odyssey, p. 246 and p. 254. Despite its lack of references. it is worth looking at 
Arnulf Baring who also argues that Wehner was the absolutely decisive man in the government at the tIme. 
Haring, Mnclitll'cchsel, p. 135 and 20 l. . 
~)~ 73 in favour, 19 against a great coalition. Schneider, Die Kunst des Kompromisses, p, 39: see alsn WInkler. 
Der lange Weg nnch Westen II. p. 2 .. W. 
45) Thompson, The Political Odyssey. p. 257. 
163 
of 1969 had been unthinkable.456 The composition of the great coalition did have the 
dimension of an 'historic compromise'. The coalition's cabinet included former members of 
the NSDAP (Chancellor Kiesinger, but also the Social Democrats Karl Schiller and Lauritz 
Lauritzen), Gerhard Schroder (member of the SA), Herbert Wehner, a former functionary of 
the KPD, as well as the former emigrant Willy Brandt. The members of the cabinet emerged 
from two conflicting camps that had fiercely opposed each other since 1945.457 
The 1969 national election results marked the final transformation of the SPD's march to 
become a people's party. Its Bad Godesberg Programme, together with the foreign policy 
reassurances since the early 1960s, and the experience of the great coalition had proved the 
SPD's democratic legitimacy and governmental responsibility. This had made the SPD 
acceptable to wide sections of the electorate; beyond the traditional social democratic 
electorate, and to a voter who did not necessarily identify with a particular party. It had been 
able to hold on to its traditional voting strength and to attract support of middle-class voters, 
who had hitherto been suspicious of the SPD's economic and foreign policies as well as 
Catholics, who the party had been able to reassure due to improved relations with the 
Church.458 There were also clear signs that the SPD's new policies towards the East were 
accepted and carried by large parts of the electorate. 
The great coalition between the SPD and the CDU/CSU legitimised the SPD in the eyes of the 
electorate and opened possibilities for future coalition partners. The Conservatives were 
forced to realise that the Free Democrats, their preferred coalition partner, were able to switch 
partners, which attributed much greater importance to the FDP in the parliamentary spectrum 
(as such, the role of the FDP was indeed comparable with that of the Italian Socialists). 
~56 Bahr, Zu meiner Zeit, p. 193. 
m Winkler. Der lange Weg nach Westen II, p. 241. See also MarshalL H'll/y Brandt, p. 50. , 
458 Stephen Padgett, Tony Burkett, Political Parties and Election~ i~l West Germany. The Search for a .\ew 
Stability (London and Ncw York: C. Hurst & Company, St. Martm s Press. 1986), p. 218. 
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The coalition with the CDU/CSU was not popular amongst Social Democrats and was by 
many simply tolerated as a necessary evil to acquire a passport for government. As will be 
established later, the PCI's equivalent, the 'historic compromise' was similarly regarded by 
many communists as a necessary tactic in order to assume governmental power. In terms of 
foreign policy achievements, the great coalition did certainly not achieve any groundbreaking 
developments.459 It was 'hostage' to its own internal constraints and contradictions. However, 
allowing for the many diverging foreign policy ideas between the coalition partners, the 
CDU/CSU-SPD coalition did achieve an initial and important rapprochement with the East. 
5.) The PCI, the SPO and the impact of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 
1968 
It was undoubtedly tempting to see the Prague Spring as a sign of the way in which the blocs 
could soon be overcome and of the possibility of East European regimes acquiring a 'human 
face'. Both PCI and SPD had observed the Czech course with hope and apprehension. With 
regard to their Ostpolitik, the Social Democrats hoped the events would lead to a further 
decentralisation (and eventual degeneration) of the communist bloc and loosen the rigidity of 
the power blocs in general- similar to the PCI, which had assumed that the process of detente 
was closely related to the advance of reformers in the East.46o 
It is undeniably correct to assert that the effect of the Cold War on the international politics of 
Europe was more striking than on the Continent's domestic politics.461 With respect to the 
SPD and the PCI this provides only half the picture. Whereas the Prague crisis and the Soviet 
invasion did not have much of an impact or proved to be of relatively little importance for 
~5l) Niedhart. 'Ostpolitik and its impact'. p. 119. . . 
460 Sassonn, One Hundred Years of Socialism. p. 3.t9. On the Prague Spring and a thorough analysIs of the 
reasons that prompted the Soviet decision to invade, see Kieran Williams. The Prague Spring and its aftermath. 
C~('clIOSlol'ak politics. 1968-1970 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1997). ., 
~hl Eric Hnbshawm, Age of Extremes. The Short Twentieth Century 1914-1991 (London: Ahacus. 199.t). p. _39. 
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most Western European socialist or social democratic parties, this was unquestionably not the 
case for the PCI and the SPD, even though the Czech events and Soviet invasion had a much 
more decisive, long-term impact on the PCI than the SPD.462 As we will examine later, the 
Czech crisis did not substantially alter the SPD's Ostpolitik and did not notably decelerate the 
opening up for negotiations with the East. In terms of opening roads to new governmental 
constellations in Germany, it in fact speeded up the SPD's course towards the East. The SPD 
had already thoroughly observed the polycentric and emancipatory tendencies in the Soviet 
bloc of the early 1960s, when the Sino-Soviet split was publicly debated. 463 The PCI saw the 
Prague spring as a case study for the establishment of a democratic socialism, a Czech type of 
socialism which would also act as counter model to Soviet communism in the East. But to the 
PCI it meant more than that, which is why the consequences of the Czechoslovak crisis were 
so grave in the long-term and had crucial repercussions on the party's identity. Then again the 
crisis, paradoxically, opened up new ways and previously ill-conceived possibilities for the 
PC I. 
The Czech crisis signified a serious blow for the Italian Communists and as some put it, 
marked the start of the PCl's new intemationalism.464 The party's attitude towards the Prague 
Spring and the Soviet intervention led to the most profound re-thinking of the definition of 
PCI-CPSU relations and those with the international communist movement thus far. It had 
occurred in a period when the PCI had engaged in an open dialogue with the SPD and had a 
crucial national interest in Ostpolitik. The Prague crisis further consolidated the rigidity of the 
blocs which the PCI so enthusiastically hoped to replace with a new and collective pan-
European security system. The invasion revealed a fundamental disconnection between Soviet 
~62 Sassoon. Ont Hundred Years of Socialism, p. 351. 
lh.l Draft of a speech hy Brandt at a conference of the Socialist International held in Brussels on 3 Septemher 
196'+. in AdSD. WBA. Puhlikationen. t\ lappe 187. 
~M Sel" for instance, Barth Urhan. Moscow and the Italian Communist Party. p. 256. 
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strategic interests in Europe (a consolidation of the status quo) and the PCI's own political 
strategies in Italy. 
From the beginning, the PCI had followed the reform process in Czechoslovakia with great 
interest, sympathy, but also apprehension.465 In April 1968, PCI leader Longo declared in 
Rinascita that 'the events in Czechoslovakia help us to reinforce our position in favour of an 
Italian road to socialism which we pursue in full liberty and autonomy together with all 
secular forces of the Left and Catholics' .466 In May 1968, Luigi Longo travelled to Prague and 
expressed the PCI's full solidarity towards Czechoslovakia's new course.467 The Italian 
Communists certainly had great expectations that Dubcek's reform communism might have a 
domino impact beyond the borders of Czechoslovakia. During many other occasions the PCI 
reconfirmed its 'solidarity with the process of democratic renovation of Czechoslovakian 
socialist society, as initiated by the new leaders of the Czech Communist Party' .468 
These hopes were shattered with the Soviet invasion and the events of August 1968 put a 
rapid end to the possibility of reform communism in Eastern Europe. The polycentric 
character of the international communist movement was given a devastating blow, and old 
norms of the past restored. It had put an end to all hopes of possibilities of reform 
communism or 'socialism with a human face'. This became ever more evident after 1968 than 
it had been after the crushing of the Hungarian uprising of 1956.469 The repercussions of 1968 
were more significant because the Prague Spring defined itself explicitly as a communist 
465 'Le conclusioni del compagno Longo al CC e alIa CCC del PCI'. originally in L' Unita, 29 March 1968. re-
printed in APC, MF 0547. 
466 Rinascita, Longo, 'Su alcuni aspetti della compagna elettorale', 12 April 1968. p . .f. See also Rinascita. 
Longo. 'Rapporto sulla Cecoslovacchia', 17 May 1968, p. 16. Sec also Pajetta, Le crisi. p. I ~ 1. . 
467 Carlo Galluzzi. La svolta. Gli anni cruciali del Partito C0l111mista italiano (Milano: SperlIng & Kupfer 
Euitori, 1 9X3). p. 195. See also 'Lettera dei comunisti italiani ai compagni cecoslovacchi' (approved hy the 
Central Committee of the PCI), 1968. in APe. MF 020. 
468 'Position of the PCI on the Czechoslovak Question'. Communique of the Political Bureau of the PCL in 
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development: while the communist party played a central role, it at no point explicitly 
questioned its basic international orientation.47o It also forcefully demonstrated, and this was 
of great importance to the PCI, that no consensus existed on the concept of socialism and on 
the limits to acceptable 'national variations' .471 This implied that the viability of the PCI's 
own concept of a national, parliamentary road to socialism was put into question. 
In the aftermath of the military invasion in August 1968, a vigorous debate had initiated in the 
PCI.472 The discussions were not about the PCl's reactions to the Soviet invasion, which had 
been condemned unanimously473, but with regard to future PCI-CPSU relations.474 Many PCI 
delegates did not intend to modify the position on Czech reform communism or the party's 
condemnation of the invasion, but they nonetheless wished to improve relations with the 
CPSU, or at least reduce tension to a minimum.475 Some PCI delegates, notably Colombi, had 
called the intervention 'a violent and non-justifiable action' but noted that PCI criticism 
should be voiced with a sense of 'responsibility and international spirit' .476 
The extent of activism (or those members more committed or with more 'extreme' attitudes) 
within the PCI has always been difficult to ascertain. Barth Urban argued that the political 
profile of the PCI ruled out disengagement from Moscow. After the Czech events of 1968, a 
third of the Italian middle-level cadres still endorsed the Soviet Union's conduct in that 
regard, while another third harboured reservations about the Dubcek regime.477 This would 
explain why the PCI, when condemning the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, somewhat 
470 For a thorough analysis see also Bracke, Which Socialism. p. 26. 
471 Ib'd '17 I " p. ~ . 
47) . 
- GallUZZI, La sl'o/fa, p. 204. 
473 Rinascifa, . II giudizio del PCI sull' occupazione della Cecoslovacchia 21 agosto 1968'. 23 August 1968. p. 1. 
474 Galluzzi. La s;'o/fa, p. 204. 
475 Barbagallo, Enrico Berlinguer. p. 101. . . .. '1 
476 As quoted by Alex.ander HdbL'L '11 PCL il '68 Cecoslovacco L' il rapporto col PCUS . Studl StorlCl. 4/~()OI 
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schizophrenically also reaffirmed the 'deep, fraternal and genuine ties that unite the PCI with 
the Soviet Union and the CPSU' .478 As Pajetta recalled later, the PCI's communique on the 
Soviet invasion intended to reinforce the PCI's profound and open disapproval, without 
suggesting that the party's position signified rupture in any way.479 
In October 1968, a party statement stressed that conditions for a 'real' internationalism (which 
would henceforth characterise relations with Moscow), reiterated every party's right and 
rigorous respect for autonomy, sovereignty, equal rights and non-interference in internal 
affairs. Berlinguer's statement was accompanied by comforting remarks (for those who feared 
rupture), reassuring that, 
the Soviet Union represents the first, the most grandiose and multiform experience in the building of 
socialism, nor do we deny that this experience remains and will always be a rich source of precious 
information for all ( ... ) and we will never underestimate the decisive importance of the existence of 
the USSR, of a community of socialist states and of their unity.480 
It has been argued that at the party's rank and file reactions to the Soviet invasion were, as 
one would assume, not uniform. In many cases, the working class base objected strongly to 
any disassociation from the Soviet Union.481 This could explain why the party leadership 
avoided any abrupt and unequivocal rupture from Moscow at this stage, presupposing of 
course that the PCI's leadership had in fact desired an open break. This was, however. 
unlikely at that point. 
In order to avoid any clear-cut criticism about the nature of the Soviet system, the PCI 
contended with a firm criticism about the intervention whilst at the same time praising the 
.j7~ '1\ giudizio del PCI sull' occupazione della Cecoslovacchia 21 agosto 1968', p. 1. 
479 P . L .. 131 
a,) etta, e cnSI, p. _ . . ., . 
480 E. Berlingucr, 'Autonomy and diversity, conditions for a real internationalism: reply to EtnheIt , Forelgll 
Bulletin (October-December 1968), pp. 100-103. 
481 Hahel '1\ PCI il '68 Cecoslovacco e il rapporto col PCUS', p. 1160. See also Varsori who argued that the 
PCI (kad'ershipl had to take into consideration that a section within the party was fa\'ouring Moscow's positions 
and the party's militants, which for many years had heen attracted hy the S(niet myth and the Bolshc\lk 
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Soviet Union and the PCI's strong and genuine relations with Moscow. PCI-Soviet relations 
were characterised by condemnation of Soviet military action and a failure to re-think the past 
approval of Moscow's military intervention in 1956. Avoidance of a thorough analysis and 
criticism of the Soviet system, unconditional autonomy, and independence versus fraternal 
and genuine ties also contributed to the problem of relations from 1968 until the mid to late 
1970s. Any comprehensive analysis of the Soviet system and PCI-CPSU relations would have 
involved a thorough and critical re-assessment of the PCI's position on the events of 1956. 
Even many years later the Soviet invasion of Hungary was still justified as necessary. 
Schizophrenically, Longo in the same statement had justified the 'painful necessity' of 1956. 
whilst declaring every party's right to national sovereignty as an undeniable principle. 
dismissing the right to military intervention in internal affairs of another communist party . .l82 
The major part of the PCI leadership around Longo did not accept the renunciation of the 
PCI's autonomy, whilst neither intending a rupture with Moscow.483 In short, the PCI's 
leading circles were fundamentally unclear and hesitant about future relations, but no one 
thought about a break (or dared to voice it) at that point. These ambiguous positions led 
foreign observers to query the PCI's true nature, and many were tempted to dismiss them as 
mere tactic manoeuvres. Habel, somewhat overstating, declared that the episode marked a 
first point of no return in PCI-CPSU relations.484 What was clear, however, is that in 1968 the 
PCI's long-term prospects and ambitions would eventually no longer be compatible with and 
lead to insurmountable divergences with the CPSU, and that the PCI would have to re-think 
its priorities - organic and genuine ties with the Soviet Union, versus domestic ambitions and 
implementation of its own road to socialism (which essentially meant achieving socialism 
through structural reforms in a coalition government). 
~~~ Longo, 'Interview to I'Astrolabio on events of Czechoslovakia', Foreig1l Bulletin, no date given, p. 2. 
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East-West relations were not disturbed by the invasion of Czechoslovakia. The Western 
powers (the United States, West Germany and NATO in particular) had displayed a low-key 
. h' . f C h . 485 reactIOn to t e InvaSIon 0 zec oslovakia. It was seen as a regional conflict within the 
Soviet sphere of influence which had no further or relatively little impact upon the West. 
The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia on 22/23 August 1968, unanimously condemned by 
the SPD as a severe setback for East-West detente486, had comparatively little impact upon 
Brandt's ideas. It also had relatively little impact on the process of Ostpolitik, which was 
more hindered by the coalition partner's return to intransigence. A brief look at the speed with 
which the East-political process (which had come to a short-lived freeze after the Soviet 
invasion) had been resumed under the social-liberal coalition at the beginning of 1969 
underlines this argument. 
The SPD reiterated the correctness of its policies towards the East and stated that the events 
must not interrupt the general improvement of East -West relations through a relaxation of 
tension in Europe.487 It is also not entirely correct to assert that before the Prague Spring, the 
SPD had originally conceived its Ostpolitik in terms of relations with Eastern Europe first and 
the Soviet Union second; and that it was only in the aftermath of the invasion that West 
Germany realised that it had to deal with Moscow directly.488 Moscow had always been of 
high strategic concern in the SPD's concept towards the East. Given the power policies and 
geometry in the East, Moscow had to be approached first. 489 
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By 1962 the SPD Party Congress had already concluded that it was impossible to force 
solutions on the German question on the Soviet Union.49o According to Brandt, the key to 
reunification had laid in Moscow, not East-Berlin.491 This has led some to assert that there 
existed discrepancies between Wehner and Brandt on whether West Germany should deal 
with Moscow (Brandt) or East-Berlin (Wehner) first over the German problem. With regard 
to both Wehner and Brandt this was only partly true. Wehner had stressed in December 1966 
that German reunification was only achievable in accordance with the Soviet Union and 
Brandt also realised that there were many paths to Germany's Ostpolitik and all possibilities 
had to be exp10ited.492 It was only in 1970 that Moscow was given the main priority after 
GDR leaders had made it clear that they would negotiate a treaty with the FRG only if the 
latter had signed a treaty with Moscow beforehand.493 
After the crushing of the Prague Spring, the coalition's room for manoeuvre had been 
severely minimised and previous, already existing, disagreements came all the more 
powerfully to the surface. Since the crushing of Czech reform communism, there was 
increasing support within the CDU/CSU for maintaining all existing legal standpoints (with 
reference to pre-war borders etc) and adopting an uncompromising line vis-a-vis the East.494 
The CDU/CSU's willingness to cooperate with the East came to an almost complete 
standstill, and the Soviet invasion proved - in the eyes of many Conservatives - the 
correctness of the Hallstein Doctrine. Additionally, the few convergences between the two 
coalition partners had been exploited to the full. By the middle of 1968 the most essential 
economic and financial reform projects of the great coalition had almost all been 
490 'Kundgchungen und Beschltisse des Parteitages von Koln'. in SPD (ed.), lahrbllch der SPD 196211963, p. 
454. 
491 Schmidt, Kalter Krieg, p . .';44. 
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implemented.495 Not much common ground was left. This showed how slender the basis for 
cooperation between the two had been. 
In the Ostpolitik - and Deutschlandpolitik - the Prague crisis led many in the CDU/CSU to 
re-think the opening to the East and to return to previous traditional positions.496 The SPD, 
anxious not to interrupt the rapprochement with the East, wished to prevent the freezing of 
former improvements in East-West relations and the German question. 
After the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, the great coalition fundamentally disagreed on 
Soviet intentions and how to react, which, in turn, almost led to a complete foreign policy 
stagnation.497 The already existing profound discrepancies in the foreign policy assessment 
came all the more powerfully to the fore. In spite of the Soviet invasion, the SPD aimed to 
move further in its policy towards the East, which had become impossible in a government 
with the CDU/CSU.498 Helmut Schmidt reaffirmed later that the opening to the East had been 
unsuccessful due to the Conservatives' intransigence; then Chancellor Kiesinger did not agree 
to overcome the Hallstein doctrine in practice and to join the nuclear Non-Proliferation 
Treaty. Personal antipathies between Brandt and Kiesinger (Brandt heavily despised 
Kiesinger who had been a former member of the NSDAP) did not make cooperation easier. 499 
In addition to the, by then almost insuperable differences between the two main parties, the 
FDP had held a crucial Party Congress in January 1968, after which the Free Democrats 
moved considerably closer to the SPD and some of the past barriers between the two parties, 
particularly in the foreign policy field, had been overcome.500 FDP party leader Scheel 
stressed that the concept entailed in the Hallstein doctrine had become outdated similar to 
-195 Winkler, Der lange Weg 1lach Westen II. p. 268. 
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preVIOUS questions about national borders or recognition of them. It was exactl \' those 
(former) perceptions which had to be overcome.SOI 
Even with respect to domestic policies, where internal consensus had been rather minimal a , 
rapprochement no longer seemed impossible. SOl By the mid 1960s, leading interest groups and 
parties in the Federal Republic were favouring a less rigid approach towards the communist 
bloc. West German industry hoped that a more flexible policy would bolster trade with the 
East.so3 
Paradoxically therefore, the Prague Spring had helped the SPD to embark upon its Ostpolitik 
in the long run. The controversy over Ostpolitik in the aftermath of the invasion created an 
opportunity for new interest coalitions to form in Germany. The Czech events brought the 
differences in the coalition and its operational strategy towards the East to the surface, while 
at the same time new room for a rapprochement with the Liberals had opened, while former 
divergences between the two parties became increasingly unravelled. In the aftermath of the 
Czech invasion, new foreign policy terrain between the FDP and the SPD had emerged. It is 
difficult to imagine that the SPD would have managed to implement its policies towards the 
East successfully if it continued the governmental cooperation with the Conservatives. 
Ironically, the Soviet invasion had pushed the Italian Communists into developing a more 
independent political course, being subsequently more critical about Soviet foreign policy and 
realising the constraints of adherence to the CPSU on the PCI's national objectives. 
501 Speech at the FOP Party Congress held on 31 January 1968 in Freiburg. re-printed in Boris ~1cissnLf (ed.!. 
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6.} The PCI's Historic Compromise: a long-term strategy for domestic and 
international legitimisation 
As already established, the PCl's foreign policy developments increasingly intended to 
prevent any return to the monolithism of the traditional communist conception as the guiding 
principle of state-to-state affairs within the international communist movement. 50.+ Towards 
the end of the 1960s, the PCI also sought more rigorously a gradual dissolution of both power 
blocs, as a process of detente would facilitate the reacquisition of autonomy as far as Italy was 
concerned. The PCI knew that an 'Italian way to socialism' (which in other words meant a 
PCI participation in government) would, if at all, stand a chance only in light of global detente 
and the overcoming of bloc hostilities. If the ideological rigidity of the blocs was reduced this 
would guarantee the individual countries more freedom of independent action in domestic 
affairs. 
In as much as the SPD proved to be an external point of legitimisation for the PCI, the SPD 
also represented a point of reference for the PCl. Not only did the PCI closely follow the 
SPD's foreign policy course at the end of the 1960s, the PCI had also observed the coalition 
the SPD had entered with the Conservatives between 1966 and 1969. 
With regard to internal matters, Italy and its political establishment faced a political 
stagnation with the dual eruption of the successive revolts of the student movement and the 
trade unions in 1968/69. The period 1968-9 signalled the crisis of the centre-left, the crisis of 
the DC and the crisis of the PCI.505 The inherent crisis of the Italian political system would -
by the PCI's calculation - make the DC more amenable and induce it towards an entente with 
the PCI. The timing had indeed seemed promising: the centre-left governments with the PSI 
(which had dominated the entire 1960s) had failed by the beginning of the 1970s. The centrist 
504 Sec also Rillascita, Giuseppe Vacca. 'La logic a dei blocchi', 17 October 1969. p. 1 S. 
505 Sassoon, The Strategy of the Italian Communist Party. p. 223. 
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government of 1972-73 only enjoyed too narrow a majority for it to become a realistic future 
project.506 Hence, the 'social and political crisis' of the Italian political establishment in the 
1970s induced Berlinguer to render Togliatti's recognition of differential paths to socialism 
more concrete and practical. In theory, the PCI's rationale was both plausible and correct and 
seemed to come to the appropriate conclusions at the time. Parallels with the German 'historic 
compromise' were evident. 
Though the proposal for an historic compromise had its origins in the crisis of the Italian 
political system, it was proposed as a reaction to an international event. 507 The immediate 
cause for the concretisation of an Italian road to socialism was the coup d' etat in Chile in 
1973.508 In Chile, a left-wing government led by Salvador Allende had attempted to rule 
against a strong Christian democratic opposition and was crushed by a military take-over. The 
basic argument was to prevent a repetition in Italy of the events in Chile and to establish a 
parliamentary majority strong enough to unite the country and avoid the danger of splitting 
the country into two. In the third of his articles in Rinascita, Berlinguer explained why it 
would be 'illusory to think that, even if the parties of the Italian Left succeeded in gaining 51 
percent of the share of votes and parliamentary seats ( ... ) this would be sufficient to guarantee 
the survival and workings of a government that represented this 51 percent. ,509 The PCI's 
historic compromise essentially intended to be an entente between the 'communist, socialist 
and Catholic masses', which would provide the basis for a government of radical reforms.510 
The broad spectrum of masses it represented would also be its legitimisation. 
506 Sassoon, One Hundred Years of Socialism, p. 576. 
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At a social level, the most important alliance was that of the working class with large sections 
of the ceti medi (middles classes). As such, Berlinguer's insight did not mark much of a 
novelty. The coming to terms with the middle classes (to render them impervious to 
reactionary appeals) had been part and parcel of the PCl's post-war strategy. The Chilean 
events therefore only precipitated what had long been under way or were used as a pretext to 
give the Italian way to socialism a new context. Neither did the historic compromise mark a 
reversal of the PCl's strategy of the past. It was the logical continuation of the PCl's post-war 
strategy of alliance-seeking and coming to terms with the Catholic sector. It was part of the 
PCl's concept of the Italian way to socialism, which was given a renewed and more precise 
meaning with the historic compromise.511 Fundamental to coming to governmental power in 
Italy involved a coming to terms with large parts of the Catholic sectors and the Christian 
Democratic Party. This was one of the origins behind the historic compromise formula. An 
entente was feasible since the DC was, according to Berlinguer, a party of 'deep 
contradictions', a party 'tied to the interests of big economic concentration and parasitic 
groups, but also a party that because of opinion, of its citizens, peasants, women and workers, 
must take popular needs and aspirations into account' .512 During 1966, Luigi Longo, then PCI 
leader, had asserted that the party's attitude towards Catholics was not based on a casual or 
tactical necessity. 
The internal strength of the DC, as Sassoon put it, 'was not only a question of votes, but 
resided also in the fact that the Christian Democratic Party had "colonised" the State, 
occupying through its clientele system all the major apparatuses of the State including the 
d· d h bl· , 513 cre It system an t e pu IC sector . 
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The underlying idea of the historic compromIse strategy was of course to overcome the 
conventio ad excludendum (an Italian peculiarity which essentially was an unwritten pact 
amongst some of the other political forces that excluded the PCI from the area of O"oYernment 
b 
by referring to its democratic illegitimacy). It was an attempt to render these boundaries 
permeable, change the PCl's image from a party of opposition to a party of government and to 
render the altering of power in Italy somewhat more concrete beyond it being merely a 
theoretical possibility. 
However, the historic compromise was not just a strategy seeking conciliation with the main 
democratic forces of the Italian political system, but it did also compromise (even if not 
intentionally) the diverging positions within the PCI itself. By proposing the strategy, the PCI 
avoided, at least temporarily, a thorough analysis and coming to terms with its own still 
ambivalent identity. 
On a similar level, it was perhaps the only way to achieve power, avoiding a rupture with the 
Soviet Union and the more complex issue of re-defining Italian communist 'ideology' and 
relations with Moscow. It could be explained (vis-a-vis the party's militants) as a necessary 
strategy in order to achieve power, a strategy in line with Gramsci' s thinking or Togliatti' s 
elaboration of it. It did not question or alter the PCl's permanent link with Moscow (at least 
this is how it could be 'sold' to the party's more militant base). 
The prospect of coming to power would avoid triggering a CrISIS amongst the party's 
militants, although cooperation with the Christian Democrats was difficult to swallow for 
many of them (much as it had been the case for many SPD members). It has been held that 
Berlinguer had to balance conciliation towards the DC at home with conciliation towards 
Moscow in the hope of assuaging discontent among communist militants in Italy.sl~ Again, 
the degree of militancy within the PCI had always been difficult to ascertain. It is therefore 
hard to assess to what extent Berlinguer had the party behind him in formulating the historic 
51-1 Barth Urhan, Moscow and the Italian Communist Party. p. 271. 
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compromise and when accepting Italy's membership in NATO prior to the national elections 
of 1976, in order to achieve the proposed alliance strategy in Italy. The internal organisational 
structure of communist parties, of course, has the advantage of allowing a certain amount of 
flexibility at the top. Leaders can easily justify a certain policy as an operational strategy in 
order to come to power. Those communist members antagonistic towards the historic 
compromise, might have accepted it as a strategy because in theory it had involved coming to 
power, but, as we will see, a DC that used the PCI's abstention in support of a minority 
government, without the Communists' acceding power or being offered something in return, 
became increasingly difficult to justify to many members and voters. 
A number of scholars suggested that Berlinguer had continued to praise the Soviet Union 
between 1976 and 1979 - precisely to push through his domestic policies that were so 
unpopular at the PCI's base.SIS This is plausible. 
It was precisely those links on the international level which caused such enormous suspicion 
and concern amongst Italy's Western neighbours and the United States. It was also those links 
which, according to the party's many opponents, marked the crucial distinction between a 
party at the threshold of government and a party in government. 
Any advance by the PCI would thus have to be implemented with maXImum caution. 
reassuring the party's democratic credentials and willingness to cooperate with the other 
political forces. This put the PCI in the difficult and ambivalent position of carefully 
balancing two increasingly incompatible but mutual interests: reassurances vis-a-vis the PCI's 
national and international adversaries with periodic praising of the Soviet Union. 
Initially. and above all electorally speaking. the historic compromise formula seemed to pay 
off. In the national elections of June 1976 the PCI increased its votes to 34.4 percent, the 
515 Patrick McCarthy, The Crisis afthe Italian State: From the Origi1ls afthe Cold Har to the Fall (~"Beriliscof/i 
~Nc\\' York: St. Martin's Press. 1995), p. 117. 
179 
highest result in the PCI's history (compared with 27.1 percent in 1972).516 Whether the high 
electoral result stood in direct relation with the historic compromise is difficult to determine. 
but for the PCI leadership it was tempting to interpret the electoral success as a plebiscite of 
its correctness. The national elections results in 1976 (as well as the regional elections in the 
previous year) were indeed remarkable, stunning Italy and its Western neighbours alike. 
It is worth having a look at the electoral results of the other parties in Italy, as electoral 
success is always also measured in comparison with that of a party's political opponents. The 
PCI's remarkable gains were not achieved at the expense of the DC. In fact, the Italian 
Christian Democrats managed to increase their share of votes, though minimally, compared to 
the previous elections of 1972. (+ 0.02 gaining 38.7 percent in 1976). The most significant 
losses were made by the smaller parties, the Social Democrats and the Liberals (- 1.77 percent 
and - 2.59 percent). The election outcome showed that it was no longer possible for the DC to 
govern by itself (or with some of the smaller parties as junior partners), nor was it possible to 
ignore the PCI any longer, especially as the PSI refused to enter a government that rejected 
PCI inclusion and demanded some sort of communist contribution.517 The gap between the 
two large Italian parties had narrowed significantly. 
Whereas the three years from 1966-69 proved to be a stepping stone for the SPD towards full 
governmental responsibility, the Italian Communists were never able to transform themselves 
from a party of opposition to a party of government. The DC managed to rule between 1976 
and 1979 (filling all the government positions), with the abstention of the PCI, PSI. PRI and 
PSDI. The most important Italian Christian Democrat, who would have made 'some sort of 
alliance' with the PCI possible, was kidnapped and subsequently killed by the Red Brigades 
in 1978. Whether Aldo Moro (against the will of many in his party) would have ultimately 
made a PCI participation (and thus the historic compromise) possible can, of course, no 
:\16 The pel's ekctoral L1(l\'ancement was already evident in the June 1975 regional elections. 
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longer be determined with certainty and remains subject to historical speculation. Sassoon 
held that 'in killing Moro the Red Brigades destroyed the key man who would have payed the 
way for entry of the PCI in the government' and that they subsequently. 'permitted the reviyal 
of the right wing of the DC,518 (and hence the staunchly anti-communist wing of the DC). 
The SPD emerged from the years of the great coalition strengthened, demonstrating to the 
CDU/CSU that the years of conservative hegemony had come to an end. Most importantly, 
the SPD had a foreign policy agenda to offer to the Free Democrats, which had realised that 
their own foreign policies were more likely to be implemented in a coalition with the SPD. 
The interests of the SPD (even if considerably more on the foreign policy agenda) were 
conform with and compatible with those of the FDP. The PCI (somewhat naively) assumed 
that the PSI voluntarily agreed to a 'great coalition' of all forces without realising that it 
proved to be of little benefit to the Italian Socialists, in fact as disadvantageous as it was in the 
eyes of most Christian Democrats. 
Although the DC had still emerged strongest party from the 1976 national polls, the advance 
of the PCI at the expense of the smaller parties (PSDI and PLI) meant that the DC could no 
longer form a stable government excluding the Left. Whereas in Germany, the 1966-69 
experience had demonstrated that the SPD could no longer be ignored and that terrain for new 
parliamentary majorities had opened, the DC was not ready for the PCI's historic compromise 
. . I f S19 III Its governmenta orm.-
'Great coalitions' are always a marriage of convenience. They are implemented either in a 
'state of emergency': in a situation of political stalemate when no other parliamentary 
majority is viab1e~ or in situations when it is profitable for both coalition partners. In other 
words, when there is a compelling parliamentary reason such as crisis or lack of seats etc. 
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Though Italy faced a political and social stagnation in 1976, there was no such crisis and the 
DC still managed to form a minority led government. 
In 1966, there had been persuasive reasons for both SPD and CDU/CSU to enter a great 
coalition. Due to West Germany's 'three-party system', coalition options had narrowed 
significantly. The years from 1966 to 1969 offered the SPD to prove its governmental 
legitimacy and secured the governmental survival of the CDU/CSU. In Italy, the minority led 
DC governments of the mid-1970s secured the survival of the Christian Democrats at the 
expense of the Communists. The DC had formed a government on its own, relying on the 
benevolence or on the abstentions of other parties, negotiating with them the government 
programme to face the inherent 'crisis' in Italy. Thus, between 1976 until the end of 1979, 
Italy was governed by minority DC-led governments which had to appeal to the PCI to 
guarantee their survival. The official reason for the PCI's return to the opposition in January 
1979 was its hostility to the new European Monetary System adopted that month; used more 
as a prerequisite to distract from the fact that the years of 'national solidarity' had definitely 
come to a close. 
Between 1976 and 1979, the PCI had tied its future very closely to the historic compromise 
formula, thereby avoiding any serious elaboration and reassessment of the party's ambivalent 
nature. After the failure of the historic compromise the party was ever more deeply 
disoriented. The party's social and political alliance options had become exhausted. Whereas 
the coalition with the CDU/CSU had in fact proved to be a stepping-stone towards fully-
fledged governmental participation for the SPD. the PCI had been contented with a 
'compromise to the compromise'. This resulted in a considerable loss of support (- -+ percent 
in 1979) for the first time in the party's post-war history. The policy of compromise had 
IX2 
become a mere policy of subordination.52o By accepting a DC-led minority government 
(without gaining anything in return), the PCI had been subservient to the DC and ineyitablv 
defended the corruption of the Italian state, the corruption of a system it had been so eager to 
replace. 
The PCI had failed because it had tied its strategy too closely around cooperation with the 
DC, leaving the PSI largely ignored. An historic compromise would not have been desirable 
or profitable from a PSI perspective. The Italian Socialists would have been the 'most 
irrelevant' partner in such a governmental constellation. The strategy would have essentially 
been a coalition between the two great forces in Italy (although of course it officially included 
the PSI and other democratic forces). In this governmental constellation - if successful - the 
PSI would have contributed to its own demise as a (largely dispensable) party of government. 
Additionally, the more pro-communist PSI leader Francesco De Martino (who had previously 
argued for re-established rapports with the PCI), had been replaced by the staunchly anti-
communist new leader Bettino Craxi in July 1976. With the beginning of his party leadership, 
Craxi was most profoundly concerned with creating a more distinctive party image and 
ideologically distancing the PSI from the PCI. Busy recreating a new and distinct party 
identity, it became clear that Craxi was little interested, if not overtly reluctant, towards an 
alliance or identification of any sort with the PCI. 521 
The heterogeneous Italian political scenery also proved to be disadvantageous for the PCI. 
Whereas in West Germany, the SPD 'enjoyed' the uncontested hegemony of the (centre)-left, 
the many smaller left-wing parties in Italy were constantly forced to distinguish themselyes 
from their opponents to secure their own parliamentary survival. Contrary to the PCI. the SPD 
had something to offer to the CDU/CSU during the great coalition (the latter being interested 
in remaining party of government) and later to the smaller FDP. The Italian Communists' 
~ '() . I I I' C . P h '1 '10 
. - Sassoon, The Strategy oj t le ta tall Om11lUIllst ar,.,·, p. __ 0. 
~21 See also Featherstone, Socialist Parties and European Integration, p. 230. 
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proposal was practically (although not rhetorically) intended towards the DC. It largely left 
the PSI ignored. Had the Italian Socialists agreed to the historic compromise, the PSI would 
have rendered itself dispensable. At least as far as the PSI was concerned, the pcrs proposal 
had failed to take that into consideration. The failure of the historic compromise had opened 
additional space for the PSI. The PCI in tolerating a DC-led government, - and as such 
defending the Italian State with its corruption and degenerations as it had turned into during 
three decades of DC hegemony - had become identified with the system itself (at least in the 
eyes of many of its voters). Even if in theory it proved to be a viable strategy at the time, it 
had become soon apparent that there was little practical application to it. The outside observer 
may therefore correctly question why the PCI continued to hold on to this alliance strategy so 
vigorously until 1979. 
7.) The consolidation of the SPD's Ostpolitik in the 1970s 
The beginning to the mid 1970s marked a period of detente, a progressive relaxation of Cold 
War political, ideological and military tensions as well as of the international system's rigid 
bipolar structure. This was in the interest of both superpowers: for the US, detente promised 
to reduce the financial burden in Europe, which was of particular concern in light of US 
engagement in Vietnam. The war had proved impossible to win, US society was deeply 
divided over its continuation and it had become an enormous drain on economic resources. 
Consequently, Washington had been less centrally concerned with European affairs in the late 
1960s and early 1970s, than it had been a decade before. The salience of Western European 
affairs in American foreign policy had steadily diminished in a period where the key issues 
preoccupying US-policy makers were the war in Vietnam and the crisis in the Middle East.522 
Vietnam played a singularly important role in American policy thinking, especially during the 
52~ Introduction by N. Piers Ludlow in N. Piers Ludlow (ed.) European Integration and the Cold War. p. 9. 
Nixon administration, whose central preoccupation from 1969 to 1973 (at the height of the 
bilateral phase of Ostpolitik) was disengagement of the United States from military 
involvement in the war in Indochina.523 
The prospects of superpower detente were therefore highly endorsed. At the end of the 1960s, 
leading SPD officials assumed that the United States were planning to withdraw some. or 
perhaps all, of its troops from West Germany, in view of the growing domestic pressures in 
the US to reduce overseas commitments as a result of the continuing war in Vietnam.52-+ In 
1970 there had been a strong movement in the US Senate to introduce legislation to reduce 
drastically the size of American forces in Europe. Although the so-called "Mansfield 
resolution' was defeated, it was increasingly feared that its support would grow for the US to 
unilaterally and significantly reduce forces in Europe.525 
The SPD's vision of European detente was therefore partially designed to create new options 
to protect German military and security interests in the expected reduction of US forces in 
Germany and Western Europe. 
For the Soviet Union, detente promised to reinforce the status quo in both East and Western 
Europe. After the events of 1968, Moscow had been increasingly concerned with 
consolidating its own sphere of influence. The weakness in the Soviet economy - the need for 
access of Western markets and technology - provided an additional rationale for Moscow's 
interest in detente. 526 Sarotte convincingly argued that in their dealings in Europe, both 
superpowers were heavily influenced by concern over issues arising elsewhere in the world.
527 
The Nixon administration's efforts at detente in Europe were in large part an attempt to 
523 Raymond L. Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation. American-Soriet Relations from Nixon to Reagan 
(Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1985), p. 10. . ., 
52,,) US Deknce Minister McNamara announced US plans to withdraw troops from Germany m the spnng 01 
1967. On the subject see Schneider. Die Kunst des K011lpromisses, pp. 20..J.-20). . 
525 Colin Bown, Peter 1. Mooney, Cold War to detente /945-80, Second Edition (London: Hememann 
Educational Books, 1981), p. 1..J.8. 
52h lIanhimaki. Westad (cd.), The Cold War. p . ..J.81. 
527 Sarotte, Dealing, p. 176. 
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establish favourable conditions for a US withdrawal from Vietnam.528 To an extent not 
previously appreciated, Soviet motives were strikingly similar. Sarotte argued that Soyiet 
receptiveness to both detente and Ostpolitik was clearly a function of increasing worry about 
the Sino-Soviet conflict and that global concerns of the Soviet superpower had direct 
consequences for the resolution of the German-German dispute. 529 This is not only plausible 
but likely. 
After Brandt's election as chancellor in 1969, West Germany improved relations with the 
East. The FRG rapidly signed the much disputed Non-Proliferation Treaty on 28 November 
1969. This had previously been impossible, as the Conservatives heavily opposed the 
ratification.53o With its ratification, the SPD-FDP coalition aimed to fulfil a Soviet 
prerequisite for talks with the FRG.531 The FRG also signed a Non-Aggression Pact with the 
Soviet Union in 1970 (ratified in May 1972) and simultaneously entered negotiations with 
Poland, Czechoslovakia and the GDR. Agreements with Eastern Europe and East Germany 
were concluded between 1970 and 1973. The treaty with Moscow was a precondition for 
further improvements with Germany's Eastern neighbours. 
At the time, however, the SPD's Eastern policy was not unanimously praised. Ostpolitik was 
a highly controversially and heavily debated national policy matter. Opponents, most notably 
the CDU/CSU, blamed Brandt and the SPD for 'selling out' Germany's national interests by 
recognising the two states in Germany and of her post-war borders, which would, in the long 
:i~S Ibid. 
)29 Ibid., pp. 176-177. . . 
530 The pro-Gaullist section of the CDU and the CSU was against the signing of the ~on-P~oltfe:atlOn agreement. 
whereas the' Atlanticists' in the CDU adopted a more positive attitude and agreed to Its ratIfIcatIOn: on the 
subject sec William E. GrinIth, Die Ostpolitik der Bllndesrepublik Deutschland (~tuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1981), p. 
190; Hartmut SoelL Helmllt Schmidt, p. 595; Schneider. Die Kunst des Kompromlsses. p. 202. . 
531 Letter Brandt to Chancellor Kiesinger, 1.5 July 1968, in Akten :llr :1llsll'artigen Politik dcr BllndesreplIbhk 
Deutschland 1968. Band II: I. Juli bis 31. Dezember 1968, Institut fUr Zeitgeschichte des Aus,,·tirtIgen Amtes 
(cd.) (Mtinchen: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1999). p. 871. 
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term, seal on the division and make reunification ever more impossible.532 As a result, almost 
the entire CDU/CSU parliamentary faction abstained during the parliamentary ratification of 
the treaty with Moscow in May 1972.533 The Bonn-Moscow treaty was followed by treaties 
with Warsaw (December 1970), a quadripartite agreement on Berlin (September 1971). a 
series of inter-German follow-up agreements (regulating traffic and postal issues between the 
two Germanies)534 as well as by a Bonn-Prague treaty of December 1973. Treaties 
establishing diplomatic relations with Hungary and Bulgaria were concluded in December 
1973. This process was accompanied by bilateral superpower negotiations, leading to a first 
arms control agreement (SALT I), limiting strategic arms as concluded by the United States 
and Moscow in May 1972. 
The SPD's Ostpolitik, deeply controversial in the 1970s, had become the object of widespread 
consensus by 1982.535 The debate about whether Ostpolitik was appropriate seemed to have 
been answered when the social-liberal Ostpolitik was adopted almost wholeheartedly by the 
CDU/CSU-FDP government in 1982. The SPD's Ostpolitik had always been contested by 
those claiming that the accommodating attitude of the West German government towards the 
SED and the Soviet Union had delayed the breakdown of the Cold War and the reunification 
of Germany. Supporters highlighted that the SPD's conciliatory policy of detente was the only 
532 See also Julia von Dannenberg, The Foundations a/Ostpolitik. The Making a/the Moscow Treaty benveen 
West Germany and the USSR (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 1. 
533 'Wahlprogramm der SPD', agreed upon at the extraordinary Party Congress held in Dortmund on 13 October 
1972, in Os sip K. Flechtheim (ed.), Die Parteien der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Hamburg: Hoffmann und 
Campe, 1973), pp. 244-292. 
53.J In a number of follow-up accords to the Basic Treaty of 1972. Bonn and East Berlin agreed to improve travel 
conditions from West to East, to modernise road and rail-road connections, to open new border checkpoints, and 
to facilitate mail, parcel service and telephone connections. Through a series of accords, the SPO-FDP coalition 
hoped to improve living conditions of Eastern Germans and improve trade relations. 
m Even after the clear-cut election result of 1972 the Eastern treaties and above all the basic treaty with the 
GOR remained subject of fierce inner-parliamentary debate. The CSU, for example. filed a lawsuit aga.inst ~he 
basic treaty at the German Constitutional Court (referring to reunification as a compulsory goal as. entaIled In the 
preamble of the Basic Law). In its verdict of 31 July 1973. the highest court declared the conformity of the treaty 
with the German Basic Law. The court nonetheless reiterated the necessity of an unambiguous. legal 
interpretation of the basic treaty. See Martin Huber. Die BlindestagsH'ahlkamp/e der CD U/CSU a/so 
Oppositionsparteien 1<)72. 1976, 1980.2002 (Mtinchen: Herbert Utz. 2008), pp .. 50-5 I. On the .subjec.t see abn 
Christian Hacke 'Die deutschlandpolitischen Konzeptionen \"on COU und CSl1 In der 0pposltJonszelt ( )lJ(ll)-
1982)', in Konr~d-Adenauer-Stiftung (ed.). Historisch Politische Mitteilungen .. 1rchil· /iir christlich-
demokratische Politik (Kiiln: Bbhlau Verlag. 1994). p . .+4. 
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feasible option at the time, to secure peace, which ultimately made the non-violent revolution 
of 1989 possible. Less debatable was the fact that Ostpolitik, as a contribution to the Western 
detente policy, was simultaneously a bold policy of pursuing the national interest of 
increasing autonomy for West Germany to adopt an independent and stronger say in world 
affairs. 536 Sarotte, however, argued that evidence in the SED archives does not support this 
argument. If Brandt hoped to make use of closer cooperation with the GDR as a means of 
gaining leverage over his European allies, so Sarotte argued, he did not ask the SED explicitly 
to join him in doing SO.537 
However, contrary to this argument, it is rather unlikely that Brandt discussed his motives 
with his East German opponents. Even if the main concern may have been superpower 
attitude, it should not be denied that re-gaining sovereignty vis-a-vis the European allies was 
an important 'by product' of the SPD's Eastern policies. 
Ostpolitik had always been contested by the parties of opposition at the time. In the 1950s, the 
SPD continuously attacked Chancellor Adenauer's Ostpolitik (or rather the lack of one), 
without offering a viable alternative; similarly in the 1970s, when the CDU/CSU loudly 
criticised the social-liberal coalition's Ostpolitik for being too lenient on the East and making 
too many concessions.538 For example, in April 1972, before the parliamentary ratification of 
the Eastern treaties, Rainer Barzel (Kiesinger's successor as the CDU's candidate for 
Chancellorship), had even invoked the 'constructive vote of no confidence' to oust Brandt. 
Barzel's attempt had failed narrowly. Here Wehner's role in Ostpolitik comes in crucial. 
When the opposition attempted to replace the government by means of a vote of no 
confidence, Wehner foiled the effort. 539 
536 See also von Dannenberg, The Foundations o.f Ostpolitik, p. 6. 
m Sarotte, Dealin~, p. 176. 
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Wehner had been at the zenith of power in the 1960s and particularly during the great 
coalition.54o As stressed by Thompson, the end of the coalition marked the decline of Wehner. 
Brandt had sought his advice less frequently.541 Nonetheless, his decisive role as the chairman 
of the SPD parliamentary faction should not be undermined. In his memoirs, Helmut Schmidt 
highlighted that Wehner's contribution to Ostpolitik was largely underestimated in German 
public opinion. Moreover, and hereby Schmidt undermined Brandt's and Bahr's role in 
Ostpolitik, Wehner's political views towards the East had already been clear well before they 
developed the concept of 'change through rapprochement' .542 
The SPD's German policy in the 1950s was unpopular because it confronted the population 
with an 'either or choice', much as it was unrealistic and somewhat utopian because it failed 
to take into account the given geopolitical circumstances and power policy interests. The 
SPD's new policy to the East was different. It was accompanied by a profound foreign policy 
reassessment and marked a complete U-turn to any of the party's previous (official) foreign 
policies. The SPD's Ostpolitik was largely supported by the population because it presented 
no disadvantages for the FRG (if at all, it offered economic advantages due to increased trade 
with the East), was developed from within the (military) security of the Western Alliance and 
ultimately offered West Germany a greater say in international affairs. It no longer 'traded' 
military security for reunification. 
Electoral results of 1969 and 1972 confirmed the popularity of the SPD' s chosen course. S-B 
The election outcome of 1972 was by many commentators seen as a referendum on the 
government's Ostpolitik since 1969, not least by the SPD itself. s.+.+ 
540 See also Meyer who stressed that Wehner had great influence on Kiesinger. especially in light of the FRG's 
german policy, in Herbert Wehner, p. 299 . 
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Then again, it is not too likely that a national election is won on foreign policy issues 
exclusively. Elections in general are not won on foreign policy issues. Brandt's Ostpolitik 
may have been endorsed by the majority of the population, but few thought it as important as 
the economy, an issue that presides over foreign policy matters in national elections in 
genera1.545 Opinion polls confirmed this. On the question of Germany's most important 
political problems, respondents considered the economy as considerably more important than 
Ostpolitik in 197211973. In the election year of 1972, the economy was seen as the most 
salient political issue by 42 percent of the respondents, Germany's Ostpolitik only by 16 
percent.546 Although opinion poll results are to be used carefully, they nonetheless provide 
some useful insight in general political trends. 
The economy was almost the only campaign platform for the CDU/CSU during the 1972 
national elections, as the Conservatives had little substantial alternative to offer in contrast to 
Brandt's successful Eastern policy. Did the SPD seek to make a deal with the Soviet Union 
that would be detrimental to Western interests? At election times, the CDU/CSU opposition 
played with these underlying anxieties and negative perceptions of Ostpolitik. Some aspects 
of the Conservatives' propaganda bordered on the hysterical, attempting to brand the SPD as 
Marxist and bringing, via Ostpolitik, Germany's subjugation to Moscow.547 The CDU/CSU 
failed to attract voters over domestic policy issues and consequently used the debate over the 
coalitions' East and German policy for attacks in the election campaign, whilst the faction in 
parliament itself was highly divided over the Eastern treaties.548 
Despite these attacks, the SPD clearly won the 1972 national elections which was a 
vindication of Ostpolitik and seen as a clear mandate to continue the foreign policy course. 
5.1:\ Padgett, Burkett, Political Parties, p. 221. 
546 lahrbllch der ojfentlichen Meinllng 1968-1973, Institut fUr Demoskopie Allenshach (ed.) (Allenshach, Bonn: 
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).1 7 P d [.. [ P' y) 2 a ~clt, Burh'lI. Po Iflca artles, p. -- . 
:\48 H ~. hlk" +. '17 uher. Die BlIlldestags\\'a ample, p .. " . 
190 
Much of its success was owed to the fact that it allowed for the specific security interests of 
Germany's neighbours and left untouched the specific rights of the former Allies over the cit\' 
of Berlin. 
It is subject of historical controversy whether Brandt had discussed his individual steps 
towards the East with the United States in advance. Some argue that Brandt had not fully kept 
Washington informed of the developments in Ostpolitik.549 Others assert that there is no 
evidence to support the thesis that the SPD's Ostpolitik was inadequately coordinated with the 
West.550 Even if individual steps were not all a priori coordinated with the United States, the 
crucial point is that no substantial evidence exists that Ostpolitik ran counter US foreign 
policy interests or had not been fully endorsed by the Americans. For instance, the 
recommendations of the Harmel report agreed in December 1967, stipulating that the Atlantic 
Alliance should henceforth have the dual objective of security and detente, were fully in line 
with Brandt's thinking. 551 More importantly, it is difficult to imagine that the SPD could have 
conducted its own policies towards the East had they ran counter superpower interests. 
Ostpolitik was so successful precisely because it was complementary to and in the interest of 
all sides involved. Of course the reasons that led to a superpower convergence of interests 
were fundamentally diverse: the Americans, to whom a stronger and united Europe presented 
a challenge and benefit alike, were involved in their own battle in Vietnam. Ostpolitik 
promised to reduce the burden of commitment in Western Europe considerably. A strategy of 
detente (and Ostpolitik as a German contribution to it) would make it possible to reconcile an 
overall reduction of US international presence. Gaddis also suggested that Nixon and 
Kissinger quickly realised that Ostpolitik could fit within a wider strategy: economic 
5-19 See. for example, Niedhart who stressed that Bahr went to Washington in order to deli~'Cr a message,. not to 
ask for advice or permission. During the first weeks of the Brandt government. Western dlplom~ts, unamr~lousl.y 
criticised the lack of information; see Niedhart, 'Ostpolitik and its impact on the Federal RepublIc s relatIonship 
with the West', p. 121. See also John W. Young, Cold War Europe 1945-89. A Political History (London: 
Edward Arnold, 1991), p. 18. .' _ 
550 Karl Kaiser. The New Ostpolitik', in Wolfram F. Hanrieder (ed.), West German ForeIgn Policy: 1949-/91 l) 
(Boulder. Colorado: Westviev.' Press. 1980), p. 147. 
551 Garthoff. Detente, p. 110. 
191 
necessity could combine with the opening to China to push the Soviet Union into negotiations 
with the United States on a range of issues, such as limiting strategic arms and increasing 
East-West trade.552 For the Soviets, the treaty packages as embraced in Ostpolitik, marked 
essential steps toward the much desired European security conference, for which Moscow had 
been pushing since the middle of the 1950s in order to legitimise the European territorial and 
political status quo, and to reduce American influence in Europe.553 
A change of leadership took place in 1974. Brandt resigned from office in the aftermath of a 
spy scandal that had become public. In April 1974, Brandt's personal assistant, GUnter 
Guillaume, was arrested for espionage. In the following two weeks, Brandt's resignation had 
been discussed internally and in May 1974 Schmidt became chancellor. Brandt ultimately 
stumbled over the Guillaume affair, but his leadership had been weakened since the second 
Brandt/Scheel cabinet from 1972 onwards. There is little substantial disagreement in the 
Brandt historiography on this. The Guillaume affair is worth mentioning for two reasons. 
Internally, it was used by the various players involved to bring their own interests to the fore. 
Thompson convincingly argues that Brandt's leadership steadily weakened between 1972 and 
1974 and Wehner, as well as Schmidt, withdrew their support and ultimately sought to replace 
the chancellor.554 Schmidt, part of the Brandt-Wehner-Schmidt troika, had been ready to 
replace Brandt for some time and his taking over of chancellorship was largely undebated in 
the SPD.555 
Secondly, the SPD's foreign policy course did not change with the new leadership. There 
exists a rather large consensus amongst historians that Schmidt's course was more pragmatic 
552 John Lewis Gaddis, The Cold War. A New History (London: Penguin Books, 2007), p. t 5'+. 
55.1 Wolfram F. Hanrieder. 'West German Foreign Policy, 1949-1979: Necessities and Choices', p. 28. 
554 See Thompson, The Political Odysse.y, p. 341 and p. 345; Merseburger. Willy ~ralldt, p .. 65.8fL Marshal~. 
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in style and that he tried to take the 'emotional steam out of Ostpolitik' (referring to Brandt's 
and Bahr's approaches).556 This did not, however, imply that Schmidt's approach constituted 
a new way forward. 557 Over the next years, Schmidt fostered direct personal relations - while 
keeping away the wider public, his allies and even his own party - in dealing with East 
Berlin.558 This took the form of direct contacts with Erich Honecker. As pointed out by 
Bange, one might call it a cynical course of history or simply Realpolitik, that the first 
tentative contact between Schmidt and Honecker took place on the day of Brandt's 
resignation.559 In his memoirs, Schmidt recalled only five personal meetings with Honecker. 
besides numerous written correspondences and telephone conversations. Schmidt felt superior 
to Honecker and pitied him for his simplicity.560 
The next important step in the history of relations between Bonn and East Berlin was the 
CSCE in Helsinki in August 1975.561 It marked the multilateralisation of Ostpolitik.562 Its 
main benefit was the reinforcement of the Four-Power agreement on Berlin, as the second 
basket of the CSCE's final document dealt with increased economic and technological 
cooperation. With regard to FRG-GDR relations, East Berlin was interested in limiting the 
impact of the CSCE on the GDR's system and to improve its steadily deteriorating foreign 
trade balance through trade with the FRG.563 Relations with the GDR were therefore confined 
556 Oliver Bange, '''Keeping detente alive"': inner-German relations under Helmut Schmidt and Erich Honecker, 
1974-1982', in Leopoldo Nuti, (ed.), The Crisis of Detente in Europe. From Helsinki to Gorbachev, 1975-1985 
(London and New York: Routledge, 2009), p. 231. 
557 See also Judt, who argued that Schmidt never deviated from the general line of Ostpolitik, pursuing it not 
only in puhlic diplomacy but also multiple links with the GDR, in Postwar, p. 498. 
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to direct diplomatic relations and not to inner-party SPD-SED relations. This is not surprising 
- given also the Conservative attacks the SPD saw itself confronted with. 
The grand design of Ostpolitik was nothing less than a means to overcoming the status quo 
and undermining the Soviet empire by peaceful means in the long-term. Whereas the kind of 
static detente envisaged by the superpowers served to reinforce the status quo equilibrium, by 
formalising it with treaties, Ostpolitik - at least in the SPD's conceptual understanding of the 
term - tried to challenge the status quo. Sarotte, on the other hand, suggested that the amount 
of initiative the Germanies were showing and their desire to reshape the status quo should not 
be exaggerated.564 Whereas this is likely to have been the case for the GDR, this cannot be 
maintained with regard to the SPD. The long-term aim was to overcome the division and 
firmly embed a united Germany in a reunited Europe. My analysis does not contradict with 
Sarotte's in the way that the FRG sought to emphasise, rather than diminish, its commitments 
to its allies on the way to achieving reunification. However, this does not imply that the 
Western military pact was the system the SPD envisaged for a reunited Germany (see Chapter 
Ostpolitik was the German contribution to an active detente. Once consolidated, the practical 
implementation of Ostpolitik was not significantly influenced by superpower tension. Finally, 
it helped the FRG to reach 'maturity' and develop and implement foreign policy interests of 
its own. The fact that they were endorsed by all sides involved made them all the more 
successful. 
~h4 S . 17 C arotte, Deairng. p. .J. 
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8.) Eurocommunism and detente 
Students of the Italian Communist Party and Eurocommunism often focus on an anal vsis of 
whether Eurocommunism could in fact have been regarded as a coherent ideological and 
political movement, what it precisely constituted of, its inherent flaws and why it had exactly 
failed to survive beyond the 1970s. Some commentators plainly dismiss it as an 'expression of 
doctrinal exhaustion' and that in order to achieve more it also needed to publicly abandon any 
association with Soviet communism itself.566 Others highlight the electoral weaknesses and 
increasing factionalism of its main actors (most notably the Spanish Communist Party) as a 
contributing element to the failure of Eurocommunism, and that the PCI had become a largely 
isolated force amongst its Western European sister parties, after the PCF's brief flirtation with 
Eurocommunism had ended and the party returned to its former dogmatism.567 
Eurocommunism, if perceived as a movement or platform of Western European likeminded 
communist parties, is largely overrated, whilst it is certainly tempting to highlight the idea of 
Eurocommunism as a true and genuine phenomenon that spread across Western Europe in the 
middle of the 1970s. Eurocommunism from an exclusively Italian perspective served as a 
platform to reinforce the PCI's more ambitious, national strategy, without which the historic 
compromise would have been, at least as far as the PCI's many critical observers in the West 
were concerned, less credible or conceivable. It was an expression of the PCI's national 
foreign policy. 
Eurocommunism, if intended as a platform of Western European communist parties, III 
essence constituted of the Italian, Spanish and French communist parties and amounted only 
to a few joint declarations on the shared understanding and mutual perception of common 
principles. These were publicly reiterated during a number of gatherings between 1975 and 
1977. For example, a joint declaration of the PCI and the PCF in November 1975 spoke in 
566 Judi. Postwar. p. 496. 
"h7 Urhan. Moscow alld the ItaUall Commllnist Party. p. 26-+. 
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favour of 'a plurality of political parties, for the right to existence and activity of opposition 
parties, for free formation of majorities and minorities and the possibility of their alternating 
democratically, for the lay nature and democratic functioning of the State, for independence 
of the judiciary' .568 As far as the PCI is concerned none of this was new. 
Besides these common interests and declarations no 'mutual Eurocommunist platform' 
existed. It remained precisely what it - from a PCI perspective - intended to be: a loose, non-
committal forum of debate amongst Western European communist parties that shared a 
mutual understanding of a certain (often vague and sometimes already existing) set of values 
such as democracy and pluralism, seeking convergences beyond fraternal parties and engage 
in dialogue with all European socialist, social-democratic and liberal democratic forces. It 
would have run counter the PCI's national interests if it had assumed the dimension of a new 
movement, let alone something of a regional direction centre amongst Western communist 
parties. Besides that, it would, even if simply from a geographical point of view, be a clear 
exaggeration to speak of a Eurocommunist movement. In essence it included the Communist 
Parties of Italy, France and Spain. What about those of Finland, Norway, Great Britain, 
Austria, Portugal and Greece? Would it not be necessary to enlarge the platform in mere 
geographical terms in order to speak of a truly Western European phenomenon? As such it 
had therefore failed. It should also be stressed that despite a mutual sharing of a certain set of 
values, the PCI and the PCF, for instance, had very different, and in some sense opposite, 
views on European strategy, detente and relations with Moscow. As far as national interests 
were concerned, their concepts of socialism lay far apart. 569 The expression of certain shared 
values bears little relation to the more profound programmatic divergences between the two 
communist parties. 
However. to challenge the idea of the existence of a true European communist movement j" 
not to deny that in the 1970s, communism had assumed a new and electorally strong appeal 
~6g As quoted in Sass(l(ln. The Italian Communists _'peak for themselr('s. p. 67. 
\hl) B . I' '16'1 
. rackL'. Which SOCIQ Ism, p. ,-' ,-,. 
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for and beyond the working class of Western Europe. The success of the PCI was the most 
open manifestation of this. Ever since the end of World War II, communism developed very 
successfully in the liberal, parliamentary environment in Italy. The success of the 1970s was 
owed much to the peculiarities of the Italian system itself, as expressed in the stagnation of 
the prevailing party system (i.e. its 'bipartismo imperfetto'), the corruption of the state 
system, the very nature of the DC itself - a party which had become increasingly identified 
with the corruption of the state - and the failure of the centre-left governments of the 1960s, 
to name only a few. 
This is not a study of the achievements or flaws of the Eurocommunist movement. The key 
question here to address is not what precisely constituted Eurocommunism but what it served 
and meant in the specific Italian context. It served to give credibility to the PCI on its way to 
become a legitimate partner in Italian government. Eurocommunism was largely a national 
policy, a strategy that was a constituent part of the PCI's historic compromise, without which, 
the party's domestic policy would have lacked sufficient credibility.57o Eurocommunism, 
together with the historic compromise formula and acceptance of NATO, gave the PCI a 
newly acquired international resonance that it never had in its entire history. The PCI's 
Eurocommunism and the strategy of the historic compromise thus go hand in hand. The 
legitimisation of the historic compromise in Italy would have to be achieved through an 
historic compromise at the European level. Granted that detente would not bring the 
dissolution of the blocs, it would at least favour their mutual opening and - in the pcrs 
interest - allow for greater internal diversity and autonomy as far as Italy was concerned. 
Eurocommunism was largely an Italian contribution to detente and a national policy to render 
the historic compromise more credible. The PCI needed to reassure the West of its democratic 
credentials - and for that a national platform did no longer suffice. Comparable with the SPD. 
the PCI sought partners in the West to implement a national strategy, a policy that could not 
570 Sec also Silvio Pons, 'Enrico Berlinguer e la riforma del comunismo. II pel. rEuropa e rl1nione Smil'tica 
nella tarda guerra fredda', lralianieuropei, 06/07 (2004), p . .229. 
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ignore the security interests of Italy's Western neighbours. In many ways, both SPD and PCI 
pursued their national interests within a multilateralised policy. SPD and PCI did not follow 
an 'either' 'or' policy, but one that geared towards both detente and national interests - full \" 
taking into consideration the given international circumstances and superpower interests. 
In the Italian context, Eurocommunism as well as the PCI's prevailing domestic alliance 
strategy were far from a radical change in doctrine (as for instance in comparison with the 
PCF), and had in practice long existed before the term 'Eurocommunism' even surfaced.57l 
The acceptance of parliamentary democracy and plurality of parties was not a novelty in the 
PCI's thinking. Ever since its rebirth in 1944 (with the turning-point of Salerno) the PCI's 
evolution occurred in the context of a parliamentary democracy. The abolition of it and its 
replacement by a one-party dictatorship had never been a party aim. 
Eurocommunism served to give the party a new platform (and greater resonance if voiced 
with other parties) to articulate some of its long-term ideas and demands. At this stage it is 
worth remembering that the SPD's 'Bad Godesberg' followed a comparable logic. Much that 
was decided and voted upon in 1959 was not new. The alleged or de facto originality of the 
Bad Godesberg Programme did, however, not matter or at least only secondarily. More 
important was that the SPD represented itself as something new and distinct on the political 
market. Even more decisive, was that it served to legitimise the party as a national force and 
potential ally in government. To overstate the originality of the party's programme only 
served this purpose. Hence, it is worth drawing a parallel between the SPD's Bad Godesberg 
and the PCI's Eurocommunism in as far as both followed a similar logic and interest. 
A word should also be said about why this tendency to reform communism - perhaps a more 
accurate characterisation of what was to varying extents pronounced by the three Western 
communist parties - had evolved. The coming to terms of Western European communism 
571 See also Sidney Tarrow, 'Historic compromise or bourgeois major~ty,? Eurocon~lu~is~ in Italy. 1976-9'. in 
Ho\\'anJ Machin (ed.), Nat;onal Communism ;1I Western Europe: a third way to socra!lsm.J (London and New 
York: Methuen. 1983). p. 12'+. 
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with the institutions of representative democracy can be explained as a result of various 
interrelating factors; the contradictions between the premises of Marxism and the reality of 
Western European capitalist development; the dynamics of party and electoral competition; 
the international context in which the reality of political-military blocs and the crisis of 
Eastern communism merit special attention (the crisis of 1968), all of which in fact illustrate 
that the PCI's political development in those areas well preceded the development of what has 
generally been ascribed to Eurocommunism around 1976.572 
For the PCI, it represented the search for a 'third way to socialism', dismissing the Soviet 
model as adequate for Italy while attempting to go beyond European social democracy. In 
seeking an Italian 'terza via' (third way), the PCI sought strategic alliances (as well as 
convergences amongst communist and social democratic parties) beyond the national borders; 
it was a concept that affected the party's domestic and international policies alike. As far as 
economic integration with Western Europe was concerned, the PCI had already engaged in a 
process of policy re-thinking in the 1960s, coming to the conclusion that the party's foreign 
policy interests were not necessarily and no longer identical with those of the Soviet Union. 
Specific and new economic problems needed solutions beyond national borders and partners -
even if they departed from diverse ideological backgrounds. 
The Berlin conference of Western and Eastern European communist parties held in June 1976 
was the most outspoken and unequivocal manifestation of the PCI's autonomist course. It left 
little doubt about the PCI's relation with the international communist movement and the 
direction of the latter in the eyes of the Italian Communists. The fact that there was a 
conference at all and a joint document produced may be seen as a success for the So\'iet 
.'iT2 Sec also Ignacio Walker. 'Democratic Socialism in Comparative Perspcctin.'·. Comparat;\,l' Poht;CI. \'01. 2.~. 
No . .+ (July 1991). p. '+39. 
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Union and the centralist view.573 The content of the final document, its non-binding nature, 
including the strong emphasis on independence and autonomy for each party as well as the 
absence of a clear reference point (i.e. Moscow's vanguard line) marked a clear triumph for 
the autonomist course. In fact the consultative character of the meeting as well as the broad 
nature of the final document had been a prerequisite for the PCI to attend the conference. In 
many ways it seemed as if the PCI wished these conferences of communist parties to be no 
more than a consultative meeting or no more than a mere debating club, which every member 
is free to join (or to resign from) at any time. BerIinguer even asserted that the conference was 
not a 'riunione di un organismo internazionale comunista', that is, not a meeting of the 
international communist organisation as such, which could not exist, neither on a global nor a 
European level, but a free encounter of autonomous and equal parties.574 Special emphasis 
was made by BerIinguer on the fact that the debate took place openly and in public. Whereas 
until the middle of the 1960s, the international communist movement was still the most 
important reference point for the PCI, this had drastically changed in the 1970s. One may ask 
why the PCI attended the meeting at all if it so rigorously opposed regional or international 
communist conferences and insisted on the non-binding character of the final document. Most 
plausibly, the PCI deliberately used the open and public platform to stress its independent and 
autonomous positions. The fact that the timing of the conference coincided with the 
government -formation process after the crucial Italian national elections of 1976 underlines 
this argument. 
In the middle of the 1970s, the PCI's greatest concern was to prove its democratic legitimacy 
to become a party of government vis-a-vis its domestic and international adversaries, and to 
m Sec also Pierre Hassner, 'The PCI, Eurocommunism, and Universal Reconciliation: The International 
Dimension of the Golden Dream, 1975-1979', in Simon Serfaty, Lawrence Gray (eds), The Italian Communist 
Parf\'. Yesterday, Today, alld Tomorrow (London: Aldwych Press, 1980), pp. 215-216. , 
.~74 BCrlinguer, :L 'inter~ento di Berlinguer: I lavori della conferenza di partiti comunisti e operai d'Europa', In 
L'Unitil, I July 1976, p, 1. 
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reassure the party's opponents that in the event of the PCI coming to power. it would not in 
the slightest modify Italy's position in the international camp.575 
The PCI's attendance at the conference in June 1976 was thus used as an open platform to 
reiterate its distinctiveness and unequivocal autonomy from Moscow (as certainly 'all eyes' 
were turned to the PCI at the conference in the aftermath Italy's elections), especially in light 
of the growing concern in Western Europe about the PCI's proposal of an historic 
compromise and the party's electoral advances. The Berlin declarations of the PCI should, 
however, not be dismissed as tactical manoeuvres, but illustrated again that the PCI's 
international proclamations were inseparably linked with the strategy of the historic 
compromise at home. 
The fate (and subsequent demise) of Eurocommunism was inevitably, and inseparably linked 
with that of Italian communism. Analysing the failure of Eurocommunism most certainly 
involves addressing the more crucial question as to why Western European communist parties 
failed to present a genuine alternative to social democratic parties in Western Europe, and 
collapsed with the demise of Soviet communism at the beginning of the 1990s. Although 
promoting a distinct model of socialism in Western Europe, the fate of communist parties in 
the West, and as such, the PCI was inextricably linked with that of their sister parties in the 
East. From a PCI perspective, Eurocommunism aimed to make clear that its goal was to 
reform, not to overthrow the capitalist order in Western Europe, by demonstrating that its first 
loyalty was to the existing order in Italy and not to the Soviet leadership. Even if unintentional 
and if denied by the PCI itself, it was a political rapprochement with social democracy. From 
this, could only but follow the logical question of what would occur beyond Eurocommunism. 
With hindsight, one could argue that the social-democratisation of the PCI more than a decade 
later. was its natural implication. 
m Sassoon, 'La sinistra in Italia e in Europa', p. 14. 
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The German Social Democrats observed the Eurocommunist trend with great interest. 
attention and scepticism576 - the latter being the result of specific German experiences with 
communism, the forced merger of SPD into the SED in East Germany. Germany's 
geopolitical situation, as well as their common tradition of mutual suspicion and antipathy.577 
Since the beginning of the Cold War, and coinciding with the merger of the Eastern SPD into 
SED, the SPD went to great length to firmly and unequivocally disassociate itself from 
communism. This was henceforth practiced by the SPD, although towards the end of the 
1960s and with the 'opening to the East', strategically somewhat less rigorously. In this 
context, the SPD had entered organisational rapports with the PC I, on a strictly 'informative 
level' since 1967. Severe Conservative attacks on the SPD (in light of Ostpolitik) induced the 
party to stress and clearly avoid any association with communist parties, particularly during 
electoral campaign periods. 
9.) The PCI in search for a 'new internationalism': Italian communism between 
East and West 
The outside observer may justifiably raise the question as to what sort of party the PCI by the 
mid-1970s had in fact been. On the one hand, the party stressed its national and distinct 
character, endorsed Europe and most of its integration projects. It had accepted NATO. had 
unambiguously condemned the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, and yet still 
remained a communist party, even if primarily a national one and only secondarily as an 
integral component of the world communist movement. On the other hand, the pcrs nature in 
)76 Willy Brandt. Z1Im Verhiiltnis von So;.ialdemokratie lind KOmmllllisllJllS. SPD (ed.). New Edition. (Bonn 
1971 ). p. 16. ' .. , ,.', . 
m See also Horst Ehmke. introduction. in Timmermann (cd.). Ell rok011l1111Ill/sm liS. Faktl'll. A,llal.\5lll. I1lTl n Ill! S 
(Frankfurt am Main: Fischer Verlag.. 1978). p. 8. 
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the mid to late 1970s can in many ways only be ascribed as ambivalent. This ambivalence \\'as 
utilised by Western critics to deny the PCI any prospects of governmental responsibility. 
Some undeniably existing contradictions in the PCl's nature led Western observers to the 
somewhat simplified and premature conclusion that the PCl's reassurances were tactically 
motivated or not to be trusted. Even so, it should be underlined that ambivalence and 
genuineness are not necessarily mutually incompatible. 
As pointed out by Barth Urban, by 1976 the organisational implications of Togliatti' s 1956 
discussion of polycentrism had become an integral part of the PCI doctrine under the rubric of 
a 'new internationalism', the crux of which was the insistence on individual communist party 
autonomy, on the priority of national party interests over the communist world in genera1.578 
By the middle of the 1970s, the PCl's international relations were thus marked by the concept 
of 'new internationalism', the foreign and security policy basis of which was a critical but 
constructive option for the West.579 The concept of 'new internationalism' replaced the by 
then (long) outdated notion of 'proletarian internationalism', a limited concept no longer 
applicable to the given realities. 58o Both Eurocommunism and new internationalism were 
specific designs of the PCI. 
The PCl's new internationalism (in essence a new concept of inter-state relations based on 
unequivocal autonomy of all communist parties) challenged the CPSU's formula of 
proletarian internationalism, according to which national party interests should be 
subordinated to the interests of the communist world, as solely and exclusively defined by 
Moscow.581 The PCl's new concept cannot be separated from the party's ambition to enter 
Italian government within the framework of the historic compromise and the establishment of 
578 Urban MOSCOlI' and the Italian Communist Party, p. 251. 
579 See al~o Heinz Timmermann. The Decline of the World Communist MOl'ement. Mosc(HI', Beijing. and 
Communist Parties in the West (Boulder. London: Westview Press. 1987). p. I-B. 
580 See also Sergio Segre,'Lineamenti per una storia dell .. eurocomunismo .. ·. in Sergio Segre (cd.). A Chi Fa 
Paura I·E/lroco~nnlllnisl1lo? (Firel1/l': Guaraldi Editore. 1977). p. 19. 
581 Urban. Mosc(JII'. p. 251. 
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a third way of socialism. The idea of a 'new internationalism' displaced and went beyond the 
former concept of internationalism that had been endorsed by the PCI. In the 1960s. prior to 
the Soviet invasion in Czechoslovakia, the Italian Communists had already developed a rather 
loose concept of a 'new kind of international unity capable of strictly securing the autonomy 
of each party and of not implying a hostile attitude towards those parties which did not agree 
with issues of common decision' .582 It had been the concept as entailed in 'unity in diversity', 
which, however, had avoided any critical assessment of the nature of the Soviet system and 
still identified American imperialism as the common enemy. The PCI's foreign policy of the 
mid-1970s went far beyond that. It was accompanied by a strategic reappraisal of PCI 
positions vis-a-vis the Atlantic Alliance, by a replacement of its former notion of Italy's 
withdrawal from NATO, and strongly and inextricably linked to the cause of detente. 
Intransigent anti-Atlanticism was no longer practised (nor considered desirable) and the PCI 
opted instead for a critical but unequivocal acceptance of NATO. The PCI had even argued 
that its own road to socialism could only be implemented in the West; the party was no longer 
willing to sacrifice its own national objectives on the altar of Soviet foreign policy interests. 
The PCI's process of political disengagement from the Soviet Union had, however, been more 
pragmatic rather than ideological. It was realised that too close an identification with Moscow 
(and Soviet military foreign policy as well as the international communist movement) was an 
impediment to the PCI's national objectives.583 Acceptance of NATO also had a mere 
pragmatic purpose. It did not derive from a sudden shift to 'Atlanticism' and enthusiasm of its 
military shield, but from the recognition that there was simply no other choice if the party 
wished to enter Italian government without awaiting the end of Cold War hostilities. 
:iX2 Longo's speech at the final meeting of the Central Committee. in Foreign Bulleti1l (Fehruary-March 19(7). p. 
36. 
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In the second half of the 1970s, the PCI had become much more of a non-class based party _ 
at least electorally speaking - and significant electoral advances were made and national 
prestige gained. The party succeeded to accumulate voters well beyond its traditional Marxist 
subculture. The PCI's pragmatic and non-ideological detachment from the Soviet Union 
manifested itself also in official (and non official) declarations. In the aftermath of the Polish 
crisis over dealing with Solidamosc, the PCI's disengagement from Moscow had reached a 
temporary climax and gained new momentum. The PCI's resolution on Poland (as issued by 
the party's Direzione)584 unequivocally condemned the military coup in Poland and the 
suppression of all political, trade union and social organisations.585 The Polish crisis itself 
cannot be, so the PCI leadership argued, attributed to any manoeuvres of reactionary forces 
hostile to socialism, which had presented a popular rationale explaining the Hungarian events 
of 1956 and justified the Soviet military reaction to it. 586 So far the PCI's declaration and 
reaction to the Polish events resembled those of 1968. 
The condemnation of the Soviet suppression was, however, for the first time accompanied by 
a critical, albeit still somewhat ambivalent, analysis of the Soviet system. The PCI declared 
that 'this phase of socialist development (which began with the October Revolution) has 
exhausted its driving force' .587 It was asserted that the 'great historical experience has 
revealed its limits, contradictions and mistakes that weighed on the internal, economic and 
political life of every country, above all with regards to democracy ( ... ) and on the relations 
:is.J The resolution on Poland was adopted with one abstention (Cappclloni) and one vote against (Cossutta). Sec 
Carlo Gallulli. La svolta, p. 258. . .. 
585 Enrico Berlinguer. After Poland. Towards a New Internationalism. Enrico Berlinguer \\"It~ the deCIsIOns alld 
resollltions of the Communist Party of Italy, Antonio Bronda, Stephen Bodington (eds) (NottIngham: 
SpoKesman, 1982), p. 13. 
'SI, lh'd 17 1 ., p. . . 
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between the various socialist countries, limiting the attraction of the ideals of socialism in the 
ld' 588 wor . 
Soviet foreign policies were also seen to damage the much endorsed European detente and not 
least to imperil the party's national ambitions and diminish party popularity at home. The PCI 
correctly assessed that the 'crisis of the socialist societies in the East puts at stake detente, 
liberty, democracy and so (thus) it is a matter of direct and important concern to us (the 
PCI), .589 Nonetheless, the PCI avoided 'to complete' its criticism of the Soviet system (and 
thus bearing all the consequences and implications of a thorough rupture with the Soviet 
state), by stressing that although the 'historical phase as opened by the October revolution in 
Russia is ended; we are not at all dismissing the value of achievements realised in that phase. 
To dismiss everything to do with the October Revolution as a sort of original sin would be 
absurd.'590 It seemed as if the PCI had to always, no matter how far its criticism of the Soviet 
Union went, to balance any critical evaluation with simultaneous praise for Soviet 
achievements. 
~ss 'Tesi del XV Congresso Nazionale'. 30 March-3 April 1979, in PCI (ed.), Da Gramsci a Ber~ingller . . ~ \'ia 
italialla al socialisl1lo attral'crso i congressi del partifo cO/1l11nisfa ifaliano \' 1976-1984 (Venezia: MarsIlIO 
Editori, 1985), p. 116. . . 
589 Berlinguer. After Poland. p. 37. Sec also 'Tesi del XV Congresso NaZionak . p. 116. 
590 Berlinguer. Atia Po/and, p. 37. 
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Chapter 6 
Part I 
The Italian elections of 1975/1976, the Puerto Rico summit and Western fears of 
the PCI 
1.) Italy and International Scene 
In the mid-1970s, Western Europe was haunted by it again - the ghost. It came in the new 
disguise of Eurocommunism, but spread as much concern and alarm as at earlier appearances. 
At least so in the eyes of some Western European and American leaders who were busily 
engaged in conjuring the danger of this newly disguised version (Eurocommunism) and its' 
haunting in Italy, Spain and France. 
By the beginning to mid-1970s, international and domestic circumstances had been most 
favourable for the pronouncement of the historic compromise and a PCI overture towards the 
DC. The urgency of domestic circumstances seemed to bring participation in government 
within reach, and international circumstances, if well exploited, seemed to render favourable 
space for the PCI in the domestic political setting. As previously analysed, the Italian political 
system had arrived at an impasse. Contributing to the Western Allies' rising concern were 
developments within the DC and their search for coalitions partners. The centre-left 
governments with the Socialists had failed. The centrist government was electorally too weak 
to govern the country. Thus, as Sassoon put it, the DC was at a dead end and was more 
amenable to compromise with the PCI. 591 It was a political stalemate which compelled the 
DC, for electoral reasons, to consider coalition alternatives. The DC faced a serious electoral 
challenge from the PCI, and due to a lack of coalition options could no longer ignore the 
591 Sassoon, One Hundred Years (~f Socialism. p. 576. 
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overtures from the Communists. Helmut Schmidt, for example, blamed the DC's failure to 
politically and socially reform the country for the PCl's rising success. 592 
Adding to this concern was the situation of the Italian Socialists. The Socialist leader De 
Martino openly endorsed closer collaboration with the PCl The collapse of the centre-left 
coalitions, the prospect of closer PCI-PSI relations and an ever increasing support for the PCI 
therefore led to a re-thinking within the DC. Further to this was the divorce referendum held 
in 1974. The May 1974 plebiscite over the divorce law had been interpreted as a clear defeat 
for the DC and as a manifestation of the weakening DC monopoly in Italy.593 
The Christian Democrats were forced to face the 'communist problem' and began to debate a 
strategy on how to best encounter the challenge from the Left. Two political factions began to 
emerge within the DC. The first, promoted by a group around Fanfani, aimed at continuing 
the path of the 'moderate' center-left and emphasised the limits of detente by recalling the 
Soviet invasion of Prague and underplaying the relevance of the PCl's opposition to it.594 The 
second developed mainly around Moro and Zaccagnini, who tended to perceive the elections 
of 1975 and 1976 as a demonstration of an altering political scene in Italy and proposed a 
dialogue with the PCl595 
592 Interview with Helmut Schmidt on German television (Panorama), 2 February 1976, re-printed in H. 
Timmermann, Wohin marschiert die Linke in Europa? (Freiburg, WUrzburg: Ploetz, 1979). p. 95. 
593 The result of the referendum of 12 May 1974 marked a clear triumph in favour of the divorce law by 59.1 
percent against 40.9 percent. At least as far as this issue was concerned, traditionalist Catholic hegemony had 
been seriously and successfully challenged. On the subject see Ginsborg, A History of Contemporary Italy, pp. 
349-351. 
~l).j Roberto Gualtieri. The Italian political system and detente (1963-1981)" JOllmal of Modem Italian Studies, 
yo!. 9, No.4 (2004), p. 433. 
Wi Gualtieri suggested that in 1974 the debacle on the referendum against divorce (which showed the deep . 
impact of the social and cultural transformations of the 1 960s, and the climate of detente) and the outbreak. of the 
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American and Western European fears about a communist advance in Italy had accelerated 
during 1975 and culminated with the Italian general elections the following year. Western 
concern of the PCI was of course partly explicable in terms of the growing strength of the 
party itself. The PCI could no longer be ignored. Compared to the 1972 elections, the PCI 
managed to gain votes in the 1975 regional elections. The Socialist leader De Martino had 
agreed to join the PCI in the creation of left-wing local and regional administrations. In the 
national elections in June 1976, the Italian political system reached its zenith of political 
bipolarisation.596 German national press had dedicated an enormous amount of attention to the 
developments in Italy in the run up to the national elections. Though retrospectively we know 
that what eventually emerged was a DC-led government which had to rely on the PCI's (as 
well as that of the other parties including the PSI) benevolent abstention in parliament, 
Western reactions and initiatives prior to the Italian national elections and the government-
formation in August 1976 will be examined.597 
The Eurocommunist trend at its peak, the PCI's increasing popularity combined with a 
stagnation of the Italian political system, thus generated growing concern amongst Western 
European leaders and in the United States. The Italian election results of 197511976 only 
underlined this trend even further. On an international level, both superpowers had been 
engaged in a process of detente whose outcome seemed rather promising by the mid-1970s. 
The 'strategy of detente' reduced the military tensions between the 'two Europe' and with the 
much desired convocation of the CSCE in 1975, the multilateral phase of detente had reached 
a temporary climax. This is important in as much as it allowed the PCI a maximum flexibility 
to launch new initiatives at home which seemed to be most viable due to the transitory phase 
~96 d' 3 
. For the 1976 polls see Appen IX . . . 
597 On II August 1976, a new government under the leadership of Giulio Andreottl_ game~ the appro~'al of the 
Chamher of Deputies. It was named the government of 'non sfiducia' ('not no-confidence ) he~ause It \\a" ha\L'd 
on the abstention of the opposition parties. The Communists and the Socialists were not part of the gmernment. 
hut they agreed not to cause its downfall. 
209 
of a relaxation of superpower tensions. This would at least minimally dampen anti-communist 
resentments in Italy and across Western Europe. As argued before, the PCI's historic 
compromise was essentially a means of legitimisation. It entailed both the domestic and 
international strategy to full governmental legitimisation. The Italian Communists had to 
reassure its Western adversaries that no intrinsic danger would derive from them in the event 
of a share of power. The inherent idea was to find a means to not only compromise anti-
communism at home, but to find a viable strategy for a communist participation in 
government that would not increase fears and risk interference from abroad. At least so it was 
hoped. 
2.) Western fears and the pel 
The 'compromesso storico' not only rapidly became a widely discussed political initiative in 
Italy and abroad, but one which, in conjunction with the PCI's electoral evolution in 1975176, 
generated significant concern amongst Western European leaders. It became clear that detente 
in international affairs ran parallel to excessive anti-communism in domestic affairs. 
German press - left wing and conservative alike - devoted a large amount of attention to the 
Italian domestic political situation, the foreign policy implications of the historic compromise 
(i.e. PCI participation in government), the PCI's attitude towards the Atlantic Alliance and its 
ambivalent identity and relations with the CPSU in the course of 1975176. In short, Western 
observers were busy to ascertain the 'true' nature and intentions of the Italian Communist 
Party. 
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Between January and June 1976, the impact of Eurocommunism, the question and 
consequences of a PCI entry in government and the nature of the PCI's objectives were 
addressed and debated weekly (if not daily) in most of Germany's national press.598 The 
SPD's weekly Vorwdrts also discussed the advantages and disadvantages of PCI 
governmental participation, often also in the context of the SPD's own confrontation with 
communism. Some authors highlighted the loosening of West European communist parties 
from the rigidity of Soviet style communism and its effect on the Eastern bloc, which, so it 
was argued, presented social democratic parties with challenges and chances alike.599 In a 
considerable number of articles in various newspapers and journals, Heinz Timmermann 
assessed the changes within the PCI (as well as those of the PCF and Spanish Communist 
Party (PCE)), the developments within the Eurocommunist movement, the PCI's perception 
of Soviet style communism and amount of autonomy from Moscow. Timmermann concluded 
that while undoubtedly the proclamations of Western European communist parties have to be 
examined critically, this should not prevent (us) from looking also at the present realities and 
developments of these parties.6oo Others stressed that although the degree of militancy and 
pro-Sovietism in the PCI had always been difficult to ascertain, most party members only 
grudgingly accepted the historic compromise as a necessary tactical means in order to enter 
government. To many Western observers and journalists, the PCI's basis remained 
fundamentally Stalinist, the party's leadership reform-oriented.60I Accordingly, this implied 
that the PCI leadership could never be truly independent from Moscow. As long as there were 
still enormous internal and external constraints the PCI would always also have to account for 
598 German press coverage on Italian domestic affairs was enormous. Almo~t daily at~ent.ion was pai? to Italian 
domestic developments and the 'Communist Question'. To mention only a few. see, for. Instance. M.llllc!leller 
Merkllr 'KPI flir "Neue Linke" mit SPD', .+ March 1976: FAZ. 'Was Italiens KommunIsten wollen. 2) t-.larch 
1976; ';',4.Z. 'Die zwei Gesichter Berlinguers·. 9 April 1976: 5Z. 'Was \'on Italiens KP zu erwarten ist'. 22 .\pri I 
1976; Vorwiirfs, 'Wir Kommunisten sind flir den Profit' (Interview with Amendola). 17 June 1976. 
"ill!) Sec. for instance. \'orwiirfs. Georg Scheuer. 'Yom Umgang mit Kommunisten·. 29 January 1976. 
600 Sec. for instance. Heinz Timmermann. 'Westeuropas Kommunisten·. 5chH'ei:.er ,\I(/llatshefte (Decl'mhcr 
19751. pp. 702-723. re-printed in Depositum Helmut Schmidt in AdSD. 1I~1S A~007930. 
601 \'0 llriirrs. Petra Roscnhaum. 'Wie dcmokratisch sind Italiens KommunIstcn') . 18 t-.larch 1976. 
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the party's more militant rank and file. This in turn would run counter PCI reassurances of its 
democratic credentials. 
The West expressed its concern about the impact a PCI participation in government might 
have on the other Mediterranean countries and the Atlantic Alliance.602 A number of scholars 
dealt with the repercussions on NATO in the event of a PCI inclusion in government, 
stressing that this would automatically raise the issue of having PCI members in NATO 
committees and hence, with access to sensitive information.603 Others held that it would be 
reasonable to argue that leftist governments in Western Europe may have a debilitating effect 
on Atlantic relations and on the security functions in NATO. Americans logically feared that 
the European communists might divulge key military plans to Moscow, after all, changes in 
PCI policy towards Italian membership in NATO were still unsatisfactory.604 
Henry Kissinger predicted that 'NATO might become a predominantly German-American 
alliance for lack of other partners in the event of Eurocommunist participation in the other 
national (West European) governments' .605 Western politicians conjured up the danger for 
NATO in the event of a communist participation in Italy. The military bases in Italy were seen 
vital to the strategy of the United States and NATO in the Mediterranean and the Middle East. 
Kissinger even hinted that in the event of a communist participation in government, the US 
Senate would, sooner or later, demand American troop reductions from Europe.606 In 
December 1975 Kissinger retained that 'it was inconceivable that the US could maintain 
602 For example, Bruno Friedrich, member of the SPD's Executive and foreign policy spokesman of the SPI)' s 
parliamentary faction, emphasised in an interview on 31 January 1976 the consequences for NATO if the PCI 
entered government. This implied Italy's dropping out of NATO, which would consequently affect the military 
halance in the Mediterranean, in AdSD, 'SPD-Bundestagsfraktion'. 7. Wahlperiode. 2IBTFGOOI538. 
603 Rohert E. Osgood, 'The PCI. Italy and NATO', in Simon Serfaty and Lawrence Gray (eds). The ItaUan 
Communist Partv. Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow (London: Aldwych Press. 1980), p. 152. 
6().l Michael M. Harrison, 'The PCI 'and other Eurocommunist Parties: Implications for Atlantic Relations', in S. 
Scrfaty, L. Gray (cds), The Italian Communist Party. Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow, p. 160 and pp. 173-174. 
605 As quoted hy Schoch. 'Eurocommunism and Defence: Do Western European Communists Feel Threatened 
hy the Soviet Union'? The Case of Italy'. p. 2). . 
606 Henry Kissinger at the NATO Council meeting in Oslo, ISMay 1976, in Politisches :\rchi\ des Aus\\~irtlgen 
Amtes (suhsequently Politisches Archi\' des AA). Bestand H 1 SO. Band .~48. 
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ground forces in Europe if there was major communist participation III Western 
t ' 607 govern men s . 
The concern about the future of the bases after a PCI entry in government, at least officially. 
mostly determined Western foreign policy vis-a-vis the PCI and Eurocommunism.608 
Conflicting interests within NATO and an occurring imbalance in the Mediterranean were 
held to be the official reasons of Western European leaders in 1975/76 and served as an 
official explanation to their opposition to a PCI entry in government. However, no unanimous 
agreement existed on what positions to take regarding the advance of communist parties in 
Western Europe. A discrepancy also often existed between the various national ministries. For 
national security reasons, defence ministries are bound to take a harder line than the diplomats 
of the foreign ministries or local embassies. With regard to the security threat that was 
conjured up by NATO and the US, a statement by the British Foreign Office declared that 'the 
community is already something of a sieve and that we should not exaggerate the significance 
of possible access by the Communists to confidential information' .609 
Recently published archival documents allegedly confirm that the British government 
considered backing a rightwing coup in Italy in 1976 in order to prevent the Italian 
Communist Party from taking power. Foreign office planners wrote in May 1976 that 'a clean 
surgical coup to remove the Communists from power would be attractive in many ways' .610 
An analysis of the relevant archival documents (on the alleged British backed coup) reveals 
that 'the consideration of extreme measures such as external military intervention or the 
encouragement of repressive measures in Italy, possibly backed by the threat of Western 
military intervention, to outlaw the Communists and to shore up a non-Communist regime. 
607 The National Archives. Kew. FeO 33/2947. 
608 William Griffith, '''L'eurocomunismo'': sara il terzo grande scisma comunista? La rivalita fra t1RSS c USA 
neIrEuropa meridionale'. in Sergio Segre (ed), A Chi Fa Paura I'Eurocomlinismo? p. 177. 
609 The National Archives. CAB 133/"+67. 
610 Sec The Guardian. 1..+ January 2008, referring to documents from the British national archives as puhlishcd in 
the Italian daily La ReplIbblica. 
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was ruled out' .611 What had indeed been discussed was the possibility of a coup d'etat by the 
Italian armed forces in the event of the PCI entering government. Officials in the British 
defence ministry had, however, come to the conclusion that 'Communist participation in the 
next Italian government is likely to be accepted by the Armed forces and that a right wing 
coup is scarcely conceivable' .612 
This further highlights the extent to which an enormous, largely unfounded, fear of Western 
communist parties was created and developed into some kind of hysteria within Western 
European diplomatic circles in 197511976. 
Hence, the prospect of a PCI entry in government was explicitly discussed in Italian, Western 
European and American diplomatic circles. But the growing support of Western European 
communist parties in general, and the PCI in particular, also caused tensions between 
American, Italian and the other European allies and led to controversial discussions between 
the members of the Atlantic Alliance - controversial as to how the communist advance in Italy 
could be most effectively detained.613 Interestingly, as we will see with respect to the course 
of developments, during a meeting between officials of the PDP-led German Foreign Ministry 
discussing further operational proposals with regard to the political situation in Italy, it was 
suggested that the deteriorating economic situation in Italy would in fact only strengthen the 
Communists. Hence it was suggested that everything possible had to be done to support Italy 
economically and monetarily and to meet her wishes in this respect. 614 
The course of the developments in 1975 and 1976 had been thoroughly observed by Western 
European and American ambassadors and was subject of concern within the SPD-PDP 
611 The National Archives, FCO 33/2947. 
612 The National Archives, FCO .B/2949. 
t>l3 L'Italia nella polit;ca ;ntemaz;onale, 1975-1976, (lstituto Affari Internazionali: Edizioni di comunita, 1l)77), 
p. 12. 
614 German foreign ministry meeting. chaired by Hermes. the state secretary in the ministry, 6 May 1976, in 
Politischcs Archiv des AA, Bl'stand B 150, Band 347. 
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governing coalition. On a governmental, bilateral level, meetings were held between Schmidt, 
Genscher, Ford and Kissinger615 and numerous internal papers specifying the position of the 
federal government vis-a-vis the Western European communist parties were written616 . 
Conversations on how to diminish the PCI's growing popularity had also taken place between 
Schmidt and Callaghan as well as between Genscher and the British Prime Minister.617 
Adding to the growing concern about the PCI's electoral success was the re-emergence of the 
Communist Parties of Spain, Portugal and Greece. In the mid 1970s, the three remaining 
authoritarian regimes of Southern Europe collapsed. In all three countries, the Communist 
parties were legalised and immediately gained prestige. In 1974-1975 the SPD, and to some 
extent the Socialist International, supplied the Portuguese Socialist Party (PSP) with financial 
and moral support; enough to permit the party to re-establish itself.618 A failure to do so, it 
was held, might consequently contribute to the success of the Communists in Portugal. A 
communist advance in the Mediterranean would, according to Schmidt, have destabilised the 
region and consequently have serious repercussions on NATO. At various occasions Schmidt 
had voiced his concern about the establishment of a Soviet-dependent communist regime in 
Portugal. In order to strengthen democracy in Southern Europe, one had to be prepared to 
make financial sacrifices.619 The concern about a possible destabilisation of the Mediterranean 
had without doubt, an impact on German perceptions about the PCI and its search for 
governmental allies. In a confidential conversation between Schmidt and the leader of the 
Portuguese Socialist Party, Mario Soares, on 1 July 1976, Schmidt briefly mentioned the 
615 Note on a meeting between Schmidt, Genscher, Ford and Kissinger on 27 July 1975, in Politisches Archiv des 
AA, Bestand B 150, Band 333. 
616 Position paper of the German government on the development of the West European communist parties. 30 
April 1976, in Politisches Archiv des AA, Bestand B 150, Band 346. 
617 Conversation between Schmidt and Callaghan on 30 June 1976, in Politisches Archiv des AA. Bestand B ISO. 
Band 350. See also conversation between Genscher and Callaghan. in Politisches Archiv des AA. Bestand B 
ISO. Band 333. 
61S The SPD provided financial aid to the Spanish and Portuguese Socialists. In fact. the Portuguese Socialist 
Party was founded in exile at Bad Mtinstereifel in Germany in 1973. See MarshalL Willy Brandt. p. 1 ()7. 
6191~L'll11ut Schmidt. Die Delltschen lind ihre Nachbam. Menschen 111ld Miichte II (Berlin: Siedler Verlag. 1990). 
p.398. 
summit meeting in Puerto Rico a few days earlier. The German chancellor asserted that Great 
Britain, France, the United States as well as Germany, jointly agreed that financial support 
would not be granted to governments that included communist parties. This was first of all 
directed against Italy, so Schmidt held, yet, it would also be applied to PortugaL which had 
equally been recipient of financial credits.62o 
As correctly pointed out by Rubbi, the fact that the PCI had expressed itself critically vis-a-vis 
the Portuguese Communist leader Cunhal, and pursued a course entirely different from that of 
the Portuguese leader did not receive much attention in the West, let alone alter the SPD-FDP 
analysis of the PCI. 621 An agreement to disagree was probably the most Berlinguer had in 
common with Cunhal. Furthermore, the PCI sought to establish ties with the Portuguese 
Socialists, with whom the PCI shared reciprocal positions622 and a number of meetings took 
place between Berlinguer and Soares.623 
The question of coalition governments with communist parties in Western Europe had also 
been subject of debate at conferences of the Socialist International held in Helsing¢r on 18 
January 1976 and in Paris on 24 January 1976. At these conferences, Mitterrand propagated a 
coalition between Socialists and Communists in France, an idea that was heavily objected by 
Helmut Schmidt. The German chancellor declared that due to both domestic and foreign 
. 624· ., h policy reasons, Mitterrand's proposals had to be rejected. In a pnvate conversatIon wit 
James Callaghan on 8 May 1976, Kissinger said that 'the US government was taking a hard 
line on the participation by the Communists in the Italian government because their 
620 Conversation between Schmidt and Mario Soares on 1 July 1976, in Politisches Archi\' des AA. Hestand B 
150. Band 351. 
()~I Rubbi. II Mondo di Berlinguer. p. 71. 
6~2 See also Barbagallo, Enrico Berlinglll'r, p. 235. . . . ". ' ',' " '~l 
(1-3 L '/falia nella polifica infema;ionale. 1979-1980, (Istttuto Aftart InternazlOnah. EdlZlom dl Comumta. 1 )X I). 
p.57--l, 
624 Hdmut Schmidt. Die Dellfschen lind ihre Nachbam. Menschen lind Miichfe II. p. 2--l2, 
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judgement was that if the Communists joined government in Italy before the French elections 
were held, this could have some influence on those elections and could increase the chances 
of Mitterrand coming to power' .625 
Thus the crisis within the DC and the growing success of the PCI had already been subject of 
debate during numerous bilateral meetings. During a meeting between Schmidt, Ford, 
Genscher and Kissinger on 27 July 1975, a key role in preventing a PCI entry into 
government was attributed to the Italian Socialists.626 This had already been affirmed during 
preceding talks between Schmidt and James Callaghan on 24 July 1975. The British Prime 
Minister held that a key role was played by De Martino and that relations with the PSI 
consequently had to be intensified.627 The SPD simultaneously deepened relations with the 
Italian Socialists.628 From the perspective of inter-party relations, the SPD had always 
considered the PCI - as the strongest party of the Italian Left - as a point of reference in Italy's 
political spectrum.629 As we will examine later, this took the form of exchanges between party 
delegations and their respective youth organisations. These were preceded by direct SPD-PCI 
contacts from 1967 onwards in light of Ostpolitik. In the 1970s, Brandt was responsible for 
coordinating SPD relations with other parties of the Socialist Internationa1.63o Germany, 
Britain and the United States had made efforts to strengthen ties with the Socialist De 
Martino, as the decision of the PSI was fundamental in the coalition building process. 631 
625 Extract from a private meeting between James Callaghan and Henry Kissinger on 5 August 1976, in The 
National Archives. PREM 16/978. 
626 The German ambassador in Rome, Meyer-Lindenberg, had voiced in a meeting with his colleagues from 
France, the United Kingdom and the United States in April 1976 that the only chance (to diminish a PCI success) 
lay in a return of the 'centro sinistra'. in Politisches Archiv des AA, Bestand B 150, Band 3-1-6. 
627 Conversation between Schmidt and Callaghan on 24 July 1975 in Hamburg, in ibid., Bestand B ISO. Band 
.~.ll 
112X Conversation on the situation in Italy amongst a delegation of the German foreign ministry on 6 May 1976. in 
ihid., Bestand B ISO. Band 3-1-7. 
1129 Interview with Karsten Voigt, 16 June 2008. 
630 On Brandt's role as the president of the SL see Marshall, Willy Brandt, p. 106ft". . 
631 Conversation between Schmidt. Genscher. Ford and Kissinger. 27 July 1975. in Politisches ArchlY Jl'\ AA. 
Hestand B 150. Band 333. 
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Western concern assumed new dimensions when the PSI had stated after the 1976 elections 
, 
that it was no longer prepared to participate in a government that excluded the PCl. 
3.} US Foreign policy and the Italian Communist Party 1975/1976 
To a student of the Italian Communist Party, it is more than surprising that the Italian political 
situation in general and the advance of the PCI caused such an enormous amount of attention 
and concern in the US-administration in 1975/76. One would have assumed that Italy did not 
rank high in the US' strategic (military) thinking. Both German and British archival sources, 
however, confirm that the eventuality of a PCI entry in government was discussed at various 
occasions between the US and Western European leaders in the course of 1976. Some quite 
plausibly suggested that the US government began to actively engage in the Italian political 
crisis only after the regional elections of 1975, as a result of the PCI's rising success.632 
Generally speaking, it can be established that the US-administration led by Jimmy Carter 
(from the beginning of 1977 onwards) was slightly less (outspokenly) concerned by a 
communist advance to government in Italy, than its predecessors, the Nixon-Kissinger and 
Ford-Kissinger administrations.633 Despite existing concerns, the Carter administration 
adopted what one may term a 'more moderate anti-communist line'. This had certainly been 
the case during the 1976 Carter presidential election campaign, though hostility intensified 
slightly once in office. In practise, this entailed a greater 'wait and see' attitude and an 
avoidance of direct interference in Italian domestic affairs. The former Ford-Kissinger 
632 Bino Olivi, Carter e L'Italia. La politica estera americana, l'Europa e i comunisti italiani (Milano: 
Longanesi & c., 1978), p. Ill. 
633 Sec also L 'Italia nella politica illtemaziollale. 1976-77. Ostituto Affari Internazionali: Edizioni di Comunila. 
1978), pp. 16-17. See also Hans Gunter Brauch, 'Eurokommunismus und europaische Si~herhcil aus dcr Siehl 
der USA: Schlussfolgerungen flir demokratische Sozialisten·. in Gerhard Kiersch and Rctmund Sellklmann . 
(cds). Sicherheit lllld Elltspalllllmg ill Europa. Die Allf1l'ort des demokratischell So-;.ialismlls \Franklurt am Main, 
Ktiln: Europaisc he VerIagsanstalt. 1977). p. 105. 
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administration was less reluctant to lay the 'democratic ground rules' for the domestic scene 
in Italy. 
During a meeting with Ford and Kissinger in Helsinki on 1 August 1975, Moro and Italy's 
Foreign Minister Rumor tried to explain the PCl's distinctiveness, stressing the party's 
attempt to become part of the regular political process in Italy and to adjust their policies 
accordingly, like in the case of the PCl's support of NATO.634 Ford and Kissinger, however, 
urged to fight the communist expansion in Italy, and to prevent a PCI entry in the area of 
government at all costS.635 In a conversation between Kissinger and the German Defence 
Minister Georg Leber on 1 July 1976, Kissinger emphasised the view that 'the possibility of 
accepting a PCI participation in government, like many American intellectuals or US media 
had voiced it, would equal political suicide. ,636 According to the US secretary of state, the 
question of the extent to which the PCI was independent from Moscow was completely 
irrelevant in this respect. 637 This was because US public opinion and decision-makers would 
never understand the idea of an 'independent' communist party. Interestingly though, 
Kissinger also stressed that the US-administration at the beginning of the 1960s was partly 
responsible for failing to strengthen a democratic alternative in Italy by promoting the 
.. ( , . h 1 f') 638 apertura a Slnlstra openIng to tee t . 
The historian Gualtieri suggests that the Carter-administration had accepted and trusted the 
DC's strategy of containing the growing electoral strength of the Italian Communists by co-
opting it in a subordinate role in order to stabilise the economy.639 German archival sources 
634 Gualtieri, The Italian political system', pp. 438-439. See also Barbagallo. Enrico Berlingller, p. 241. 
635 Barbagallo, Enrico Berlingller, p. 241. 
636 Conversation between Kissinger and Georg Leber, 1 July 1976, in Politisches Archi\' des AA Bestand B 150. 
Band 351. 
637 Ibid. 
638 Ibid. 
h.1lJ Gualtieri, The Italian political system', pp. 440--+-+ 1. 
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also confirm that Carter seemed more reluctant to isolate Italy in the event of a communist 
entry in government. 640 Rather, so Carter held, it is important to employ possibilities that 
would allow Italy to remain a solid member of the Atlantic Alliance even under a communist 
inclusion in government.641 Until the formation of a DC-minority government in Italy in 
August of 1976, Carter adopted a comparatively moderate position on the PCI and the 
eventuality of its entry into Italian government, despite an undoubtedly existing preference for 
the opposite scenario. Carter thereby distinguished himself from his political opponent Ford. 
4.) The Puerto Rico meeting of June 1976: a Western coordinated strategy 
against a PCI entry in government? 
The Puerto Rico summit of June 1976 is generally referred to in the existing literature as an 
overt expression of Western interference in Italian domestic affairs. 642 The participants of the 
meeting, the heads of states of the United States, Britain, France and Germany (at the 
exclusion of the Italian Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti) allegedly established a common and 
coordinated strategy to exclude the PCI from the area of government. Italian parties across the 
political spectrum and Italian national press expressed in the aftermath of this 'disclosure' 
their greatest exasperation about Western outspoken interference in national affairs of a 
member state of the Western alliance.643 In the following I will shed some new light on the 
events prior to Puerto Rico, the economic summit and its aftermath, based on German and 
British archival information, contesting the existing literature that the Puerto Rico summit 
6~O Mario Margiocco, Stati Uniti e PCI 1943-1980 (Roma-Bari: Editori Laterza, 1981), p. 214. 
h-ll Notes on the current problems of the Atlantic Alliance, 1 June 1976. in AdSD. 2IBTFGOO 1540. See also an 
essay hy Dieter Dettke on Carters' foreign policy. 24 May 1976, in AdSD, 2IBTFGOOI540. 
()-l~ Gualtieri, greatly overstating, even spoke about the 'Puerto Rico declaration', in Gualtieri. 'The Italian 
political system', p. 439. 
6~3 The issue was logically picked up by the Communist daily L'Unita. The newspaper declared that the incident 
marked a means of putting on enormous pressure to influence decisions of national matters. It was an attempt to 
condition the autonomous and sovereign choices of the Italian population. See L' Ullita. 'Critiche 
all'acquiescenza dei governanti italiani dopo il ricatto rivelato dal cancelliere Schmidt'. 20 July 1976. p. 1: 
L' Unita. 'Grave intl'rvcntn di Ford sulla situazione italiana'. 20 July 1976, p. 1. 
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marked a coordinated expression of Western hostility against the PCI. There was no coherent 
strategy or Western policy to speak of, neither prior nor after the Puerto Rico meeting. 
'-
Equally important, as far as the SPD was concerned, an enormous discrepancy between 
official government declarations and internal party lines will be highlighted. 
The fear of a communist expansion in Italy and its influence on the Mediterranean were 
indeed discussed in private talks during the economic summit meeting held on 27/28 June 
1976 in Puerto Rico. British archival information confirms that an occasion was sought to 
privately discuss the recent developments in Italian politics. A steering brief by the British 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office prior to the Puerto Rico summit stated on 23 June 1976 
that the 'original and undisclosed purpose of the meeting was to provide cover for private 
discussion between the US, Britain, France and Germany of Italy in the aftermath of the 
Italian elections' and that 'it was clear that domestic political motives were high among 
Ford's reasons for calling the summit. ,644 'Ford and Kissinger have been particularly 
concerned for some time about the consequences of the possible participation of the 
C .. h I l' ,645 ommunIsts In t e ta Ian government. 
On 16 July 1976, two weeks after the summit of Puerto Rico, the German Chancellor Helmut 
Schmidt had declared in an interview with American economic journalists that the 'United 
States, France, Britain and Germany would refuse to grant Italy financial assistance if the 
Communists participated in the Italian government' .646 In response to a comment by a 
journalist that 'the US made it very plain that they would not help if the Communists came 
into Italian government', Schmidt had replied that 'not only the United States but also France 
h.j.j Economic Summit Meeting. Brief by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 23 June 1976. in The National 
Archives, CAB 133/467. 
645 Ibid. 
646 Helmut Schmidt in an interview with American economic journalists. 16 July 1976, in AdSD. Depositum 
Hdmut Schmidt. IIHS AA 6351. 
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and Britain and we (Germany) will not participate if the Communists are included' .647 No 
specific reference was made to Puerto Rico. Prior to the interview with US journalists, 
Schmidt had, however, insisted that what he said about other countries was off the records and 
that he did not wish to be quoted on his remarks.648 
The Italian historian Barbagallo argued that although international hostility to a PCI advance 
to government was eventually publicly expressed only by Schmidt, he did so undoubtedly 
also in the name of Ford, Callaghan and Michel Debre.649 With respect to the British Prime 
Minister, there is no substantial evidence to maintain this argument, at least as far as it is 
possible to tell on the basis of the archival records.65o Whereas German and British archival 
sources do not reveal anything substantially new with respect to an analysis of the PCI prior 
to Puerto Rico (in as much as official government papers produced by the respective foreign 
and defence ministries alerted the serious repercussions for NATO and the Mediterranean if 
the PCI were to enter government, despite the party's democratic reassurances)6SI, it is of 
great interest that British archival sources indicate that no official decision or common 
strategy on the PCI had been taken at Puerto Rico.652 On the contrary, Schmidt's remarks on 
16 July 1976 had largely taken British officials by surprise. In a report, Anthony Crosland, 
Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, stated that 'we were surprised by 
reports that we had, together with our German, French, and US colleagues, reached agreement 
in Puerto Rico to withhold financial aid to Italy if the Communists were to enter the Italian 
government. We have not been party to any such agreement in Puerto Rico or anywhere else. 
We note that the French dissociated themselves from the comments attributed to Chancellor 
647 Ibid. 
648 Ibid.; see also The National Archives, PREM 16/978. 
649 Michel Debre was President of the French Council. See Barbagallo, 'Enrico Berlinguer, il Compromesso 
Storico e I'Alternativa democratica', pp. 943-944 and Barbagallo, Enrico Berlinguer, pp. 271-272. 
6.~O It is also worth mentioning that no reference was made by James Callaghan to Puerto Rico in his . 
autobiography, at least not with regard to the discussions on Italy. This suggests a lack of relevance of the Is-,ue 
on British policy. See James Callaghan, Time and Chance (London: Collins. 1987). . ' . 
651 Declaration on the position of the federal government on Western European CommunIst partIes. 30 Aprtl 
1976, Politisches Archiv des AA, Bestand B 150, Band 346. 
652 The National Archives, FCO 33/2950. 
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Schmidt.' Moreover, Crosland's report stated that the British opted for a policy of absolute 
non-interference in Italian domestic politics.653 British diplomats stated in response to 
Schmidt's interventions that they were 'from a point of view of effect, clumsy and ill-timed 
and that they were widely attributed to German electoral considerations' .654 
This has also been confirmed in a telephone conversation between James Callaghan and the 
French President Giscard D'Estaing on 18 July 1976. With reference to the Puerto Rico 
summit, the French president stated that the meeting was confined to an exchange of views 
and that while undoubtedly all four (the US, Britain, France and Germany) agreed that a 
communist participation in Italian government was not desirable, it was preferred not to 
express this publicly at the moment. Giscard D'Estaing voiced his astonishment and 
incomprehensiveness about Schmidt's remarks and that they were not very appropriate at the 
time.655 Callaghan seemed more hesitant in general, on taking a firm line towards the PCI and 
stated that he preferred to 'say that he would not be prepared to absolutely deny aid to any 
Communist government'. 656 The British Prime Minister voiced that 'he did not comprehend 
why Schmidt had made public that an exchange of views was held and that he had always 
been fearful that it would come to the public' .657 
A number of reports prior to the meeting confirmed that Britain was somewhat hesitant in 
taking a firm position on any Italian government including the PCI. Papers by the Foreign 
Office argued that 'there was no need for the Alliance to take decisions in a hurry·658 and that 
653 Report by Crosland on Italy, in The National Archives, PREM 16/978. A statement by the ~oreign and 
Commonwealth Secretary in Brussels on 19 July 1976 said that 'no decisions were taken on aId for Italy and that 
British policy is one of absolute non-interference in Italian domestic affairs', FCO 33/2950. . 
b5~ They continued to argue that 'the episode will not have made easier Andreotti's task of secur~ng P~~ support 
for a new government and that it has given the PCI the opportunity to claim that he has shown hImself mcapahk 
o}: defending Italian interests and national dignity', in ibid .. FCO 33/2950.. . ,.. 
h~.~ Records of a telephone conversation between the Prime Minister and PreSIdent Glscard 0 Estamg on 18 July 
1976, in The National Archives. PREM 16/978. 
656 Ibid. 
657 Ibid. . 
658 The Italian political situation', Brief by the Foreign and Commo.nwealth O~lice (on what line (0 take) tor the 
economic summit meeting at Puerto Rico. 23 June 1976, in The NatIonal Archl\'es. C. .... B 1311467. 
'external pressure on the new government if too abruptly applied could have serious adverse 
political consequences in Italy' .659 A briefing by the British Foreign Ministry from 23 June 
1976 stated that the 'present thinking in London is that any action in the direction of putting 
Italy in quarantine or of showing deliberate coolness towards any Italian government 
whatever its complexion, would be a serious mistake' .660 
Britain undoubtedly considered a communist entry into Italian government as undesirable as 
its Western allies since it would consequently lead to disturbances within the Atlantic 
Alliance, yet refrained from expressing this hostility too overtly. A British analysis of the PCI 
emphasised that the Leninist elements in the party were not to be underestimated, but that 
there could be no hope of having broad Italian or other European public opinion in sympathy 
with the Western powers if the PCI's claims to accept democratic pluralism were 'brushed 
aside as totally irrelevant' .661 Other statements even suggested that the 'initial objective 
should be to test the genuineness of the Communists' intentions' .662 
With regard to taking drastic measures or putting pressure on Italian politicians prior to 
government formation, the British also adopted a 'wait and see policy'. In a statement it was 
held that 'it may be argued (e.g. by the Americans) that the right course is now for the 
international financial community to put pressure on the new Italian government, as soon as it 
is formed, to take the necessary measures to put its economic house in order. But ... external 
pressures on the new government if too abruptly applied could have seriously adverse 
I·· I . I I ,663 po lhca consequences III ta y. 
Britain thus opted for a policy of non-interference, at least with respect to statements prior to 
the Italian elections and the Puerto Rico summit. Britain' s line did not alter substantiall y in 
659 Briefhy the Foreign and Commonwealth Office on 24 June 1976. in The National Archin?s. C\B n~/467. 
660 Ihid. 
661 Brief hy the Foreign and Commonwealth Office on 23 June 1976. in ihid. 
662 Ihid. . 
(1(1.1 Brief hy the Foreign and Commonwealth Office on 2-1. June 1976. in ihid. 
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the aftermath of the meeting and Schmidt's declarations were not only not shared but 
disapproved of by the British government. 
This indicates a discrepancy between Schmidt's declarations in the aftermath of Puerto Rico 
and British archival findings. Even the findings of the German state archives of the Forei an 
b 
Ministry do not confirm Schmidt's declaration on behalf of the United States, Britain and 
France. To the best of my knowledge, no paper or minutes of the private meeting or its 
alleged decisions at Puerto Rico can be found in the German state archives. The only 
reference to the alleged decisions taken at Puerto Rico was during Schmidt's previously 
mentioned conversation with Mario Soares, leader of the PSP, on 1 July 1976. 
Helmut Schmidt's remarks on the so-called agreement amongst the four powers also led to 
considerable dissent between the SPD and the French Socialists. In a meeting between 
officials of SPD and the French Socialists of the 'Parti socialiste' (PS) in July 1976, the 
French delegation stressed that the attempt to pressurise the Italian government was based on 
a political analysis with which they largely disagreed. More generally, PS and SPD diverged 
over their appraisal of Western European communist parties.664 According to the French 
Socialists, the PCI was on its way to democracy, which in turn could have a positive impact 
by leading towards an opening up of the international communist movement. Any erroneous 
reaction by the West would bear the risk of pushing them back into Soviet arms.665 In 
accounting for these remarks, one has to bear in mind of course the specific domestic political 
situation of the French Socialists and their relation with the French Communists. 
Disregarding the PS' national motivations, the debate manifested the deep rift between the 
SPD and the French Socialists and their diametrically opposed evaluation of European 
66-1 Die Welt, 26 July 1976. ,." 
665 Conversation between a delegation of SPD and PS officials on 21 July 1976. \\ Illy Brandt and JUff,l!n 
Wischnewski were part of the G~rman delegation. In AdSD, Depl1situm Helmut Sdlll1idt. 1/HS :\A 6241. 
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· 666 S h 'd' commUnIsm. c m! t s statements were met with great incomprehension by the Vice 
Secretary-General of the French Socialists, Pierre Mauroy. According to him. they merely 
represented a German pivoting to US demands.667 
Whereas on the basis of the archival records in Britain one can confirm that one or a number 
of private meetings were held in Puerto Rico, it cannot be concluded - after the consultation 
of both German and British archives - that a common strategy was adopted. It is quite 
plausible that the situation in Italy was informally discussed (given the overwhelming amount 
of material accumulated on the PCI and its evolution in general as well as previously 
mentioned discussions amongst heads of states) but British sources equally indicate that no 
mutual decision was taken and that Schmidt's remarks did not meet British or French 
agreement. The lack of sources on the matter in the German state archives support this 
argument. Thus, with respect to the four, one cannot speak of a thoroughly developed strategy 
to co-ordinately attempt to detain and ultimately damper the Italian Communists' growmg 
support. 
In the aftermath of Puerto Rico, a quadripartite diplomatic meeting on Italy took place on 9 
July 1976 in Paris.668 The purpose of the meeting was to establish a set of guidelines on which 
governments (of the four) might base individual approaches to Italian leaders with a view to 
persuading them to work towards a truly reformist Italian government (without the PCI). The 
intention was to convey to the Italian leaders that if a reformist government with a developed 
plan was formed, it would make it easier for (other) governments to provide the economic and 
666 \'or\\'(·irts. 29 July 1976. 
667 SZ, 2.~ July 1976. . . . , \"'11 
668 The meeting was attended by Sonnenfeldt (US), ~ibbe.r~ (Great Bnt.am). Carnac (hance) and va~ \ t: _ 
(Germany). See paper on the meeting. 9 July 1976, m PohtJsches ArchlY des AA, Bestand B 150. Band .~) I. 
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financial facilities required.669 The German representative at the meeting, GUnther van Well. a 
high-ranking German diplomat in the foreign ministry, pressed for the financial experts of the 
four powers to meet and establish a specific economic package to be added to the draft 
guidelines. The United States, Britain and France as represented by Sonnenfeldt, Hibbert and 
Carnac, however, opposed this on the grounds that a specific economic package could not be 
forwarded to individual Italian leaders until a government was formed to deal with.67o 
With respect to the foreign intervention in Italian domestic affairs as expressed by Schmidt. 
Barbagallo argued that it was Giulio Andreotti who maintained that Schmidt's declarations 
were requested by Ford, in order to counterbalance those statements made by the democratic 
candidate Carter, who in fact downplayed the problem of a communist participation in 
government. 671 This is possible but not plausible. It would overstate the importance of the 
Italian political situation in American domestic affairs and ongoing presidential election 
campaign. It is equally unlikely that the declaration was made as a result of DC pressures on 
Germany or the US to position themselves against the PCI. Any foreign interference would 
have reflected negatively on the DC by questioning its capacity to defend Italian national 
interests and to press ahead with the coalition building process. Foreign interference could 
even play into the hands of the PCI by raising anti-American or anti-German sentiments in 
Italy. This implies that Andreotti in fact had been rather upset by these interventions on the 
grounds that they ultimately only strengthened the PCI, suggesting that there had not been any 
alternative to the PCI's abstention. Andreotti later recalled that the Italian Socialists had been 
very critical about Schmidt's declaration and with reference to the level of governmental 
669 With a balance of payments in deficit. the Italian government was forced to seek a series of international 
loans hoth from West Germany and from the International Monetary Fund (lMF). . 
670 Sec paper on proposals forwarded to Italian leaders in light of coalition huildi~g ta~ks. 9 ~uly 1976. 10. 
Politisches Archiy des AA. Bestand B 150. Band 351. See also meeting on quadnpartIte actIOn on Italy. 10 The 
National Archives. PREM 16/978. 
671 No sources are used by Barhagallo in support or this argument. See Barbagallo. Enrico Berlingller. p. 274. :\ 
similar line of reasoning can be found in Carriere della Sera. 20 July 1976. p. 1. 
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interference in the domestic affairs of another country, and he expressed his accordance with 
the Socialists.672 
The whole 'Puerto Rico affair' was completely overstated in importance and dimension. 
Nonetheless it is interesting to examine the extent to which the PCI, and its possible entry into 
Italian government, were so widely and thoroughly discussed by Western European leaders. 
The Western European leaders', governments' and ministries' appraisal of the PCI was in no 
way homogeneous so that a 'common strategy' was in any case impossible to adopt. The 
enormous concern was pushed to the extreme by Schmidt and the Ford-administration. Hence, 
the so-called Western interference in Italian affairs as entailed in Schmidt's statements was 
most likely a joint US / German 'initiative', whose origins can only be sought in the domestic 
political situations. At the same time it was expressive of an ignorance and failure to 
understand the Italian political situation and the PCI. In an interview on 8 June 1976 Crosland 
acknowledged that he believed that 'people in Northern Europe have an extraordinary 
ignorance about the Italian Communist Party. It is a party that has its own tradition, its own 
aspiration, its own theory in Italy which owes a great deal more to Gramsci than it does to 
Marx.' He concluded that 'it was very hard, given the degree of ignorance of the party, to 
make up his mind as to how far the revisionist trend was a genuine factor and how far it was 
not. ,673 
Nonetheless, there existed a mutual agreement between the United States and Germany (at 
least with respect to Schmidt and Genscher) that concrete initiatives had to be taken in order 
to prevent a communist participation in Italian government. A number of meetings between 
Schmidt, Genscher. Ford and Kissinger held on 14/15 July 1976 indicate that a reciprocal 
understanding existed between the US and Germany that aid should not be granted to an 
672 Giulio Andreotti. Diari 1976-1979. Gli anni della solidarieta (Cles: Mondatori. 1981). p. 23. 
673 The National Archives. FCO _~3/2949. 
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Italian government that included the PCI. Moreover, financial assistance was to be tied to 
certain sets of reforms.674 Schmidt's public statement on 16 July 1976 was therefore most 
likely made in agreement and prior consultation with the US-administration, yet there is no 
evidence to suggest that the declarations were also made on behalf of Britain and France. 
Moreover, these statements merely reflected Schmidt's personal line, were not discussed 
within the SPD and would not have found official party approval. 675 
To a student of the PCI, this immense Western concern and exorbitant hysteria about the 
consequences of a PCI participation in government seems fairly exaggerated. The West 
largely overreacted to the threat that Western communists' participation in government 
actually posed. As suggested above, it also seems somewhat surprising that the fear of a 
communist advance in Italy took a high priority in the US-administration, especially in light 
of the forthcoming elections in the autumn of 1976, as had been maintained by a number of 
scholars.676 Again, foreign policy and even less the domestic political affairs of other 
countries, never assume a high strategic importance during national election campaigns, 
unless perhaps parallels can be drawn between the domestic circumstances of the two. 
It could even be held that it was in fact in the interest of US leaders not to voice an 
intransigent line about a PCI advance to government publicly, as this could have been 
counterproductive: an American involvement in Italian domestic affairs might have raised 
anti-American sentiments in Italy. Consequently, this would only further strengthen the PCI 
rather than weaken it, or push the party closer to the Soviet Union. A similar rationale had 
been advanced in a paper by the British Foreign Ministry, arguing that the strains of office. if 
the PCI were to achieve it, would be likely to increase the tension between the hardliners and 
the reformist wing in the party, and it would be important, if possible, to encourage the 
674 Politisches Archiv des AA, Bestand B 150, Band 352. 
675 Intl:f\"il:w with Voigt, 16 June 2008. . .. .. 
676 Sl:l:, for l:xampk, Oli\'i. Carter e I'Italia. pp. 111-112: Varsori. L'Italia nelle rela-:'lOnll1ltema-:'lOnah dol 
1943 al 1992, p. 193; Barbagallo, Enrico Berlingller, pp. 271-272 and p. 27-+. 
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latter.677 'We must be careful to avoid any action which can be represented as designed to 
make more difficult the task of an Italian government which included the Communists, such 
action would only enable the Communists to blame the Allies for unwarranted 
. rf ,678 
mte erence. 
A German governmental analysis had in fact come to a similar conclusion, suggesting that 
isolating Italy (in the event of a PCI entry into government) would only push those forces 
within the PCI closer to Moscow, forces which had previously been interested in greater 
autonomy. This would only counteract their assimilation.679 
As much as the Ford-Kissinger administration wished to prevent a communist participation in 
Italian government and thus took an intransigent line on the PCI, Schmidt equally went to 
great lengths not to be considered soft on communism. There were national electoral reasons 
for this. Most plausibly, Schmidt's outspoken anti-communist stance must be analysed in light 
of the upcoming elections in Germany in autumn 1976, and allegedly positive remarks about 
the PCI made by Schmidt in the spring of 1976. 
In March 1976, Schmidt was reported to have been too lenient about a PCI participation in 
government. In response to a question by foreign press, Schmidt seemed to have said that he 
did not wish to get involved in domestic affairs of other countries. In a different context. 
Schmidt had highlighted that in Western Europe's post -war history, communist parties had 
twice joint government in a member state of NATO. Schmidt supposedly declared that 'the 
Western military alliance was flexible enough to also include governments with communist 
677 Brief by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 23 June 1976, in The National Archives. CAB 1_~_V46 7. 
678 Ibid. . , 
679 'Analvsc der Auswirkungen moglicher italienischer Wahlergebnisse fUr Bumkskanzler. hlcr: N.\ TO , 
II June i 976, in Politisches Archiv des AA, Bestand B 150, Band 3-'+9. 
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participation', so that In fact the PCI could have been very pleased with the German 
680 
chancellor. 
This was presumably said by Schmidt In response to prevIOUS critical statements by US 
President Ford and NATO Commander-In-Chief Haig.681 Schmidt's remarks were reported to 
have led to serious rifts over the issue between Schmidt and US-President Ford. Schmidt's 
press speaker was later busy repudiating press reports about the chancellor's comments and 
suspected US-German divisions.682 
Being 'soft on communism' or seeking contacts with Western European communist parties 
could be greatly misinterpreted and used by the opposition in the German election campaign, 
as had been done during the 1972 election campaign of the CDU.683 In the SPD-related press, 
it was regularly held that the Conservatives had previously used every opportunity to 
insinuate and accuse Brandt of popular front intentions (a term generally used when 
discussing left-wing coalitions including the communists).684 In a conversation between 
Genscher and Callaghan, the German foreign minister drew a parallel between the coalition 
building process in Italy and the forthcoming German elections, suggesting that 'if the Italian 
Socialists refused to co-operate with the Christian Democrats and formed a government with 
the PCI, he [Genscher] would not be prepared to take any bets on the elections in the FRG. 
One of the main slogans of the CDU/CSU was that socialism was akin to communism. If a 
popular front government was formed in Italy, the CDU could take major gains. ,685 
680 This, at least, was the impression of the journalist of the following article. entitled 'The Italian Communists 
could be pleased about Schmidt': see FAZ, 'Italiens Kommunisten mit Schmidt zufrieden', .f March 1976. 
681 Ibid. 
682 52. 'Schmidt dementiert positive AuBerungen tiber KPI'. 6 March 1976. 
683 Politisches Archiv des AA. Bestand B 150, Band 345. 
684 VonrdrfS. 'Mit Kommunisten regieren'?'. 20 May 1976. . . 
685 Meeting between the Prime Minister and Genscher at the House of Commons. 25 May 1976. In The NatIOnal 
Archives. PREM 16/978. 
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Given the particular geopolitical situation of the FRG, all parties naturally and unequivocally 
distanced themselves from the communist regime in the GDR. The SPD was, however, as a 
result of its Ostpolitik, more vulnerable to attacks by the CDU/CSU and subject of ongoing 
criticism for being 'too soft and for pursuing a compromising line vis-a.-vis the East". The 
SPD's allegedly moderate line and willingness to negotiate with the East had been publicly 
used to damage the SPD during the election campaigns in 1972 and 1976.686 As discussed 
before, the CDU/CSU criticised what they had seen as unnecessary concessions in the 
negotiation process over the Eastern treaties and therefore largely refused to vote in favour of 
the treaties in parliament. 687 
In 1976, the CDU/CSU conducted a calculated Angst (,fear') election campaign, designed to 
play on the insecurities in the new political and economic environment. The SPD was 
portrayed as a party dangerously close to communism and as a counterpart the CDU/CSU, 
represented themselves as close to the values of the social market economy and liberal 
freedoms. 688 The SPD's central themes in the campaign were 'Model Germany' - the success 
of detente policy and relations with East Germany and Eastern Europe, a sustained high level 
of economic performance despite world recession, social stability and security attained 
through the consolidation of social security and welfare provisions.689 Even if the elections 
were ultimately successful and the social-liberal coalition renewed, the SPD saw itself 
continuously confronted with opposition attacks about its relations with communism and the 
East.690 Schmidt's hostility towards a PCI entry into government was therefore largely 
686 In an interview, Schmidt stressed that the discussion about the so-called 'popular front virus' was a 
propaganda tool used by the CDU/CSU in every national election campaign. Interview with Pallorama, 2 
Fehruary 1976, re-printed in Timmermann, Wohin marschiert die Linke ill E/lropa'?, p. l)'+. 
687 Sec also Garton Ash, III Europe's Name, p. 32. 
I1SS Padgett and Burkett, Political Parties and Elections ill West German.", p. 227. 
689 Ihid. 
690 It is worth notinr. that the SPD's partner in government. the FDP, did at various occasions voice its h()stilit~ 
\"is-a-\"is the PCI. Genscher had called upon all German forces to do everything possihle to pren~nt a communist 
entry in government in Italy (and France). See Miillcheller Merkllr, 'Italienische f-..lahnung an Genscher'. 2.~ 
March 1976. 
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influenced by the German election campaign and attacks about formerly published, more 
positive statements. Schmidt himself justified his positions time and again by stressing that he 
was in fact very interested in the Eurocommunist movement and political figures such as 
Berlinguer and the Spanish leader Carillo, he could, however, not afford to do so for fear of 
misinterpretations in Germany and abroad. He consequently refrained from personal 
691 
contact. 
Italian national press for their part took on the 'Puerto Rico incident' and rejected, quite 
comprehensively, Western interference in affairs of national concern. On 21 July 1976, the 
communist daily L'Unita spoke of a 'Giscard-Schmidt plot', against which the PCF was 
organising protest rallies.692 Press reports in Italy largely concord over the origins of 
Schmidt's revelations in them being widely attributed to German national electoral reasons~ 
Schmidt feared that a DC-PCI agreement in Italy would favour the Kohl-Strauss opposition 
prior to the elections in autumn 1976.693 While British participation in the affair was generally 
seen as minimal, contradictory statements were made as far as French involvement in the 
matter was concerned.694 
As far as the SPD was concerned, it is absolutely essential though to distinguish between 
statements made on an official government level and internal party positions. There existed an 
enormous discrepancy between Schmidt's declarations and those of other German Social 
Democrats. They reflected upon Schmidt's personal views (and some individuals within the 
691 See Schmidt Die Deutschen //1ld ihre Nachbarn. Menschen und Miichte II, p. 420. 
::2 L'Unita, 21 july 1976. . ..... 
3 Schmidt went to great length to make hIS mark as an anti-commumst on a natIOnal and InternatIonal level 
especially vis-a.-vis his national opponents who attacked SPD policies towards the East and the results of 
Ostpolitik, in Carriere della Sera. 'La strategia dura di Schmidt'. 21 July 1976. . . 
694 Carriere della Sera, 'Washington conferma l'accordo anti-PCr, 18 July 1976. ThIS artIcle suggcsts ~hat 
Schmidt's and Giscard's positions were more explicit and rigid (exceeding evcn those .of Ford ~nd. KISSInger?, 
while Callaghan had been more subtle. The same article, however. also argue~ that w~tle SchmIdt s declaratIOns 
were approved in the United States and France. Britain tried, for national and InternatIOnal reason'>. not to get too 
o\'ertly involved in the matter. 
233 
SPD) and were not shared by other leading SPD figures. Willy Brandt, SPD leader at the time, 
for example, thought it useful if the former 'centro sinistra' and the PCI discussed possibilities 
of agreements over crucial questions outside the area of government695 and was in fact open to 
PCI ... . 696 a partiCIpation In government. Karsten Voigt highlighted that the SPD had long 
considered the PCI as the undisputed partner in Italy; after all, both parties represented the 
strongest and uncontested parties of the Left in their countries alike. Contacts and exchanges 
between the SPD' s and PCI's respective youth organisations, the Young Socialists 'J usos' 
and the Federazione Giovanile Comunisti Italiani (FGCI) had long existed.697 Heidemarie 
Wieczorek-Zeul for example, leader of the German 'Jusos' at the time, heavily criticised 
Schmidt's declarations on the PCI. 698 
During many occasions Horst Ehmke approved of the recent positive development of the PCI. 
'If Western European communist parties succeed in freeing themselves from Soviet 
hegemony, this can only positively influence our judgement about the parties' .699 This, so 
Ehmke, applied in particular to the Italian Communist Party, in which positions had come to 
the fore which had previously only been adopted by Western European socialist parties. The 
changes within Eurocommunist parties is of great importance to the development of 
communism and it would be wrong, so Ehmke said, to dismiss these as mere tactical 
manoeuvres as many Conservatives have done in Germany.700 Ehmke even saw analogies 
between the position of the PCI and that of social democratic parties. 'The PCI, which 
"carried" a very unpopular economic policy saw itself, as a result of it, confronted with 
attacks from leftist extremists. The party is in a typical social democratic situation.' 701 Finally, 
and this is crucial, after a thorough analysis and observation (of the Eurocommunist parties) 
695 Conversation between Willy Brandt and Meyer-Lindenberg (ambassador) at the occasion of Brandt's visit to 
Rome on 1.f/15 April 1976, in Politisches Archiv des AA, Bestand B 150, Band 346. 
696 Interview with Voigt, 16 June 2008. 
697 Ibid. 
698 FAZ. 22 July 1976. 
hl)l) F AZ, 'Ehmke bcgrtiBt Offenheit der italienischen Kommunisten·. 6 March 1976. 
700 Horst Ehmke, 'Sozialdemokratic und Eurokommunismus·. in Gotz Hohenstein (ed.), Der Ul1nreg ~lir .\Iuc'hr 
(MOnchen: Wirtschafts\'crlag Langen-MtillerlHerbig, 1979). p. 226. 
701 Ibid. 
Ehmke refused to accept the dogma of the impossibility of communism to transform itself, as 
a failure to do so would be a grave political mistake.702 
Paradoxically, these 'extremist positions' on the PCI occurred at a time when the party had 
opened up considerably to and reiterated its acceptance of the values of Western European 
democracies, 'the plurality of political parties in an atmosphere of free competition, autonomy 
of the trade unions, religious freedom, freedom of speech, culture, art and science' .703 
The PCI had long accepted and supported the Common Market and came to endorse NATO in 
the context of its dynamic understanding of detente. A withdrawal from NATO would 
destabilise the prevailing superpower equilibrium, and endanger the strategy of detente. The 
securing of detente had been possible, so said the PC I, due to the attainment of a military 
strategic equilibrium and further progress can be made only if unilateral disadvantages for one 
or the other side were not produced.704 PCI foreign policy was outspokenly equidistant and 
declarations about positions that were 'neither anti-American nor anti-Soviet' were reiterated 
whenever possible. The PCI came to embrace a kind of pacifist, critical Atlanticism, similar to 
the German Jusos. Bracke went even further arguing that it was necessary for the Italian 
Communists to continue emphasising the benefits of detente to domestic and international 
strategy, as after 1969 this became the main, even the only, justification for its continued 
belonging to the Soviet-dominated communist world.705 
Paradoxically, the Puerto Rico meeting coincided with the conference of European 
communist parties held in East Berlin on 29-30 June 1976. The fact that the PCI participated 
at this conference at all was owed to the fact that there existed no final. obligatory resolution 
or binding document for all communist parties of the conference to sign. The contents of the 
702 Ib'd Y1V I ., p. _~o. 
7m . Q .". I I' 70'" 
. Segre, The "CommunIst uestlOn In ta y . p. -"}. 
704 Ibid .. p. 699. 
705 Bracke, Which Socialism, p. 369. 
document had been heavily debated prior to the conference and the PCI ultimately attended, 
retaining that it would not be party to any such resolution or document. In his speech, 
Berlinguer clearly and unequivocally stressed the right of every communist party to follow an 
autonomous and national path to socialism and firmly rejected any foreign intervention in 
national affairs, This was, without doubt, directed against the Soviet Union, Moreover. 
Berlinguer did not fail to emphasise that the conference represented a meeting amongst free, 
equal and independent communist parties and not a closed reunion of the international 
communist movement. Finally, he underlined that the PCI did not agree with the content of 
the final document. 706 According to PCI officials, this rejection underlined the unbinding 
character of the conference. The importance of this meeting with respect to the PCI's 
growingly independent and autonomous international policy should not be underestimated. It 
was the most outspoken public manifestation of how narrow the shared ideological ground 
between the PCI and Moscow and its world communist organisation had become. The 
benefits of belonging to this movement were increasingly explained in terms of European and 
global strategy. 707 
Berlinguer also addressed the issue of a confrontation with social democracy. While he 
rejected social democracy as adequate in overcoming capitalism in the West, he 
acknowledged certain achievements in improving the conditions of the working class. At the 
same time, he firmly dismissed the model of Eastern European socialist societies as 
appropriate in corresponding to the particular conditions of the working and popular masses in 
the West.708 The PCI by then shared more common ground with Western European socialist 
parties and links with the Soviet Union had become somewhat of a painful necessity. The 
pel's concept of an Italian socialism had always been diametrically di\'erse from SO\'iet 
706 L'Unita, 'I Lavori della Conferenza dei Partiti comunisti e operai d'Europa, L'inter\'ento del compagno 
Berlinguer', I July 1976, re-printed in APe. Fondo Berlinguer, MOl. 140, 
707 Bracke, Which Socialism, p, 369. , 
70S 'Discurso di Berlinguer alia Conferenza dei Partiti comunisti e operai d'Europa'. East BerlIn. 29-30 June 
1976, in APC, Fondo Bcrlinguer. MOl 1'+0, 
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communIsm; the idea of diverse modes to socialism had been inherent in Togliatti' s 
polycentrism of the international communist movement. By the mid-1970s, the difference was 
that the PCI had come to realise the insurmountable disagreement with Moscow in doctrinal 
terms; what had to be re-thought were the relations with the Soviet-led movement in strateaic 
c 
terms. Interestingly and ironically with regard to the almost simultaneously held Puerto Rico 
summit, West German diplomats had positively acknowledged the importance of the June 
1976 East Berlin conference. By far, the highlight of the conference was acknowledged to 
have been Berlinguer's speech. According to German diplomats, the speech had assumed 'an 
historical dimension' in the history of the communist movement and Berlinguer had clearly 
used the occasion 'to underline the basis of a socialist world-view' .709 The report about the 
conference concluded that Berlinguer convincingly laid out his party's independent position 
vis-a-vis Moscow and the international communist movement.710 
In 1979, the PCI 'returned to opposition', in the sense that the years of 'national solidarity' 
and communist collaboration with the DC outside the area of government had come to a 
close, Despite all dangers of PCI advances to power as conjured up in the West. and 
exaggerated concern of the Italian situation, the PCI's failure to enter government and 
subsequent return to opposition was not primarily due to international reasons. To assign this 
exclusively to external hostility would be too simplistic and overestimate the weight of 
international influence on Italian domestic affairs. Moreover, it would fail to acknowledge the 
impact of the domestic context. The PCI failed first and foremost because of its own rank-
and-file. and DC supporters who were more deeply antagonistic towards governmental 
cooperation between the two forces than their respective leaderships. International hostility 
709 Report on the conference of European communist and workers parties in East Berlin. repl)rt from 2 }uly 1 'no. 
Permanent mission of West Germany in the GDR, Politisches Archiv des AA, Bestand B 150. Band )) 1. 
710 Ihid. 
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against the PCI might have diminished, if the PCI in fact had the chance to 'mature' through 
governmental responsibility. 
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Chapter 6 
Part II 
The NATO dual-track, the end of detente and the return to 'opposition' 
1.) SPD, PCI and the question of Cruise missiles 
Towards the end of the 1970s, detente was increasingly imperilled and came to an end with 
the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979. In strategic-military terms, the return 
to and building up of the growing Cold War tension was most forcefully expressed by the 
debate over the installation of new US Cruise missiles and Pershing 2 on Western European 
territories in response to and as a shield towards the Soviet SS-20s, which had been produced 
since 1974 and had replaced some of its older versions. 
In the second half of 1979, the debate over the deployment of what had widely become known 
as 'euromissiles' therefore largely determined the international political climate. At first sight, 
the debate over the Cruise missiles highlighted a noticeable divergence between the SPD and 
the PCI, at least as far as official party resolutions on the issue were concerned. Both parties 
held in common a similar notion of detente, and its importance for the overcoming of East-
West divisions. The climate of international detente, which had characterised the post-1968 
period until 1975/76 (with the CSCE), had allowed a maximum amount of freedom for both 
parties to have pursued their distinct policies and contribute to the stabilisation of the 
international climate. The SPD did so through its unique and internationally accepted social-
democratic foreign policy as entailed in Ostpolitik. On the other side, we witnessed a 
communist party that enjoyed maximum electoral support, pursuing a distinct foreign policy 
which not only distinguished the party from other communist parties but may lead attenti\'e 
students to address the question of what was still communist about that party when in fact so 
little distinguished it from the Western European non-communist left. In the late 1970s 
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however, the debate over the euromissiles seemed to renew the gap between the PCI and its 
national and international opponents. 
A closer analysis of the debates which took place within the SPD and the PCI, as well as an 
examination of the motivations for certain positions, alters this first impression. Even if 
officially supporting the NATO resolution to install new missiles in case negotiations with 
Moscow failed (this is essentially what the NATO dual-track entailed), the SPD was painfully 
divided over the issue. This also reflects upon the enormous constraints the SPD faced in 
complying to the Atlantic Alliance, vis-a-vis its coalition partner, the PDP, and last, but not 
least, its own chancellor. 
The PCI's position was also branded by paradoxes and ambiguities, determined by external 
and internal constraints. At its first Party Congress in 1979 to discuss the matter, the majority 
of the SPD voted, after an enormous internal debate, reluctantly in favour of the dual-track 
decision. Simultaneously though, the SPD's resolution put great emphasis on the negotiation 
aspect of it. On an official party level, the SPD's support of NATO's decision of course 
underlined the differences with the PCI (which had voted against it). This, however, provides 
us only with half of the picture. The matter was much more complex than that. A closer 
analysis of the internal party debates, origins and motivations for specific positions reveals a 
much more accurate picture of the multiplicity of factors that were intertwined in the 
euromissile debate. It also suggests that the two parties' positions produced more similarities 
and shared more common ground than one would have initially assumed. 
Before gomg any further another point needs to be addressed here. The PCI and SPD 
delegates' so often painful debate over the NATO dual-track decision provides an illustrative 
case of the study between the considerable correlations of international decisions and 
domestic policies and complexities. Both SPD and PCI were heavily constrained by internal 
and international obligations. While external constraints should not be undermined. I will 
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emphasise the primacy of domestic politics and the national context in accounting for the 
SPD's and PCI's positions over the NATO decision. The central hypothesis, therefore, is that 
the parties' position on the euromissile debate was a reflection of domestic policy interests. 
The PCI's strategic link with the Soviet Union as to further the cause of detente should also 
not be underestimated in the context of the missile debate. 
Had the two parties managed to liberate themselves from the constraints they faced, the 
outcome of decisions on the matter may have been rather different. The dual-track was 
approved of at the December 1979 SPD Party Congress despite its unpopularity. Many SPD 
delegates were divided over the notion of military parity through rearmament in order to then 
disarm. The many pacifists in the SPD could not quite comprehend what seemed to them to be 
the obvious paradox of achieving and maintaining detente only via a military strategic 
equilibrium (and through rearmament if necessary to restore the disparity) as entailed in 
Helmut Schmidt's military strategic thinking. To many of them, the notion of rearmament 
stood in direct contradiction with the concept of detente. Yet, they adopted a position of what 
one can term ambivalent benevolence at the 1979 Party Congress, perhaps in respect of their 
own chancellor, who had very early on linked his own political fate to his party's decision. 
One will also notice a discrepancy between the thinking behind the PCI's alternative proposal 
to the dual-track and that of the remaining activists at the party's base. An overview of the 
developments in Italy also demonstrates that the Cruise missile debate provided quite an 
interesting example of the use made of international questions for domestic purposes. Foreign 
policy decisions can almost never be analysed exclusively, but must be placed in the context 
of national interests as they are often a reflection of domestic strategies and calculations. 
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2.) European interests in the SALT negotiations 
To fully comprehend the debate that evolved around the production and subsequent 
deployment of Cruise missiles and Pershing 2, as formulated in the NATO dual-track 
decision, it is helpful to engage in a brief excursion of the ongoing SALT II negotiation 
process and the European security interests involved in it. The United States and the Soviet 
Union had previously excluded the so-called European strategic weapons, both those of the 
two superpowers and of the nuclear forces Great Britain and France from negotiations and on 
26 May 1972, SALT I was signed. With this treaty, the superpowers agreed to freeze the 
number of launchers for intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) and for sea-launched 
ballistic missiles (SLBM) for a period of five years until October 1977. Negotiations for a 
follow-up agreement of SALT II were initiated almost immediately after the signing of SALT 
I (at the end of the year). It is important to note here, that the members of both the Warsaw 
Pact and NATO were not directly involved in the negotiation talks, but the negotiations' 
outcome affected their own military security interests.711 The social-liberal government in 
Germany unequivocally supported the signing of both SALT I and II, however, disapproved 
of the failure to achieve military strategic parity on all levels, especially with respect to so-
called euro-strategic weapons. Of course the demand for a rapid signing and ratification of 
SALT (I and II) was not solely raised by the SPD and the PCI, but widely agreed upon and a 
general understanding existed amongst all political parties in Germany and Italy over the 
issue.712 
In this context, the peculiar geopolitically-related security dilemma of the Federal Republic 
should be re-addressed. The geopolitical and strategic position of the Federal Republic, which 
would make it the first and utmost victim in an East -West confrontation, shows the FR G' s 
711 Thomas Pal's, Die Carter-Administration llnd die Regierzmg Schmidt, KOllSens 11IId DissCl1S iiber die 
SOlljetunion-Politik 1977-1981 (Berlin: Schauble Verlag Rheinfelden, 1991), p. 80. . . 
71~ The PCI also called the ratification of SALT as one of its principal objectives. Sec PCl (ed.), Prog( fro dl lesl 
per il Xl' Congresso na-:.ionale del PCl (Roma: Editori Riuniti. 1978), p. 42. 
vulnerability with regard to the Soviet Union. The federal Gennan foreign and security policy 
capacities were still limited and characterised by a clear dependency on the USA.713 
3.} The theoretical foundations of the Cruise missile debate in Germany 
The theoretical background was developed by Helmut Schmidt in the autumn of 1977. On 28 
October 1977, Schmidt used the occasion of a speech to the International Institute for 
Strategic Studies (nSS) in London to publicly address the issue of an impending imbalance 
between the Soviet and US intennediate-range nuclear forces. This, according to him, was a 
result of the stabilisation of the US-Soviet strategic powers through SALT, which had left the 
issue of intermediate-range missiles untouched. There is no doubt that Schmidt argued from 
the viewpoint of a necessary parity in tactical nuclear weapons.714 Since the mid 1960s, 
Schmidt had always linked his detente policy to a rather mechanistic conception of military 
balance. 715 This was one of the key differences that distinguished Schmidt from his 
predecessor Brandt. Whereas according to the latter, rearmament was detrimental to any 
successful European peace policy, Schmidt argued from a classic military, security-related 
perspective. The concept of political and military parity was, according to him, indispensable 
to and the precondition for any fruitful reduction of tension.716 Moreover, it was the sine qua 
non for the maintenance of security altogether. 717 If not, military imbalance on the one side 
would automatically result in political blackmail by the superior side. It is interesting to note 
that the very concept of Schmidt's security rationale and the 'logic' of disparity equal 
7l.1 Herbert Dittgen, Deutsch-amerikanische Sicherheitsbeziehungen in der Ara Helmut Schmidt. Vorgeschichte 
ulld Folgen des NATO-Doppelbeschlusses (Mtinchen: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 1991). p. 21. 
714 Sec also Susanne Peters, The Germans and the INF Missiles (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgcsdlschaft. 
1990).p.147. , 
715 Helmut Schmidt, Strategie des Gleichgewichts (Stuttgart: Seewald Verlag. 1981). pp. 16-19. SL'C also 
Wilfried Loth. Ol'{'I"comillg the Cold War. p. 159., . 
716 H. Schmidt 'Politische und wirtschaftliche Aspekte der westlichen Sicherheit'. Speech by Helmut SL'hlllldt to 
the IISS on' 28 October 1977 in London. re-printed in Helga Haftedorn. Sicherheit lind Stabilitat. 
Ali}3enbeziellllllgen der BlIlldesrepliblik zH'ischell Olkrise 1I11d NATO-Doppelbeschluss (i\l~nchen: Deutscher 
Taschenbuch Verlag. 1986). p. 197. See also Haftedorn. Sicherheit l/1ld Elltspa1ll~ll1lg. p. 56. SL'~ also ~arhara n. 
Heep. Helmllt Schmidt lilld Amerika. Eille schH'ierige Partllerschaft (HllOn: BOUVier Verlag. 1990). p. _h. 
717 H. SL"llillidt. 'Politische und wirtschaftliche Aspekte der wcstlichen Sicherheit'. p. 197. 
repreSSIOn were challenged by Karsten Voigt. He contested the idea that one-sided 
rearmament measures automatically led to a loss of security by the other side. Armament 
imbalances in specific areas did not inevitably signify that the - for military security 
'l'b . f I d 718 necessary equl 1 num 0 mutua eterrence - would lapse. On the contrary, they could, if 
the general defence mobility was not compromised, positively support and accompany the 
negotiations process.719 
Brandt's foreign policy concept was marked by the priority of negotiation and disarmament. 
Schmidt, on the other hand, saw the overriding task in the strengthening of transatlantic (and 
European) cooperation, especially in the military-security related field. 72o These two 
diverging quests marked the twin components of social democratic security thinking in the 
mid-1970s. The debate over the Cruise missiles forcefully demonstrated that these two 
concepts became increasingly incompatible. Schmidt, however, continued to emphasise that 
detente could only be achieved and maintained on the basis of military parity.721 Thus, he 
reiterated during various occasions that it was of key strategic importance to establish and 
maintain a military balance between the two superpowers, and most importantly, a strategic 
parity which were to include medium-range weapons directed at Europe.722 
A general agreement existed that Schmidt's fears were not completely unfounded. By the 
mid-1970s, there was a growing concern within the NATO alliance that detente, whatever its 
other merits, was not a substitute for continuing NATO military programmes and that the 
Soviet Union was steadily building its military power - conventional, tactical nuclear, and so-
718 Voigt, Wege ;'lIr Abriistullg, p. 57. 
719 Voigt. Pn:ss documentation of the German parliament, INT-102-6/4. 
720 Sec also Thomas Enders. Die SPD und die dufJere Sicherheit. ZllIn Wandel der sicherheitspolitischell 
KOllzeptioll der Partei in der Zeit der Regierzmgsl'erantll'ortllllg ( 1966-1982) (Melle: Ernst Knoth. 19R7), p. I ~2. 
721 Helmut Schmidt 'Wir sichern den Frieden', in \'onvdrts, 15 March 1979. p. 9. 
m In an articlc in' February 1979, Herbert W chner stressed that both SPD and FDP agreed to the fact that 
military parity did not need to hc expressed in total arithmetical equivalencc of all f~)r.ccs a,nd wca~~)~s. h~t 
political and sccurity parity needed to be assured ovcrall. See H. Wehner 'Deutsche Pohtlk auf dem Prufstand . 
as quoted in AdSD. SPD-Bundestagsfraktion, 8. Wahlperiode, 2IBTFHOOO079. 
called 'long-range theatre nuclear forces' (LRTNF) - in Europe. 723 The new medium range 
SS-20 missiles, which were gradually replacing the older SS-4s and SS-5s beginning in 1977. 
could give the Soviets a first strike capability against NATO's European allies. 724 
An interesting question with no definite answer is whether Schmidt (and naturally all those 
who were concord with his military thinking) was concerned with a real fear of a Soviet threat 
(due to the undeniable existence of the SS-20s) or was more interested in the never ending 
longing for an American commitment to the security of Western Europe. Here I opt for the 
latter. 
Schmidt himself admitted that at no time did he seriously believe in a Soviet strike against 
Western European cities. Military superiority (by one bloc) was, according to Schmidt, 
equivalent to the political suppression (of the other). True parity in military terms was hence 
the essential precondition for successful negotiations. This did not reflect upon SPD thinking 
in general. Many in the SPD did not arrive at the same conclusions as a result of the present 
military status quo. Karsten Voigt, for example, had also stressed that whilst 'the Soviets 
disposed superiority in intermediate range missiles, this would not logically imply an 
uncalculated threat and that because Moscow was rather risk-averse. The existing Western 
nuclear potentials provided a sufficient deterrence' .725 
The intentions of Schmidt's speech held at the IISS in October 1977 were subject to various 
interpretations. The crucial question to address was whether Schmidt intended to establish a 
Euro-strategic balance exclusively through arms control or whether he called for the 
deployment of LRNTF as a shield against the SS-20s. Did he have a rearmament option in 
7~3 Garthoff. Detente. p. 935. 
7~.J Loth, O\'('I"com;ng, p. 150. 
7~<, Interview with Voigt. 16 June 2008. 
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mind, or did he hope to publicly press the US to include the weapons of debate in the ongoing 
SALT process? In spite of all strong declarations in favour of military equilibrium etc., it is 
most likely that Schmidt was, at that stage, most interested in armament reduction and not an 
arms race. The occasion was chosen carefully to press the US to take Western concerns 
seriously. Schmidt himself declared in his speech that in order to establish parity between the 
two superpowers, there were two options: rearmament and reduction. He would opt for the 
latter.726 The argument that Schmidt in theory favoured disarmament over remilitarisation was 
further strengthened by the fact that Schmidt had previously urged US leaders to include the 
SS-20s in the ongoing SALT II negotiations. Schmidt recalled that during a private 
conversation between him and Ford, he had raised the subject of the emerging 'Grey Area' in 
Europe. The term 'Grey Area' had been invented to describe all of the US and Soviet nuclear 
delivery systems not included in the SALT II negotiations. The US president had reassured 
the German chancellor explicitly that he would attempt to include the SS-20s and the 
backfire-bombers in the ongoing SALT II process.727 No written record of this conversation, 
however, exists; typical of Schmidt's style of leadership at the time to discuss such matters 
during private meetings. This perhaps also demonstrates that Schmidt trusted Ford and 
believed he would seriously attempt to address the issue of Soviet superiority in the area of 
intermediate range missiles. Whether Ford in fact would have threatened the already difficult 
SALT II negotiations prior to the US elections in November 1976, or whether he had hoped to 
postpone the question of the inclusion of the SS-20s until after the elections, is difficult to 
7"'8 d '11' ascertain and subject to controversy. - Contrary to Carter, For was more WI mg to 
understand Schmidt's fear of the emerging 'Grey Area', whereas Schmidt's concern of the 
impending imbalance was simply dismissed by the succeeding US president and his national 
7~6 Helmut Schmidt. 'Politische und wirtschaftliche Aspekte der westlichen Sicherhcit'. pp. 198-199. . 
727 Helmut Schmidt. Menschen IIl1d Machte. p. ~ 10. Brandt. Eril1nerzmgen. p. 366. SL'e alsll Paes. DIe Carter-
Administration. p. 90. . . . 
72X Hcep argued that Ford believed a signing of SALT II before the US electio~s to be unrealistIC. He prderred to 
address the subject of the SS-20s only after the L'lections. Heep. Helmllt SchmIdt lind .\menka. p . .f.f. 
security advisor Brzezinski. Schmidt was particularly concerned to avoid giving Moscow any 
impression of a possible decoupling of the US-West German security partnership and any US 
disengagement from Western Europe and the FRG. Any doubts about US willingness to 
defend its Western European allies would presumably, following Schmidt's rationale, give the 
Soviets a psychological advantage over the West Europeans, which could then be exploited. 
Schmidt had come to realise that his concerns were largely ignored in Washington and he 
therefore attempted to publicly put the Americans under pressure.729 This was the context 
within which Schmidt addressed the issue in his speech in London in October 1977. 
After the US elections in November 1976 and the victory of President Carter, American-
German relations deteriorated. The US was neither prepared to complicate the already 
stagnant SALT II process any further by insisting on the incorporation of medium-range 
missiles as Schmidt had demanded, nor did the US regard it as necessary to station new 
medium-range missiles on European soil. During 1977 and 1978, Schmidt continuously 
sought to discuss the emerging military disparity in Europe with Carter and his national 
security advisor Brzezinski.73o The Carter-Administration did not share Schmidt's concern 
over the increasing Soviet nuclear capacity and the deployment of the SS_20S.731 The US-
administration under Carter held that the United States were superior in the area of strategic 
weapons in general, so that rearmament in the intermediate missile range was not necessary to 
achieve parity.732 Schmidt, on the other hand, insisted that the SS-20s represented a growing 
instrument of political threat and coercion.733 He firmly believed that negotiations with the 
Soviet Union were only possible on the basis of a military parity and not through Soviet 
71<) . • 
- InterVIew wIth Bahr, 1 June 2007. 
7)0 Helmut Schmidt. Menschen lind Mtichte, p. 228. 
7.'1 Dittgen DClitsch-amerikanische Sicherheitshl':iehllllgell, p. 183. 
7.\~ Inlen'jew with Bahr, 1 June 2007. 
m Helmut Schmidt. H'egge!tihrten, p. 266. 
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growing superiority.734 Carter and Brzezinski simply did not share Schmidt's concerns. n5 The 
position of the Carter administration, that large-scale attacks on Western Europe by Soviet 
medium-range forces could be deterred or countered by US strategic central deterrence alone 
(especially sea-based forces that were committed to NATO), did not convince Schmidt. 736 He 
was irritated by the fact that Carter did not take his concerns seriously.737 His speech at the 
IISS in 1977 was therefore most likely intended to pressurise the new US-administration to 
change its intransigent position by publicly raising the issue. 
4.) Germany, the US and the debate over the neutron bomb 
The neutron bomb debacle had without doubt, a negative impact on German-American 
relations in general and on the Schmidt-Carter relation in particular. Its influence on the 
development over the NATO dual-track decision, at least as far as Schmidt's own decision-
making process was concerned, but also its impact on shaping transatlantic relations in 
general, should not be underestimated. The debate over the production and eventual 
deployment of a neutron bomb on European soil had been triggered by Egon Bahr in an 
article for the SPD's weekly Vorwiirts. Bahr called the issue a 'symbol of the perversion of 
human thought'. 738 The broad public opposition that made it a political issue in several 
countries of Western Europe, above all West Germany, was based largely on emotional 
grounds. The controversy over the neutron weapon also became an issue in American 
politics.739 In the course of the debate, opposition in Europe grew. In West Germany, Schmidt 
faced a particular problem within his own party. The opposition against the neutron bomb 
73-1 H. Schmidt, Die Deutschen 1111d ihre Nachbam. Menschen und Mdchte II. p. 251. 
735 See also Sodaro who argues that Brzezinski, Carter's national security adviser. greatly disfavoured new land-
hased missiles, in Sodaro. MascOl\,. p. 270. 
736 Christian Hacke, 'After NATO's Dual Track Decision of 1979: Where Do We Go From Herd', The Journal 
of Strate~ic Studies, Vol. 9. No . .+ (1986), p. 84. 
7~7 L 
. Brandt. Erillllerungell. p. 364. 
m As quoted by Helga Haftedurn. Sicherheit lind Stabilitiit. p. 104. 
7.N Garthoff. Detente, p. 937. 
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within the SPD intensified in November 1977, when the SPD Party Congress in Hamburg had 
voted against the deployment of the neutron bomb in Western Germany. Schmidt himself was 
in favour of the bomb, and had attempted to prevent his own party from openly opposing the 
deployment.74o After internal disputes within the German government, between the FDP-Ied 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the SPD-Ied Ministry of Defence, the German Federal 
Security Council finally decided in favour of deployment of the neutron bomb on Western 
German soil, subject to various conditions. The United States had insisted on public European 
acceptance of the deployment of the neutron bomb prior to any production decision. 
On 7 April 1978 Carter, however, announced a postponement of his ultimate decision on the 
neutron bomb production. In a statement, Carter declared that he decided, 'to defer production 
of weapons with enhanced radiation effects', with 'the ultimate decision' to be made later. 741 
Schmidt felt betrayed since he had fought hard in his own party for approval of this decision 
and to establish the necessary preconditions for deployment on the domestic policy terrain.742 
German-American relations were damaged by Carter's mishandling of the neutron bomb 
affair, and Schmidt's personal disappointment about the weakness and inconsistency of the 
American president.743 The affair over the neutron bomb was not only important in light of 
SPD relations with the USA, but even more important as far as its domestic implications were 
concerned. In contrast to the majority of the SPD, the liberal coalition partner, strongly 
pushed by Genscher, had supported the production of the neutron bomb.744 In this context, an 
inclination to weigh security and military priorities differently became already noticeable in 
the SPD-FDP coalition, but could be temporarily overcome by the postponement of Carter"" 
decision. It is also important to note that the CDU-CSU had unanimously supported the 
m Peters, The Germans alld the INF Missiles, p. 167. 
7~1 Garthoff, Detente. p. 938. 
m Haftedorn, Sicherheit IIlld Entspannung. p. 238. . 
743 Interview with Bahr 1 June 2007; on the subject see also Heep. Helmllt Schmidt lind AlIlenka. pp. 106-107. 
n~ Andreas Kramer. Di~ FDP und die iilljJere Sicherheit. Zlim Wandel der siciJcrheitspolitischell Kon:eption de,. 
Partei vall 1966 his 1992 (Bonn: Holos Verlag. 1995). p. 172. 
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production of the neutron bomb, which could be interpreted as a renewed overture to the 
FDP.
745 
This showed that a common perception of foreign and security policy-related issues 
was developing between the FDP and the CDU/CSU. In retrospect, this quite plausibly 
induced Schmidt to force his own party to support his line over the missile debate. 
5.} The Guadeloupe summit meeting of 1979 and the formulation of the NATO 
dual-track decision 
At the invitation of US President Carter, a summit meeting took place at Guadeloupe at the 
beginning of 1979. This meeting is generally held to have been crucial in the evolution of the 
dual-track decision of the Atlantic Alliance. Even though the concept of the NATO dual-track 
decision was more closely defined and elaborated upon at this summit meeting between 
President Carter, Chancellor Schmidt, President Valery D'Estaing and the British Prime 
Minister James Callaghan in January 1979, an analysis of the memoirs of Carter, Callaghan 
and Schmidt leaves some doubt as to whether the dual-track decision was officially decided 
upon at Guadeloupe and what the individual positions were. 746 The sequence and content of 
the Western European leaders' answer to Carter's proposal to deploy new US missiles in 
Western Europe, as expressed at Guadeloupe on 5/6 January 1979, were also subject to 
controversy. 
During 1978, after the debacle of the neutron bomb, a re-thinking had taken place within the 
US-administration regarding the nuclear disparity in Europe. Continuing pressures from the 
Schmidt government and other European allies, backed by supporters in the United States. 
convinced the Carter administration that a new land-based deterrent located in \\' estern 
m Ihid. 
7411 Callaghan recalled that the Guadeloupe meeting could not reach a decision. In James Callaghan. Time and 
Chance, p. 5'+'+. 
Europe was critical to reaffinning the durability of the American nuclear umbrella, especially 
since a loss of credibility began to characterise US defence policies after the decision to 
withdraw from neutron bomb production.747 
At Guadeloupe, Carter had raised the issue of allied self-defence and pointed out that the 
West must meet the Soviet threat on intennediate-range missiles. As Carter later recalled, 
Schmidt had been very contentious, insisting that he would permit the deployment of 
additional missiles on German soil only when other European nations made arrangements for 
similar agreements. 748 Carter, however, insisted that it was Schmidt who had initiated the 
entire discussion of an impending imbalance on European nuclear theatre forces, and that the 
Germans must be willing to deploy these missiles in order for negotiations with the Soviets to 
be successfu1.749 The meeting was expressive of the existing antipathy between Schmidt and 
Carter. As a result of the neutron bomb controversy, Schmidt no longer trusted Carter, 
considering him unreliable and unpredictable.75o 
It was the French President Valery Giscard D'Estaing, in cooperation with James Callaghan, 
who stressed the need to negotiate with the Soviets. Callaghan had also emphasised the view 
that the West should engage in negotiations prior to any decision for further deployment.751 
D'Estaing developed the theoretical basis for the dual-track, arguing that the Western position 
in these negotiations would be further strengthened by the decision to deploy new missiles in 
case negotiations failed. 752 Interestingly, it had not been Schmidt who pressed for a parallel 
effort to negotiate arms limitations. The negotiation aspect had only gained importance in the 
succeeding months, when it became clear that without an emphasis on simultaneous 
7-17 See Sodaro, MoscoH', p. 271. 
7-18 Jimmy Carter, Keeping Faith. Memoirs oj a President (Fayetteville: University of Arkansas Press. 1995), p. 
2.+ 1. 
7-19 Ibid. 
750 Helmut Schmidt, Weggejahrten, p. 264 and pp. 300-301. . 
751 Stephan Layritz, Der NATO-Doppelbeschlllss. Westliche Sicherheitspolitik im Spallllllllgs.te/d mn [1IIIe1l-. 
~~illdllis- lind AlIjJenpolitik (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 1992), pp. 68-69.. _ 
7:-_ H. Schmidt. Menschen llnd Machte. 1987, pp. 231-232. See also James Callaghan, Tllne and Ch~1Ice, p .. ))0. 
It is also worth mentioning that both Carter and Callaghan recalled that the meeting e~ded \\"lt~ ,the. l'.sue 
unresolved, \\'hereas Schmidt argued that the dual-track was formulated by Valery Glscard )) Estamg at 
Guadeloupe. See also H. Schmidt. H'cggejahrten, pp. 267-268. 
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negotiations, large parts of the SPD would not support the decision at all. 753 The meeting 
ended with no finalised decision taken. Nonetheless, one could not deny a prevailing general 
agreement at Guadeloupe that the West must meet the Soviet threat, in spite of the absence of 
. d 754 a preCIse accor . 
Guadeloupe had enormous repercussIons for Schmidt and his position within the SPD. 
Schmidt had agreed at Guadeloupe on the deployment of new missiles - after all, as pointed 
out by Carter, it was Schmidt who had raised the issue in the first place - but without any 
prior consultation within his own party. This so-called 'blank cheque', in the words of Egon 
Bahr, as signed by Schmidt at Guadeloupe, was later agreed upon in a small circle of SPD 
officials, but only if it was conditionally linked to the demand for simultaneous 
negotiations.755 To many in the SPD, the negotiations aspect always had clear priority over 
rearmament. Many Social Democrats simply accepted the deployment side as a necessary 
'evil' in order to arrive at negotiations with Moscow. After Guadeloupe, Schmidt was 
increasingly torn between his commitment vis-a-vis the alliance and forcing through the 
decision within his own party - a party in which many had strong ideological or moral 
objections to the idea of rearmament ever since the 1950s. The repercussions the issue had on 
the PCI were also considerable. As we shall see, the party was once more forced to make a 
'choice of side', whilst not losing sight of its domestic ambitions. 
After having principally agreed to the deployment of new Cruise missiles and Pershing 2 in 
West Germany, Schmidt's prior concern was directed towards avoiding Germany being the 
sole country where US missiles would be stationed. He was thus in search for allies across 
Western Europe. In order to avoid Germany's isolation, Schmidt insisted that intermediate 
m It should not ero unmentioned that Bahr recalled later that Schmidt had, 'signed a type of hlank cheque at 
Guadeloupe for ~he stationing of new missiles': it was only in the aftermath that th.i~ had ~e~, 'strong re"j"tance 
in the SPD. The party demanded the inclusion of the negotiations aspect and only If these faded would the party 
support deployment of new missiles'. Interview with Egon BahT. 1 June 2007. 
7:'i~ See also Haftedorn. Sic/zerheit lllld Stabilitat, p. 117. 
755 Interview with Bahr, 1.6.~()()7. 
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range missiles should also be deployed in Italy, the Benelux countries as well as Great 
Britain.
756 
The reason for this was to allocate the burden, i.e. to spread the potential repression 
of the Soviet Union resulting from the deployment decision and more importantly, it was the 
only means to secure the support of his own party at all. Additionally, it was a means to 
spread public disapproval over the stationing across Western Europe. In short, by insisting on 
the issue of Germany's non-singularity, Schmidt hoped to disarm those in West Germany. 
within the party and other social and political movements in society, who would oppose the 
deployment of new missiles. 
On 12 December 1979 the decision was formally taken. The deployment of these nuclear 
systems would be distributed among five European countries: all 108 Pershing II and 96 
ground-launched Cruise missiles would be deployed in the FRG, 160 Cruise missiles in the 
United Kingdom, 112 in Italy and 48 each in Belgium and the Netherlands.757 At the same 
time, arms control negotiations on US and Soviet long-range theatre nuclear systems were 
offered to the Soviet Union in order to achieve a more stable overall nuclear balance at lower 
levels of nuclear weapons on both sides. 
6.) The development of the NATO dual-track debate in Germany and Italy 
The debate over new missiles on Italian and Western European soil occurred amidst a wider 
transformation of the Italian domestic political scenario. By 1979, the PCI's search for an 
entente with the centre and moderate left, had failed to succeed and had come to an abrupt 
end. The 1979 national elections seemed to confirm the end of the PCI's coalition experiment 
with the DC and the PSI; the party had suffered its first 'defeat' in terms of a decreasing share 
of votes in its post-war existence (a 4 percent loss compared to the 1976 elections). At the 
756 H. Schmidt. Die Deutschl'l1 llnd ihre Nachbarn. Menschen lmd Machte II. pp. ~ ll-.~ 12. 
m Peters. The Germans and the INF Missiles. p. 2. 
same time, the platform for a renewed understanding and cooperation between the DC and the 
PSI (at the expense of the PCI) seemed to be set. 
Italy, as well as Britain, had agreed relatively quickly (subject to approval in parliament) to 
accept new deployments, thus reassuring Schmidt that West Germany would not be the only 
continental country to receive the new weapons. This public reassurance was important in that 
neither Belgium nor the Netherlands had finally decided to participate, given certain 
reservations and political uncertainty.758 As a result of Italy's decision to participate in 
NATO's euromissile deployment, a new security debate took place in the country. The DC. 
the Republican Party, the Liberals, the Social Democrats and the Socialist Party signed a 
proposal declaring the government's official support of the dual-track decision as adopted at 
the NATO council meeting on 12 December 1979.759 In Italy, the government's decision was, 
without doubt, also linked to a question of national prestige. This entailed the desire in 
playing a larger role in the moderation of NATO's nuclear forces and to increase the national 
importance over NATO affairs. This was likely to have been further accelerated after the 
absence of Italy's prime minister at Guadeloupe.76o 
The political weight of the Italian Socialists gained a new momentum In the missile 
controversy after the PCI had withdrawn its support from the DC-led government, thus 
bringing the years of national solidarity to an end. The Italian decision (as subject to 
ratification in parliament) was in the hands of the Socialists' choice in the matter. Without the 
PSI's support, the government coalition could not muster sufficient votes to secure the 
necessary parliamentary approval for the deployment.761 The PSI was in a position to exploit 
758 Garthoff, Detente. p. 542. .. . . . , 
759 L'ltalia nella Palitica intema;..iana/e. 1979-1980, Istituto Affari Internazinnali (ed.) (EdlzlOm dl Comumta: 
1981), p. 543. . 
760 Leopoldo Nuti, 'Italy and the BattIc of the Euromissiles: The Deployment of the US BGM~ 1 09 G 'Gryphon. 
1979-XY. in Olav Nj{)lstad (ed.), The Last Decade afthe Cold War (London and New York: hank Casso 200·+), 
r,. 343. 
hi Ihid .. p. 345. 
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the situation by drawing the maXImum benefit from it. Craxi' s party benefited from its 
support of the deployment by deliberately demonstrating to the US that his party could be a 
reliable partner in transatlantic relations, and with respect to the DC. a responsible coalition 
partner.762 Moreover, Craxi had used the occasion to highlight PSI convergences with the 
SPD and the significance of his party's decision for the SPD and NATO.763 
7.) The FOP and the debate of new missiles in Germany 
Although the FDP did by no means support the NATO dual-track unanimously, the FDP's 
rank and file sustained its leadership's line more homogenously than its coalition partner. 
Despite its belief in the necessary continuation of Ostpolitik and detente, the FDP increasingly 
favoured the nuclear deterrent component as an appropriate response to the SS_20S.764 One 
can notice a certain convergence between Schmidt's and Genscher's strategic military 
thinking. According to the Foreign Minister, the decision to rearm would not inevitably 
imperil the process of detente. In an article to The Times, Genscher declared that he was 
'cautiously optimistic about the chances of negotiations with Russia after the expected NATO 
decision next week to arm itself ( ... ), and that 'there could be no security without balanced 
armaments' .765 Over the course of the debate until the installation of new missiles, Genscher 
managed to control the opponents in his party, and overall secured a relatively undisputed 
support. Anxious as both Schmidt and Genscher were to avoid any disturbance of relations 
with their Eastern neighbours, they were nevertheless convinced that a precondition of this 
relationship was the maintenance of the military equilibrium.766 Despite numerous critical 
voices in the FDP, it can be principally sustained that the dual-track decision brought the FDP 
7()' . 
- IbId .. p. 353. 
763 L'Italia nella Politica interna:.ionale. 1979-1980. p. 544. 
764 Kramer. Die FDP. p. 175. 
7(,'; The Till/es. 'German hopes for detente after arms reduction' , 3 December 1979. _ 
766 Sl'l' also Pl'll'r Pulzer, German Politics 19';5-1995 (Oxford: Oxford Univl'rsity Prl'ss. 1995). p. 13:" 
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closer in line with the foreign policy and security-related concept of the CDU/CSU.767 The 
position of the CDU/CSU in this debate should not go unmentioned. Both factions 
unanimously supported the decision to rearm. Franz-Josef StrauB (the CSU candidate for 
chancellor), considered the NATO decision as essential given Soviet superiority in the 
field. 768 Pressing the SPD to unequivocally position itself behind the modernisation of 
medium-range missiles, StrauB even argued for a stationing solely on German territories in 
case Belgium, the Netherlands (and the other countries under consideration) decided to 
withdraw from the decision.769 The apparent FDP-CDU/CSU convergence over the issue 
induced Schmidt 'to discipline' his own party over the issue. 
7.1) Germany, the SPO and the Cruise missile debate 
Since the debate on military rearmament in West Germany in the early to mid-1950s, no 
military-related decision had been discussed so vehemently or caused such controversy in the 
SPD's rank and file and society than the issue of deploying new missiles on German territory. 
The key question to address, however, is why Helmut Schmidt (together with some prominent 
SPD figures) so vehemently supported a decision which was widely unpopular and caused 
such profound inner-party conflicts. This question can be dealt with, departing from the basis 
of two (mutually compatible) assumptions: firstly, Schmidt's dogmatic conviction in the 
correctness of the notion of military-parity and in the policy of deterrence and secondly the 
desire to remain in power. 
Before going any further, the impact of German public opinion over the dual-track should not 
go unmentioned. Some of the existing literature stressed the growing unpopUlarity of the dual-
track as expressive in public opinion polls. In this particular case, public opinion polls are to 
767 Kramer, Die FDP, p. 180. For a detailed analysis of the FDP's position on the dual-track and the opponenl~ in 
its own rank and file Sec ibid., pp. 188-189. 
768 Miinchener Merkur. 'StrauB fordert klares Ja zur NATO-RUstung', 3 December 1979. 
769 General-An:.eiga. 'Union und fDP fordern klare Entscheidung der SPD', 3 Decemhl'r 1l)79. 
be used cautiously and are not necessarily helpful; rather they produce contradictory results 
on the matter depending on how the question was phrased. In a poll conducted in May 1981 
asking whether, 'the dual-track by and large was supported or not'. 53 percent of the 
respondents answered in favour of it (compared with 21 percent against). This result did not 
alter substantially between 1981 and 1982 (54 percent in favour). However, in another poll in 
1981 that confronted the respondents with the question of, 'whether the planned Cruise 
missiles in response to the Soviet SS-20s on European territories should be prevented'. 47 
percent agreed the decision should be banned, 28 percent voiced their approval of it.77o 
Whether this influenced Schmidt's decision-making process is plausible. but unlikely. It may, 
however, have had an impact on the debate amongst the SPD's base. Schmidt himself was 
steered by his rigid belief in the policy of deterrence (even if at the lowest possible level), by 
his binding agreement towards NATO and the US as well as a strong commitment to the 
survival of the SPD-FDP coalition government and hence to his own political fate. 771 By 
connecting the decision over the dual-track with a possible resignation, he used a strong 
instrument to discipline and pressurise inner-party adversaries. 772 After all. what held the 
party together was a common desire to remain in government. On 9 October 1979, Schmidt 
had declared in a conversation with the Italian Prime Minister Cossiga that he was even 
wi Bing to put at risk the existence of his government in order to push through the dual-
track. 773 To link the decision over the missiles so vehemently with the continuation of the 
770 Allensbacher lahrbuch der Demoskopie 1978-1983, Vol. 8, Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann, J·.dgar PieL K.G. 
Saucr (eds) (Mtinchen: Institut flir Demoskopie Allensbach, 1983), p. 636. 
771 Helmut Schmidt Die Deutschen und ihre Nachbam. Mellschen llfld Miichte Il , p. 251. 
77~ In his memoirs Jimmv Carter said that Schmidt seemed to be torn betwcen the conflicting political force" in 
his country. In private c~nversations between the two, so Carter recalled, Schmidt was \'cry tou~h in dealing . 
with the So\'iet threat and that he was often the leader among Europeans in pWp(lsmg stnng actIOn. Howe\er. m 
German political debates, hc emphasised the opposite fact of the same question and scem~d reluctant to do . 
anything which might be interpreted as anti-So\iet. Both Giscard and Schmidt we:e hea:t1y under prc"surc tWill 
iL'ftist political groups to minimise their criticism of the Soviets. Sec Carter. Keeping Fat[h. p. 547. 
7T1 Schmidt. Die Deutscllen lind illre Nachbam. Menschen lllld Miichte Il , p. 312. 
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coalition government was used by Schmidt as a tool not to lose control over his own party on 
the matter. 
After the Guadeloupe summit, Schmidt had first addressed the problem of a growing Soviet 
military superiority in the SPD' s parliamentary faction meeting in February 1979. As far as 
the so-called 'Grey Area' was concerned, he reiterated that a combination of simultaneous 
modernisation and armament control negotiations had become vital. 774 The ultimate decision. 
however, was to be taken at a Party Congress held in December 1979 in Berlin. The 'Berlin 
Resolution' called upon the United States to continue arms production in the specific area and 
German acceptance of those on its territory if negotiations with Moscow failed to achieve the 
desired results.775 The declaration had therefore linked the decision to rearm with a 
simultaneous demand for negotiation with Moscow. There should be no automatism. Leeway 
must exist to revise the decision in the event of a successful outcome of negotiations.776 
The desire to remain in government was prevalent, and decisive for many prominent SPD 
members to accept the decision in spite of massive reservations. For instance, Willy Brandt's 
vote in favour was not motivated by conviction, but determined by the willingness to remain 
in power.777 Brandt and others stressed that there could be no 'automatism' to the decision to 
deploy and that the issue would be discussed during two further party congresses. 
Bahr later recalled that the decision over the dual-track was inextricably linked with the 
ratification of SALT II. 'Had we known that the SALT II ratification process was halted by 
. ,778 Th' . II the US senate the dual-track would have never come to eXIstence. IS essentla y meant , 
that many in the SPD would have voted against it had they anticipated that SALT II had 
failed. Bahr ultimately voted in favour of the dual-track, albeit reluctantly. and with severe 
774 Schmidt. SPD parliamentary faction meeting, 6 February 1979, in AdSD, SPD-Bundestagsfraktion, 
8. Wahlperiode, 2IBTFH000081. 
775 SPD Party Congress in Berlin, 3-7 December 1979, re-printed in ~PD (e~.), D~~ll111ellte. ~Pf! , .. 
Al{/3erordentlicher Parteitag. Beschliisse ::'11 Europa Friedens- lind S,cherheTfspolmk Orgamsatumspolwk (Bonn. 
1983), p . .+, 
776 Ihid. 
777 M h 11"11 B dt p 781 See also D,'e WeIr 'Die Raketen-Schlacht mohilisierte alles', 6 Decemher erse urger. HI y rail ,. . , 
1979. 
778 Egon Bahr. Was wird aus dell Deutschen? (Hamhurg: Rowohlt. 1982). p, 1'+9. 
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reservations. His choice was determined by the desire to prevent Schmidt from resigning and 
to press the Americans to enter negotiations as entailed in the second aspect of NATO's 
resolution.779 The INF served as an instrument; to ensure that the American government came 
back to the arms control negotiating table with the Soviets.78o 
Karsten Voigt, on the other hand, had stressed during the debate at the 1979 Party Congress 
that a final decision could not be made at the present stage. A conclusive choice could only be 
made after a re-evaluation of the negotiation results of the two superpowers prior to any 
stationing.781 Voigt also stressed that if SALT II failed to be ratified, in spite of a previous 
decision in favour of the NATO resolution, a new context would emerge and the issue would 
have to be voted upon again.782 Despite this, the Berlin Congress was a failure for those in the 
party critical of the NATO resolution, and who wished to give the priority to armament 
contro1.783 Voigt also touched upon the issue of the 'quality' of new missiles. In this context, 
he suggested that the Pershing II and the Cruise missiles not only meant rearmament in 
response to and directed at the Soviet SS-20s, but that NATO was planning a weapon arsenal 
on a qualitatively much higher technological level than the Soviet missiles.784 
After the issue of Germany's non-singularity had been officially resolved and the negotiations 
part incorporated, the 1979 Party Congress voted in favour of NATO's decision. Both aspects 
had been preconditions for the majority to agree. The fundamental problem with the dual-
track, of course, was that support for it needed to be secured over the period of four years 
until the deployment in 1983. Continued negotiations with the Soviet Union were therefore 
779 Ibid., p. I SO. 
780 Ibid. . . , 
7S1 Karsten D. Voigt. 'Schrittweiser Ausstieg aus dem Rtistungswettlauf nach dem Berliner Partellag der SPD . 
in Die Nelle Gesellschaft, No.1. 1980, pp. 47-51. . ., ... 
782 Voigt, Press documentation of the German parliament. INT-102-6/-+. See also VOIgt. 'SchnttwL'\'-,L'r .\u'-,'-,tleg . 
p. '+7. 
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important to maintain and reassure the support of the SPD over a period of four years. 785 
Without the commitment to negotiate, the already fragile majority within the SPD could ha\'e 
easily dissolved and shifted to opposition. 
Schmidt therefore had every interest in East-West detente, as a collapse would have implied a 
return to Cold War hostilities and the freezing of arms negotiations. In late June 1979. 
Schmidt had already paid an unsuccessful brief visit to Moscow, and offered Kosygin a 
compromise whereby NATO wou~d refrain from deploying new missiles, if the Soviets 
limited the number of warheads on the SS-20s to the level of the old SS-4s and SS-5S.786 In 
1980, Schmidt proposed a 3-year moratorium on the INF-deployment, his intention being to 
direct the Soviets to halt the emplacement of new SS-20s while NATO was waiting for Cruise 
missiles and Pershing II to become operational. 787 This triggered a wide rift in the already 
difficult relation between Carter and Schmidt. 788 Carter later recalled that Schmidt's proposal 
for some kind of 3-year moratorium had caused a serious problem between him and Schmidt, 
as Schmidt's proposal was widely interpreted as a reversal of Germany's position and an 
abandonment of the December 1979 NATO agreement.789 Negotiations as envisaged in the 
dual-track officially began in November 1981 in Geneva. They lasted for the next two years 
without reaching a solution. 
7.2) The pel and the euromissile debate 
The debate over the installation of new missiles caused a foreign policy dilemma for the PCI. 
Faced with the challenge of accepting new missiles (i.e. adopting a position similar to that of 
the SPD and of the other national players in Italy), the PCI was from the onset in a difficult 
situation with little prospect. By opposing NATO's decision. the party would risk complete 
785 See also Layritz, Der NATO-Doppelbeschlllss, p. 380. 
786 Loth. Overcoming, p. 155. , . 
787 Moscow rejected a moratorium on the stationing of new medium-range missiles as propnsl:d hy SchmIdt. In 
ibid .. p. 164. 
788 Helmut Schmidt. Menschell lind Miichte, pp. 256-257. See also Sodaro. MoscoH'. p. 274. 
789 Carter. Keeping Faith, pp. 544-545. 
260 
isolation, or vice versa by accepting it the PCI could have prompted its own division as the 
party's activists might not have carried the decision. Instead, the PCI did what it had done 
over the past decade. By referring to the primacy of detente it avoided aligning itself 
unequivocally with either side. In the euromissile debate, it adopted a position of neutrality. 
one that would not too outspokenly attack the United States or the Soviet Union. or reversely, 
one that criticised the arms race of both sides as detrimental to the cause of detente. 
In line with previous statements in the 1970s, the party's careful balancing act of being 
'neither against the US nor against the Soviet Union' continued. The PCI went to great 
lengths demonstrating that it took a responsible position directed towards preventing to 
impede previous achievements in the field of detente. In short, the PCI reiterated its 
equidistant character in the Cold War. 790 Whilst this was a reasonable position to adopt, 
especiall y as to the process of detente, this rendered the party vulnerable to attacks from both 
sides. At the same time this demonstrated that acceptance of NATO was one thing, but if this 
involved positioning itself clearly in the event of a military conflict, it was quite another. By 
referring to the primacy of detente at all costs, the PCI's position was certainly the most 
reasonable one (if viewed in the general debate over nuclear disarmament), but in the context 
of the given circumstances, also the most unrealistic: it showed once more that equidistance in 
the framework of deteriorating East-West relations was simply not an option and certainly not 
one to strive for if the other domestic political players had already placed themselves 
unambiguousl y. 
The PCI attempted to carefully adjust the nature of its opposition to the security and defence 
interests of Italy and of the government - in particular those stemming from NATO decisions 
in order to retain its new image of a pro-Atlantic Alliance communist party. Against this 
790 Contrary to this, Piero Ostellino. for example, argued that in the debate over the Cruise. ~1issiIcs. the PC)" ~ . 
position was closer to that of the Soviet Union than Western Europe, in Ostellino. 'La pohtlca estera del pel. In 
Renato Midi (ed.). II PCI allo specchio (Milano: Rizzoli Editore, 1983). p. -+ 72. 
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background, the PCI reiterated that the question could not simply be reduced to the call 'of 
staying in NATO or not'. NATO and Italy's belonging to it were not questioned. However. 
while leaving NATO was 'out of the question', staying in NATO could not simply amount to 
an unconditional acceptance of all of its decisions.791 As far as the content of the NATO 
resolution was concerned, the PCI demanded instead the 'suspension or postponement for at 
least six months of any decision on the production or deployment of new US Cruise missiles 
or Pershing 2 and insisted simultaneously that the Soviet Union refrained from deploying SS-
20s' ,792 The PCI insisted at once on immediate negotiations between the two superpowers to 
establish a military equilibrium in Europe at the lowest military level possible.793 This 
.-
emphasis on negotiations, rejecting any decision linked with the deployment of new missiles, 
was presented by Berlinguer in parliament on 5 December 1979, a few days before the NATO 
summit in Brussels finalised the dual-track decision.794 
Prior to the PCl's decision, there was, following Pons, much greater debate on the euromissile 
issue within the party than had publicly appeared or may have been assumed,795 The PCl's 
spokesman on the euromissile question was Romano Ledda, director of the PCl's centre of 
international political studies. Ledda's report acknowledged that the strategic balance might 
have shifted to the advantage of the Soviet Union. This acknowledgment could in fact have 
been taken as a first move to the Right - away from the Soviet Union. 
The PCI had also closely observed the debate within the SPD. Ledda proposed that the PCI's 
position should highlight the demands for negotiation, thereby aligning the party to the 
791 L'unifa 'Per fermare la corsa al riarmo atomico'. 6 December 1979. in APC, Fondo Berlinguer. Varie 108. 
792 'Discor~i, Dichiarazioni, Interviste 1979'. in APe, Fondo Berlinguer. Varie 108. 
793 'Discorsi 198011981'. in APC'. Fondo Berlinguer, Varie 109. . , . 
794 L' Un if a 'Per fermare la corsa al riarmo atomico', 6 December 1979, in APe. FllOdo Berhnguer. \ arle 108: 
Sec also E~rico Berlinguer. Discorsi parlamenfari (1968-1984), Maria Luisa Righi (ed.) (Rnma: Camera del 
Deputati. 2(01). p. 189. 
795 Pons. Berlillguer e fa fine del C011111nis1110 (Torino: Giulio Einaudi. 2006), p. 165. 
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SPD.796 The condition would be the freezing of both NATO's decision to deploy as well as 
the construction of new Soviet missiles. 
The PCl's executive was divided over Ledda's formulation. 797 Some members of the PCl's 
leading circle insisted on the dismissal of NATO's decision, but not in favour of negotiations. 
The most outspoken supporter of this position was Pecchioli, who held that the US position 
towards the euromissiles represented 'a clear anti-communist instrument' because it refused to 
accept the existing military equilibrium.798 Both Bufalini and Napolitano gave way to the 
priority of the negotiation aspect, referring to the dramatic repercussions the installation of 
both Pershing 2, Cruise missiles and SS-20s would have. What was important here, is that 
Napolitano underlined the link between the missile question and the party's national policy. 
The PCl's access to government, so Napolitano said, was also dependent on a foreign policy 
consensus with the other democratic parties.799 The debate demonstrates again the enormous 
internal and external constraints the PCI had faced and how they affected the party's position. 
As discussed before, the Italian Communists' domestic strategy was heavily dependent on 
detente and international disarmament. Foreign policy divergences with the other parties 
would only further isolate the PC I. On the other hand, any decision that would have clearly 
aligned the party with one of the superpowers would have undermined the party's self-
perceived image and intermediary role between the Cold War antagonists. At the same time, 
one could question whether the PCl's already prevailing national isolation would have 
substantially altered if the party had sanctioned the dual-track decision unequivocally. With 
hindsight, one can argue that PCI's impasse - in terms of an exhaustion of its political and 
social alliance options - had become an established fact, which a diverse position over the 
missile debate would not have changed. 
796 Ihid., p. 166. 
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Berlinguer ultimately spoke in favour of negotiations, arguing that the PCI could neither 
approve of the US missiles, nor was his party the foreign policy spokesman of the Soviet 
Union. In short, the PCI spoke against the NATO dual-track decision. but its opposition was 
. ld' d d . 800 T not unyle lng an ogmahc. he PCI attempted to adopt a position which would be 
adjudged sensible and responsible, further highlighting the PCI's national responsibility. The 
PCI's effort to avoid an explicitly pro-Soviet stance in the debate was evident as this was 
essential not to provide party adversaries with further evidence or incentives for isolating the 
party, and dismissing it as anti-Atlanticist or a foreign policy arm of the Soviet Union. 
Although the SPD had officially carried the installation of new missiles, we do notice a 
certain convergence between the SPD and the PCI. The idea behind the PCI's proposal was 
not that dissimilar from the reasoning of many leading figures in the SPD. The debate also 
produced considerable similarities with wider sections of the SPD and its youth organisation. 
Both the PCI and the majority of the SPD firmly believed in the necessity and significance of 
maintaining a military balance in Europe, but at the lowest possible level. 
An examination of the debate within the PCI's leading circles sheds some interesting light on 
the reasoning behind the party's position. In his report to the PCI's executive, Berlinguer 
emphasised that he did not perceive the PCI as being altogether isolated. On the contrary, he 
stated that although the Italian Socialists adopted a pro-American position in principle, there 
also existed severe reservations within the PSI as to pursue a line that would too clearly 
distinguish the party from the PCI.801 A closer assessment of the debate within the DC. so 
Berlinguer stressed, demonstrated that within this party too, there existed pressures from 
certain sectors within society and Catholic organisations. This in tum reflected upon the 
800 See. for l'xampk. also Varsori who argued that the pel. at least in the initial phase of the NATO decision. 
decided to adopt a low-profile attitude. in L 'Italia nelle relazioni i1lterna~ionali. p. 212. 
80( 'Berlinguer's report to the Dirczione·. 28 November 1979. in APe. MF 0·+397912. 
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position of the Vatican. 802 The Vatican was against any military escalation in principle, and 
therefore unsurprisingly pacifist in nature. Berlinguer criticised the Italian government for 
failing to develop an independent and autonomous position, and for tying its decision too 
closely to that of other governments, most notably to that of the Federal Republic of 
Germany.803 This of course marked a contradiction as the PCI had also sought the SPD as a 
reference point in formulating its decision. 
After examining the debate within other Western European countries such as the Netherlands 
and Belgium, Berlinguer concluded, also with reference to oscillating parts within the SPD, 
that the PCI was not isolated after all. 804 
Berlinguer's analysis seemed to present a fairly accurate picture of the debate that had 
evolved over the installation of new missiles and managed to grasp the generally pacifist 
mood amongst large parts of Western European society. In October 1979, large sections of the 
Italian Catholic organisations published a manifesto against the installation of new missiles. 
This further induced leading PCI officials to conclude that the appeal of these organisations 
against the deployment of Cruise missiles would offer a basis for unitary action. 80S This could 
also be interpreted as a renewed overture towards the DC or at least those sections more 
reluctant to rearmament. In the debate over the PCI's position, Di Giulio, a member of the 
party's executive, emphasised that the missile debate put the DC in clear difficulty. The DC 
was immensely concerned about the pressures and resistance coming from a broad Catholic 
spectrum. It was to those sections, Di Giulio concluded, that the PCI's position would be 
appealing. 806 Natta also stressed that the PCI was not isolated at all since its position would 
802 Ibid. 
8aJ Ibid. 
804 Ibid. . 
805 'Lettera aperta di associazioni cattoliche'. in A\'\'enire. 31 October 1979. re-printed in APC. [\11" O-BY 0576. 
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meet agreement of the other European political forces and governments.807 The most 
outspoken overture to the PSI was entailed in Napolitano's statement, who maintained that 
contacts with the PSI were useful and essential. Possibilities of mutual agreement and 
convergences could not be excluded altogether and certain pressures on the PSI could tum out 
fruitful. 808 
Berlinguer and some of the other members of the PCl's executive realistically evaluated and 
assessed the doubts this new military debate had caused within some sections of the PSI and 
the DC. Despite these uncertainties, the PSI and the DC, much as the SPD, officially carried 
the NATO decision. What Berlinguer had failed to realise and what eventually led to the 
party's isolation on a national scale, was the fact the PSI attempted to distinguish itself from 
the PCI over the missile debate. Even if there were some parts in the PSI who held views not 
dissimilar from those of the Communists, awareness of the influence on the government of the 
socialist stance, of the opportunity to hold a position similar to that of the SPD and the 
convenience of the debate in creating and establishing a distinction from that of the PCI in 
order to politically re-Iaunch the party, induced the PSI and most importantly its leader, 
Bettino Craxi, to support the government's decision. This further demonstrates, as argued 
above, that the euromissile debate in Italy (as well as Germany) was exemplary for the 
domestic policy implications of certain foreign policy related issues and decisions. Both PCI 
and PSI were highly attentive to the domestic implications of their decision, while the former 
failed to grasp the prevailing desire within the PSI to disassociate itself from the Communists 
over the issue. The Italian Socialists sought the possibility to adopt a position similar to that 
of the SPD, which it thought useful in order to create a distinction from the PCI. It also seized 
the opportunity to re-identify the party's national and foreign policy image. After all, one has 
to bear in mind that political parties have to define themselves, when in power. against the 
coalition partners as well as the opposition. Once in power. they have to define themselves 
807 Ibid. 
808 Ibid. 
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again against its domestic rivals as well as against the other governing parties. The ratification 
of the NATO resolution in Italian parliament and the dependence on PSI votes attributed an 
enormous political weight to the party. This opportunity was seized by the Socialists to render 
themselves politically indispensable for the new government. 
Ever since Bettino Craxi was elected leader of the PSI on 16 July 1976, he had stressed that 
the PSI had tied its destiny too closely to the Communists in recent years and reiterated that 
his party must follow a more independent line if it wished to restore its electoral fortunes. 809 
Hence, the Socialist's support of the government's Atlantic policy and of the dual-track 
isolated the PCI and reduced its room for manoeuvre in the foreign policy context. Most 
importantly, the domestic and international importance of the euromissile question helped the 
Italian Socialists to build the image of an Italian left-wing party able to assume responsibility 
in the field of military and defence-related issues without being ideologically conditioned.810 
The primary motivation for the DC to support a decision that was highly unpopular, not only 
amongst large parts of the population but that was also directed against a section of its own 
party supporters that should not be underestimated, was an attempt to gain a stronger role in 
the Atlantic Alliance. Italy had not been invited to Guadeloupe when the US, France. Britain 
and Germany had first discussed the SS-20s on a high summit leve1. 811 
The PCI's position, while in line with its general image of being a pacifist, albeit Atlanticist. 
national party, that wished to enhance its legitimacy by an intermediary role in the East -West 
conflict. contained a number of flaws: first of all, the PCI never managed to break away from 
its image to take truly independent decisions from Moscow. After alL the PCI was still a 
communist party and had no self-declared intention to tear itself away from its communist 
809 The National Archives. PREM 16/978. 
SIO Sec also Maurizio Cremasco, 'Italy: A new Role in the Mediterranean', in John Chipman (ed.), NATO's 
SOllthern Allies: Internal and External Challenges (London and New York: Routledge. 1988). p. 207. 
811 Ihid., p. 206. 
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heritage (at least for the time being). No matter how often and how strongly the PCI reiterated 
its neutral position in the East-West conflict and its firm acceptance of Italy's international 
obligations, it remained after all a communist party and never managed to conyince its 
political opponents that its decisions were not ideologically motivated or of tactic nature. As 
suggested before, the desire for international detente was accompanied by the fighting of a 
'national Cold War' in Italy. The underlying problem of the PCI was that, in spite of all 
reassurances, it still called itself communist, though with the benefit of hindsight, only for 
another decade. Nonetheless, this would always discriminate and isolate the PCI nationally. 
accompanied by a reluctance of the other parties to enter a governmental entente with the 
party. This went hand in hand with the fact that the leading DC so far had no compelling 
reason to form a coalition with the PCI. To that end, the very question of whether the PCI's 
programme, its language, its political objectives, still had anything communist about them 
was indeed secondary. 
Secondly, the PCI's foreign policy concept was very tightly linked to the process of detente 
and its self-imposed role as a mediator. The party failed to develop a dynamic and 
independent foreign policy in case detente and negotiations collapsed. Thirdly, and perhaps 
most politically fatal of all, was the PCI's failure to understand the changes occurring within 
the PSI. The Socialists' support of the government's Atlantic policy isolated the PCI by 
reducing its room for manoeuvre and simultaneously paved the way for the PSI to engage in 
new modes of collaboration with the DC. Although the PCI was fully aware that its political 
maturity as a possible and reliable party of government was also always evaluated on the basis 
of its compliance with NATO's military decisions, nevertheless. it underestimated the 
position of the PSI and the consequences of both parties' decisions on the Italian political 
system. Thus, although the PCI's position can be deemed responsible and characterised by it--
non-alignment in urging both superpowers to negotiate. the Italian Communists remained 
268 
relatively isolated on a national scale due to a failure to adopt a strategy in case superpower 
willingness to negotiate collapsed. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 
only further reduced the PCI's room for manoeuvre. Moreover, given the transformed 
political landscape in Italy as a result of a reshuffling of coalition constellations. the pcrs 
position was irrelevant for the ratification process. This underlines my previous argument that 
in the event of the PCI carrying the NATO resolution, this would most likely not have 
substantially altered its domestic isolation. 
Although the PCI's line and logic behind (the dual-track) converged with that of large parts of 
the Italian (and Western European) population, it did isolate the PCI nationally by further 
distancing it from the other Italian political forces. 812 The PCI's proposal to open negotiations 
immediately, dismissing every decision related to further deployment (on both sides), as 
represented by Berlinguer in parliament, however desirable, did not stand a realistic chance, 
although it managed to grasp the general pacifist atmosphere amongst the Italian population. 
This was, nevertheless, not sufficient. In the more general framework of Italy's military 
obligations, the PCI's proposal was not viable due to the country's obligation of alliance 
burden sharing. This was also the prevalent position of the other parties. Another weakness in 
the PCI's proposal lay in the fact that it anticipated a certain Soviet willingness to 
negotiate. 813 This was ever more openly questioned after the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan. 
812 Sassoon. Introduction to Enrico Berlinguer. Discorsi parlamentari (1968-1984), p. xlii. 
813 Bcrlinguer stressed that the PCI opposed the NATO decision to deploy new e~romissiles al~o because 
according to the PCI. there was the possibility to enter negotiations with the SOY let bloc to anHd .both t,he 
installation of new US missiles and SS-20s, See Berlinguer in L'Unita. 8 fchruary 1980. as re-pnnted In ,\PC. 
Fondo Berlinguer, Varic 109. 
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7.3) pel and SPD convergences over the NATO dual-track 
In retrospect, both SPD and PCI positions over the deployment of new missiles were 
determined by international obligations and domestic policy considerations. The pcr s line 
did not, and in many ways could not go beyond a 'neither SS-20s nor Cruise missiles or 
Pershing 2' without putting at stake its credibility as a promoter of international detente and a 
relaxation of military escalation. At the same time, as long as the PCI did not liberate itself 
from its ideological ballast (name, symbols etc. as the SPD had done in 1959). the party's 
policies were bound to be ideologically conditioned - at least as far as the PCI's national and 
international adversaries were concerned. The SPD accepted the dual-track reluctantly. not 
least in order to secure its own political position in government. Referring to an article by 
Egon Bahr in the German weekly Der Spiegel, the PCI affirmed the convergence between the 
two parties' positions. The SPD advocated ideas and positions which the PCI largely 
shared. 814 Bahr had criticised the uncontrollable rearmament and arms race, as well as the 
serious threats this implied. Instead, the proposed common objective should be the 
maintaining of a military equilibrium at the lowest possible level.815 Disarmament and nuclear 
parity always had the priority over rearmament for many in the SPD. The logic of military and 
nuclear equilibrium as a method (to arrive at negotiations) seemed antiquated to many in the 
SPD. The level of the existing arms race was sufficient, and the stationing of new missiles in 
Western European would merely equate American superiority.816 This of course. did not 
reflect upon the official party position on the government level. The question of whether the 
two parties converged, or held divergent conceptions over the missile debate depends on the 
perspective from which the subject is viewed. Despite the official agreement on the dual-
track, the SPD was, on a non-governmental level, yet even more so viewed from the broad 
spectrum of party adherents as very critical and sceptic about the rearmament initiative. 
814 . V' 108 APC Fondo Berhnguer, ane . 
8I:i DerSpiegel. 15 Oc(oher 1979. as quoted in L'Unita, 6 Decemher 1979, in APe. Fondo BerIinguer. Varie lOR. 
Hltl Dehate at the SPD Party Congress in Munich, 19-23 April 1982, re-printed in AdSD. DepOSitum Helmut 
Schmidt. IIHSAA 7814. 
270 
Inherent in this was the rejection of the idea that deployment of new missiles and the concept 
of nuclear deterrence would provide an additional security for Western Europe. The dual-
track decision only forcefully triggered an existing and never ending security dilemma. West 
Europeans, and especially Germans, were on the one hand afraid that the United States would 
not use its nuclear arsenal (in defence of Europe), and on the other hand, precisely that they 
would. The PCI denounced the notion of deploying new missiles in case negotiations failed. 
In essence, this entailed the idea of ongoing negotiations until they were successful. In this, 
the PCI did indeed not follow the NATO line, which entailed a rearmament automatism, but 
nonetheless, profound features of the PCI's concept were compatible with ideas forwarded by 
leading figures in the SPD. 817 Pons suggested the opposite: that the SPD's vote in favour, 
though inextricably linked to the perspective of negotiation, underlined more the differences 
than the similarities with the PCI on an internationalleve1.818 Here I would suggest that the 
tendency was the opposite. The rearmament debate illustrates the fact that more often than 
not, government parties, and less frequently opposition parties are not confronted with a 
certain set of foreign policy options. The choices are often already 'given' in that parties' 
policies often reflect upon internal (electoral and coalition) obligations and external 
responsibilities (international commitments etc). 
Both parties became nationally isolated over the issue and were confronted with a lack of 
political alliances, the PCI from 1979, the SPD from 1982 onwards. The case of the missiles 
also demonstrated that every so often national political and international obligations or 
constraints undermine the existence of 'policy choices' . 
817 See also Timmermann, 'Die Verwestlichung der KPI. Zu den internationalen Beziehungen der italienischen 
Kommunisten nach ihrem XVI. Parteitag', Osteuropa-Archil' (1983), p. 52fl. 
Rig Pons, Berlinguer, p. 168. Rubbi, for example, later stated that in the euromissi.le que~tion, t~e PC I. ~nd the 
SPD held almost the same position, only that Brandt, in his function as SPD preSIdent. lound hlmsC\l In the 
conflicting position to allow for official govcrnmental policy; in Rubbi, II Mondo. p. 1"+0. The revc~se may 
certainlv be argued with rcgard to the PCl which, while adopting a principally pro-Western stance In the dehate 
had to ~lIow for and balance this with the pro-Moscow wing of the party. 
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The German Jusos heavily objected to the SPD's approval of the dual-track. In a resolution of 
its federal committee, the Jusos demanded the denunciation of the NATO decision to deploy 
new missiles. The resolution further dismissed any such stationing in the FRG or Western 
Europe; spoke in favour of an immediate ratification of SALT II as well as direct and 
unconditional negotiations on the basis of the existing status quO. 8I9 The Jusos heavily 
attacked the new Reagan-administration and its delaying of negotiations over intermediate 
range missiles as well as US imperialist policies in Latin America, Asia and Africa.82o The 
Jusos' positioning over the matter was in fact more 'left-wing' and uncompromising than the 
PCI's. The German Young Socialists did not conceal their criticism against American 
(imperialist) foreign policies, and required an instant return to the negotiations table. In this, 
the Jusos were less constrained and inhibited. According to many in the SPD's youth 
organisation, there was no clear cut line between American imperialism and Soviet 
expansionism. The PCI's disapproval was more subtle and characterised by the primacy of 
detente whilst avoiding to be pinned down favouring a specific side. As such, it practised 
open condemnation of either side and criticised the ongoing armaments race. The comparison 
shows that there was not necessarily anything distinctively 'communist' or unyielding about 
the PCI's stance in the missile debate. 
7.4) Pacifist movements in Italy and Germany 
The dual-track decision caused one of the most fiercely and controversially debated foreign 
policy issues and security-related discussions within the SPD in its post-war history. The 
movement against Cruise missiles and Pershing 2 developed into the biggest mass mo\,\?ment 
in Europe since the Second World War thus far, with demonstrations involving millions of 
819 AdSD, Depositum Hdmut Schmidt. IIHS AA007790. 
820 Ibid. 
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people.
821 
The missile debate involved the possibility of fighting a nuclear war. This prospect 
naturally elicited a reaction of extraordinary alarm not only on the part of the inhabitants of 
the countries where such a war was likely to take place or where new nuclear weapons would 
be deployed, but frightened the Western European popUlation in general. 
It also triggered one of the largest public debates in Western German society. After 1981, 
German resistance to the impending installation of new missiles was increasingly widespread 
across a broad spectrum of the population. In May 1981, some 800,000 peace activists had 
signed the 'Krefelder Initiative' - a letter to Schmidt demanding a withdrawal of the 
government's decision to agree on the deployment of Pershing 2 and Cruise missiles in 
Western Germany.822 On 10 October 1981, some 350,000 people gathered in Bonn and 
demonstrated against Western rearmament in what became one of the largest demonstrations 
in the history of the Federal Republic. 823 The PCI's return to opposition limited its political 
weight in disagreeing with the INF decision. After the PCI's initial phase of moderate 
criticism of the missiles, the party moved closer to the pacifist groups. The PCI's role in the 
1980-1983 anti-nuclear pacifist demonstrations was strong, but not comparable to the anti-
NATO demonstrations of the 1950s or 1960s. It was characterised by a mutual condemnation 
of both NATO and Soviet missiles as an impediment to detente and a parallel denunciation of 
the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the 1981 Polish military coup against 
Solidarnosc.824 
821 Kate Hudson. European Communism since 1989. Towards a New European Left? (Basingstoke. London: 
Macmillan Press, 2000), p. 29. _ . 
822 The Krefelder Initiative'. the letter to Schmidt was published in Frankfurter Rundschau. I) May Il)X I. In 
AdSD. Depositum Helmut Schmidt. I/HS AA 8000. 
823 Martin Rupps. Troika wider Willen (Berlin: Propylaen Verlag. 2004). p. 280. 
S24 Rimanelli, Ita(r between Ellrope and the Mediterranean. p. 774. 
A further consequence arising from the debate over rearmament was its reinforcement of a 
new 'green' movement. Even more alarming than pacifist sentiments across a politicised and 
activist society in the eyes of Schmidt, was the extending opposition within his own party.82) 
No other foreign policy issue was so inextricably linked with inner German domestic policies 
like the question of INF-negotiations. Schmidt repeatedly related his own political destiny to 
the support of the dual-track. 826 
Schmidt's authority over the issue shrank enormously and his popularity and support within 
the SPD began increasingly to decline in 1982. The SPD was deeply divided over Schmidt's 
security policy. The unpopular decision to accept new US missiles in Germany had triggered 
a deep crisis within the SPD. This could only but affect the party's support and popularity in 
general. 
8.) The end of detente 
Two weeks after the NATO decision had been adopted, the Soviet Union invaded 
Afghanistan in December 1979. Though detente had been imperilled before, the invasion put 
an end to it, and made any possibility for East-West negotiations over the deployment of 
missiles in Europe seem unlikely for an uncertain period of time. The invasion strengthened 
supporters of the dual-track and undermined the Soviet credibility as to have a serious interest 
in negotiations. This profoundly reduced any room for manoeuvre for those who referred to 
Soviet benevolence, and who wished to ultimately avoid the deployment from 1983 onwards. 
The collapse of detente complicated and jeopardised the negotiations part of the NATO 
resolution, on which the SPD's fragile but ongoing support so fundamentally relied. 
The question of Western reactions to the Soviet invasion led to a further rift between the 
United States and Germany. According to Carter, the Soviet military invasion marked the 
most profound violation of the process of detente and automatically involved the suspension 
S) -
,-) Sodaro. MOSCOII', p. 277. 
R26 Winkkr, Der lange Weg nach Westem II. p. 391. 
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of the ratification of SALT II. Additionally, the American president urged NATO members to 
boycott the Moscow Olympics. Though Schmidt agreed with Carter on the gravity of the 
invasion on detente, he, along with his French counterpart D'Estaing. was anxious not to 
interrupt the dialogue with Moscow (and hence the negotiations over missile reductions).827 
To the PCI, the Soviet invasion marked a further strong setback and undermined the party' s 
already little credible position on the missile debate. The invasion was instantly and 
unconditionally condemned as an act of Soviet aggression and expansionism. declaring that 
there was no justification for military interference in the domestic affairs of another country. 
The PCI underlined the gravity of the events by stressing that it was the first Soviet invasion 
outside the geographical area of the Warsaw Pact. Against the vote of one exception, 
Armando Cossutta, the military intervention was unequivocally condemned by the PCI.828 
9.) The end of the social-liberal project in Germany and the failure of Italian 
communism 
In the SPD, party critical voices against the deployment of new missiles after 1983 grew 
enormously in tone and numbers during 1982. With the failure to ratify SALT II, the given 
circumstances had changed drastically, which in tum required a policy reappraisal in the eyes 
of many Social Democrats. Analysing the period from summer 1982 to 1983, we observe a 
radical policy reversal from the SPD as a party of government to a party of opposition. The 
basis of support had been maintained due to the desire to remain in government. At the SPD's 
Party Congress in 1982, voices demanding a moratorium for the time of negotiations 
increased but a corresponding motion was narrowly dismissed.
829 
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The missile controversy had damaged the internal cohesion within the SPD and disagreements 
over budgetary priorities were strongly undermining the relationship with the FDP. By mid-
1982, Genscher was ready to switch allegiance to the CDU. 830 This came to the fore in the 
summer of 1982 in a number of articles in German newspapers, in which the FDP expressed 
that it had become ever more reluctant to continue the coalition. This inevitably led to strong 
speculations that the FDP was openly seeking an overture toward the CDU/CSU.831 Towards 
the autumn of 1982, critical voices in the FDP begun to publicly question the coalition with 
the SPD and to explore new convergences with the Conservatives.832 Nonetheless, it would be 
oversimplifying and premature to argue that the coalition split over the NATO decision. 83] 
The matter was more complex. Beyond doubt, the euromissile debate confirmed existing 
foreign policy and security- related discrepancies in the coalition. However, the argument that 
the FDP was unanimously united over the missile debate is a simple myth. Genscher himself 
had to threaten to resign if his party failed to follow him on the question at the 1982 Party 
Congress of the FDP. 834 At the final vote, a quarter of the delegates rejected the idea of 
deploying new nuclear missiles in principle.835 Despite a genuine Schmidt-Genscher 
agreement on the question, it became increasingly apparent that the chancellor was struggling 
to discipline his own party. Common ground for joint social-liberal projects amounted to very 
little. Without doubt, the SPD's growing unpopUlarity alarmed the FDP as well. After all, the 
830 Sodaro, Moscow, p. 280. 
831 Helmut Schmidt's speech addressing the nation on 6 September 1982, re-printed in AdSD, Depositum 
Helmut Schmidt, IIHS AA010598. 
832 Winkler, Der lange Weg nach Westen II, p. 392 and p. 394. One of the problems for the FDP was how to 
make the break with the SPD without destroying themselves in the process. Irving and Paterson held that by the 
spring of 1982 there was clearly a majority in the FDP parliamentary faction, led by Genscher and Lambsdorff, 
in favour of changing the coalition. On the subject see R.E.M. Irving a~d W.E. Paterson. The ~~chtwechsel of 
1982-83: A Significant Landmark in the Political and Constitutional History of West Germany. In 
Parliamentary Affairs, Vol. 36, No.4 (1983), p. 426. . . 
83.1 See, for instance. Loth who argued that Genscher opted to switch coalition partners In 1982 partly because of 
the SPD's questioning of the resolution for the buildup; in Overcoming, p. 179. .. 
Hl~ V0I11't7r!S, 'Parteitag der Liberalen', 4 June 1981. in Press documentation of the German parltament. f 035-
2/199. 
835 Die Zeit 'Kalkulationen in Koln', 5 June 1981, in Press documentation of the German parliament. I- O~5-
2/199. A re~olution of the FDP's youth organisation to reject the stationing of nuclear missiles in We-,tern 
Europe was undermined by a vote against it. in Das Parlament. 'FDP-Bundesparteitag 1981 in KiHn·. 13 June 
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FDP was the 'smallest' party in the hitherto 'tripartite' German system, a party that had to 
constantly secure its own parliamentary survival by overcoming the necessary fiye percent 
hurdle.836 But the final rupture of the coalition occurred over economic and budgetary 
policies.837 The SPD utilised the missile question to end the cooperation with the FDP. a party 
with which it fundamentally diverged over economic questions and no longer wished to 
cooperate. 838 The same may of course be argued from a FDP perspective. Critical voices 
within the SPD had amplified, demanding an end of the coalition. Many held that the party 
could merely re-define itself from within parliamentary opposition. Part of this social 
democratic 'regeneration' would have to be an unequivocal dismissal of the NATO dual-
track. 839 Schmidt later argued that the FDP, by terminating the social-liberal project on its 
own demand, wished to prove that it was, despite its size, the linchpin of the coalition.84o 
Once forced to return to the opposition benches, the SPD had liberated itself from all 
remaining constraints and subsequently pursued a line of strongest objection against the dual-
track. On a national level, however, the SPD became increasingly marginalised after 1983. 
For an uncertain period of time, the SPD was left without a viable coalition alternative and its 
centre-left monopoly became increasingly challenged by the birth and growth of the Green 
Party. 
A few years earlier, the Italian Communists' decline set in: from 1979 onwards, the PCl's 
history became characterised by dwindling electoral decline, decreasing membership and 
political marginalisation.841 To trace the PCI's 'crisis' to the party's isolation over the dual-
track would be oversimplifying. The PCI's marginalisation had set in well before that. In fact. 
Slh It should be noted though that after the 1980 election the 'Green problem' became ever more th~eatc~ing to 
the SPD. A 'fourth' party had arrived on the political stage and the SPD was in difficulty to deal with thiS 
newcomer. 
837 Inten'iew with Bahr. 1 June 2007. 
m Interview with Voigt. 16 June 2008. 
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S·lo Helmut Schmidt, Eigentlich wollte ich Stiidtebauer werden. Helmut Schmidt im Gesprach n1lt Ulnch \\ Ickcrt 
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the party's position over the missile debate, had it been different. would not have substantially 
altered its political stalemate. 
After the failure of the historic compromise formula, the PCI was engaged in an uncertain and 
partly inconsequent process of re-defining its nature, political path and programme. On 27 
November 1980, after an earthquake had hit Italy and devastated large parts of the Irpinia in 
the South on 23 November, Berlinguer sought the occasion to finally renounce the pcrs 
willingness to cooperate with the DC. The earthquake of course only marked the external 
impetus for the PCI to change its political and social alliance strategy, yet again. The historic 
compromise was finally abandoned in favour of the somewhat vague strategy of a 'democratic 
alternative', which in essence meant that cooperation with the DC was replaced in favour of a 
renewed partnership with the Italian Socialists. The peculiarity of this strategy was not the 
abandonment of the DC as its preferred partner or as its 'centre of attention', or the concept's 
vagueness as a matter of fact, but that it was expressed at a time, when the PSI did not conceal 
its very disinterest in cooperation with the PCI. The PCI's change of strategy in favour of the 
PSI therefore came more than surprising, given the fact that the Italian Socialists under 
Craxi's leadership went at great lengths to create an identity distinctive from the PCI. At the 
same time, the DC prepared the ground for a new centre-left and to re-establish the links with 
the Socialists under Craxi.842 A renewed centre-left coalition eventually emerged in 1980. 
The outcome of the missiles debate only further underlined the PCI's political 
marginalisation. This isolation was not, as yet, so much expressed in terms of voters and 
members as in a lack of alliance strategies. By proposing a 'democratic alternative' or 'left-
wing alternative', whatever one may term it, but essentially a governmental alliance strategy 
without the DC, the PCI simply admitted that it had exploited its strategic options to the 
fullest. Not only was there little practicability to the proposed model, but it was also unclear 
in which direction the PCI was heading. 
8~2 Sassoon, The Strategy of the Italian Communist Party, p. 232. 
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During numerous occasions, Berlinguer attempted to explain that the PCI was seeking a 'third 
way' towards socialism. Whilst the Soviet model, whose great achievements were still 
sporadically acknowledged, was an inappropriate type for Italy (not a novelty), European 
social democracy, having achieved certain improvements, did not go far enough to overcome 
the capitalist system. 843 By reforming the capitalist system, Social Democrats, so the PCI 
argued, simply accommodated the system, without helping to overcome its inherent 
contradictions and injustices. Whereas Social Democrats would always move within the 
confines of the system, the PCI intended to replace it. 
The fact that the path followed in Russia was not practicable for advancing towards socialism 
in societies where capitalism was more fully developed was not new, and can be directly 
traced back to the party's theoretical foundations as envisaged by Gramsci. The overcoming 
of capitalism was still the 'end goal', though the means of how the building of a socialist 
society - with full respect, guarantee and protection of democratic liberties by parliamentary 
means - was to be achieved, remained obscure and as cryptic as ever. 
Of course, parties of opposition have the advantage of being able 'to afford' being more 
vague and unclear about their programmes, whilst benefiting from underlying the failure of 
their political opponents in government. Parties of government are also always more directly 
measured by their success and by sticking to their governmental programmes or coalition 
pacts. While the PCI may have benefited from this in the past, by the beginning of the 1980s 
it was ever more uncertain which path it would follow next. 
By pointing out the inappropriateness of the Soviet system as a transferable model for the 
West (or Italy) and the weakness and contradictions of social democracy or social democratic 
parties in Western Europe, the PCI avoided being specific about its own programme and 
political identity. Then again. one could argue that it was precisely and paradoxicall y the 
Italian political scene which had induced the PCI to keep its (ambivalent) communist identity. 
W 'BeriingueT in an interview with Giampaolo Pansa', 28 May 1979, in APe. Fondll BcrlingucT. VaTic lOR. 
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A de facto (and in name) social-democratisation of the PCI (which in political practise had in 
many ways already occurred) would have rendered the PCI little distinguishable from its other 
opponents of the Italian Left. With benefit of hindsight, it would have led to a split of the 
party and merger into a social democratic party (and a smaller communist splinter group). 
In the late 1970s, this was not as yet desirable. At the same time one could argue that the 
party's ambivalent identity, the existence of a 'left' and a 'right' wing, of 'Soviet-hard liners' 
and 'reformers' within the PCI, was in fact already a characteristic feature of a people's party 
of the Left and expressive of the social-democratisation process that slowly occurred within 
the party. A brief look at the SPD during the same time shows that the party was painfully 
divided into a left and a right wing over security policies. It is an inherent characteristic of 
social democratic parties to be divided between traditionalists and modernisers. 
Returning to the PCI, while for an attentive observer of the party this process may well have 
been under way, the party stuck to its communist heritage for another decade. In order not to 
turn into a social democratic party - when in fact little was left that distinguished the PCI 
from the latter in terms of foreign and security-related policy programmes - the PCI reiterated 
its sort of historical and ideological link with its communist heritage by not dismissing the 
rewards of the October Revolution entirely. To explain this solely by referring to the grass-
root militants that the leadership did not want to further alienate, is not sufficient. Despite the 
leadership's repeated insistence on the PCI's pro-Western alignment and moderate party 
outlook, the past and present link, however uncertain, to the Soviet Union remained, even 
minimally, important to the party's identity in the 1980s. If the PCI did not wish to 'dissolve' 
into a Western European type of social democratic party, which it is assumed that at this stage 
it had no intention to, then some (even if highly uncertain and ambivalent) link with the 
Soviet Union needed to be maintained. 84'+ This was the furthest the PCI had mo\'ed in 
844 In an interview with the German weekly Stem. Berlinguer declared in August 1979 that he 'did nl:t feci . 
Social Democratic hut Communist ( ... ) and that the pcr s autonomy and independence from the S(lvlet U nwn 
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clarifying its identity by the beginning of the 1980s. Finally, one may suggest. and this was 
noticeable particularly in the context of the SPD's re-identification as entailed in the 
Godesberg Programme, political parties tend to re-think their nature, identity, strategies and 
programmes from within parliamentary opposition and as a result of continuous electoral 
setback and without any feasible prospects for the future. Despite a noticeable onset of a 
decline (after the 1979 election), the PCI, at the beginning of the 1980s was, still a 
comparatively stable and, electorally speaking, strong and well established party. One may 
only speak of a serious drop-back or phase of electoral stagnation by the 1987 election, when 
the party lost three points compared to 1983 (1987: 26.6 percent; 1983: 29.9 percent). After 
all, it took traditionalists within the SPD two subsequent electoral defeats to acknowledge the 
need for and reformers to push through change. In the 'long' decade of the 1980s, the PCI 
embarked upon its own road to 'Bad Godesberg'. The electoral setbacks of 1983 and 1987 led 
reformers within the PCI to speed up the process of transformation, which was ultimately 
'justified' and perhaps further legitimised, by international events at the beginning of the 
1990s. The two go hand in hand; the process was prompted by internal and justified by 
international circumstances. The irony is that as the Soviet empire dissolved, the Communists 
became viable electoral partners, but their tiny size meant that they were no longer relevant. 845 
A last aspect should not go unmentioned: much as national elections are not 'won' on foreign 
policy programmes solely, it would be oversimplifying to argue that the PCI's failure to enter 
government may be exclusively attributed to its ambivalent relations with the CPSU or to the 
Cold War framework. Although international adversaries preferably pointed to the PCI's 
foreign policies ambivalences (and that a communist government in Italy would most likely 
act as Soviet satellite) when referring to its alleged democratic illegitimacy, these factors only 
(whose system the PCI had not intention to adopt) was complete'. Re-printed in L' Unita. 17 August 1l)7l). in 
APC, Fondo Berlinguer. Varie 108. 
H~'i David S. Bell, introduction to David S. Bell (ed.), Western European Communists and the Col/aps£' (~( 
Communism (OxfordlProvidence: Berg. 1993), p. 11. 
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partially, if not minorily, accounted for the PCl's failure. 846 A number of reasons led to the 
PCl's electoral demise after 1979. Uncertainties in the party's programme (whereas in the 
past the PCl's imprecision may in fact have been beneficial) and identity, doubts about its 
relations with the Soviet Union together with a lack of results in the party's alliance strategies 
as envisaged in the historic compromise or the democratic alternative, as well as haying 
become a party of the system between 1976-79 (being identified with much of its corruption) -
contributed to a decline in support for the PCl. It was in those years that the PCI had lost most 
of its previously gained prestige. 
. .. t f 1981 to 1984. althou~h \\!ry 
846 After all one should remember that the peF participated In governmen rom ~ 
much as a junior partner. 
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Conclusions 
The comparative approach between the SPD and the PCI is interesting and revealing because 
similarities existed well beyond the minimum of commonalities necessary for a comparison. 
Beyond the minimal convergences, the thesis demonstrated that the two parties. in spite of 
underlying ideological and dogmatic differences, converged over and shared a number of 
similar foreign policy perceptions. It showed that the SPD and the PCI held convergmg 
conceptions in more foreign policy fields than one may have assumed. 
On a domestic level, these commonalities evolved around the desire to assume governmental 
responsibility, the coming to terms with Christian democratic hegemony and the challenges 
and constraints of parliamentary democracy as well as the adaptation to political, economic 
and social circumstances. Though admittedly to a different extent, both parties faced similar 
problems and constraints in their attempt to become responsible governing partners and to 
varying degrees, both came to embrace the features of government-oriented parties, 
attributing more weight to pragmatism than ideological adherence. 
One general assumption that can be drawn from this comparIson is that every so often, 
consensus-seeking politics weaken the very idea of ideological adherence. Electoral fortunes 
depend much upon the ability to adapt to changes and to exploit the peculiarities of party 
political competition, though more so in Italy due to the largely unprecedented heterogeneity 
of the political structure. In systems of proportional representation, election results are e\'er)' 
so often secondary if a party fails to find a coalition partner or be imbedded in a governmental 
alliance. National political parties generally act and react in a specific domestic context. in 
response to social and economic circumstances, to electoral considerations. amhitions and to 
. d' tl n1easured bv . succes ..... political competition. After alL political partIes are pre omman y . -
This pattern of dealing with the various demands of parliamentary competition. electoral 
interests, national constraints and international obligations marked the red thread and 
perspective from which the developments of the SPD and the PCI were analysed. 
On an international level, both were affected by the Cold War and attempted to originate a 
foreign policy that took firmly into account the international context. This involved a move to 
bipartisanship in foreign policy terms in general, and a reappraisal towards NATO in 
particular. Despite the existence of ideological differences, both came to embrace 
bipartisanship in foreign policy and attempted to originate foreign policy concepts that went 
well beyond the mere acceptance of the status quo and sought to replace the existing bipolar 
order. The peculiarity of the PCI of course was that it found itself in an apparently insoluble 
dilemma of preserving the minimal core of what it meant to be a communist party, including 
close ties with Moscow, without at the same time relinquishing forever its chance to mount 
the seats of power. Any analysis of PCI history must necessarily take into consideration this 
dual nature, or conversely, PCI historiography can only be comprehensive when 
contemplating both the national and the international context. 
Any study on West European communism during the period of analysis is inevitably also a 
study on the Cold War, and any study on the SPD's foreign policy necessarily involves an 
analysis of German-German relations and Ostpolitik. Given the international framework in 
which the SPD and the PCI operated, both were more directly affected by the Cold War than 
other Western European political parties. This is why the SPD's and PCI's foreign policy 
course must unavoidably be examined against the context of the Cold War and detente. Yet. 
focusing on the Cold War and bipolar issues exclusively, as much of the English speaking 
scholarship has done, provides an incomplete picture. The comparati\'e method exemplifies a 
more comprehensive study of SPD and PCI history. A study of the PCI and the SPD a" \\cll 
as their relations can expand our understanding of the Cold War: it reveals the tight 
interconnection and interdependence between local and global politics. PCI and SPD 
historiography needs to show an awareness of the links between the local and global levels. 
The choice of the two at first sight very different political forces was revealing and insightful 
for a number of reasons: first of all, the comparative method bore the advantage of 
demonstrating that the SPD's and the PCl's reappraisal towards NATO was strikingly similar. 
Both occurred in the context of seeking power at home. Similarly so, the PCl's and SPD's re-
thinking of the pros and cons of the European integration process. Here even the timing bore 
remarkable resemblance. The thesis offered a more comprehensive understanding of the 
origins and motivations behind foreign policy revisionism. Key to their revisionism was the 
acknowledged necessity of seeking foreign policy convergences with the other national 
parties and of the unfruitfulness of maintaining unpopular positions at home (i.e. over NATO 
and European integration). 
Secondly, the methodological approach chosen here allowed me to arrive at more general 
conclusions about policy revisionism. Moreover, it manifested that national political interests 
and demands coincided with international constraints and obligations to the extent that it is no 
longer possible to speak of positions that were particularly 'communist' or 'socialist' or 
'social democratic'. National power politics undermine the preservation of particular bloc 
politics. 
Both the international context as well as domestic questions shaped the decision-making 
processes of the PCI and the SPD. This led to a convergence of perceptions on detente. and 
the desire to untangle the existing bloc rigidities which in tum accumulated in direct SPD-PCI 
relations in 1967/68. Both agreed that at least a temporary 'settlement' of the German 
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problem would lead to the much desired relaxation of military tensions and pave the way for 
the CSCE. Nationally isolated and 'hostage' to a domestic Cold War, the PCI realised that it 
had to actively move away from static detente and find conceptual solutions to its national 
stalemate and increasingly marginal role in Italian politics - marginal at least as far as the 
coming to power was concerned. The SPD, keen to actively de-freeze inner German tensions, 
sought contacts with the PCI to launch new dynamics in the East-West relations. In this 
context, the thesis sought to challenge existing research that attributed the initiative of talks to 
the PCI (Timmermann, I Comunisti italiani). At first, the SPD wished to examine the impact 
of its own course on the East; in doing so, the PCI came in handy. It is unlikely that the PCI 
had something to offer to the SPD that would have triggered talks at PCI initiative. The SPO 
wished to transmit a more balanced picture of its interests to Moscow, and the PCI, having a 
particular national interest in detente, seized the opportunity to increase its own standing. 
Though European detente was provoked by the initiation of Ostpolitik and led to the desired 
treaties with the East as well as an improvement of FRG-GOR relations in terms of trade and 
humanitarian questions, it did not bring about the much desired change of attitude towards 
Western European communist parties. East-West detente ran parallel to a continuation of 
domestic Cold Wars. The absence of changes in Italy pressured the PCI to foster and speed up 
its own conceptual changes (NATO, Eurocommunism, internationalism). International and 
national hostility made it more urgent for the party to shift its positions and present itself as a 
realistic government partner. The SPD's political stalemate prior to the great coalition and the 
PCI's launch of the historic compromise strategy thus bear remarkable resemblance. 
In spite of a significant reappraisal of some of its domestic and foreign policy decisions 
(historic compromise, security policies, relations with the CPSU). PCI strategy at home 
seemed to have reached a dead end. Though on the one hand the pcrs national i ... olation led 
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to some U-turns that were largely unprecedented amongst Western European communist 
parties, and led to a rapprochement with certain aspects of Western European social 
democracy, the PCI felt the limits of East-West detente more directly than most other parties. 
On the other hand, one cannot trace the PCI's failure to enter government to the international 
situation exclusively. Many of the reasons can be found in the peculiarity and heteroaeneitv of 
b • 
the Italian domestic scene and the PCI's failure to render itself indispensable. 
The thesis also sought to make sense of the paradox that international hostility towards the 
PCI accumulated at a time when the party made the utmost effort to prove its democratic 
credentials. Perhaps this was precisely one of the reasons that strengthened international 
suspicion. This is also particularly interesting as far as the complexity of SPD-PCI relations 
was concerned. This study attempted to place the PCI's situation in 1976 in the wider context 
of Western reactions on the one hand, whilst keeping firmly in mind the party's relation with 
the SPD on the other. While direct SPD-PCI contacts were fostered at the end of the 1960s, 
relations seemingly deteriorated in the mid-1970s. At the same time, the thesis sought to offer 
an alternative reading of the Puerto Rico incident and thereby challenge and contribute to 
some of the existing literature. There was neither a coherent and coordinated strategy against 
a PCI participation in government nor was Schmidt's advance discussed within or shared by 
his party. On the contrary, SPD-PCI relations continued on various levels after the bilateral 
phase of Ostpolitik had been accomplished. The reasons for Schmidt's declaration in July 
1976 must be sought in the domestic situation prior to the national elections and the statement 
was not shared, let alone supported by Britain or France. SPD relations with the PCI were 
certainly constrained by the Cold War context in the wider sense and by the peculiarities of 
the German situation in particular as well as by direct experiences of many Social Democrats 
with the SED after the Second World War. The thesis attempted to provide one interpretation 
of SPD-PCI relations but there is certainly room for further research in the field. 
The comparison of the SPD and the PCI also sought to demonstrate the high correlation 
between domestic choices and international obligations. Their debate over the NATO dual-
track decision provided an illustrative case of the study between the considerable correlations 
of international decisions and domestic policies and complexities. Moreover, it showed that 
the debate can only be fully comprehended when emphasising the primacy of domestic 
politics and the national context. Finally, the euromissile debate suggests that the two parties' 
positions produced more similarities and shared more common ground than initially assumed. 
The SPD's and the PCI's position over the dual-track were strikingly similar when viewed 
from an internal party perspective; when analysed from an official party level, their choices 
were shaped by international obligations, domestic demands and inner party constraints. It 
demonstrates the tight interconnection between local and global politics and offers a more 
thorough understanding of some of the decision-making processes during the Cold War. 
The idea behind this comparative approach was to open up new perspectives of partly familiar 
subjects by analysing the Cold War context and the development of detente from the 
perspective of two major Western European forces. As such, the thesis sought to complement 
on existing research such as Timmermann's approach of analysing the PCI from a German 
Social Democratic perspective. At the same time, it sought to challenge the idea that 
communist party behaviour can be almost exclusively explained through the prism of the Cold 
War. A strong case can be made that both parties' decisions were strongly shaped by a mutual 
desire to come to power. It can equally be maintained that both parties, though to varying 
degrees, had become revisionist parties that faced similar challenges in a bipolar world. 
Analysing the PCI from a Cold War perspective or as a member of the Soviet dominated 
communist movement does not sufficiently and adequately account for the complex character 
of this party. Comparative communist studies do not reveal anything substantially new other 
than generally proving that the PCI was a radical and innovative party if compared with. for 
example the PCF, which remained fairly Stalinist throughout. Any comprehensive study of 
the PCI must be sufficiently intricate to deal with the differing aspects of PCI identity. The 
analysis presented here has the advantage of examining foreign policy choices against the 
international context whilst keeping in mind the national context. A comparison with the SPD 
is therefore particularly revealing in as far as it contests some of the previously written 
histories on the PCI by providing a more comprehensive picture. At the same time it showed 
that some, though by no means all, of the SPD's developments were strikingly similar. In 
essence, the thesis attempted to reinterpret some of the parties' decisions by taking into 
account international and national aspects and thereby arriving at a more comprehensive 
understanding of policy revisionism. It is the comparison that allows one to make more 
general assumptions rather than attributing all changes solely to the particular circumstances 
of a party. 
Bibliography 
Archival Sources 
Archiv der Sozialen Demokratie (AdSD) der Friedrich-Ebert-Stijtung, Bonn 
(Archive of Social Democracy of the Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation) 
• Depositum Willy Brandt im Archiv der Sozialen Demokratie (WBA) 
Willy Brandt, private fund, in the Archive of Social Democracy (WBA) 
- AuBenminister 1966-1969, Allgemeine Korrespondenz; 
Mappen 1,2,3,4,9,10,13,14,15,16,20,30,42. 
- Korrespondenz B undeskanzler 1969-1974; 
Mappen 1, 2, 3,4,5. 
- Publikationen; 
Mappen 172,174,179,182,187,199,200,266,267,275,283,303. 
• Depositum Helmut Schmidt im Archiv der Sozialen Demokratie (HS) 
Helmut Schmidt, private fund, in the Archive of Social Democracy (HS) 
- I~SAA007790, 7814, 7929, 7930,8000,8114,8179,8181,8324,8326. 
- IIHS AA 005412, 5415, 5421, 5462, 5368, 5384. 
- I~SAA010262,266,283,284,342,362,380,447,506,517,523,587,598. 
- l~S AA 007486, 7505, 7555, 7569, 9689, 9690. 
- I~S AA 006194,6351,6355,6368,6377,6399,6407,6417,5473, 5496, 6119. 
• SPD-Bundestagsfraktion, Sitzungen, 6. - 8. Wahlperiode, 1969-1982 
Papers of the SPD parliamentary faction (6th - 8th election periods, 1969-1982) 
6. Wahlperiode (6th election period): 
- Signaturen: 11, 15, 16,30,31,42,48,81,87,91,96, 168. 
7. Wahlperiode (ih election period): 
- 21BTFG001753, 2IBTFG001757, 2IBTFGOOI789, 2IBTFGOOI790, 2IBTFGOOI791, 
2IBTFGOOI792, 2IBTFG001519, 2IBTFGOOI520, 2IBTFGOOI538, 2IBTFGOOI540. 
2IBTFGOOI715, 2IBTFG001716, 2IBTFG001742, 2IBTFGOOI744, 
8. Wahlperiode (8th election period): 
- Signaturen: 55,61,79,81,83,88,90, 105, 119, 121. 
2L)() 
Politisches Archiv des Auswiirtigen Amtes, Berlin 
(Political Archive of the Federal Foreign Office) 
Bestand (Boxes) 
B 150 (Band 333) 
B 150 (Band 335) 
B 150 (Band 342) 
B 150 (Band 345) 
B 150 (Band 346) 
B 150 (Band 347) 
B 150 (Band 348) 
B 150 (Band 349) 
B 150 (Band 350) 
B 150 (Band 351) 
Pressedokumentation des Deutschen Bundestages, Berlin 
(Press documentation of the German Parliament) 
1-060-5 
INT -102-6/4 
F 035-2/199 
Archivio Partito Comunista (APC); Fondazione Istituto Gramsci, Rome 
(Archive of the Italian Communist Party at the Gramsci Institute) 
Fondo Enrico Berlinguer 
Enrico Berlinguer, private fund 
Collection: 
- "Movimento operaio internazionale (MOl)"; 
Boxes: 1,5,6,7, 12, 13, 17,33,34,35,39,44,56,74, 114, 148, 158. 
- "Congressi Nazionali"; 
Boxes: 19,21,27. 
- "Varie'" , 
Boxes: 53, 85,90,108, 109. 
APC: 
Direzione: MF 019 285 (1967) 
Ufficio politico: MF 019 1005 (1967) 
Direzione: MF 0545 (1967) 
Ufficio politico: MF 020 1339 (1968) 
Direzione: MF 020 640 (1968) 
Direzione: MF 020 822 (1968) 
~91 
The National Archives, Kew, UK 
CAB 133/467 
FCO 59/1378 
PREM 16/819-821 
FCO 33/2940 
PREM 16/978 
FCO 33/2956 
FCO 49/608 
Personal communications 
Egon Bahr, Interview, Berlin, 1 June 2007 
Karsten D. Voigt, Interview, Berlin, 5 May 2008, 16 June 2008 
Newspapers 
(For the 1960s and 1970s) 
Corriere della Sera 
L'Unita 
Franlifurter Allgemeine Zeitung 
Silddeutsche Zeitung 
Franlifurter Rundschau 
Printed Primary Sources 
• Akten zur Auswiirtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1968, Band II: 1. luli bis 
31. Dezember 1968, Institut fUr Zeitgeschichte, Auswartiges Amt (ed.) (Mtinchen: R. 
Oldenbourg, 1999). 
• Akten zur Auswiirtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1976. Band II: 1. luli bis 
31. Dezember 1976, Institut fUr Zeitgeschichte, Auswartiges Amt (ed.) (Mtinchen: R. 
Oldenbourg, 2007). 
• Albrecht, Willy (ed.), Die SPD unter Kurt Schumacher und Erich Ollenhauer 1946 bis 
1963. Sitzungsprotokolle der Spitzengremien, Band 2, 1948-1950 (Bonn: 1.H.W. Dietz. 
2003). 
• Allensbacher lahrbuch der Demoskopie 1978-1983, Band 8, Noelle-Neumann. Elisabeth 
and Piel, Edgar (eds) (MUnchen: K.G. Saur Verlag, 1983). 
• Amendola, Giorgio, Lotta di classe e sviluppo economico dopo la liberazione (Rom a: 
Editori Riuniti, 1962). 
• Amendola, Giorgio, I Comunisti e l'Europa (Roma: Editore Riuniti, 1971). 
• Amendola, Giorgio, Il rinnovamento del PCI. Intervista di Renato Nicolai (Roma: Editori 
Riuniti, 1978). 
• Amendola, Giorgio, 'Discorso al Parlamento europeo', in Maggiorani, Mauro and 
Ferrari, Paolo (eds), L'Europa da Togliatti a Berlinguer. Testimonianze e Documenti 
1945-1984 (Bologna: n Mulino, 2005), pp. 283-287. 
• Andreotti, Giulio, Diari 1976-1979. Gli anni della solidarieta (Cles: Mondadori, 1981). 
• Bahr, Egon, Was wird aus den Deutschen? Fragen und Antworten (Hamburg: Rowohlt. 
1982). 
• Bahr, Egon, Sicherheitfiir und vor Deutschland. Vom Wandel durch Anniiherung ;'llr 
Europiiischen Sicherheitsgemeinschaft (MUnchen, Wien: Carl Hanser, 1991). 
• Bahr, Egon, Willy Brandts europiiische Auj3enpolitik. Vortrag von Bundesminister a.D. 
Professor Egon Bahr am 9. Oktober 1998 im Rathaus Schoneberg ;'ll Berlin, 
Schriftenreihe der Bundeskanzler-Willy-Brandt-Stiftung. No.3 (Berlin: Bundeskanzler-
Willy-Brandt-Stiftung, 1999). 
• Bahr, Egon, Zu l11einer Zeit (MUnchen: Karl Blessing Verlag. 1996). I 
! 
• Berlinguer. Enrico, 'Autonomy and diversity. conditions for a real internationalism: reply 
to Einheif. Foreign Bulletin of the PC1. October-December 1968. pp. 91-105. I 
29J 
• Berlinguer, Enrico and Tato, Antonio (eds), La politica internazionale dei comunisti 
italiani 1975-1976, (Roma: Editori Riuniti, 1976). 
• B~rlinguer, ~~rico, After Pola~d. Towards a new internationalism. Enrico Berlingller 
with the decislOns and resolutlOns of the Communist Party of 1taly (Nottingham: 
Spokesman, 1982). 
• Berlinguer, Enrico, Discorsi parlamentari (1968-1984) (Roma: Camera dei Deputati. 
2001). 
• Brandt, Willy, 'The East-West Problem as seen from Berlin', International Affairs, Vol. 
34, No.3 (1958), pp. 297-304. 
• Brandt, Willy, Das Regierungsprogramm der SPD. Auj3erordentlicher Kongress der 
SPD, Bonn, 28. April 1961 (Bonn: Vorstand der SPD, 1961). 
• Brandt, Willy, Begegnungen mit Kennedy (Munchen: Kindler, 1964). 
• Brandt, Willy, 'Die Entscheidung des Jahres', Die Neue Gesellschaft, No.2 (1965), pp. 
601-607. 
• Brandt, Willy, 'German Policy toward the East', Foreign Affairs, Vol. 46, No.3 (1968), 
pp. 476-486. 
• Brandt, Willy, 'Feste Verankerung der deutschen Ostpolitik in der westlichen 
Zusammenarbeit', Die Neue Gesellschaft, No.6 (1970), pp. 834-838. 
• Brandt, Willy, Berlin bleibt frei: Politik in und fur Berlin 1947-1966, Berliner Ausgabe 3 
(Bonn: J.H.W. Dietz, 2004). 
• Brandt, Willy, Ein Volk der guten Nachbarn. Auj3en- und Deutschlandpolitik 1966-1974, 
Berliner Ausgabe 6, (Bonn: J.H.W. Dietz, 2005). 
• Brandt, Willy, Erinnerungen (Hamburg: Spiegel-Verlag, 2006/2007). 
• Callaghan, James, Time and Chance (London: Collins, 1987). 
• Carter, Jimmy, Keeping Faith. Memoirs of a President (Fayetteville: University of 
Arkansas Press, 1995). 
• Cossutta, Armando, Lo strappo. USA, URSS, movimento operaio di fronte alla crisi 
internazionale (Milano: Arnoldo Mondatori,1982). 
• Ehmke, Horst (ed.), Perspektiven Sozialdemokratischer Politik im Ubergang ~ll dell 
sich~iger lahren (Bonn: Rowohlt, 1969). 
• Ehmke, Horst. 'Einleitung', in Timmermann. Heinz (ed.). Eurokommunis11lus. Fakten. 
Alla/Ysen, InfC1TieH's (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer Verlag. 1978). 
i 
• Ehmke, Horst, 'Sozialdemokratie und Eurokonlmunismus·. in Hohenstein. Gl)tz (ed.). l 
29.+ 
Der Umweg zur Macht (MUnchen: Wirtschaftsverlag Langen-MUllerlHerbig. 1979). pp. 
223-240. ~ 
• Ehmke, Horst, Mittendrin. Von der GroJ3en Koalition ~llr Deutschen Einheit (Berlin: 
Rowohlt, 1994). 
• Galluzzi, Carlo, La svolta. Gli anni cruciali del Partito Comunista italiano (Milano: 
Sperling & Kupfer, 1983). 
• Galluzzi, Carlo, Togliatti, Longo, Berlinguer (Milano: Sperling & Kupfer, 1989). 
• lahrbuch der offentlichen Meinung 1965-1967, Institut fUr Demoskopie Allensbach. 
Noelle, Elisabeth and Neumann, Erich Peter (eds) (Allensbach, Bonn: Verlag fUr 
Demoskopie, 1967). 
• lahrbuch der offentlichen Meinung 1968-1973, Institut fUr Demoskopie Allensbach. 
Noelle, Elisabeth and Neumann, Erich Peter (eds) (Allensbach, Bonn: Verlag fUr 
Demoskopie, 1974). 
• Jotti, Nilde,'Elezione del Parlamento europeo a suffraggio universale diretto', in 
Maggiorani, Mauro and Ferrari, Paolo (eds), L'Europa da Togliatti a Berlinguer. 
Testimonianze e Documenti 1945-1984 (Bologna: n Mulino, 2005), pp. 312-315. 
• Kissinger, Henry, 'Communist Parties in Western Europe: Challenge to the West', in 
Ranney, Austin and Sartori, Giovanni (eds), Eurocommunism: The Italian Case 
(Washington D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1978), pp. 
183-196. 
• L'Italia nella politica internazionale, 1975-1976, Istituto Affari Internazionali (ed.) 
(Milano: Edizioni di Comunita, 1977). 
• L'Italia nella politica internazionale, 1976-1977, Istituto Affari Internazionali (ed.) 
(Milano: Edizioni di Comunita, 1978). 
• L'Italia nella politica internazionale, 1979-1980, Istituto Affari Internazionali (ed.) 
(Milano: Edizioni di Comunita, 1981). 
• Longo, Luigi, 'Report on domestic policy to the Central Committee on 20 October 1965'. 
Foreign Bulletin of the PCI, October-December 1965, pp. 5-21. 
• Longo, Luigi, 'Speech at the Final Sitting of the Central Committee Meeting'. Foreign 
Bulletin of the PCI, February-March 1967, pp. 19-33. 
• Longo, Luigi. 'La CED divide l'Europa' in Maggiorani, Mauro and F_errari. Paolo (eds). 
L' Ellropa da Togliatti a Berlinguer. Testimonianze e Documenti 194)-1984 (Bologna: II 
Mulino, 2005), pp. 237-240. 
• Napolitano, Giorgio, 'Report to the Central Committee and Central Commission of 
Control' , Foreign Bulletin of the PCI, July-August 1967. pp. 5-18. 
• Napolitano, Giorgio, The Italian Road to Socialism, an interview with Eric Hobsbawm 
(Westport, Conn.: Lawrence Hill; London: Journeyman Press, 1977). 
• Novella, Agostino, 'Report to the Foreign Policy Commission of the Central Committee'. 
Foreign Bulletin of the PCI, March-June 1973, pp. 62-70. 
• Pajetta, Giancarlo, La lunga marcia dell'internazionalismo. Intervista di Ottal'io Cecchi 
(Roma: Editori Riuniti, 1978). 
• Pajetta, Giancarlo, Le crisi che ho vissuto: Budapest, Praga, Varsavia (Roma: Editori 
Riuniti, 1982). 
• PCI (ed.), Documenti per if VI Congresso nazionale del PCI (Roma, 1947). 
• PCI (ed.), Progetto di tesi per if XV Congresso nazionale del PCI (Roma: Editori Riuniti. 
1978). 
• PCI (ed.), Da Gramsci a Berlinguer. La via italiana al socialismo attraverso i congressi 
del partito comunista italiano II 1944-55 (Venezia: Marsilio Editori, 1985). 
• PCI (ed.), Da Gramsci a Berlinguer. La via italiana al socialismo attral'erso i congressi 
del partito comunista italiano III 1956-1964 (Venezia: Marsilio Editori, 1985). 
• PCI (ed.), Da Gramsci a Berlinguer. La via italiana al socialismo attraverso i congressi 
del partito comunista italiano, IV 1964-1975 (Venezia: Marsilio Editori, 1985). 
• PCI (ed.), Da Gramsci a Berlinguer. La via italiana al socialismo attraverso i congressi 
del partito comunista italiano V 1976-1984 (Venezia: Marsilio Editori, 1985). 
• Peggio, Eugenio, 'Riesaminare il MEC?', in Maggiorani, Mauro and Ferrari, Paolo 
(eds), L'Europa da Togliatti a Berlinguer. Testimonianze e Documenti 1945-1984 
(Bologna: II Mulino, 2005). 
• Pesenti, Antonio, 'Sospensione + Riforme', in Maggiorani, Mauro and Ferrari, Paolo 
(eds), L'Europa da Togliatti a Berlinguer. Testimonianze e Documenti 1945-198-1 
(Bologna: II Mulino, 2005), pp. 249-252. 
• Rubbi, Antonio, 1 partiti comunisti dell 'Europa occidentale (Milano: Teti Editore, 1978). 
• Rubbi, Antonio, Il Mondo di Berlinguer (Roma: Napoleone, 1994). 
• Schmid, Carlo, Bundestagsreden (Bonn: AZ Studio, 1966). 
• Schmid, Carlo, Erinnerungen (Bern: Scherz, 1979). 
• Schmidt. Helmut, Strategie des Gleichgewichts (Stuttgart: Seewald Verlag. 1981). 
• Schmidt. Helmut, Menschen und Mdchte (Berlin: Goldmann Verlag. 1987). 
296 
• Schmidt, Helmut, Die Deutschen und ihre Nachbarn. Menschen und Mdchte II (Berlin: 
Siedler Verlag, 1990). 
• Schmidt, Helmut, Weggefdhrten. Erinnerungen und Rejlexionen (Berlin: Siedler Verla!2:. 
1996). ~ 
• Schmidt, Helmut, 'Vom Klassenkampfer zum Staatsmann', in Herbert-Wehner-
Bildungswerk (ed.), Herbert Wehner 1906-1990 Deutscher lahrhundertpolitiker 
(Dresden: Herbert-Wehner-Bildungswerk, 2006), pp. 72-79. 
• Schmidt, Helmut, Ausser Dienst. Eine Bilanz (Mlinchen: Siedler, 2008). 
• Schumacher, Kurt, Aufgaben und Ziele der deutschen Sozialdemokratie (Karlsruhe: 
Verlag Volk & Zeit, 1946). 
• Schumacher, Kurt, 'Was wollen die Sozialdemokraten? Neubau nicht Wiederautbau!·. in 
Susanne Miller (ed.), Die SPD vor und nach Godesberg (Bonn-Bad Godesberg: Verlag 
Neue Gesellschaft, 1974). 
• Schumacher, Kurt, Reden-SchriJten-Korrespondenzen 1945-1952, (Berlin. Bonn: Verlag 
1.H.W. Dietz Nachf., 1985). 
• Secchia, P., Il Partito comunista Italiano e la guerra di liberazione 1943-1945 (Milano: 
Feltrinelli, 1973). 
• Segre, Sergio, 'The "Communist Question" in Italy', Foreign Affairs, Vol. 54, No.4 
(1976), pp. 691-707. 
• Segre, Sergio, 'Lineamenti per una storia dell' "eurocomunismo''', Segre, Sergio (ed.), A 
Chi Fa Paura l' Eurocomunismo? (Firenze: Guaraldi Editore, 1977), pp. 11-40. 
• Serfaty, Simon and Gray, Lawrence (eds), The Italian Communist Party, Yesterday, 
Today, and Tomorrow (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1980). 
• Sodaro, Michael J., Moscow, Germany, and the West. From Khrushchev to Gorbachel' 
(Ithaca, London: Cornell University Press, 1990). 
• Soell, Hartmut, Helmut Schmidt 1918-1969 (Mlinchen: Deutsche-Verlags-Anstalt. 2003). 
• SPD (ed.), Grundsatzprogramm der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands. SPD 
Parteitag, Bad Godesberg, 13.-15. November 1959 (Kaln: Druckhaus Deutz. 1959). 
~----------------------------------~~~~-----------
• SPD (ed.), lahrbuch der SPD 1946 (Berlin: Vorstand der SPD. 1946). 
• SPD (ed.), lahrbuch der SPD 1950/1951 (Dortmund: Westfalendruck. 1951). 
• SPD (ed.). lahrbuch der SPD 1958/59 (Hannover, Bonn: Neuer Vorwarts Verlag \:au & 
Co .. 1959). 
• SPD (ed.). lahrbuch der SPD 1960/61 (Hannover. Bonn: Neuer Vorwarts Verlag \:all (\: 
Co., 1961 ). ---- ---- - - ---
297 
• SPD (ed.), lahrbuch der SPD 196211963 (Hannover, Bonn: Neuer Vorwarts-Verlag :\ au 
& Co., 1963). 
• SPD (ed.), lahrbuch der SPD 196411965 (Bonn-Bad Godesberg: Neuer Vorwarts-Verlag 
Nau & Co., 1965). 
• SPD (ed.), lahrbuch der SPD 1966167 (Bonn-Bad Godesberg: Neuer Vorwarts-Verlag 
Nau & Co., 1967). 
• SPD (ed.), lahrbuch der SPD 196811969 (Bonn-Bad Godesberg: Neuer Vorwarts-Verlag 
Nau & Co., 1969). 
• SPD (ed.), lahrbuch der SPD 197011972 (Bonn-Bad Godesberg: Neuer Vorwarts-Verlag 
Nau & Co., 1972). 
• SPD (ed.), Parteitag der SPD 1946 (Berlin: Vorwarts-Verlag, 1946). 
• SPD (ed.), Parteitag der SPD 1947 (Hannover: Vorwarts-Verlag, 1947). 
• SPD (ed.), Parteitag der SPD 1964 (Hannover, Bonn: Neuer-Vorwarts Verlag Nau & 
Co., 1964). 
• SPD (ed.), Parteitag der SPD 1968 (Hannover, Bonn: Neuer-Vorwarts Verlag Nau & 
Co., 1968). 
• SPD (ed.), Protokoll der Parteitages der SPD 1947 (Hamburg: Auerdruck, 1947). 
• SPD (ed.), Protokoll des Parteitages der SPD 1950 (Frankfurt am Main: Union-
Druckerei und Verlagsanstalt, 1950). 
• SPD (ed.), Protokoll des Parteitages der SPD 1962 (Hannover, Bonn: Neuer-Vorwarts 
Verlag, Nau & Co., 1962). 
• SPD (ed.), Die Europapolitik der Sozialdemokratie (Bonn, 1953). 
• SPD (ed.), Zum Verhiiltnis von Sozialdemokratie und Kommunismus (Bonn-Bad 
Godes berg: V orw arts-Druck, 1971). 
• SPD (ed.), Sicherheit fur Deutschland. Wahlprogramm 1980 (Kaln, 1980). 
• SPD (ed.). Dokumente. SPD Auj3erordentlicher Parteitag. Beschlusse :[{ E[{ropa 
Friedens- und Sicherheitspolitik Organisationspolitik (Bonn. 1983). 
• SPD-Bundestagsfraktion (ed.). Parlamentarische Positiollell ;:;l~ Ell~-opa. VOIl dell 
So;:;ialdemokraten il71 Reichstag 1866 bis ;:;ur SPD-Bundestagsfraktwll heute (Bonn: 
Courir-Druck, 2007). 
----~ 
• Tata, Antonio (ed.), Conversazione con Berlinguer (Roma: Editori Riuniti, 1984). 
• Togliatti, Palmiro and Longo, Luigi and Berlinger, Enrico, (eds), lL PCl e if movimento 
operaio internazionale (Roma: Editori Riuniti, 1968). 
• Togliatti, Palmiro, On Gramsci and Other Writings (London: Lawrence Wishart. 1979). 
• Togliatti, Palmiro, Opere Scelte (Roma: Editori Riuniti, 1974). 
• Togliatti, Palmiro, Problemi del movimento operaio internazionale 1956-1961 (Roma: 
Editori Riuniti, 1962). 
• Voigt, Karsten D., 'Dialog zwischen SPD und kommunistischen Parteien', in Bentele. 
Karlheinz, Faerber-Husemann, Renate, Scharpf, Fritz W. and SteinbrUck, Peer (eds), 
Metamorphosen. Anniiherungen an einen vielseitigen Freund. Fur Horst Ehmke ~11l71 
Achtzigsten (Bonn: Dietz, 2007). 
• Voigt, Karsten D., 'Motive und Ziel der ersten und zweiten Ostpolitik der SPD', 
Kommune, Forum fUr Politik und Okonomie, No.9 (1985), pp. 41-43. 
• Voigt, Karsten D., 'Schrittweiser Ausstieg aus dem RUstungswettlauf nach dem Berliner 
Parteitag der SPD', Die Neue Gesellschaft, No.1 (1980), pp. 47-51. 
• Voigt, Karsten D., Wege zur Abrustung (Frankfurt am Main: Eichborn Verlag, 1981). 
• Wehner Herbert, Bundestagsreden (Bonn: Verlag AZ Studio 1970). 
• Wehner, Herbert, Wandel und Bewiihrung. Ausgewiihlte Reden und Schriften 1930-1980, 
5. AufIage (Frankfurt am Main, Berlin: Ullstein, 1981). 
Secondary Sources 
• Abelshauser, Werner, Deutsche Wirtschaftsgeschichte seit 1945 (Mtinchen: C.H. Beck. 
2004). 
• Accorsero, Aris and Mannheimer, Renato and Sebastiani, Chiara (eds). L'identita 
comunista. I militanti, Ie strutture, la cultura del PCI (Roma: Editori Riuniti, 1983). 
• Agosti, Aldo, Palmiro Togliatti (Torino: UTET, 1996). 
• Amyot, Grant, The Italian Communist Party. The Crisis of the Popular Front Strategy 
(London: Croom Helm, 1981). 
• Artner, Stephen Joseph, The SPD and NATO: The Transformation of Social Democratic 
Alliance Policy 1957-1961, PhD, (Bologna: The Johns Hopkins University, 1984). 
• Ash, Timothy Garton, In Europe's Name. Germany and the divided Continent (London: 
Jonathan Cape, 1993). 
• Ashkenasi, Abraham, Reformpartei und Auj3enpolitik. Die Auj3enpolitik der SPD Berlin -
Bonn (Kaln, Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1968). 
• Bange, Oliver, 'Keeping detente alive"': inner-German relations under Helmut Schmidt 
and Erich Honecker, 1974-1982', in Nuti, Leopoldo (ed.), The Crisis of Detente in 
Europe. From Helsinki to Gorbachev, 1975-1985 (London and New York: Routledge, 
2009), pp. 230-243. 
• Barbagallo, Francesco, 'Enrico Berlinguer, il Compromesso Storico e l' Alternativa 
Democratica', Studi Storici (Roma: October-December 2004). 
• Barbagallo, Francesco, Enrico Berlinguer (Roma: Carocci, 2006). 
• Barbagli, Marzio and Corbetta, Piergiorgio, 'After the Historic Compromise: A Turning 
Point for the PCI', European Journal of Political Research, Vol. 10, No.3 (1982), pp. 
213-239. 
• Baring, Arnulf, Machtwechsel. Die Ara Brandt-Scheel (Mtinchen: Deutscher 
Taschenbuch Verlag, 1984). 
• Bark, Dennis L. and Gress, David R., Democracy and its Discontents 1963-1988 
(Oxford. Cambridge, Mass.: Basil Blackwell, 1989). 
• Barth Urban, Joan, Moscow and the Italian Communist Party (Ithaca. London: Cornell 
University Press, 1986). 
• Bellers, Jtirgen. EWG und die" Godesberger" SPD, Schriften des Faches 
Politikwissenschaften. No.9 (Siegen: Universitat Siegen, 2003). 
• Bellers, JUrgen, Reformpolitik und EWG-Strategie der SPD. Die innen- und 
auj3enpolitischen Faktoren der europapolitischen Integrationswilligkeit einer 
Oppositionspartei 1957-63 (MUnchen: tuduv-Verlagsgesellschaft. 1979). 
• Benz, Wolfgang, 'Kurt Schumachers Europakonzeption', in Herbst. Ludolf and Blihrer. 
Werner and Sowade, Hanno (eds), Yom Marshallplan ~llr EWG. Die Eingliederung der 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland in die westliche Welt (MUnchen: R. Oldenbourg, 1990). pp. 
47-61. 
• Berger, Stefan, Social Democracy and the Working Class in Nineteenth and TH'entieth 
Century Germany (London: Pearson Education, 2000). 
• Blackmer, Donald L.M., Unity in Diversity. Italian Communism and the Communist 
World (Cambridge, Mass., London: MIT Press, 1968). 
• Blackmer, Donald L.M., 'Continuity and Change in Postwar Italian Communism'. in 
Blackmer, Donald L.M. and Tarrow, Sidney (eds), Communism in Italy and France 
(Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1975), pp. 21-68. 
• Blackmer, Donald, L.M., 'The International Strategy of the Italian Communist Party', in 
Blackmer Donald L.M. and Kriegel, Annie (eds), The International Role of the 
Communist Parties of Italy and France, No. 32 (Cambridge, Mass.: Center for 
International Affairs, 1975), pp. 1-33. 
• Bocca, Giorgio, Palmiro Togliatti (Rom a, Bari: Editori Laterza, 1973). 
• Bown, Colin and Mooney, Peter 1., Cold War to detente 1945-80, Second Edition 
(London: Heinemann Educational Books, 1981). 
• Bracher, Karl-Dietrich, Funke, Manfred, Schwarz, Hans-Peter (eds), Deutschland 
~wischen Krieg und Frieden. Beitrage zur Politik und Kultur im 20. Jahrhundert. 
Festschrift fur Hans-Adolf Jacobsen (Droste Verlag, DUsseldorf, 1991). 
• Bracke, Maud, Which Socialism, Whose Detente? West European Communism and the 
Czechoslovak Crisis 1968 (Budapest, New York: Central European University Press. 
2007). 
• Brandstetter, Karl 1., 'Willy Brandts "Ostpolitik" und die Detente: zur Historie einer 
fortdauernden Begriffsverwirrung', Blatter fur deutsche und internationale Politik, No . .3 
(1994), pp. 296-303. 
• Brandt, P. and Schumacher, 1. and Schwarzrock, G. and SlihL K., Karrieren eines , 
Auj3enseiters. Leo Bauer ~H'ischel1 Kommunismus und So-;.ialdemokratie 1912 his 197:l 
(Bonn: Dietz. 1983). 
I 
• Brauch. Hans GUnter. 'Eurokommunismus und europaische Sicherheit aus der Sieht der 
USA: Schlussfolgerungen fUr demokratische Sozialisten·. in Kiersch. G.erhard and I 
Seidelmann. Reimund (eds), Sicherheit und Entspanllung in Europa. DIC ;\lIn\'or/ des 
demokratischen So~i({lismus (Frankfurt am Main, Kaln: Europaische Verlagsanstalt. I 
I 1977), pp. 93-11'+. 
30l 
• Braunthal, Gerard, The West German Social Democrats 1969-1982 (Boulder, Colorado: 
Westview Press, 1983). 
• Carr, Jonathan, Helmut Schmidt (MUnchen: Knaur, 1987). 
• Cesari, Laurent, 'France and NATO from 1966 to 1976', in Loth, Wilfried and Soutou. 
Georges-Henri (eds), The Making of Detente: Eastern and Western Europe in the Cold 
War, 1965-75 (London: Routledge, 2008), pp. 91-102. 
• Cremasco, Maurizio, 'Italy: A New Role in the Mediterranean?', in John Chipman (ed.), 
NATO's Southern Allies: Internal and External Challenges, Atlantic Institute for 
International Affairs (London, New York: Routledge, 1988), pp. 195-235. 
• Czerwick, Edwin, Oppositionstheorien und Auj3enpolitik. Eine Analyse 
sozialdemokratischer Deutschlandpolitik 1955 bis 1966 (KbnigsteinfTs.: Anton Hain, 
1981). 
• Dannenberg von, Julia, The Foundations of Ostpolitik. The Making of the Moscow Treaty 
between West Germany and the USSR (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008). 
• De Deken, Johan Jeroen, 'The German Social Democratic Party', in Ladrech, Robert and 
Marliere, Philippe (eds), Social Democratic Parties in the European Union, History, 
Organisation and Policies (Basingstoke, London: Macmillan Press, 1999), pp. 79-94. 
• Dittgen, Herbert, Deutsch-amerikanische Sicherheitsbeziehungen in der Ara Helmut 
Schmidt. Vorgeschichte und Folgen des NATO-Doppelbeschlusses (MUnchen: Wilhelm 
Fink, 1991). 
• Dowe, Dieter and Klotzbach, Kurt (eds), Programmatische Dokumente der deutschen 
Sozialdemokratie (Berlin, Bonn: Verlag J.H.W. Dietz Nachf., 1984). 
• Dowe, Dieter, Partei und soziale Bewegung (Bonn: J.H.W. Dietz, 1993). 
• Drott, Karl (ed.), Sozialdemokratie und Wehrfrage (Berlin, Hannover: 1.H.W. Dietz, 
1956). 
• Drummond, Gordon D., The German Social Democrats in Opposition, 1949-1960 
(Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1982). i 
, 
I 
• Duggan, Christopher and Wagstaff, Christopher (eds).1taly in the Cold War Politics, 
Culture and Society 1948-58 (Oxford, Washington: Berg. 1995). 
• Ehrler. Solveig 'Zur Deutschlandpolitik der SPD', in Ehrler. Solveig (e~.). 
So;,ialdemokratie und Sozialismus heute. Beitrage ;:ur Analyse lind Veranderung 
so;:ialdemokratischer Politik (Kbln: Pahl-Rugenstein Verlag, 1968). pp. 78-87. 
• Enders, Thomas, Die SPD und die auJ3ere Sicherheit. Zum 1randel de,. 
sicherheitspolitischen Konzeption der Partei in der Zeit der Regierllng.\\'erantH'ortllllg 
(1966-1982) (Melle: Ernst Knoth, 1987). 
• Favretto, Daria, The Long Search for a Third Way. The British Labour Parf'.' alld the 
Italian Left since 1945 (Oxford, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003) .. 
• Favretto, Daria, 'The Wilson Governments and the Italian Centre-Left Coalitions: 
Between "socialist" Diplomacy and Realpolitik, 1964-70', European History Quarterly, 
Vol. 36, No.3 (2006), pp. 421-444. 
• Featherstone, Kevin, Socialist Parties and European Integration. A comparative history 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1988). . 
• Feld, Werner J., West Germany and the European Community. Changing Interests and 
Competing Policy Objectives (New York: Praeger Special Studies, 1981). 
• Fiori, Giuseppe, Vita di Enrico Berlinguer (Roma, Bari: Laterza & Figli, 1989). 
• Fischer, Frank, 1m deutschen Interesse. Die Ostpolitik der SPD von 1969 bis 1989 
(Husum: Matthiesen Verlag, 2001). 
• Flechtheim, Ossip K. (ed.), Dokumente zur parteipolitischen Entwicklung in Deutschland 
seit 1945 (Berlin: Dokumenten-Verlag Dr. Herbert Wendler & Co., 1962). 
• Flechtheim, Ossip. K. (ed.), Die Parteien der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Hamburg: 
Hoffmann & Campe, 1973). 
• Fouskas, Vassilis, Italy, Europe, the Left. The transformation of Italian Communism and 
the European imperative (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1998). 
• Fuchs, Stephan, Dreiecksverhaltnisse sind immer kompliziert. Kissinger, Bahr und die 
Ostpolitik (Hamburg: Europaische Verlagsanstalt, 1999). 
• Fulbrook, Mary, The Divided Nation (London: Fontana Press, Harpers Collins. 1991). 
• Gaddis, John Lewis, The Cold War. A New History (London: Penguin Books. 2007). 
• Galante, Severino, Il Partito comunista italiano e l'integrazione europea. II decennio del 
rifiuto: 1947-1957 (Padova: Liviana, 1988). 
• Garthoff, Raymond L., Detente and Confrontation. American-Soviet Relations from 
Nixon to Reagan (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1985). 
Ginsborg, Paul, A History of Contemporary Italy, Society and Politics 1943-1988 (~('\\ I • i ! 
York, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003). 
• Gozzini, Giovanni and Martinelli, Renzo, Storia del Partito comunista italiallo \'11. I 
Dall'attentato a Togliatti al/'VII congresso (Torino: Giulio Einaudi Editore. 1998). 
• Griffith, William E .. '''L' eurocomunismo ": sara il terzo grande scisma comuni~ta:) La 
rivalita fra URSS c USA nell'Europa meridionale'. in Segre. Sergio (ed.l..\ Clll fa PailI'll 
I'Eurocomunismo? (Firenze: Guaraldi Editore. 1977). pp. 163-179. -- ----
3( l.' 
• Griffith, William E., Die Ostpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Stuttgart: Klett-
Cotta, 1981). 
• Griffith, William E., The Ostpolitik of the Federal Republic of Gennany (Cambridge. 
Mass., London: MIT Press, 1978). 
• Gualtieri, Roberto, 'The Italian political system and detente (1963-1981)" Journal of 
Modern Italian Studies, Vol. 9, No.4 (2004), pp. 428-449. . 
• Gundle, Stephen, 'The Italian Communist Party: Gorbachev and the End of "Really 
Existing Socialism''', in Bell, David S. (ed.), Western European Communists and the 
Collapse of Communism (Oxford, Providence: Berg, 1993), pp. 15-30. 
• Hacke, Christian, 'After NATO's Dual Track Decision of 1979: Where Do We Go From 
Here?', The Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 9, No.4 (1986). 
• Hacke, Christian, 'Die Rolle der Bundesrepublik Deutschland zwischen Ost und West: 
Von der Tyrannei der Wahl zur glUcklichen Krise', in Bracher, Karl-Dietrich, Funke. 
Manfred, Schwarz, Hans-Peter (eds), Deutschland zwischen Krieg und Frieden. Beitriige 
zur Politik und Kultur im 20. lahrhundert. Festschriftfur Hans-Adolf Jacobsen (Droste 
Verlag, DUsseldorf, 1991). 
• Hacke, Christian, 'Die deutschlandpolitischen Konzeptionen von CDU und CSU in der 
Oppositionszeit (1969-1982)' , in Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (ed.), Historisch Politische 
Mitteilungen. Archiv fur christlich-demokratische Politik (KOln: Bohlau Verlag. 1994). 
pp.33-48. 
• Haftedorn, Helga, Sicherheit und Entspannung. Zur Auj3enpolitik der Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland 1955-1982 (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1983). 
• Haftedorn, Helga, Sicherheit und Stabilitdt. Auj3enbeziehungen der Bundesrepublik 
zwischen Olkrise und NATO-Doppelbeschluss (MUnchen: Deutscher Taschenbuch 
Verlag, 1986). 
• Hanhimaki, Jussi and Westad, Odd Arne (eds), The Cold War. A History in Documents 
and Eyewitness Accounts (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003). 
• Hanrieder, Wolfram F., 'West German Foreign Policy, 1949-1979: Necessities and 
Choices', in Hanrieder, Wolfram F. (ed.), West Gennan Foreign Policy; 1949-1979 
(Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1980), pp. 15-36. 
• Hanrieder, Wolfram F.. Germany, America, Europe: Forty Years of German Foreign 
Policy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989). 
• Harrison. Michael M., 'The PCI and other Eurocommunist Parties: Implications for 
Atlantic Relations'. in Serfaty, Simon and Gray. Lawrence (eds). The 1talian Communis! 
Party. Yesterday. Today and Tomorrol\' (London: Aldwych Press. 1980), pp. 1 )7-189. 
• Hassner, Pierre, Eurocommunism and universal reconciliation: The international : 
dimension of the Golden Dream of the PCI (/975-1979), No. 28 (The Johns Hopkins 
University, Bologna Center: Research Institute, 1980). 
• Haupt, Heinz-Gerhard and Kocka, JUrgen, 'Historischer Vergleich: Methoden. Aufoaben. 
Probleme. Eine Einleitung', in Haupt, Heinz-Gerhard and Kocka, JUrgen (eds.). 0 
Geschichte und Vergleich. Ansiitze und Ergebnisse internationaler vergleichender 
Geschichtsschreibung (Frankfurt, New York, Campus Verlag, 1996), pp. 9-39. 
• Heep, Barbara D., Helmut Schmidt und Amerika. Eine schwierige Partnerschaft (Bonn: 
Bouvier, 1990). 
• Heitmann, Clemens, FDP und Ostpolitik. Zur Bedeutung der deutschlandpolitischen 
Vorstellungen der FDP von 1966-1972 (Sankt Augustin: Comdok, 1989). 
• Hellman, Stephen, 'Italian Communism in the First Republic', in Gundle, Stephen and 
Parker, Simon (eds), The New Italian Republic. From the Fall of the Berlin Wall to 
Berlusconi (London, New York: Routledge, 1996), pp. 72-84. 
• Hellman, Stephen, 'The PCI's Alliance Strategy and the Case of the Middle Classes', in 
Blackmer, Donald L.M. and Tarrow, Sidney (eds), Communism in Italy and France 
(Princeton, London: Princeton University Press, 1975), pp. 373-419. 
• Hellman, Stephen, Italian Communism in Transition. The Rise and Fall of the Historic 
Compromise on Turin, 1975-1980 (New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988). 
• Hertle, Hans-Hermann, 'Germany in the last decade of the Cold War', in Nj0lstad, Olav 
(ed.), The last decade of the Cold War (London, New York: Frank Cass, 2004), pp. 265-
287. 
• Hildebrand, Klaus, Integration und Souveranitat: Die Auj3enpolitik der Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland, 1949-1982 (Bonn: Bouvier, 1991). 
• Habel, Alexander, 'll PC I, il '68 Cecoslovacco e il rapporto col PCUS', Studi Storiei. No. 
4 (2001), pp. 1145-1172. 
• Hobsbawm, Eric, The Age of Extremes. The Short Twentieth Century, 1914-1991 
(London: Abacus, 1994). 
• Hofmann, Arne, The Emergence of Detente in Europe. Brandt, Kennedy and the 
formation of Ostpolitik (Oxon, New York: Routledge, 2007). 
• Hofmann, Robert, Geschichte der deutschen Parteien (MUnchen: ZUrich: Piper Verlag, 
1993). 
• Hrbek Rudolf Die SPD - Deutschland und Europa. Die Haltling der So::ialdemokratie 
::11111 V~rhiiltni; VOIl Deutschland-Politik und West-Integration (Bonn: Europa tTnion 
Verlag, 1972). 
• Huber, Martin, Die Bundestagswahlkampfe der CDU/CSU als Oppositiollsparteien 
1972, 1976, 1980, 2002 (MUnchen: Herbert Utz, 2008). 
• Hughes, H. Stuart, The United States and Italy (Cambridge, Mass., London: Harvard 
University Press, 1979). 
• Ilardi, Massimo and Accomero, Aris (eds), Il Partito comunista italiano: Struttllra e 
storia dell'organizzazione 1921-1979 (Milano: Feltrinelli, 1982). 
• Irving, R.E.M. and Paterson, W.E., 'The Machtwechsel of 1982-83: A significant 
landmark in the political and constitutional history of West Germany', Parliamentary 
Affairs, Vol. 36, No.4 (1983). . 
• Judt, Tony, Postwar. A History of Europe since 1945 (New York: Penguin Press, 2005). 
• Kaiser, Karl, 'The New Ostpolitik', in Hanrieder, Wolfram F. (ed.), West German 
Foreign Policy: 1949-1979 (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1980), pp. 1--1-5-156. 
• Keller, Katharina, Modell SPD? Italienische Sozialisten und deutsche Sozialdemokratie 
bis zum ersten Weltkrieg (Bonn: I.H.W. Dietz Nachf., 1994). 
• Kertzer, David I., Politics and Symbols. The Italian Communist Party and the Fall of 
Communism (New Haven, London: Yale University Press, 1996). 
• Kitschelt, Herbert, The Transformation of European Social Democracy (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1994). 
• Klaus, Rainer W., 'Uberwindung der BlOcke: Konzeptionen der italienischen Linken zur 
Entspannung und Sicherheit in Europa', in Kiersch, Gerhard and Seidelmann, Reimund 
(eds), Sicherheit und Entspannung in Europa. Die Antwort des demokratischen 
Sozialismus (Frankfurt am Main, Koln: Europaische Verlagsanstalt, 1977), pp. 76-92. 
• KleBmann, Christoph, 'Sozialdemokratie und deutsche Frage zwischen Kaltem Krieg und 
neuer Ostpolitik', in Dowe, Dieter (ed.), Sozialdemokratie und Nation in Geschichte und 
Gegenwart, Forum Deutsche Einheit. Perspektiven und Argumente, No.2 (Bonn: FES. 
1990), pp. 39-51. 
• KleBmann, Christoph, 'Wiedervereinigung und deutsche Nation - der Kern der Politik 
Kurt Schumachers', in Dowe, Dieter (ed.), Kurt Schumacher und de,. "Neuhall" de,. 
deutschen Sozialdemokratie nach 1945, Gesprachskreise Geschichte. No. 13 (Bonn: FES, 
1996), pp. 113-132. 
• Klotzbach, Kurt, Der Weg z,ur Staatspartei: Programmatik, praktische Poli.tik lind 
Organisation der deutschen Sozialdemokratie 1945-1965 (Bonn: 1.H.W. DIetz, 1996). 
• Koser. Helmut, Die Grundsatzdebatte in der SPD \'011 1 Y.J51.Jo his 1 Y5815Y, PhD 
(Freiburg i.Bf.: Krause, 1971). 
~-------------------------------------------. --------
J06 
• Kramer, Andreas, Die FDP und die dufJere Sicherheit. Zum Wandel der 
sicherheitspolitischen Konzeption der Partei von 1966 bis 1992 (Bonn: Holos Verla£. 
1995). '-
• Ladrech, Robert and Wegs, Robert J., Europe since 1945 (Basingstoke, New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2006). 
• Lange, Peter, The Communist Parties of Italy, France, and Spain: Postwar Change and 
Continuity (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1981). 
• Layritz, Stephan, Der NATO-Doppelbeschluss. Westliche Sicherheitspolitik im 
Spannungsfeld von Innen-, Bundnis- und Auj3enpolitik (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 
1992). 
• Ledeen, Michael A., West European Communism and American Foreign Policy (New 
Brunswick, Oxford: Transaction Books, 1987). 
• Losche, Peter, 'Abschied von der Klassenpartei - das Ringen der SPD urn die 
Mittelschichten', in Dowe, Dieter (ed.), Kurt Schumacher und der "Neubau" der 
deutschen Sozialdemokratie nach 1945, Gesprachskreise Geschichte, No.13 (Bonn: FES. 
1996), pp. 93-112. 
• Loth, Wilfried, 'Germany in the Cold War: Strategies and Decisions' , in Westad, Odd 
Arne (ed.), Reviewing the Cold War. Approaches, 1nterpretations, Theory (London, 
Portland: Frank Cass, 2000), pp. 242-257. 
• Loth, Wilfried, 'Von Heidelberg nach Godesberg: Europa-Konzepte der deutschen 
Sozialdemokratie zwischen Utopie und Politik', in Clemens, Gabriele (ed.), Nation und 
Europa. Studien zum internationalen Staatensystem im 19. und 20. lahrhundert 
(Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 2001), pp. 203-219. 
• Loth, Wilfried, Der Weg nach Europa. Geschichte der europdischen Integration 1939-
1957, Second Edition (G6ttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1991). 
• Loth, Wilfried, Overcoming the Cold War. A History of Detente, 1950-1991 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002). 
• Lowke, Udo F., Fur den Fall, dass ... SPD und Wehrfrage 1949-1955 (Hannover: Verlag 
flir Literatur & Zeitgeschehen, 1969). 
• Ludlow, N. Piers (ed.), European Integration and the Cold War. Ost- Westpolitik. /965- I 
I 
1973 (London, New York: Routledge, 2007). 
• Maddison, Angus, The World Economy in the 2d" Centllry (Paris: Development Centre I I 
of the OECD, 1989). 
, 
• Maggiorani, Mauro and Ferrari, Paolo (eds), L'Ellropa da Togliatfi (/ Berlingller. 
TestimOlli(/l1~e e DOClIIllenti 1945-1984 (Bologna: II Mulino, 2005). , 
--~ 
• Maggiorani, Mauro, L'Europa degli altri. Comunisti italiani e integra-;,ione ellropea I 
(1957-1969) (Roma: Carocci, 1998). 
• Marcowitz, Reiner, Option fur Paris? Unionsparteien, SPD und Charles de Gaulle 1 <)58 I 
bis 1969 (Mtinchen: R. Oldenbourg, 1996). ! 
• Margiocco, Mario, Stati Uniti e PCI 1943-1980 (Roma, Bari: Editori Laterza. 1981). i 
• Marshall, Barbara, Willy Brandt. Eine politische Biographie (Bonn: Bouvier Verlaa, 
1993). b 
• Marshall, Barbara, Willy Brandt: A Political Biography (Basingstoke, London: 
Macmillan Press, 1997). 
• McCarthy, Patrick, The Crisis of the Italian State: From the Origins of the Cold War to 
the Fall of Berlusconi (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995). 
• Meissner, Boris (ed.), Die deutsche Ostpolitik 1961-1970. Kontinuitiit und Wandel (Koln: 
Verlag Wissenschaft & Politik, 1970). 
• Merseburger, Peter, Der schwierige Deutsche: Kurt Schumacher (Stuttgart: Dt. 
Verlagsanstalt, 1995). 
• Merseburger, Peter, Willy Brandt 1913-1992 (MUnchen: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 
2004). 
• Meyer, Christoph, Herbert Wehner (MUnchen: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 2006). 
• Meyer, Thomas, 'The transformation of German Social Democracy' , in Sassoon, Donald 
(ed.), Looking Left: European socialism after the Cold War (London: LB. Tauris, 1997), 
pp. 124-142. 
• Miller, Susanne (ed.), Die SPD vor und nach Godesberg (Bonn-Bad Godesberg: Verlag 
Neue Gesellschaft, 1974). 
• Miller, Susanne, 'Die SPD vor und nach Godesberg', in Lowenthal, Richard and 
Schwarz, Hans-Peter (eds), Die zweite Republik (Stuttgart: Seewald Verlag. 1974). pp. 
371-407. 
• Moravcsik, Andrew, The Choice for Europe (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University 
Press, 1998). 
• Moring. Andreas, Die Europapolitik der FDP. Die Ennvicklung der Ellropa-
Programmatik in den lahren 1949-1989 (Berlin: Verlag Dr. Koster. 2(04). 
• MUller. Reinhard. Herbert Wehner - Moskau 1937 (Hamburg: Hamburger Edition. 
2004). 
• Mutz, Reinhard, 'Atlantische Abschreckung und europaische Entspannuna: Kritische 
Analyse des Sicherheitskonzeptes der SPD', in Kiersch, Gerhard and Seid~lmann 
Reimund (eds), Sicherheit und Entspannung. Die Antwort des demokratischen ' 
Sozialismus (Frankfurt am Main, KOln: Europaische Verlagsanstalt, 1977), pp. 18-41. 
• Narr, Wolf-Dieter, CDU-SPD, Programm und Praxis seit 1945 (Stuttgart: W. 
Kohlhammer Verlag, 1966). 
• Niedhart, Gottfried, 'Ostpolitik and its impact on the Federal Republic's relationship with 
the West', in Loth, Wilfried and Soutou, Georges-Henri (eds), The making of detente: 
Eastern and Western Europe in the Cold War, 1965-75 (Oxon: Routledge, 2008), pp. 
117-132. 
• Niedhart, Gottfried, 'The East-West Problem as seen from Berlin: Willy Brandt's Early 
Ostpolitik', in Loth, Wilfried (ed.), Europe, Cold War and Coexistence, 1953-1965 
(London: Frank Cass, 2004), pp. 285-296. 
• Notz, Anton, Die SPD und der NATO-Doppelbeschluss (Augsburg: UniversiUit 
Augsburg, 1987). 
• Nuti, Leopoldo, 'Italy and the Battle of the Euromissiles: The Deployment of the US 
BGM-I09 G "Gryphon" 1979-83', in Nj¢lstad, Olav (ed.), The last decade of the Cold 
War (London, New York: Frank Cass, 2004), pp. 332-359. 
• Olivi, Bino, Carter e L'Italia. La politica estera americana, l'Europa e i comunisti 
italiani (Milano: Longanesi, 1978). 
• Orlow, Dietrich, Common Destiny, A Comparative History of the Dutch, French, and 
German Social Democratic Parties, 1945-1969 (New York, Oxford: Berghahn Books, 
2000). 
• Osgood, Robert E., 'The PC I, Italy and NATO', in Serfaty, Simon and Gray, Lawrence 
(eds), The Italian Communist Party. Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow (London: 
Aldwych Press, 1980), pp. 143-155. 
• Ostellino, Piero, 'La politic a estera del PCI', in Mieli, Renato (ed.), Il PCI allo specchio 
(Milano: Rizzoli Editore, 1983), pp. 461-498. 
• Padgett, Stephen and Paterson, William E., 'The Rise and Fall of the West German Left', 
NeH' Left Review, No. 186 (1991), pp. 46-77. 
• Padgett, Stephen and Paterson, William E., A History of Social Democracy in Postwar 
Europe (London: Longman, 1991). 
• Padgett, Stephen and Tony Burkett, Political Parties and Elections i.n ,West Germany. 
The Search for a New Stability (London, New York: Hurst, St. Martm s Press. 1986). 
• Paes, Thomas. Die Carter-Administration und die Regierllng Schmidt, Konstll'. /lIul 
. .... . 81 (B I' . S h" ble Verlag Rhemfc1dcn. Dlssens iiher die SmljctlllllOn-Poliflk 1977-19 er m. c au 
1991 ). 
• Painter, David S., The Cold War. An international history (London and New York' 
Routledge, 1999). . 
• Paterson, William E. and Thomas, Alastair H., Social Democratic Parties in H'estern 
Europe (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997). 
• Paterson, William E., The SPD and European Integration (Famborough, Hants: Saxon 
House, 1974). 
• Patton, David F., Cold War Politics in Post War Germany (New York: St. Martin's Press. 
1999). 
• Peters, Susanne, The Germans and the INF Missiles (Baden-Baden: Nomos 
Verlagsgesellschaft, 1990). 
• Pons, Silvio, 'Enrico Berlinguer e la riforma del comunismo. n PCI, I'Europa e l'Unione 
Sovietica nella tarda guerra fredda', ltalianieuropei, 06/07 (2004), pp. 227-250. 
• Pons, Silvio, 'The Italian Communist Party between East and West, 1960-64', in Loth, 
Wilfried (ed.), Europe, Cold War and Coexistence, 1953-1965 (London: Frank Cass, 
2004), pp. 98-107. 
• Pons, Silvio, Berlinguer e lafine del comunismo (Torino: Giulio Einaudi, 2006). 
• Pons, Silvio, L'impossibile egemonia. L'URSS, il PCI e le origini della Guerrafredda 
(1943-1948) (Roma: Carocci, 1999). 
• Pott, Andreas and StrUbel, Michael, 'Eurokommunismus aus der Sicht der NATO', in 
Lutz, Dieter S. (ed.), Eurokommunismus und NATO (Bonn: Osang, 1979), pp. 129-144. 
• Potthoff, Heinrich, Miller, Susanne, Kleine Geschichte der SPD 1848-2002 (Bonn: 
I.H.W. Dietz, 2002). 
• Pulzer, Peter, German Politics 1945-1995 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995). 
• Piitz, Karl Heinz, 'Atlantische Beziehungen und Eurokommunismus: Die KPI in der 
AuBenpolitik der USA', Zeitschrift der Deutschen Vereinigung fur Politische 
Wissenschaft, Vol. 21, No.1 (1980), pp. 20-42. 
• Ragionieri, Ernesto, Palmiro Togliatti (Roma: Editori Riuniti, 1976). 
• Ramuschkat, Dietmar, Die SPD und der europaische Einigungsproz.ess, Kontinuitat lind 
Wandel in der sozialdemokratischen Europapolitik 1949-1955 (Niebiill: Videel OHG, 
2003). 
• Ranney, Austin and Sartori. Giovanni (eds), Eurocommllnism: The Italian Cusc 
(Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research. 1978). 
• Renger, Annemarie, Verantwortung fur das Ganze. Die ersten Jahre des demokratischen 
Neubeginns in Deutschland (Hannover: Niedersachsische Landeszentrale fUr politische 
Bildung, 1990). 
• Righi, Maria L. (ed.), Quel terribile 1956. 1 verbali della direzione comllnista tra if XX 
Congresso del PCUS e I 'VIII Congresso del PCI (Roma: Editori Riuniti, 1996). 
• Rimanelli, Marco, Italy between Europe and the Mediterranean. Diplomacy and Sand 
Strategy from Unification to NATO, 1800s-2000 (New York: Peter Lang. 1997). 
• Ronzitti, Natalino, 'Italian Political Parties and European Integration', Lo Spettatore 
Internazionale, Vol. 10, No.1 (1975), pp. 5-26. 
• Rother, Bernd, 'Between East and West - social democracy as an alternative to 
communism and capitalism. Willy Brandt's strategy as president of the Socialist 
International', in Nuti, Leopoldo (ed.), The Crisis of Detente in Europe. From Helsinki to 
Gorbachev, 1975-1985 (London and New York: Routledge, 2009), pp. 217-229. 
• Rupps, Martin, Troika wider Willen (Berlin: Propylaen Verlag, 2004). 
• Sapelli, Giulio, 'The Italian Left after 1989: Continuity and transformation', in Sassoon, 
Donald (ed.), Looking Left: European socialism after the Cold War (New York: The New 
Press, 1997), pp. 44-63. 
• Sarotte, M.E. Dealing with the Devil. East Germany, Detente, and Ostpolitik, 1969-1973 
(Chapel Hill&London: The University of North Carolina Press, 2001). 
• Sassoon, Donald, 'The Italian Communist Party's European Strategy', The Political 
Quarterly, Vol. 47, No.3 (1976), pp. 253-275. 
• Sassoon, Donald, The Italian Communists speak for themselves (Nottingham: 
Spokesman, 1978). 
• Sassoon, Donald, The Strategy of the Italian Communist Party (London: Frances Pinter. 
1981). 
• Sassoon, Donald, 'La sinistra in Italia e in Europa. Elezioni e governi 1945-1988'. Italia 
Contemporanea, No. 175 (1989), pp. 5-19. 
• Sassoon, Donald (ed.), Looking Left: European socialism after the Cold War (New York: 
The New Press, 1997). 
• Sassoon, Donald, Contemporary Italy. Second Edition (London, New York: Longman. 
1997). 
• Sassoon, Donald, One Hundred Years of Socialism. The \\'est Ellropean Le./f in the 
Twentieth CentlirY (London: Fontana Press, 1997). 
31 1 
• Sassoon, Donald, 'Togliatti, Italian Communism and the Popular Front", in Graham. 
Helen and Preston, Paul (eds), The Popular Front in Europe (Basingstoke, London: 
Macmillan Press, 1987). 
i 
• Sassoon, Donald, 'La sinistra, l'Europa, il PCI', in Gualtieri, Roberto (ed.). II PCI 
nell'Italia repubblicana 1943-1991 (Roma: Carocci, 2001), pp. 223-252. 
• Schleker, Manfred, Die Suche nach Wegen zum Frieden. Yom Doppelbeschluss der 
NATO zur "Doppel-Null" -Losung (Sankt Augustin: Comdok Verlagsabteilung, 1989). 
• Schmidt, Wolfgang, Kalter Krieg, Koexistenz und kleine Schritte: WillY Brandt und die 
Deutschlandpolitik 1948-1963 (Wiesbaden: Westdeutscher Verlag, 200 1). 
• Schmitz, Kurt Thomas, Deutsche Einheit und Europaische Integration: Der 
sozialdemokratische Beitrag zur Auj3enpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland linter 
besonderer Beriicksichtigung des programmatischen Wandels einer Oppositionspartei 
(Bonn: Verlag Neue Gesellschaft, 1978). 
• Schneider, Andrea H., Die Kunst des Kompromisses: Helmut Schmidt und die Groj3e 
Koalition 1966-1969 (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schoningh, 1999). 
• Schneider, Michael, Kleine Geschichte der Gewerkschaften (Bonn: Bundeszentrale fUr 
politische Bildung, 2000). 
• Schoch, Bruno, 'Eurocommunism and Defence: Do Western European Communists Feel 
Threatened by the Soviet Union? The Case of Italy', Bulletin of Peace Proposals, Vol. 
15, No.1 (1984), pp. 25-36. 
• Schonhoven, Klaus, Wendejahre. Die Sozialdemokratie in der Zeit der Groj3en Koalition 
1966-1969 (Bonn: I.H.W. Dietz Nachf., 2004). 
• Schroder, Karsten, Egon Bahr (Rastatt: Verlag Arthur Moewig, 1988). 
• Schwabe, Klaus, 'German Policy Responses to the Marshall Plan', in Maier, Charles S. 
(ed.), The Marshall Plan and Germany. West German Development within the 
Framework of the European Recovery Program (New York, Oxford: Berg, 1991). pp. 
225-281. 
• Seebacher, Brigitte, Willy Brandt (MUnchen, ZUrich: Piper, 2004). 
• Spriano, Paulo, Storia del Partito comunista italiano, V. La Resistenz-a, Togliatti e il 
partito nuovo (Torino: Giulio Einaudi Editore, 1975). 
• Steiner, Wolfgang, SPD-Parteitage 1964 und 1966, Analyse und Vergleich (Meisenheim 
am Glan: Verlag Anton Hain, 1970). 
• StrUbeL Michael, Neue Wege der italienischen Kommunistell. Zur Al~(.)en- lind 
Sicherheitspolitik der KPI (1973-1981) (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgescllschaft. 
1982). 
• . . . f m t E r Jpe .\ Comparati\,(' Still,," TannahIll. R. Neal, The Commu11lst Parties (~ es ern II ( ., 
(Westport, London: Greenwood Press, 1978). 
• Tarrow, Sidney, 'Historic compromise or bourgeois majority? Eurocommunism in Italv. 
1976-9', in Howard Machin (ed.), National Communism in Western Europe: a third H'~y 
to socialism? (London, New York: Methuen, 1983), pp. 124-153. . 
• Thompson, Wayne C., The Political Odyssey of Herbert Wehner (Boulder. Colorado: 
Westview Press, 1993). 
• Timmermann, Heinz, 'Der "neue Intemationalismus" der KPI. Zum auBenpolitischen 
Programm der italienischen Kommunisten nach ihrem XV. Parteitag (1979),. Ostellropa. 
No. 10 (1979), pp. 785-797. 
• Timmermann, Heinz, Eurokommunismus: Fakten, Analysen, IntenJiel-vs (Frankfurt am 
Main: Fischer Verlag, 1978). 
• Timmermann, Heinz, I comunisti italiani (Bari: De Donato, 1974). 
• Timmermann, Heinz, The Decline of the World Communist Movement. Moscow, Beijing, 
and Communist Parties in the West (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1987). 
• Timmermann, Heinz, Wohin marschiert die Linke in Europa? (Freiburg, WUrzburg: 
Ploetz, 1979). 
• Tokes, Rudolf (ed.), Eurocommunism and Detente (Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1979). 
• Valentini Chiara, Berlinguer (Roma: Editori Riuniti, 1997). 
• Vannicelli, Primo, Italy, NATO, and the European Community. The interplay of Foreign 
Policy and Domestic Politics, No. 31 (Cambridge, Mass.; Center for International 
Affairs, Harvard University, 1974). 
• Varsori, Antonio, 'La questione europe a nella politica italiana (1969-1979)'. Studi 
Storici, 4 (2002), pp. 971-995. 
• Varsori, Antonio, L'ltalia neUe relazioni internazionali dal1943 al1992 (Roma, Sari: 
Editori Laterza, 1998). 
• Vittorio Di, Giuseppe, 'SuI trattato istitutivo della CECA', in Maggiorani. Mauro an~ 
Ferrari, Paolo (eds), L'Europa da Togliatti a Berlinguer. Testimonian~e e DOClll1lentl 
1945-1984 (Bologna: n Mulino, 2005), pp. 226-232. 
• Vogtmeier, Andreas, Egon Bahr und die deutsche Frage (Bonn: 1.H.W. Dietz. 1996). I 
, 
Walker. Ignacio. 'Democratic Socialism in Comparative Perspective". Comparatil'e 
I 
• 
Politics. Vol. 23. No.4 (1991). pp. 439-458. 
• Walker. Richard, Dal Confronto al COl1senso. 1 partiti politici italialli l' l'illtl'gra:iolll' 
l'uropea (Bologna: II Mulino. 1976). 
3U 
• Wall, Irwin, M., 'The United States and two Ostpolitiks: de Gaulle and Brandt'. in Loth. 
Wilfried and Soutou, Georges-Henri (eds), The Making of Detente: Eastern and \\Testern 
Europe in the Cold War, 1965-75 (Oxon, New York: Routledge, 2008), pp. 133-150. 
• Walter, Franz, Die SPD. Yom Proletariat zur Neuen Mitte (Berlin: Alexander Fest 
Verlag, 2002). 
• Weinberg, Leonard, The Transformation of Italian Communism (New Brunswick: 
Transaction Publishers, 1995). 
• Westad, Odd Arne, 'Beginnings of the end. How the Cold War crumbled', in Pons. Sil\'io 
and Romero, Federico (eds), Reinterpreting the End of the Cold War (London. New 
York: Frank Cass, 2005). 
• Wilkens, Andreas 'New Ostpolitik and European integration', in Ludlow. N. Piers (ed.). 
European Integration and the Cold War. Ostpolitik-Westpolitik, 1965-1973 (London, 
New York: Routledge, 2007). 
• Winkler, Heinrich August, Der lange Weg nach Westen II (MUnchen: C.H.Beck. 2001). 
• Woolf, SJ. (ed.), The Rebirth of Italy 1943-1950 (London: Longman, 1972). 
• Young, John, W., Cold War Europe 1945-89. A Political History (London: Edward 
Arnold, 1991). 
Appendix 1 
Membership figures for the SPD and the PCI, 1956-1979 
SPD PCI 
1956 2,035,353 
1957 626,189 1,825,342 
1958 1,818,606 
1959 634,254 1,789,269 
1960 1,792,974 
1961 644,780 1,728,620 
1962 1,630,550 
1963 648,415 1,630,000 
1964 678,484 1,615,296 
1965 710,448 
1966 727,890 1,575,935 
1967 733,004 1,534,705 
1968 732,446 1,502,862 
1969 778,945 1,503,816 
1970 820,202 1,507,047 
1971 847,456 1,521,642 
1972 954,394 1,584,659 
1973 1,623,082 
1974 957,253 1,657,825 
1975 1,730,453 
1976 1,022,191 1,814,263 
1977 1,006,316 1,814,154 
1978 997,444 1,790,450 
1979 1,761,297 
.. Sources: Bracke, Which socialism, Whose detente?, p. 375; JahrbucherderSPO 1957-1979 
Note: For some years, no figures are given 
Appendix 2 
Electoral results for the SPD and the PCI, 1948-1987 
SPD PCI 
1946 
1948 
1949 29.2 
1953 28.8 
1957 31.8 
1958 22.7 
1961 36.2 
1963 25.3 
1965 39.3 
1968 26.9 
1969 42.7 
1972 45.8 27.8 
1976 42.6 34.4 
1979 30.4 
1980 42.9 
1983 38.2 
Sources: Potthoff, Miller, Kleine Geschlchte der SPD, p. 449; Glnsborg, A HIstory of Contemporary 
Italy, p. 442. 
Appendix 3 
Votes cast in elections to the Chamber of Deputies, 1948-87 
1948 1953 1958 1963 1968 
PSI UP, POUP, - -
- 4.4 -Opa 
PCI - 22.6 22.7 25.3 26.9 
Popular Front 31.0 -
-
-
-
PSI - 12.7 14.2 13.8 -
PSU - -
- 14.5 -
PSOI 7.1 4.5 4.6 6.1 -
Republican 2.5 1.6 1.4 1.4 2.0 
Party 
OC 48.5 40.1 42.4 38.3 39.1 
Liberal Party 3.8 3.0 3.5 7.0 5.8 
Monarchist 2.8 6.9 4.9 1.7 1.3 
Party 
MSI, MSI-OND 2.0 5.8 4.8 5.1 4.4 
Others with 1.1 0.5 1.1 0.5 0.5 
seats 
Others without 1.3 2.3 0.5 0.8 1.0 
seats 
1972 1976 1979 1983 1987 
PSI UP, POUP, 1.9 1.5 1.4 1.5 1.7 
Dps 
Greens - - - - 2.5 
Radical Party - 1.1 3.4 2.2 2.6 
PCI 27.1 34.4 30.4 29.9 26.6 
PSI 9.6 9.6 9.8 11.4 14.3 
PSDI 5.1 3.4 3.8 4.1 3.0 
Republican 2.9 3.1 3.0 5.1 3.7 
Party 
DC 38.7 38.7 38.3 32.9 34.3 
Liberal Party 3.9 1.3 1.9 2.9 2.1 
MSI and PMN 8.7 6.1 - - -
MSI, MSI-OND - - 5.3 6.8 5.9 
Others with 0.6 0.6 0.8 1.2 1.6 
seats 
Others without 1.5 0.2 1.8 2.1 1.9 
seats 
a PSIUP in 1968 and in 1972' POUP in 1979; OP In 1976, 1983 and 1987. 
b ' MSI-ON in 1979 
Source: Paul Ginsborg, A History of Contemporary Italy, p. 442. 
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Appendix 4 
Votes cast in elections to the German parliament, 1949-1987 
1949 1953 1957 1961 1965 1969 1972 1976 1980 1983 1987 
COUI 31.0 45.2 50.2 45.3 47.6 46.1 45.8 48.6 44.5 48.8 44.3 
CSU 
SPO 29.2 28.8 31.8 36.2 39.3 42.7 44.9 42.6 42.9 38.2 37.0 
FOP 11.9 9.5 7.7 12.8 9.5 5.8 8.4 7.9 10.6 7.0 9.1 
Grune 1.5 5.6 8.3 
Source: Potthoff, Miller, KleIne Geschlchte der SPD, p. 312. 
Appendix 5 
SPD and PCI Party Leaders since 1945 
SPD Party Leaders 
Kurt Schumacher May 1946 - August 1952 
Erich Ollenhauer September 1952 - December 1963 
Willy Brandt February 1964 - March 1987 
PCI Party Leaders 
Palmira Togliatti 1944 a - August 1964 
Luigi Longo January 1966 - March 1972 
Enrico Berlinguer March 1972 - 1984 
. . 
a1944 is chosen as It IS the year when Togllattl returned from Moscow . 
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AA 
APC 
AdSD 
CC 
CDU 
CGIL 
CLN 
COMECON 
COMINFORM 
CPSU 
CSCE 
CSU 
DC 
DGB 
ECSC 
EDC 
EEC 
EESC 
EFfA 
EP 
ERP 
FDP 
FES 
FGCI 
FRG 
GDR 
GDP 
Appendix 6 
List of Abbreviations 
Auswartiges Amt (Federal Foreign Office) 
Archivio Partito Comunista (Italiano) 
Archiv der Sozialen Demokratie bei der Friedrich-Ebert-
Stiftung 
Central Committee 
Christlich-Demokratische Union (Christian Democratic 
Union) 
Confederazione Generale Italiana del Lavoro 
(the communist-socialist Italian trade union) 
Committee of National Liberation 
Council for Mutual Economic Assistance 
The Soviet-installed Information Bureau 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union 
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe 
Christliche-Soziale Union (Christian Social Union) 
Democrazia Cristiana (Christian Democratic Party) 
Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund 
(German trade union federation) 
European Coal and Steel Community 
European Defence Community 
European Economic Community 
European Economic and Social Committee 
European Free Trade Association 
European Parliament 
European Recovery Programme 
Freie Demokratische Partei (Free Democratic Party) 
Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (Foundation) 
Federazione giovanile comunista italiano (Italian 
Communist Youth Federation) 
Federal Republic of Germany 
German Democratic Republic 
Gross Domestic Product 
J20 
ICBM 
IMF 
INF 
IISS 
KPD 
LRTNF 
MBFR 
MLF 
NATO 
NSDAP 
OECD 
PCI 
PCF 
PCP 
PDS 
PLI 
PRI 
PS 
PSDI 
PSI 
PSIUP 
PV 
SALT 
SED 
SI 
SPD 
WBA 
WCM 
WEU 
Intercontinental Ballistic Missile 
International Monetary Fund 
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces 
International Institute for Strategic Studies 
Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands 
(Communist Party of Germany) 
Long-Range Theatre Nuclear Forces 
Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction 
Multilateral Force 
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 
N ationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei 
(National Socialist German Workers Party) 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development 
Partito Comunista Italiano (Italian Communist Party) 
Parti Communiste Franc;ais (French Communist Party) 
Communist Party of Portugal 
Partito Democratico della Sinistra 
(Democratic Party of the Left) 
Partito Liberale Italiano (Italian Liberal Party) 
Partito Repubblicano Italiano 
(Italian Republican Party) 
Parti Socialiste (Franc;ais) (French Socialist Party) 
Partito Social-Democratico Italiano 
(Italian social-democratic Party) 
Partito Socialista Italiano (Italian Socialist Party) 
Partito Socialista di Unita Proletario 
(Italian Socialist Party of Proletarian Unity) 
Parteivorstand der SPD (SPD Party Executive) 
Strategic Arms Limitations Talks . . 
Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands (Sociahst 
Unity Party of Germany) 
Socialist International 
Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands 
(German Social Democratic Party) 
Willy Brandt Archiv 
World Communist Mo\,ement 
Western European Union 
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